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Abstract 
The final quarter of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a variety of 
security threats, perhaps the most pernicious and least understood of which has been the 
rise of religiously motivated violence and terrorism. While a great deal has been written on 
this phenomenon, much has been in the form of individual case studies and those more 
inclusive examinations which have been offered deal more with the causes of religious 
violence and not the underlying processes of justification and operational activity. In cases 
where such an approach has been attempted these have been conducted in a cursory 
fashion, presenting generalisations which are not necessarily valid across the entire 
spectrum of religious violence. The purpose of this thesis is to offer a holistic examination 
of violence within the three revealed religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) in order to 
establish common features in the conduct of violence across the faiths and to provide a 
framework whereby the ideological and operational processes and mechanisms can be 
understood collectively rather than individually. In the process, a number of commonly 
accepted generalisations regarding religiously motivated violence will be modified or 
challenged. The method chosen consists of the identification of a number of key 
components common to all revealed violent groups, ranging from the formation of an 
ideology which justifies violence to the tactics that are employed, and these key 
components are then used to examine the behaviour of three distinct group types. The 
three group types are represented by ten case studies, chosen to reflect the variety of group 
types that have existed and continue to exist. The objective is to present a broad 
framework which will enable a greater understanding of how religiously motivated 
violence is justified both to internal and external audiences, the manner in which this 
violence is expressed operationally, and the degree to which the course and trajectory of 
group violence may be anticipated. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
One of the most worrying and in many respects unexpected international security 
threats to arise in the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the emergence and 
spread of violence motivated by a religious imperative. Although initially confined to 
Islam, this phenomenon has quickly expanded to include all the world's major religions 
and to manifest itself across the globe. The 1979 Iranian Revolution marked the beginning 
of a wave of Shi'ite and Sunni violence both in the Middle East and beyond that continues 
to the present. This wave has taken many different forms, from the hostage taking and 
suicide bombings of Lebanese Shi'ite militants in the 1980s, the sporadic activities of 
Egyptian Islamic militants in the 1980s and 1990s, the activities of Palestinian Islamic 
groups in Israel, to the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. 
Jewish militants have also been propelled into violent action, in part as a reaction to 
Palestinian violence but also in reaction to secular Israeli willingness to trade 'land for 
peace'. This perceived betrayal has led to activities such as the murder of Palestinians, 
attempts to destroy the Muslim Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and even the assassination 
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Even in less politically volatile societies with a longer 
secular tradition such as the United States, religiously motivated violence has reared its 
head. An amorphous racial and religious ideology and constellation of 'leaderless 
resistance' has resulted in attacks on Jews and non-whites and the vilification of the US 
Federal government leading to events such as the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. In 
many respects this phenomenon was not an historical novelty. Violence motivated by 
religion has been a constant feature of human relations throughout recorded history, but its 
contemporary manifestation has appeared to contradict the dominance of secular 
ideological forms as a motivating force for violence and in significant geographical regions 
has supplanted them almost entirely. 
I 
While the underlying causes, features and motivations of all religiously motivated 
violence are essentially the same, the various organisations involved, their objectives and 
their perception of the social, geographical and political contexts within which they 
operate have shown a high degree of variation. What is required is a means of identifying 
and understanding these underlying dimensions within the light of these different group 
forms and differing perceptions. The purpose of this work is to examine the phenomenon 
of religious violence and terrorism within the contemporary context in a holistic, rather 
than a piecemeal, fashion, through the construction of a framework of analysis with which 
organisations may be classified, their beliefs and activities categorised and understood 
which as a result may offer to make their future behaviour more predictable. 
The process whereby a religious group or community becomes violent is a gradual 
one. In the contemporary period the move to violence, if it is made at all, has been 
preceded by a general religious revival in reaction to the perceived gradual failure of 
existing ideologies and political systems. But why does religious revival necessarily lead to 
violence in some cases and not in others, and how can this phenomenon be usefully 
explained across the faiths? Throughout history Judaism, Christianity and Islam have all 
periodically re-asserted themselves as important alternative social and political ideologies 
and as motivating forces for violent struggle. These revivals, although their root causes are 
distinguishable, frequently appear to be random occurrences because they often take 
secular societies by surprise. However, certain historical trends can be observed with 
regards both to religious resurgence, the turn to violence and the broad spectrum of 
intensity and extremity this violence might take. Generally speaking violence plays a part 
when the religious revival is perceived as a threat to the existing political status quo, or a 
religious community sees itself as being acutely threatened by the existing political status 
quo. In either event the resort to violence is seen as defensive in nature which provides a 
major source of legitimacy for their actions. 
Following this it makes sense to ask why there has been a revival of religious 
violence across all faiths at this particular juncture in history. While detailed evidence for 
previous revivals may be at times scanty due to the absence of records and documents - 
particularly the further one travels back in time - this is obviously not the case for recent 
history and the contemporary period. A pattern of political, economic, social and military 
2 
factors influence to one degree or another outbreaks of religious violence. The 
combination of factors may vary considerably between faiths (and in some cases even 
within them), and depend on historical circumstance. In cases where conditions, such as 
economic circumstances and political and social freedoms (particularly freedom of 
religious expression) are least extreme, or insufficient factors are involved, there may be 
no turn to violence at all. By the same token in cases where conditions are most extreme 
and repression effective, the violence may adopt an other-worldly, messianic or 
apocalyptic dimension. It is certain that all religions contain an important violence- 
reducing aspect, but they also have an equally important violence producing dimension, 
which is often brought to the fore in times of crisis. ' 
If societies have weathered the storm of outbreaks of religious violence in the past 
then why is the threat so much more severe in the contemporary period? This is mainly 
because the tools of modernity (as opposed to the ideological term of `modernist' with its 
secularist implications) have expanded enormously both in the capacity to disseminate 
ideology, combined with the cataclysmic destructive power of weapons. Technology is, 
however, not the sole determinant of destructive capability. A great deal of destruction and 
slaughter has been achieved in the past despite comparatively low levels of technology by 
groups, most notably the Sicarii and related groups that operated in the two Jewish revolts 
in what was then Judea, the medieval Ismaili sect the Assassins and the Hindu Thugs. 2 In 
the contemporary period, the potential for destruction (if not the durability of groups) is far 
greater, not only because the tools of violence have developed dramatically but also 
because religious justification for violence provides a sacred sanction removed from 
existing temporal legal norms and a broad category of almost limitless targets. 3 
While religious violence with a messianic or apocalyptic programme shares much 
with more mainstream religious violence, it is different in one major regard. Messianic and 
1 D. C. Rapoport, `Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Vol. IV, # 1,1992, p. 1] 8. 
2 For an interesting analysis of the destructiveness and durability of `pre-modern' violent religious groups see 
D. C. Rapoport, `Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', American Political Science 
Review, Vol. LXXVIII, # 3,1984. 
3 This so called 'open-ended' category includes not only members of other religions but co-religionists who 
have become apostates. Indeed, the latter category is frequently perceived as the greatest threat and which 
must be treated in a more ruthless fashion. See D. C. Rapoport, op. cit., pp. 660-664, and B. Hoffman, "`Holy 
Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Justified by a Religious Imperative', Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. XVIII, # 4, pp. 271-273. 
3 
apocalyptic based violence does not envisage political or temporal goals. The major goal is 
active participation in altering the temporal world to a spiritual one - an event predicted by 
certain scriptural and prophetic traditions - specifically through the methods of violence. 
At the same time messianic and apocalyptic beliefs form an integral part of all the three 
revealed religions - it is simply a matter of emphasis and a certain belief in active 
participation. The messianic can also accompany the religious-political. The attack on the 
Grand Mosque in 1979, for instance, involved not only demands for the reversal of Saudi 
modernisation in favour of a fundamentalist Muslim state, but also the declaration of one 
Mohammed ibn-Abdullah Qahtani as the long awaited Mahdi or Islamic Messiah. 4 Even 
when the proposed actions of a group are purely messianic in nature - such as the plot by 
the Gush Emunim Underground to blow up the Dome of the Rock - the repercussions will 
be of the severest political and military kind. As one observer put it "I do not know 
whether the Messiah will come if the Third Temple is built, but I do know that if the 
Muslim holy sites are blown up catastrophic results could ensue which may indeed put us 
one step closer to Armageddon. "5 In this respect it can be said that there are two principal 
and integrated religious sources used to justify religious violence: what might be called the 
`founding myth' and millenarian or messianic expectations. The former reflects a belief 
that a return to a community's origins will renew its vitality, while the latter refers to 
divine promises regarding the future of a religious community. 6 
What lies between these two principal sources is a process whereby violence is 
justified, rationalised and carried out. All manifestations of religious violence are the by- 
product of specific political, social, economic and historical circumstances but at the same 
time they all share certain common characteristics. An understanding of these common 
features and how they are displayed by different groups promises to provide a more 
inclusive and predictive framework for understanding the dynamics of religiously 
motivated violence across the three revealed religions. 
4 E. F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979,1980, p. 888. The timing and 
location of the declaration were also extremely significant. Shi'ite prophecy claims that the Mahdi will appear 
at the beginning of the Muslim century (although which one is obscure) - 20 November was the first day of the 
Islamic year 1400 - 'and his manifestation will be accompanied by fighting in the streets of Mecca'. S D. C. Rapoport, `Messianic Sanctions for Terror', Comparative Politics, Vol. 20, # 2,1988, p. 195. 6 D. C. Rapoport, `Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements', in Fundamentalisms and the State: 
Remaking Polities, Economics, andMilitance, (M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby, eds. ), 1993, p. 447. The term 
`founding myth' itself is one borrowed from political theory. 
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1.1 Chapter Structure 
This introductory chapter establishes the need to study the phenomenon of 
religiously motivated violence within the broader contexts of religious revival and violence 
inspired by religion generally. This will be followed by a definitional section that will 
delineate important terms, the meanings of which are frequently assumed - and 
subsequently misused - in much of the literature on the subject. This will 
lead to an 
examination of the theoretical apparatus and methodology employed to examine religious 
violence and an explanation of where this work fits in. Chapter Two will establish the 
methodological framework that will be used. The methodology lies in two parts, the first 
of which is the identification of common features to all violent religious groups forming 
the core of the framework for analysis, thereby deconstructing the components of violence 
across the faiths. These will include the formation of group ideology and the justification 
for violence, the importance of leadership as both a sanctioning force and a command and 
control mechanism, the importance of the timing and location of acts of violence, the 
choice of targets, and the tactical programmes that violent religious groups embark upon. 
Each of these six sections will examine internal typologies and will form the basis for the 
ensuing chapters. The second part of the methodology is an examination of group type. 
Three specific group types will be identified and represented by ten case studies and they 
will then be analysed through the lens of the six common features. The group profiles 
chosen are not intended to be exhaustive in scope, merely illustrative of the broader 
phenomenon. 
Once these common features have been identified Chapter Three will offer a 
detailed examination of the formation of an ideological justification for violence. Basic 
sacred sources such as religious texts and traditions are essential in this respect, but also in 
their connectivity linking present and historic past. Of central importance is the process of 
interpretation of these texts and events, in the light of contemporary political, military, 
social, economic and environmental events which may play the role of fulfilling prophetic 
traditions. Chapter Four will examine the function of group leadership. The relative 
influence of each leadership type identified in Chapter Two on the formation of ideology is 
5 
i' 
f' 
critical for the direction of the group, but equally so is the relationship between leadership 
type and the choice of targets and tactics. 
Chapters Five and Six will look at the centrality of the timing and location of 
violent acts and Chapter Seven the targets against whom they are perpetrated. All three of 
these issues are heavily influence by scripture, historical anniversaries, religious festivals 
and religious tradition. Once again there is an important interpretative element involved in 
relating religious history and tradition to contemporary circumstances. Chapter Eight will 
consider the actual tactics chosen and employed to serve a programme of religious 
violence. In particular the desirability of mass violence, how scriptural interpretation and 
basic texts can justify such violence, and the practicalities of employing various means 
will be explored. An important element will be the desirability for the religiously violent of 
employing unconventional weapons - especially those groups with a messianic or 
apocalyptic programme. 
1.2 Scope and Justification for Scope 
While this work will centre around what can be called the three revealed religions 
religious violence is not confined solely to them. Sikhism, Hinduism? and Theravada 
Buddhism8 have all fostered outbreaks of religious violence in both the past and during the 
contemporary period. The 1984 Indian army attack on the Golden Mosque in the Punjab in 
order to quash Sikh extremism, the massacre of Sikhs by Hindus in Delhi following the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi, and the Sinhalese Buddhist-Tamil ethnic violence which 
swept Sri Lanka in July 1983 are three of the more salient examples from recent history. 
What the three revealed religions represent however is a set of common traditions and 
histories and a confluence of their eschatological traditions. 
In common with the revealed religions Theravada Buddhism and Sikhism both 
contain a strong millenarian element. In Sri Lanka the idea that the millenarian promise 
(leading to the expulsion of the Tamil community) would be fulfilled in the twenty-five 
7 For discussions of Sikh and Hindu violence see D. Gold, `Organised Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu 
Nation' and T. N. Madan, `The Double-Edged Sword: Fundamentalism and the Sikh Religious Tradition', in 
Fundamentalisms Observed, (M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby, eds. ), 1991. 
5 Theravada Buddhism is one of the three sub-traditions of Buddhism which developed in India after the death 
of Buddha in 544 B. C. E. through to the first century C. E. The other two are known as Mahayana and 
Vajrayana. 
6 
hundredth year of the Buddhist era (1956) was established by the fifteenth century. 
9 
Tibetan Buddhist theology also contains the concept of the semi-mythical kingdom of 
Shambhala, the final king of which will emerge from his kingdom at the head of a great 
army, subdue the forces of evil which have brought about a decline in religious values and 
institute a golden age. 1° Millenarianism is also important for Sikh fundamentalists. As one 
observer has commented, "of all the indigenous Religious communities in India, Sikhism 
possesses the most advanced paradigm of millennial thought and practice... Sikhs have 
opted to deal with social crises.. . 
by invoking the millenarian paradigm. "' 1 However, these 
ideas, whilst conducive to violence and supported by prophetic visions lack the entrenched 
and clearly defined messianic and apocalyptic traditions possessed by the three revealed 
religions. 
Moreover, the revealed religions have had an enormous influence on each other 
throughout the centuries. Christianity may be seen as an heretical off-shoot of Judaism, 
and Islam was influenced by both Christianity and Judaism. All three religions trace their 
lineage from Abraham, the first prophet to receive a divine revelation from God. While 
Jews and Christians trace their descent from Abraham and Sarah through Isaac, Muslims 
do so through Ishmael, the first son of Abraham and his concubine Hagar. '` All three share 
a common belief in God, prophets and revelation. 13 Similar characters also appear across 
the religions. In both Shi'ite and Sunni theology the return of Jesus as a messianic prophet 
precedes the return of the Mahdi or Twelfth Imam. 14 Nor has there been any need to 
reinterpret the figure of Jesus as a central figure in Western Christian Society in recent 
Islamic theology. In a speech made by the Ayatollah Khomeini which describes the need to 
kill the infidel as a basic command of Allah, the Imam opines "Had Jesus - blessed be his 
soul - been allowed to live a little longer, he too would have acted as Moses did and used 
9 K. Malaboda, `Millenialism in Relation to Buddhism', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. XII, 
4 4,1970, p. 438. 
10 This belief system is found in the Kalacakra cycle of tantras. One early Kalacakra text identifies Islam as the 
force provoking the apocalypse. See E. Birnbaum, The Way to Shambhala, 1980. 
11 H. Oberoi, `Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History Into Theory', in Fundamentalisms and the Stale, p. 
267. 
12 F. E. Peters, Children of Abraham, 1982. 
13 For a useful and accessible comparison of the three religions see F. E. Peters, Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam: The Classical Texts and Their Inteºprelution, 1990. 
14 A. A. Sachedina, IslamicMessianism, pp. 171-172. 
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the sword. "15 Jesus is mentioned frequently throughout the Qur'an, although his role is ý' 
more that of `Jesus with a sword', familiar in the New Testament Book of Revelations 
rather than the `suffering servant' more common to orthodox Christianity. Nor is he the 
only figure common to both or all three religions - David, Elijah, Abraham and Moses are 
merely four of the more important examples. The figure of Elijah in both Judaism and 
Christianity is considered a forerunner of the messianic age. In the Old Testament book of 
Malachi, after a brief discussion of the fire and slaughter that will precede the arrival of 
the Messiah, "Elijah the Prophet" will be sent before the Messiah himself 16 Sometimes 
messianic outbursts within different religions have been heavily interactive, as exemplified 
by Islamic and Jewish messianism in nineteenth century Yemen. '' 
There are many holy places which Jews and Muslims share such as the city of 
Jerusalem and other parts of the `Holy Land' are sacred to all three religions. Groups 
representing all three religious communities have conquered and ruled from the city for 
explicitly religious reasons (and for varied periods of longevity) over the past three 
thousand years. Of particular note in Jerusalem is the Dome of the Rock or Temple Mount. 
The Dome of the Rock is Islam's third most sacred place, purported to be the site where 
the prophet Mohammed ascended into heaven by 'a ladder of light'. The Dome of the Rock 
is also the site of the First, Second and Third (future) Temples - Judaism's most sacred 
site. The rebuilding of the Third Temple is critical to the beginning of the Jewish 
Messianic age, and also the Christian messianic age. 
There are also many intersections of conflict between the religions. The fact that 
the Jews allowed Christ to be crucified (or as some would have it that the Jews crucified 
Christ) has had a significant influence on the persecution and demonisation of the Jewish 
people in Christian communities throughout history, particularly during and since the 
Middle Ages. Nor did the various Wars of the Crusades and their attendant slaughter 
enhance Islamic-Christian relations, leaving a lingering and rhetorically emphasised legacy 
to the present. 18 In the contemporary period, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the 
15 A Taheri, Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism, 1987, p. 113. 16 Malachi, 4: 5-6. 
17 B. E. Klorman, `Jewish and Muslim Messianism in Yemen', International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. XXII, 1990, p. 216. 
18 P. Partner, God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam, 1997, pp. 241-242,283-284,293-294, 
297-298. 
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displacement of Palestinians and the various Arab-Israeli wars have created new and acute 
friction between Judaism and Islam that had been latent or suppressed for many centuries 
due to the diasporas. Indeed, all three traditions provide a precedent for the notion of `Holy 
War'. The most prominent and frequently discussed is the Islamic concept of jihad. The 
idea of jihad is a complex one, open to interpretation and historically largely 
misunderstood in the Western world. Most educated Muslims see the Holy War as a moral 
idea concerned with an individual's internal struggle to be good - what is known as the 
`greater jihad': The `lesser jihad' refers to a Muslim's military obligation to defend the 
faith. Both ideas have existed for over a thousand years, although which one is stressed at 
any one point in time depends heavily on historical circumstances. 19 Western scholars such 
as Rudolph Peters20 and Bernard Lewis2' believe the moral interpretation of jihad arose 
after the decline of Muslim political power which followed European imperial 
expansion. 22 Not surprisingly the concept of the moral greater jihad has been derided by 
leaders of violent Islamic groups. This outlook relies on a narrow view of history which 
believes that Islam was always spread by the sword, and that the defensive nature of jihad 
is a fiction. Abdu Faraj, in his seminal book The Neglected Duty, states that without jihad 
Islam cannot prosper and that jihad has always meant taking up arms against infidels. 23 
This interpretation sees the jihad as an obligation to defend and propagate Islam as well as 
to fight the infidel - the moral, peaceful dimension is rejected as an invention. 
While both Judaism and Christianity historically contain concepts of Holy War, 
they have not been as pervasive as jihad, nor have they been re-articulated and revived in 
modern history. The Christian Crusade and the Jewish herem (a religious mandate to 
exterminate enemy populations and to utterly demolish their possessions)24 are in fact 
19 An interesting contemporary Christian example comes from William Fowler's Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian in Idaho: "We have two wars we are engaged in. One [is] against the antichrist that rules the world; 
the other is an internal war within ourselves for the purification of our body and mind". See'Seek the Inner 
Man', End Time Revelation Newsletter 2, (Oct. 1976), p. 1. See also in the same issue'Conspiracy to Destroy 
the Christian West', pp. 1-8. 
20 R. Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History, 1979. 21 B. Lewis, Islam and the West, 1993. 
22 TransState Islam, 'Jihad - Holy War or Moral Rearmament', Vol. I, # 2,1995, p. 21. It is interesting to 
note that the initial idea of holy war in Christianity was also moral (esoteric). The writings of Origen (c. 183- 
253 AD), Augustine (354-430 AD) and Jerome (c. 340-420 AD) viewed the struggle as taking place within 
the soul of each individual. 
23 ibid. 
24 D. C. Rapoport, `Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', p. 129. 
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conceptually different to the Islamic view of holy War. From the very beginning, the 
Crusade depended on the initiative of the papacy, which in turn helped to strengthen the 
Church's claim to universal leadership - there was never any real scriptural precedent. 
While the concept of Crusade can be traced to that of the Judaic herem`5, neither concept 
has been used to fulfil a proselytising function to the same extent as has jihad. The concept 
of Crusade had effectively exhausted itself by the late middle ages with the decline of 
Church power and the rise of the secular state, and the herem had already ended as a useful 
concept much earlier in the time of Saul. 26 Indeed, some sociologists argue that the herem 
was fabricated long after the Jews had become a subjugated people. As Weber notes "The 
utopian phantasies of their [Judaism's] champions were saturated the more with bloody 
images of Yahweh's heroic feats the more unmilitary they had become in fact. "27 Although 
there are differences in statistics for all religions, Christianity and Islam historically appear 
to be more warlike than the `Eastern' religions, while (perhaps) surprisingly Christianity 
seems the most warlike. 28 
There has also been much conflict within religions. While the first century Jewish 
revolts were primarily anti-Roman in nature, groups such as the Zealots and the Sicarii 
also targeted Jewish apostates and Roman sympathisers. 29 Since then the scope for inter- 
Judaic violence was lessened considerably by the scattered nature of the Jewish people 
whose sole unifying feature was their religion itself. In the contemporary period, however, 
it has reappeared with the establishment of the state of Israel, primarily over disagreements 
concerning the Israeli-Palestinian peace process - the most significant and dangerous act to 
date being the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995. In contrast, 
Christianity has seen much more internal violence. Apart from the Crusades against Islam, 
there was also much internal crusading to suppress heretical or unorthodox Christian 
groups in order to consolidate the power of the Church and of the emerging states. During 
25 D. C. Rapoport, `Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', p. 675 (fn. 33). The Islamic 
jihad can also be seen as a distant off-shoot of the herem, albeit an almost unrecognisable one. 
26 C. Roth, (ed. ), Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. VIII, 1971, p_ 345. 
27 M. Weber, Ancient Judaism, 1952, p. 111. 
2S D. Wilkinson, Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of Wars, 1980, pp. 87-91 & 
112. Such statistics, however, cover a broad range of history and are hardly complete. There is also no 
distinction made between state or sub-state conflict. 
29 M. Hengel, The Zealots: Investigations Into the Jewish Freedom Movement in the Period From Herod I 
Until70AD, 1988. 
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the latter Middle Ages, millenarian and messianic movements such as the Taborites, 
Hussites and Anabaptists were brutally suppressed, and later still there were the protracted 
and bloody `Wars of Religion'. 30 Islamic internal violence has frequently centred around 
the Sunni-Shi'ite divide, but also, like Christianity, around the suppression of messianic 
off-shoots such as the tenth and eleventh century Qaramitah, and the Khajarites, Wahhabis 
and nineteenth century Sudanese Mahdi who accused their co-religionists of apostasy and 
declared jihad against them. 
Accordingly it makes sense to examine the three revealed religions in isolation 
from others. This by no means implies that an incomplete picture of religious violence will 
be presented. On the contrary, the three faiths are tied by common historical experiences, 
historical characters and to a certain extent geography, and the eschatological elements are 
most firmly represented and expressed within Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These 
religions share much in the way of theology and historical interaction, and this work will in 
no way be handicapped by concentrating on them alone. 
1.3 Underlying Themes 
While this study is complicated by the number of religions and the various subtle 
differences between many of the groups involved, there are two underlying themes which 
will run consistently throughout. The first and most important of these will be the dynamic 
interaction between past and present religious belief systems and expressions of religious 
violence. The traditions and texts of the three revealed religions have remained fairly 
constant over time though there may be different degrees of emphasis and interpretation. A 
first century zealot in Judea, for example, would not have been much different in terms of 
religious ideology than a member of the Israeli Gush Emunim Underground. Religious 
tradition, however is constantly evolving and so events in the present which mirror events 
in the past are seen in the context of the past and also form part of an ongoing religious 
history. The root causes behind religious violence have also remained fairly constant. The 
effects of economic hardship, social injustice, tyrannical overlordship, domination by a 
foreign power and military defeat have been consistent features, not only of resurgences in 
30 For more on these groups see N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and 
Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages, 1970. 
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belief, but also in the religious sanctioning of violence to defend a religious community. 
Throughout history the three revealed religions have interacted and dialectically influenced 
each other. This is not only an important consideration when examining them in isolation 
from others, but also provides important insights into the various common features of 
violence. 
Although much would seem to be consistent through history, certain important 
things have altered with the passage of time, and herein lies the second theme - the actual 
influence of the contemporary context. History may contain instructive themes but it does 
not precisely repeat itself. As mentioned above, the resurgence of religious violence in the 
contemporary period is more dangerous for reasons of societal complexity and 
advancement in technologies. New technologies contribute not only to the destructiveness 
of violence but also to the ability to propagate a religious message, to raise funds and 
acquire new members and to influence target audiences - both internal and external. But 
there are other factors which relate closely to prophetic tradition and to previous root 
causes that are unique to the present. Political events and trends, such as the establishment 
of the state of Israel, advances in weapons technology, potentially disastrous alterations in 
the environment with global warming, and the approach of various dates which 
purportedly have eschatological significance of one sort or another, all combined provide a 
sense of urgency to prophecy. Others are more tangible such as demographic change, 
precise events (elections, violent acts and so on) and the day-to-day minutiae of specific 
environments which nurtures social rebellion. In a secular context what might otherwise 
appear to be random and unconnected historical events for the religious they form 
important, interconnected and pivotal moments in history. 
1.4 Definitions 
Before embarking on any detailed analysis it is vitally important to clearly define 
and understand the terms which will recur throughout. Fundamentalism, for example, is 
frequently misused, or used to describe an aspect of religious revival without considering 
its real meaning. Similarly the precise meanings of messianism, and apocalypticism are 
often confused, and, of course, these terms mean slightly different things to different 
religions. 
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1.4.1 Fundamentalism 
While the word fundamentalism is used frequently and indiscriminately to describe 
certain aspects of religious revival in all religions, the term originated in America in 1920 
to describe a `subspecies' of evangelical Protestantism. The term referred to evangelicals 
who considered it a religious duty to resist `modernist' theology and elements of secular 
culture. 31 One of the features which most closely defined this fundamentalism was 
`organised militancy'. However, it is important to realise that violence and 
fundamentalism are not synonymous, a point frequently misunderstood by mainstream 
society. As the twentieth century has progressed, the term fundamentalism has come to be 
applied to all religions which exhibit certain characteristics. In its most basic form, the 
term is best understood as a defensive reaction to the perceived disappointments of 
secularism which affirms "the religious authority of scripture as holistic and 
absolute... admitting neither criticism nor reduction; expressed through a demand that 
scripture be publicly recognised and legally enforced. "32 In this regard fundamentalism as 
a system for reclaiming or preserving the efficacy of religious life has much in common 
with religious revivals of the past. However, it does not merely intend a return to ancient 
practices or some long lost golden age - although such nostalgia is one of the most salient 
features of fundamentalist rhetoric. Religious identity renewed can be seen as an absolute 
way of recreating both the social and political realms which looks to the future more than 
the past. 33 
There are of course objections to such a definition of fundamentalism. The most 
important of these is that the term is derogatory - it is less descriptive than it is accusatory. 
As one Muslim scholar puts it, fundamentalism refers to those who hold "an intolerant, 
self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism. "34 This, however, is not so 
much the fault of the term itself but of the way it is interpreted and used. A second 
31 G. M. Marsden, `Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity', in Encyclopaedia of Religion (M. Eliade, ed. ), 
Vol. V, pp. 190-197. 
32 B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modem Age, 1989, p. 27. 
33 M. E. Marty, & R. S. Appleby, Fimdamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and 
Education, 1993, p. 3. 
34 U. F. Abdallah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, 1983, p. 23. Quoted also in B. Lawrence, Defenders of God, 
p. 96, and M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, 1993, 
p. 4. 
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criticism is that fundamentalism is too imprecise a term for comparisons across cultures. 
Much religious activism in the contemporary world is marked by a rejection of modern 
Western secularism, and consequently a better term would be `anti-modernism', a term 
Bruce Lawrence uses to define fundamentalism as a global phenomenon. 35 A third 
criticism, particularly in relation to Islam, is that the term fundamentalism is too laden 
with "Christian presuppositions and Western stereotypes. 36 A fourth objection is that the 
term does not carry any political meaning - it suggests that a fundamentalist is motivated 
solely by religious beliefs rather than issues of societal and global concern. With this in 
mind Juergensmeyer prefers the term 'religious nationalist'. 37 Alternative terminology 
though can be more confused and less accurate than the almost simplistic 
`fundamentalism'. Juergensmeyer once suggested the term `heretical modernism' because 
religious activists decry the secular principles contained within modernism. 3A Even less 
appealing is the definition offered by John Stratton Hawley of `militant anti-modern 
religious activism', a term he soon abandoned in favour of fundamentalism. 39 
While these objections are understandable, they stem far more from definitional 
imprecision than they do from actual meaning. When closely defined the term 
fundamentalism can be a useful category for examining groups and belief systems which 
have arisen from religious revivalism. There are several other reasons for retaining the 
term as a useful concept. Fundamentalism serves to create a distinction between other 
useful but not fully appropriate words such as `traditionalism' or `orthodoxy'. Moreover, 
after much research the editors of The Fundamentalisms Project noted, no other term was 
found to be "as intelligible or serviceable". 40 Attempts by various authors to provide 
distinctive alternatives led to confusion and an acknowledgement that they were describing 
something similar anyway. 41 
35 B. Lawrence, Defenders of God, p. 2. 
36 J 
. 
L. Esposito, The Islamic Areal: Myth or Reality?, 1995, p. 8. Esposito prefers the terms 'Islamic 
revivalism' or'Islamic activism'. See also Voll, J. O., Renewal and reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah', 
in J. L. Esposito (ed. ), Voices of Resurgent Islam, 1983. 
37 M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, p. 6. 
38 ibid., p. 204, fn. 12. 
39 J. S. Hawley, `Introduction', in Fundamentalism and Gender, (J. S. Hawley, ed. ), 1994, p. 15. 
40 M. E. Marty, & R. S. Appleby, `The Fundamentalism Project: A User's Guide', in Fundamentalisms 
Observed, pp. viii. 
41 ibid., pp. viii-ix. 
14 
1.4.2 Messianism 
The word messianism is derived from messiah, itself a transliteration of the 
Hebrew word Mashiah ('anointed'), originally denoting a king whose reign began with a 
ritual anointment. In the Old Testament Mashiah is used to describe the actual king of 
Israel, but in the intertestamental period the term came to mean the `future king' who was 
expected to "restore the kingdom of Israel and save the people from all evil"42 The term 
messianism denotes either a movement or system of ideas centred upon the advent of a 
messiah. Each of the three revealed religions contains a messianic tradition and while 
these traditions vary between and even within religions, there are certain common 
characteristics. The greatest problem with these traditions is their imprecision which opens 
up various possibilities for the identity of the messiah and the circumstances under which 
he (and it is invariably always a he) will reappear. It is important to note that all three 
religions have seen numerous claimants to this title through the ages even where a tradition 
proclaims a specific personality. This situation is inextricably linked to the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of when, where and how messianic figures are expected to manifest themselves. 
Messianism and messianic beliefs do not necessarily imply a turn to violence - messianism 
can be either `active' or `passive' in nature. 
Most orthodox religious messianism is passive, where the messianic vision is not 
translated into action because this would constitute a perversion of God's will - God has 
set a timetable and none but God can hasten or retard the process. The active form calls for 
mortal participation in order to realise the messianic vision. Even where the messianic 
advent is fixed at an undisclosed point in time, when a sense of imminence - for whatever 
reason - takes root in a religious community, many believers find it psychologically 
difficult to regard any action they might take as unnecessary or irrelevant 33 Active 
participation can easily be portrayed as a religious duty, as exemplified by the Jewish Gush 
Emunim, a necessary condition for being one of `the elect'. It is this active form which 
combines not only a belief that the day of deliverance is `imminent', but also a belief that 
mortal activity can help to precipitate the End-time. When the common features of most 
43 S. W. Crow `Messianism', in Encyclopaedia of Religion, Vol. IX, M. Eliade, ed. , 
1987,469. D. C. Rapoport, 'Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror', in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart, eds. ), 1987, p. 77. 
15 
messianic visions, such as a cataclysmic battle and the wholesale slaughter of unbelievers, 
are considered, it is this second point of human agency which provides scope for violence. 
1.4.2.1 Messianism on a state level 
Apart from being the province of small groups, messianic expectations can also be 
manifested on a state level. Three prominent, although historically distant examples, are 
the German Emperor Frederick 11 the Sudanese Mahdi and most recently the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. In thirteenth century Europe, the Emperor Frederick II was regarded as a 
messianic figure, even after his death. Frederick went a long way to realising the messianic 
expectations placed upon him when he 'liberated' Jerusalem in 1229 and crowned himself 
king of the city. 44 Frederick's conflict with the Vatican was also seen by contemporaries as 
an enactment of the End-time of Revelations with the Pope (or Frederick, depending on 
which side one was on) identified as the Anti-Christ. 45 In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, a 
charismatic Sudanese cleric declared himself to be the Mahdi and in the space of four 
years his forces had gained control over most of the Sudan. Ahmad himself died in 1885 
shortly after the capture of Khartoum but the Mahdist state was perpetuated by his 
successor the Khalifa Abdullah until 1898 when it was crushed by an Anglo-Egyptian 
army. 46 The best contemporary example of messianic expectations at the state level can be 
seen in Iran. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appropriated the religious title of Imam (na'ib 
al-'Imam or vicar of the hidden Imam) which not only placed him above all other religious 
authority, but seemed to suggest that his role was analogous to that of the Mahdi in Shi'ite 
eschatology. 47 Although Khomeini never acknowledged such claims he seemed content for 
his more literal adepts to claim he was a mystical emanation issuing directly from the 
Mahdi and serving in preparation for the Mahdi's return. It is no surprise that the Hidden 
Imam's birthday is one of the three great national holidays in Iran, and on these days 
Khomeini praised the return of the Imam-Mahdi during intense speeches which received 
wide media coverage. 48 Messianic expectation is also enshrined in the Iranian political 
44 N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 111. 
45 ibid., p. 111-113. 
46 See P. Holt, The Mahdist Slate in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins, Development and 
Overthrow, 1958. 
47 F. Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, p. 60. 49 E. Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, pp. 194-195. 
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system. The 5th article of the Iranian constitution, for example, states that it will remain in 
force until the return of the twelfth Imam. 49 Messianic expectations woven into the fabric 
of the state could potentially pose a greater danger to international security than the 
activities of small and marginalised groups. 
1.4.2.2 Judaism 
The Jewish vision of a messiah in the intertestamental period'° moved away from a 
mortal agent in the form of a wise and righteous king descended from David to a 
transcendental figure, divine and at present hidden in heaven. At the end of time, the 
Messiah will appear to judge the world, the pious will be freed from the wicked and he 
will rule the world "forever in peace and righteousness. "'' Because of the nature of the 
messianic promise, messianism develops and flourishes during periods of frustration and 
suffering. When the present is satisfactory there is no need for redemption. When it is not, 
messianism emerges as one of the possible answers, based as it is on God's promise of an 
ideal future. In times of stress and crisis, messianic pretenders have appeared, frequently as 
leaders of revolts. Many of these revolts also had disastrous consequences for the Jewish 
people. The First Jewish Revolt (65-70 AD) resulted not only in wholesale slaughter but 
also the destruction of much of Jerusalem and the Second Temple. Similarly the Bar 
Kokhba Revolt (132-135 AD) resulted in what one historian has described as "the effective 
destruction of Palestinian Jewry. "52 
Throughout Jewish history there has been a tension between two types of 
messianism: an apocalyptic one with its miraculous and supernatural elements and a more 
rationalist one. 53 The second type was at least in part influenced by the fact that too many 
messianic outbursts had ended in disaster. The great medieval rabbinical authority Moses 
49 H. Algar (trans. ), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1980. 
so The period relating to the two centuries between the composition of the last book of the Old Testament 
(Proverbs) and the first book of the New Testament (Mathew). 
51 S. W. Crow, `Messianism', p. 470 
52 R. J. Z. Werblowsky, `Jewish Messianism', in Encyclopaedia of Religion, Vol. IX, (M. Eliade, ed. ), 1987, p. 
472. 
53 The standard works for early Jewish messianism include J. H. Greenstone, The Messiah Idea in Jewish 
History, 1906; S. Mowinckel, He That Cometh: The Messianic Concept in the Old Testament and Later 
Judaism, (G. W. Anderson, trans. ), 1956; G. Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays in 
Jewish Spirituality, 1971; J. Klausner, The Messianic Idea in Israel, From its Beginning to the Completion of 
the Mishnah, 1955; R. J. Z. Werblowsky, `Messianism in Jewish History', in Jewish Society Through the Ages, 
(H. H. Ben-Sasson & S. Ettinger, eds. ), 1971. 
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Maimonides (Moshe ben Maimon, 1135/8-1204), held the belief in the advent of a messiah 
as a basic article of faith but was careful to point out that what scripture said on such 
matters was obscure, and that time should not be wasted on interpreting or computing the 
date of the messianic advent. Nonetheless, messianic movements, fired by suffering and 
persecutions, were a consistent part of Jewish history throughout the Middle Ages. The 
common fate of Jews through history as a despised and persecuted minority forms a 
general framework for understanding Jewish messianic outbursts, but it is clearly 
inadequate for explaining specific messianic movements. In the twentieth century, the 
ideology of Zionism, while more concerned with issues of civil liberties, equality before 
the law and the emancipation of the Jewish peoples, still contained a messianic element. 
Indeed, since the Six Day War, the messianic theme in Israeli politics has become 
noticeable, partly as a result of the teachings of Abraham Isaac Kook (chief rabbi of 
Palestine from 1921-1935) and his son Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook. Particularly for the 
younger Kook and other religious ideologues the events since the foundation of Israel, 
have a profound eschatological significance. One contemporary religious political 
movement with a messianic vision is the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful). Inspired by 
the writings of the younger Kook and the successes of the 1967 war, the Gush Emunim has 
played a prominent role in Israeli politics. In fact, it was an associated splinter of this 
group that launched the most credible attempt to destroy the Dome of the Rock. 54 
1.4.2.3 Christianity 
Early Christianity borrowed many of the Jewish ideas about the messiah and 
applied them directly to Jesus Christ. The word messiah itself was translated into Greek as 
Christos. While New Testament Christology borrows much from Jewish Messianism, it 
adds two new dimensions. Firstly, the identity of the Messiah is actually known. Secondly, 
while Christ has fulfilled the messianic expectations to a certain extent, he will return at an 
undisclosed point in the future in order to bring them to their final fulfilment. As with 
Judaism there have been numerous Christian messianic outbursts throughout history, the 
sa For an excellent overview of modern Jewish messianism see I. S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord., 
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 1988. For the Gush Underground specifically E. Sprinzak, `From Messianic 
Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground', in Inside Terrorist 
Organisations (D. C. Rapoport, ed. ), 1988. 
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most bloody and well documented occurring in the later Middle Ages. 
55 Since then 
Christian messianism has seldom manifested itself in an active way. This has largely been 
due to the relatively rapid secularisation of most Christian societies and the pervasive 
belief in passive messianism which has been encouraged by all branches of Christianity. 
This is understandable in light of the inherent instability even mild active messianic 
visions can cause -a situation the Church was acutely aware of from at 
least the eighth 
century AD. The contemporary period has, however, seen a recurrence of active Christian 
messianism on a small but significant scale. The most notable of these can be seen in the 
ideology of the American Christian Identity movement56 and also in a number of small 
cults, some of which may not be entirely Christian in theology but which borrow the ideas 
of the Second Coming and all the trials and tribulations which this entails. As with 
contemporary Jewish messianism political events in particular are interpreted to create the 
necessary sense of imminence. 
1.4.2.4 Islam 
As with Judaism and Christianity the expectation of a divinely sent figure (known 
generally as the Mahdi) at the end of time has played an important role in Islam. 
57 
Messianic expectations were part of the formation of the original Islamic community and 
contributed to dividing Islam into two great competing branches, Sunni and Shi'a. The 
basic features of the `Mahdi myth' have not altered appreciably since its early appearance. 
The Mahdi will appear during the period of chaos preceding the end of time. Within the 
Shi'a faith, the identity of the Mahdi is known. As with Christianity it is the reappearance 
of a specific personality, in this case Mohammed ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, the twelfth Imam 
who will return (the raja) after the great `occultation' or period of hiding (ghayba), a state 
chosen for the Imam by God. 58 What is not known is the actual time of his return, although 
ss See N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, 1970. 
56 Christian identity is frequently considered more millenarian, apocalyptic and racist than messianic, but the 
messianic dimension is certainly there. See M. Barkun's Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the 
Christian Identity Movement, 1994, p. 112. 
57 As Douglas Crow notes in the Encyclopaedia of Religion "No comprehensive study of the whole range of 
Mahdi themes and historical movements exists". Important studies if the Mahdi concept include J. Blichfeldt, 
Early Mahdism: Politics and Religion in the Formative Period of Islam, 1985; H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Some 
Religious Aspects of Islam, 1981, pp. 48-57; and A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. 
58 A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 23. 
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it is generally accepted that this will occur at the beginning of an Islamic century. Some 
Sunni Muslim scholars argue that the identity of the Mahdi cannot be known until he 
actually appears (there is no strong tradition as regards when) and makes his claim, while 
others limit the function of the Mahdi to Jesus alone. For both branches of Islam, Jesus 
functions as a prophet who precedes the Mahdi at the end of time. Two of the four 
fundamental collections of Sunni traditions, those of the Bukhari and Muslim make no 
mention of the Mahdi and some pre-eminent theologians such as the Twelfth century al- 
Ghazali omit any reference to the Mahdi when discussing the end. 59 Of greater 
significance, there is no mention of the Mahdi in the Qur'an, the basic text which 
underpins both branches of Islam, although the notion of God's guidance is an established 
principle. 60 Most Sunnis, however, accept the general Muslim belief in a renewer or 
reformer (mujaddid) who appears each century in some part of the Muslim world and who 
acts to renew the faith and strength of the community. There are many historical examples 
of Mahdi claimants who have sought the destruction of an existing political order though 
violence, the two most recent being the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad in late nineteenth 
century Sudan and Mohammed ibn-Abdullah Qahtani during the attack on the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca in 1979.61 
1.4.3 Apocalypticism 
The fourth term which must be discussed, and which is also frequently misused, is 
that of apocalypticism. Strictly speaking an apocalypse is a revelation of a mysterious 
nature, usually explained by a supernatural being which discloses "a transcendent world of 
supernatural powers and an eschatological scenario that includes the judgement of the 
dead. "62 However, before a transcendent world and the judgement of the dead can be 
realised, a cataclysmic battle between the forces of good and the forces of evil must occur. 
All messianic traditions envisage some form of violent conflagration in which the relevant 
deity participates in order for good to ultimately triumph. In this sense the modern 
s9 C. S. Crow, `Islamic Messianism', p. 479. 
60 ibid., p. 477. 
61 see J. A., Kechichian, `Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-Utaybi's "Letters" to 
the Saudi People', The Muslim World, Vol. Lam,, 11 1, pp. 1-16. 
62 J. J., Collins, `Apocalypse', in Encyclopaedia of Religion, Vol. I, p. 334. 
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colloquial use of the word to denote a catastrophic disaster is accurate, although it loses 
63 the context of revelation that was essential for the original meaning of the word. 
However, it is the modern usage of the word which will be used here because it is the 
violent dimension rather than the revelatory one which is the most pertinent. 
Apocalypticism then can be seen as a rather violent element of religious 
messianism which is far more concerned with the actual end of the world than with what 
will come after. As with messianic belief systems, apocalypticism can have an active or 
passive expression, and it is apocalyptic belief of both kinds which has flourished 
independently of the revealed religions (although it is heavily influenced by them) for 
centuries in the form of what might loosely be called `doomsday cults'. Nor is 
apocalypticism an entirely religious phenomenon. Since the early 1970s secular 
apocalyptic literature has grown out of a naturalistic world view, and is couched in terms 
of social and political crisis, the threat of a nuclear holocaust, technological breakdown 
and ecological disaster. '4 Examples of this secular apocalyptic are also to be found in 
popular culture. Books such as Hal Lindsay's eschatological thriller The Late Great Planet 
Earth65 and movies such as Stephen King's The Stand66 are based around contemporary 
interpretations of a final apocalyptic confrontation. These events which have influenced 
the secular apocalyptic also form an important part of the religious apocalyptic as signs of 
the impending End-time. 
1.5 Theoretical Approach and Methodology 
The issue of religious violence and religious terrorism67, be it political, messianic 
or apocalyptic is addressed within a variety of different disciplines. Religious historians, 
63 Another term which has passed into common parlance is that of `Armageddon' used to denote a final 
cataclysmic battle. The term originally appears as the place where the final battle will occur in the book of 
Revelations (16: 16). 
"4 For an interesting discussion of the contemporary secular apocalyptic see Barkun, M., `Divided apocalypse: 
Thinking About the End in Contemporary America', Soundings, Vol. LXVI, # 3, pp. 257-280. 
65 1970. 
66 1990. The Stand, while it can be regarded as `secular' in the sense that its appeal was not to a solely 
religious audience, is nonetheless a contemporary remodelling of the Christian apocalyptic. 
67 Due to the imprecise meaning of the word terrorism, its pejorative meaning and subjective usage, the term 
'violence will be used throughout this work because it is both more accurate and less contentious. As Walter 
Laqueur has noted, ten years of study of the term terrorism has yet to result in an explanatory and accepted 
definition, see A. P Schmid, A. Jongman et al, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Databases, Theories and Literature, 1988, p. 3. The pejorative and subjective nature of the term is reflected 
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theologians, social and political anthropologists, political and social scientists and 
journalists all seem to have something to offer. Within the discipline of what may loosely 
be called international relations, religion itself has occupied an awkward and ill-defined 
position, frequently identified as an intangible force, and perhaps in the past even an 
irrelevant one, surpassed by secular ideologies. In particular, classical theorists of 
international relations have focused exclusively on states as the basic unit and `elite 
cultures' as determining ideology in global society. 68 Religion, however, is vital to an 
understanding of international relations. At its most basic, it can be seen as the oldest form 
of social organisation and ideology, and the most deeply rooted in the human psyche. As 
one commentator puts it, religions can be seen as "among the oldest of the transnationals: 
Sufi orders, Catholic missionaries.. . carried word and praxis across vast spaces 
before those 
places became nation-states or even states. "69 It is only at the time of the enlightenment 
and the ascendance of scientific faith over the religious that religion as an ideology 
(particularly, but not exclusively, in the `West') has taken a back seat to secular belief 
systems. Enlightenment rationalism saw religion as false knowledge, and for the modem 
enlightenment rationalist religion "involves at best the non-rational, transcendental and 
`otherworldly', and at worst the irrational, superstitious and magical. "70 
The resurgence of religion in the past twenty years, particularly its political 
expression and association with extreme violence, has gone some way to changing this. 7' 
Frequently, however, manifestations of religious violence are examined in isolation, either 
within a particular state or geographical area such as the Middle East, or within individual 
religious faiths. This isolated approach is particularly true of messianic or apocalyptic 
violence. 72 Such events and movements are often regarded as ephemeral in the extreme, 
by the inability of the United Nations to settle on an agreed definition. For an overview of the word's 
etymology see B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Ch. 1,1998. 
68 See for example E. Luard, Types of International Society, 1976; H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study 
of Order in World Politics, 1977; A. Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 1992. 
69 S 
. 
H. Rudolph & J. Piscatori, Transnational Religion and Fading States, 1997, p. 1. 
70 ibid., p. 246. 
71 For Example R. S. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion Violence and Reconciliation, 2000, 
D. Johnston and C. Sampson (eds. ), Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, 1994, and collections such 
as M. Juergensmeyer, Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1992. More recently S. H. Rudolph and 
J. Piscatori (eds. ), Transnational Religion, although this work is notable for its failure to address Judaism. 
72 For example see E. Sprinzak, `From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush 
Emunim Underground', in Inside Terrorist Organisations, (D. C. Rapoport ed. ), 1988. A notable but brief 
exception is D. C. Rapoport, `Messianic Sanctions for Terror', pp. 195-213. 
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despite their historical track record and the very real political, social, economic and 
military events of the contemporary period which have done so much to inspire them. Far 
from being aberrations, there is a definite inner logic to manifestations of religious 
violence, and identifiable influences which cause such phenomena. It is vitally important 
to examine in detail the different mechanisms which lead to religious resurgence and in 
some cases religiously motivated violence. It is also important to examine why different 
religions in different contexts give rise to the use of violence. 
Various theoretical structures have been advanced with regards to why a religious 
resurgence has occurred in the contemporary period, why some religious movements turn 
to violence and why others do not, and the role played by messianic, apocalyptic and 
millenarian belief systems in generating religious violence. But there has been a failure to 
integrate these various disparate analyses into a coherent whole which incorporates both 
political religious violence and that which is more transcendental. This link is an important 
one to make because there is frequently a progression from a revival of belief to active 
involvement in violence which may involve, or lead to, a transcendental - as opposed to a 
political - agenda. This progression is by no means consistent nor even complete, but the 
common elements of scripture and context are always present, especially the selective 
retrieval of sacred passages to fit a particular contemporary context. Some works of this 
nature also suffer from an historically narrow focus. 73 Although this is essential for a 
thorough examination of religious violence and its motivations at specific points in time, 
the issue of how these historical experiences interact with each other and how they are 
reflected in and influence contemporary events is seldom considered. Historical context is 
important because previous religious events and authorities, near or distant, are constantly 
drawn upon to justify violence. It shows that even distant events are as important as 
contemporary ones in terms of justifying actions. 
Similarly examinations of the resurgence of religion, most notably Gilles Keppel's 
The Revenge of God74, and Bruce Lawrence's Defenders of God75, fail to introduce a 
73 See for example N. Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium, B. McGinn, Visions of the EncL Apocalyptic 
Traditions in the Middle Ages, 1979, J. Blichfeldt, Early Mahdism. 
74 A. Braley trans., 1994. 
 1989. 
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critical comparative element. 76 While both works contain case studies on each of the 
revealed religions, for reasons of space few comparisons are made and the case studies 
themselves are made in fairly broad strokes and barely touch upon the specific issues of 
how violence is perceived, justified and orchestrated. Comparison is important in order to 
determine at what point, if there is a specific `point', political and transcendental religious 
violence diverge and what they share in common. This is not to deny the value of these 
two works, both of which are indispensable for understanding the resurgence of the 
revealed religions and the role played within them by fundamentalist belief systems. 
Common themes and causes such as political, economic, social and environmental change 
are identified by both authors, and many of these will be drawn upon in Chapter Two in 
order to explain why there has been a religious resurgence in the contemporary period and 
what form, or forms, it has taken. 
An interesting theoretical approach to the issue of why violence is so central to 
religion is posited by Rene Girard77, based around the idea that violent symbols and 
sacrificial rituals evoke and thus vent violent impulses. This idea is explored by a variety 
of authors in Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World. 18 While the editor notes that 
the various essays do not give definitive proof that Girard's theories are `intrinsically true 
or consistently useful', certain problems can be identified with Girard's theory in terms of 
explaining contemporary manifestations of religious violence. Firstly, there is the 
identification of the uniqueness of Christianity. The figure of Christ can be seen as ending 
the cycle of sacrifice by allowing himself to be the victim, "as a result Christianity gives to 
the world an enduring message of pathos and peace. , 79 Such a statement, however, fits 
awkwardly with the abundant evidence of violence inspired by Christian theology in the 
ensuing centuries. Indeed, in Violence and the Sacred, Girard concerns himself solely with 
primitive religious systems and concocts his theory around them. Judeo-Christian texts are 
76 A similar criticism can be levelled at other works dealing with the resurgence of religion and religious 
violence such as L. Caplan (ed. ), Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, 1987, and Religious Resurgence: 
Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism, R. T. Antoun & M. E. Hegland, eds., 1987. As 
Lawrence also notes, both these are also handicapped by the difficulty of "trying to make a coherent point in 
an edited work combining several literary hands and often incompatible methodologies", See Defenders of 
God, p. 249, fn. 19. 
77 Violence and the Sacred, 1977. 
72 M. Juergensmeyer (ed. ), 1992. 
79 M. Juergensmeyer, `Editors Introduction: Is Symbolic Violence Related to Real Violence? ', in Violence and 
the Sacred in the Modem World, p. 4. 
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not examined within his framework, a task which "must be left to a future study"80, nor 
does he consider Islam, and thus his theoretical framework, while still useful in an abstract 
form, suffers from a kind of myopia. Other social scientists also share this interest in 
`primitives' and attempt to create universalist models which can also be applied to other 
religious communities. 81 Attempts to do so, however, are frequently unsatisfactory due to 
the vast differences between 'primitive' and `civilised' societies. 82 
Samuel Huntington, while examining the future of international relations as a 
`clash of civilisations' 83, only touches upon the issue of religion. Religion for him 
represents one of the six reasons that the eight major civilisations 84 that he identifies will 
be prone to conflict in the future. Huntington's perspective is an holistic one in the purist 
sense as he attempts to explain the future of international relations by examining the 
`whole' of which religion represents only one contributing element (albeit frequently a 
defining one) of any civilisation or culture. By contrast Mark Juergensmeyer places heavy 
emphasis on religion in his The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the 
Secular State. The central thesis of Juergensmeyer's book is that a new cold war will 
develop between religious and secular nationalism, noting that "what once appeared to 
many Westerners as an anomaly and an annoyance is now seen as a global foe. "85 Drawing 
on the ideas of Reinhold Neibuhr that there can be no easy accommodation on the 
ideological level between the secular state which represents reason and the religious state, 
it is possible to "imagine that the current situation could get far worse. , 86 Again this is an 
holistic approach which regards political religious activism as most heavily influenced by 
temporal processes while it pays scant attention to the underlying scriptural basis for 
religious activism and violence, nor to the interrelationship between the selective use of 
$o R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 309. 
81 Perhaps the first and most influential of these is E. Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 
1915. 
82 An uncomfortable use of the anthropologist A. F. C. Wallace's `primitivist' theory appears in W. 
McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings and Reforms: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 
1607-1977,1978. 
83 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996. S4 These are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and `possibly 
African'. 
&S M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, 1993, p. 193. 
86 ibid., p. 201. See also R. Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, 1932. 
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scripture, current and past political, social and economic events, and the form religious 
activism and violence take. 
One important criticism levelled at many of these recent examinations is the failure 
to develop a theory to explain phenomena such as religious revival and fundamentalism. 
Gabriel Ben-Dor sees many studies as simply historical discussions of given cases which 
make an attempt to find what is common to them after the analysis. 
87 The alternative 
would be `real' comparative studies which start with common theoretical framework "for 
the simultaneous study of comparable cases. "88 Accordingly, Chapter Two presents a 
framework with which to examine and compare violent religious groups from different 
religions and those of the same religion but with different motivations and objectives. The 
framework consists of common features which can be found in all violent religious groups 
to one extent or another. 
The issue of historical continuity is also important for any theoretical 
understanding of religious violence of whatever kind. As Martha Crenshaw notes "in 
linking terrorism to historical setting, it is logical to start by asking how social, political, or 
economic conditions contribute to its emergence. "89 At the societal level these broad 
conditions can manifest themselves in different ways and with varying degrees of 
importance. Although they can be generalised about, they seldom combine in an identical 
fashion. The influence of socio-economic hardship and the experience of 'relative 
deprivation' has been a recurrent feature of outbursts of religious violence throughout the 
centuries, but it cannot be viewed in isolation and its influence is variable. 
90 At the 
individual level, these conditions are pivotal in shaping the ideas and aspirations of 
religious ideologues such as Sheikh Hassan al-Banna and the rabbis Kook. The formation 
of ideology and decisions to act in a violent fashion are doubtless influenced by broader 
societal events, but the role of the individual, especially charismatic individuals or those 
with accepted messianic pretensions, is an essential catalyst. 91 This is even more true of 
' For example the 'anecdotal' approach to gathering evidence in Juergensmeyer's excellent Terror in the Mind 
of God. " The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 2000. 88 G. Ben-Dor, `The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VIII, # 
2,1996, p. 249, fn. 5. 
89 M. Crenshaw (ed. ), Terrorism in Context, 1995, p. 13. 
90 T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 1970, p. 24. 
91 R. S. Appleby, Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, 1997, pp. 7-11. 
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violent religious groups than of the secular ones which Crenshaw concentrates on because 
the source of ideology and justification is the immutable (although flexible) word of God. 
The theoretical approach put forward in this thesis will be a comparative one along 
two axes. The first will be to compare differences and similarities in the motivation of, 
justification for and execution of acts of violence between the revealed religions and also 
within them. Do events in the political sphere, for example, have the same influence on the 
turn to violence for all the revealed religions or do different events carry different weights 
in different cultures? Identifying which similarities are most salient and which differences 
are most important is an essential step towards creating a framework for understanding 
religious violence in its entirety. Of obvious significance for such a theoretical structure 
are issues of how violence is justified by scriptural interpretation, the role played by 
leadership, charismatic and collective, the identification of targets and the means deemed 
appropriate for dealing with them, and the issues of when and where violent acts should be 
perpetrated is collectively important. This framework will be outlined in full detail in 
Chapter Two. It will also be useful to discuss how these common elements are drawn 
upon, and can be applied to, `cult' groups which strictly speaking do not belong firmly to 
any of the three revealed religions but which nonetheless formulate a hybrid theology 
based upon selected elements of revealed (and other) belief systems. 
The second axis will involve comparing different types of violent religious groups. 
This will be done employing the framework set out in Chapter Two which identifies 
various processes and structures common to all violent religious movements. 92 The 
purpose of this is to highlight similarities and differences once again in the formation of 
ideology, underlying motivations and scriptural justification. There are also other issues 
such as the identification and selection of targets, the accepted level of violence and the 
tactics employed. While there will be many common features, the defining difference will 
be the ultimate objective. As Raymond Aron has put it, the essence of social science 
research (or any research for that matter) is to look for similarities in that which appears 
different, but also to look for differences in that which appears similar. Consequently, 
while charismatic leadership is one of the common features identified in the framework, 
92 This is not dissimilar to the `group type' and `leadership type' typologies R. H. Dekmejian sets out for 
Islamist groups in Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 1995, (2nd. edn. ). 
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not all forms of such leadership are exactly alike and there is scope for vast differences. 
The key question, as for all the other elements identified in Chapter Two, will be to 
understand the process of why this is the case. Whereas a violent mainstream religious 
group sees a political, temporal goal such as the establishment of a religious state (which 
may or may not see one of its functions as to proselytise beyond its borders), messianic or 
apocalyptic groups perceive a spiritual, other-worldly objective. This fundamental 
difference is far from being clearly defined. However, because the basis for activism, the 
theology of the religion itself, is the same in both cases, it is simply a matter of differences 
in emphasis, interpretation and selective retrieval brought about by circumstance. In this 
respect the issues of interpretation and external influences play a major role, with the aim 
of creating an overall framework for identifying the mechanisms of extreme religious 
activism across the faiths. Interpretation and external influences will inevitably vary from 
case to case, sometimes radically, though some general characteristics will be consistent 
throughout, such as the need to define an ideological programme, the function of 
leadership, the identification of target enemies, the type of violence that will be engaged in 
and when and where violent acts will be conducted. 
Methodologically the most appropriate approach for this work is one similar to that 
employed by Bruce Lawrence. It is true that until the first quarter of this century, the study 
of religion and religious phenomena was the preserve only of those creedally and 
professionally committed to it. With the advent of the social (or human) sciences the 
approach to all studies of religion has altered considerably. The distinction Lawrence 
draws is between `social scientific' and `humanist' approaches, the latter being more 
useful for his investigation of fundamentalism. In its basic form, the humanist approach 
prefers textual evidence over empirical observation when examining what he calls `the 
human condition', a more appropriate approach considering the historical breadth of this 
study. For this approach, scripture itself becomes "a crucial, defining element. "93 The 
examination of scripture is also bound with references to the past and the important role 
played by charismatic mediaries, yet the starting point is the examination of scripture 
itself, how it is selected, emphasised and used to justify violence. 
93 B. Lawrence, Defenders of God, p. 15. 
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This humanist approach is useful for two reasons. Firstly, the primacy of scripture 
in the move towards and conduct of religious violence cannot be denied. Secondly, 
scripture for all the revealed religions is an important historical constant. Alongside the 
selective reading of scripture is the `partial loyalty' to the past and a highly selective vision 
of its importance - not all points in time, characters and events are drawn upon with equal 
passion, and not all come to the fore at particular times of crisis. 94 For example, when a 
Jewish settler murdered twenty-nine people in February 1994, the significant site was the 
Ibrahim (Abraham's) Mosque on the day of the second Muslim sabbath during Islam's 
holy month of Ramadan. By contrast the attempted bombing of the Al-Aqsa mosque on the 
Temple Mount by the Jewish Gush Emunim `Underground', was to involve the destruction 
of a Muslim shrine to enable the Third Temple to be built and thus a new messianic age to 
begin. 
Scripture does change during the formative period of any religion, and it is always 
open to varying interpretations and degrees of emphasis. The Book of Revelations in the 
New Testament, the most apocalyptic of all in Christianity is at least in part what can be 
described as vaticinium ex eventu - history described as prophecy. Written during the first 
century AD, the book itself contained strong anti-Roman inferences which became 
increasingly embarrassing to Christians living within the empire and was subsequently 
condemned from the third to the sixth centuries. Subsequently it has become the foremost 
Christian apocalyptic book, introducing as it does the ideas of a final battle, Antichrist, and 
the thousand year reign of Christ and the saints. A similar process occurs in Judaism and 
Islam where historical circumstance and events alter the meaning or emphasis of scripture. 
These interpretations and emphases are closely related to the political, social, economic 
and contextual circumstances of any particular age, but the point of origin, that of 
scripture, remains the same. As Lawrence puts it "religious ideology arises out of 
scripture... [and] religious ideology is textually based before it is contextually elaborated 
and enacted. "95 This does not mean that political and social events and historical context 
are unimportant. On the contrary, they are pivotal, for it is these factors which help define 
va ibid. 
95 B. Lawrence, Defenders of God, p. 15. 
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and direct scriptural interpretation. But without the scripture, the motivation and 
justification is lost. 
What remains to be done - once the reasoning and processes which underlie 
religious resurgence are identified - is to examine the relationship between groups 
motivated by religious messianic imperatives and those which have more specifically 
political goals in mind. Scriptural eschatology forms part of both group type cosmologies 
and by developing a framework which encompasses both group types and their common 
features, more light will be thrown on the subject of religious violence and religious 
terrorism as a whole. 
The most important contribution this study proposes to make is a fuller 
understanding of the similarities and differences between and within the revealed religions 
and to place the messianic and apocalyptic imperative firmly within what is broadly 
examined as religious violence. While there are distinctions between what might be called 
`political religious violence' and `spiritual religious violence' there is a definite overlap 
between them. Consequently the analytical structure for this work identifies features which 
are common to most, if not all, violent religious groups across the revealed religions so 
that that they may be usefully compared, better understood and more easily identified. An 
important part of this structure is that it will allow for an understanding of why a violent 
religious group might shift its emphasis in terms of theological justification, choice of 
targets, timing of acts and choice of means in particular. 
While the historical dimension is identified in the existing literature, it is important 
to look to the future in terms of preventing such violence. Previous historical 
manifestations can tell us a great deal about motivations and objectives, but the exact 
nature of the critical influences on activism can only be revealed with the passage of time. 
While the general area of socio-economic hardship or political events, for example, may 
be consistent, what exactly these are during any age - particularly their correlation to End- 
time prophecy - is of vital importance not only for understanding events with the benefit of 
hindsight, but also for predicting them in the first place. The fact that messianic and 
apocalyptic groups in particular are often not identified by government agencies as a 
serious threat until it is too late - despite what would seem to be obvious signs - is 
30 
indicative of the low priority given to examining and understanding these organisations 
outside the scholarly world. 96 
96 While the reasons are very different and the choices may seem eclectic, the Gush Emunim Underground and 
the Aum Shinrikyo cult are two excellent examples in this regard. 
31 
Chapter II 
Framework of Analysis 
Having examined the historical context and fundamental dynamics which lie 
behind the religious resurgence and the turn to religiously motivated violence it is critical 
to examine the mechanisms and prominent features which broadly define and regulate the 
conduct of sub-state religious violence in the contemporary period. These features have 
been identified by examining the phenomenon of religious violence generally, and the 
primary and secondary material on ten case studies specifically. The ensuing framework of 
analysis has been designed to bridge the gap between the broader phenomenon of religious 
resurgence and group specific analyses, and also to challenge some of the assumptions 
within the existing orthodoxy on sub-state religious violence. The framework is both 
instrumental and organisational in structure': instrumental in the sense that it addresses the 
need for a violent group to justify and conduct a deliberate programme of violence, and 
organisational in the sense that such groups come in a variety of different forms which in 
turn influences the course of violence. The instrumental dimension consists of six 
fundamental common elements in the conduct of all religious violence: the formation of an 
ideology derived from a religious system which justifies the need for violence and its 
purpose; the role leadership plays in both the formation of this ideology and the conduct of 
operations; the importance of the timing of violence at both the symbolic and practical 
levels; the importance of the location of violent acts on the symbolic and practical levels; 
the targets selected by the groups; and the tactics employed in the pursuit of group 
objectives. The organisational dimension adopts a categorisation of contemporary violent 
religious groups into three types. The conduct of these groups is then examined through the 
lenses of the six instrumental elements. Such a framework enables similarities and 
differences to be identified both between and within the three revealed religions and also 
1 M. Crenshaw, 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches', in D. C. Rapoport (ed. ), 
Inside Terrorist Organisations, 1990. 
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between different group types. The primary objective is to create a comparative framework 
(as opposed to a case study approach) for examining the whole phenomenon of religious 
violence where previously one has not existed, whereby each case may be observed as a 
part of the whole or in isolation. 
Instrumental theories are based on the assumption that violence is "a deliberate 
choice by a political actor"Z, where both an extremist group and their adversaries are 
engaged in a struggle where each attempts to influence the behaviour of the other. In this 
respect extremist group violence may be seen as a form of coercion based on the capacity 
of the 'weak' to hurt, rather than overcome through superior military force. 3 While most 
instrumental paradigms have been developed based on secular groups, the basic idea that 
extremist groups are calculating holds equally true for most religious groups. It is valid, for 
instance, that few organisations actually attain their long term objectives, that targets are 
symbolically related to a group's ideological beliefs and that some groups are unwilling to 
commit acts of violence which might alienate a potential constituency. 4 The actions of all 
religious groups cannot, however, be described in terms of calculation, and deviations 
from a kind of cost benefit approach cannot simply be dismissed as 'miscalculations'. 5 In 
the case of religious groups their very perception of the world they live in is often 
fundamentally different to secular groups from the outset and calculations of action and 
influence must therefore in many cases be different also. It is therefore important to offer 
an analysis of the foundations of religious ideological beliefs which are interpreted and 
used to justify the conduct of violence. In terms of organisational theory, the framework 
set out below concentrates on leadership and group type rather than sociological and 
psychological approaches to membership and group dynamics. This approach has been 
adopted primarily because leadership has by far the greatest influence on the formation of 
2 ibid. p. 13. 
3 T. C. Schelling, Arms and I uence, 1966, Ch. 1. 
4 M. Crenshaw, 'Theories of Terrorism', p. 15. Crenshaw adds "On the other hand, organisations which have 
no desire of an earthly constituency and possess the necessary resources, such as the followers of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini (italics added), are unlikely to practice moderation". Such a broad generalisation is 
singularly uninformative and in the case of Hlzballah, incorrect. 
s See M. Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice', in W. 
Reich (ed. ), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, 1990. 
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group ideology and the formulation of strategy, and because a detailed examination of 
group members and group dynamics is beyond the scope of this study. 6 
2.1 Critical Literature Review 
As noted in Chapter One, a great wealth of information exists on the subjects of the 
resurgence of religion and religiously motivated violence. The material which deals with 
the second area may be divided into two types: those of a holistic variety; and those which 
concentrate on particular case studies. Works which concern themselves with religious 
resurgence and religious violence as a whole tend to dwell on the macro considerations of 
the influence religion plays on politics and society as a whole, and do not generally 
concentrate on the micro considerations of the actual conduct of violence itself. What is 
missing is a micro analysis of the justification and conduct of violence itself as it applies to 
the revealed religions generally, identifying common features and processes and thus 
filling an analytical gap in the study of religiously motivated violence. 
One of the most influential attempts at a systematic, theoretical explanation of the 
link between violence and religion was offered by Rene Girard in his Violence and the 
Sacred. Girard stresses the fact that the original rite of primitive religion was the sacrifice 
(what he refers to as "collective murder") and that religion begins as an attempt to cope 
with limiting 'reciprocal' violence within a community and ultimately to externalise it. 7 
Girard's ideas deal with the broad issues of why religion gives rise to violence, but he does 
not examine the processes whereby religious violence is conducted in the contemporary 
era. 8 By contrast Mark Juergensmeyer9 has examined religious violence as an extreme 
reaction to the primacy of the secular state, identifying religious ideologies as a form of 
nationalism. 10 The strength of this work is the creation of an overview of the place 
religious violence occupies in modern international society. However, the major weakness 
6 There is also the issue of ambiguity when discussing the value of psychological analyses. See A. Schmid & 
A. Jongman et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and 
Literature, 1988,87-98. 
7 R. Girard, Violence and the sacred, 1977, pp. 55 & 92. 
8 For an examination of the applicability of Girard's ideas to contemporary cases see M. Juergensmeyer, 
Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1992. 
9 M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, 1993. 
to The two forms of religious nationalism are ethnic and ideological. See M. Juergensmeyer, 'The Worldwide 
Rise of Religious Nationalism', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. L, 4 1,1996. 
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is that basic processes whereby violence is justified, rationalised and conducted are not 
examined in a systematic, theoretical fashion applicable to a group of religions. II 
An even greater quantity of information is available in the form of case studies. An 
excellent example are the various studies contained within the Fundamentalisms Project12 
and many others which deal either with specific groups 13, a specific religion'` or with a 
specific scriptural motivation. '' Specific case studies have the advantage of a narrow focus 
thus allowing for the development of in depth knowledge through rigorous qualitative 
analysis. 16 The only draw back arises from their examination in isolation from other 
groups, religions or motivations. A far more beneficial approach to understanding religious 
violence as a whole would be a comparative study involving specific case studies. As 
David Rapoport has noted "the monographs on particular religious movements... are often 
excellent-But the gap between the specific analyses and the effort to integrate with the 
terrorist experience in general is enormous. " 17 Comparative studies have been conducted 
before such as David Rapoport's contribution to the Fundamentalism's Project, 'Comparing 
Militant Fundamentalist Groups', yet this approach is not used in conjunction with a series 
of clearly defined case studies, and is conducted within the context of state type. '8 It is 
these extant case studies which can be drawn upon collectively to compose a theoretical 
framework for examining extremist groups from a variety of religions and within a variety 
of contexts. 
If it can be said that a framework for examining the conduct of religious violence 
already exists, it is in the form of what might be called trend analysis. The chief exponent 
11A similar criticism may be made of Juergensmeyer's later Terror in the Mind of God" The Global Rise of 
Religious Violence, 2000. 
12 Especially Volume III, Funda nentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economics and Militance, 
1993. 
13 E. Sprinzak, 'Kach and Meir Kahane: The Rise of Jewish Quasi-Fascism', Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 19, # 
4-5,1985; K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, 1990; and M. Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: 
The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, 1997. 
14 E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, 1991; J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho 
Christian Patriotism, 1990; and R. H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 
1995. 
Is D. C. Rapoport, Why Does Messianism Produce Terror? ', in P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart (eds. ), 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 1987. 
16 H. Eckstein, 'Case Study Theory in Political Science', in F. I Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (eds. ), Handbook of 
Political Science, 1975, p. 122. 
t' D. C. Rapoport, Perceptions and Misperceptions of Religious Terror, 2000, fn. 2. 18 D. C. Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups', in Fundamentalisms and the 
State. 
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of this trend analysis approach in contemporary literature is Bruce Hoffman. When 
examining the phenomenon of religious violence Hoffman makes a series of primary 
assumptions, some valid and others inapplicable to the majority of religious groups. First 
amongst these is that religious groups regard violence as a'sacramental act' and because of 
its transcendental character "its perpetrators are consequently unconstrained by political, 
moral or practical constraints. " 19 Even at a cursory glance constraints, however, do exist at 
all these levels. Politically, most groups are constrained by a basic need to survive20 and a 
need not to isolate the broader community from which they have arisen - as Ranstorp notes 
almost all contemporary religious groups are offshoots of broader movements which are 
not necessarily exclusively violent, and they are not only constrained but driven by 
"[p]ractical political considerations. i21 The absence of moral restraints is a valid feature 
also identified by Ranstorp22 and Rapoport23, however this 'absence' is frequently guided 
by principles of proportionality, and are tempered by those tactics of a practical and 
political nature. 24 The practical constraints faced by religious groups are similar to those 
experienced by secular organisations. In fact, there are the obvious constraints imposed by 
religious legal systems and their enforcement mechanisms. 
Secondly, Hoffman states that unlike secular terrorists, religious groups "seek to 
appeal to no other constituency than themselves" and so the constraints imposed by a 
constituency do not exist. 25 Many groups, however, do have a constituency to appeal to, 
arising as they do not from a vacuum but from a larger community and, in most cases, 
"[r]epresent growing masses of supporters [who] exemplify currents of thinking that have 
risen to counter the prevailing modernism. , 26 The proclivity for some groups to engage in 
social welfare activities creating a web of cultural, educational and social grassroots 
19 B. Hofiman, Inside Terrorism, 1998, p. 94. 
Z° As Graham Fuller has noted of Islamist groups a primary tactical requirement is surviving in the face of a 
hostile enemy, an argument easily extended to Jewish and Christian groups: 'Islamism(s) in the Next Century' 
in M. Kramer (ed. ), The Islamism Debate, 1997, p. 141. 
21 M. Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. L, # 1,1996, p. 48 
&44. 
22 ibid., p. 54-55. 
23 D. Rapoport, Messianic Sanctions for Terror', Comparative Politics, Vol. XX, # 2,1988, pp. 204-205. 
24 Modem expressions of proportionality have as their biblical root Lex Talionis (the law of exact retaliation). 
Examples of this in the Old Testament such as Exodus 21: 22-25 and Deuteronomy 19: 19-21 have as their 
likely root the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686 BC). 25 ibid., p. 95. 
26 M. Juergensmeyer, 'The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. L, 
# 1,1996, p. 3. 
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networks, or even to participate in mainstream politics are instructive. Equally is the 
perception by all religious groups that they are conducting a primarily defensive war in 
order to preserve a culture and community of believers that are perceived to be or actually 
are under threat. It is certainly true that the desire of some messianic and apocalyptic 
groups, such as the Saudi Ikhwan or the Jewish Underground, for an imminent end to 
temporal history alienates them even from their parent community, but these groups 
merely represent the marginal fringe of religiously motivated groups. However, conversely 
it is important to note that historically messianic and apocalyptic groups have had 
significant constituencies, a point illustrated in the contemporary era by the relatively 
large27, and international character, of Aum Shinrikyo's membership. 28 
The third assumption made by Hoffman and related to the absence of a 
constituency, is the "sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended 
category of targets. "29 This is a sanctioning which is seldom adhered to in reality due to the 
political, moral and practical constraints enumerated above. It is certainly true of the 
rhetoric of 'cosmic war' that broad categories of enemies are identified in the form of 
whole societies such as Israel, America and the West, or forms of society such as the 
'secular'. Yet in most instances it does not coincide with the tactical realities which 
confront all groups (whether they choose to acknowledge them or not). The identity of the 
enemy in real terms is dependent on the nature of the crisis which threatens a particular 
religious community and is further shaped by issues of political repression (past and 
present), political, economic and social inequality, and also by inter-communal conflict. 30 
The rhetorical dimension serves to convey and to reinforce the totality of the struggle, and 
except in the case of apocalyptic groups 'open-ended' categories (that is all who are not 
within the group) are seldom actively engaged. 
27 See D. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. LXXVIII, 1984, pp. 658-677, and N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: 
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages, Temple Smith, London, 1970. 
28 At the organisation's peak Aum was estimated to have 10,000 Japanese members, between 20,000 and 
30,000 members in Russia and a further 10,000-15,000 members in six other countries. 
29 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 95. It should be noted that an earlier rendition of these ideas (since 
modified) stated that "[w]here the secular terrorist sees violence primarily as a means to an end, the religious 
terrorist tends to view violence as an end in itself', B. Hofiman, ""Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism 
Motivated by a Religious Imperative', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. XVIII, pp. 271-284. 
30 M. Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', p. 57. 
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This critique is far from saying these assumptions are of no utility but rather that 
they are only true in part while too general to be valid across the spectrum of violent 
religious groups. Other assumptions are absolutely valid such as the pivotal role of clerical 
sanction and the deliberate use of dehumanising rhetoric. 31 The problem here is two-fold. 
Some assumptions may be true for a certain type of group and not for others, so there is a 
missing analytical dimension at the group level. The second problem is that there exists a 
gap between the rhetoric of religious groups and the action they actually take primarily 
because there are always constraints of one form or another. The mechanisms and 
processes which moderate the size of this gap are extremely complex and multi- 
dimensional, and because these assumptions are not contextualised their applicability over 
the broad range of revealed religious violence is questionable. The framework which is 
described below is intended to resolve these problems by examining in detail some 
common, crucial facets of religious violence and how these apply to three distinctly 
different group types, while in the process it attempts to answer the basic questions of who 
are these groups, what exactly are their objectives and how do they go about achieving 
them. 
2.2 Framework of Analysis 
The six common features selected for this analysis are the ideological justification 
for violence, the leadership type, the attitude of the groups towards the timing and location 
of violence, the tactics employed and the targets selected. Each of these six elements will 
in turn have distinct sub-types, the importance of which lies primarily in examining shifts 
in attitudes and values within these dynamic social organisms. These particular 
components have been selected because they cover a spectrum which ranges from the 
interpretation and reformulation of traditional ideas into a contemporary, functional, 
militant ideology through the instrumental and operational considerations which define 
religious violence. 
The first element, justification, reflects the reality that the ultimate objectives of 
religious violence, be they temporal, spiritual, or any combination of the two, must first be 
rationalised and sanctioned by the formation of an ideological programme. This 
31 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 94 & 95. 
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rationalisation must also take place within a specific temporal context which will govern a 
group's overall strategy. Such an ideology is primarily derived from religious scripture and 
tradition, frequently a selective process and one which is profoundly influenced by the 
relationship between religious systems and contemporary events. The second area to be 
examined is the role of leadership. Leadership is important not only for planning and 
sanctioning violence but also in the formulation of group ideology and strategy. In extreme 
cases, charismatic leadership can assume messianic dimensions where the instructions of 
the leader are regarded not only as being sanctified but often are seen as divine. Together 
the first two elements constitute the 'why' of religious violence in the form of rhetorical 
justification and decision making based on this rhetoric. The timing and location of 
violence, representing the 'when' and the 'where', are the next to be considered. Once again 
these elements are dictated by a combination of religious tradition and political 
circumstance. Certain places and dates have long been regarded as sacred for long- 
standing religious reasons while others achieve prominence through the influence and 
medium of more recent historical events. The final two elements are the tactics employed 
by the group to achieve their objectives and the targets that are selected. 
The identification of these six elements themselves, however, tells us only so much 
about the groups themselves, and little about their objectives and their structures, and the 
propensity for a group to engage in violent activity. In order to enhance this examination, 
all the six elements of religious violence will be used to examine three different group 
types across the three faiths: mainstream, core and messianic/apocalyptic. In order to 
provide a meaningful cross section of groups ten primary case studies have been selected - 
Aryan Nations, Kach, Hizballah, Hamas32, Eyal, The Order, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PU) 33, the Jewish Underground, Aum Shinrikyo34 and the Saudi Ikhwan. These groups 
have been chosen primarily because they represent a cross section of violent religious 
groups from the revealed religions active since 1979. Some are progenitors such as 
Hizballah while others are radical splinter groups such as the Order. Equally they also 
32 Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-islamiyya or Islamic resistance movement. The acronym 
means literally 'zeal' or 'enthusiasm'. 33 Sometimes referred to as the Movement for Islamic Jihad, MU. 34 While the theology of Aum Shinrikyo is if the composite variety the messianic and apocalyptic themes are 
distinctly Christian. Other parts of the group's belief system, especially those drawn from the'Cultic Milieu', 
are common to many (primarily Christian) sects and cults. 
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represent a cross section of different ideological emphases, group structures, size, tactical 
orientations, objectives and national milieus. Two prominent Islamic groups have been 
selected for the mainstream category because one is Shi'ite and the other Sunni, a 
dichotomy not as apparent in the core or messianic categories, and one which has a bearing 
on the conduct of mainstream Islamic organisations. Some of these groups are defunct but 
the majority are extant and all of them are prominent - in the past and for the extant groups 
for the future. Furthermore, these groups have engaged in violent activity at different levels 
of persistence, intensity, sophistication and success for vastly different periods of time. 
Despite these differences they are unified by the fact that all derive their belief systems and 
justifications from interpretations of scripture and religious lore within their own socio- 
political context. 35 The purpose of such a selection therefore is not to be absolutely 
exhaustive in each analysis, but illustrative, offering a large number of studies across a 
range of denominations and contexts to demonstrate both the varied forms religious 
violence may take and to stress the commonalties both within and between religions. Such 
a categorisation combined with the six common features will allow an observer to 
determine more clearly the propensity for a group to engage in violence and the form this 
violence might take in the future. 
2.3 The Formation of Ideology 
The logical starting place when discussing the dynamics of religious violence is to 
examine the process of ideological formation. Human beings, it can be said, inhabit worlds 
of their own making and the process of ideological formation establishes the parameters of 
that world. 36 The very term 'ideology' itself remains a controversial one and is even more 
so when applied to religious belief systems rather than secular ones. 37 The term ideology in 
a religious context is useful not least because of its origins. The French Revolutionary 
35 For a study of different violent religious groups in two different political contexts (within the 'sectarian state' 
and the 'nation-state') see D. C. Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups', in 
Fundamentalisms and the State. 
36 See P. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 1967. 
37 See D. Apter (ed. ), Ideology and Discontent, 1964 & C. I. Waxman (ed. ), The End of Ideology Debate, 
1964. Suggested alternatives to the term include 'imagined communities' and 'world views'. See Anderson, 
Imagined Communities and N. Smart, Worldviews: Cross Cultural Explorations of Human Beliefs. While 
interesting the form these terms take is reminiscent of some of the alternative terms offered to replace 
fundamentalism. 
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ideologues who coined the term were attempting to create a science of ideas based on 
enlightenment thinking which would offer a secular alternative to religion. 38 This process 
had two significant consequences. Firstly, nationalism emerged, the first great secular 
ideology, and by seeking to replace religion, secular ideology had been put on the same 
plane as that of religion. As such, the secular as a mode of justification for violence 
supplanted the religious. The added attraction of using the term religious ideology for the 
purposes of this work is that it allows secular and religious belief systems to be contrasted, 
both being doctrines which claim a complete and universally applicable theory of man and 
society from which can be derived a programme for political action. As such, both sacred 
and profane ideologies may more easily be seen as actual or potential rivals and discussed 
as such on similar terms. 39 Both secular and religious ideologies in their current forms are 
also relatively new historically, although the constituent inspirations are not. As Bruce 
Lawrence notes "[f]undamentalism has historical antecedents, but no ideological 
precursors... though the antecedents are varied and distant... fundamentalism as a religious 
ideology is very recent. "40 
A religious ideology which acts as a justification for violence has many sources. 
The most important of these are those pertaining directly to the religion itself - scripture 
and religious traditions. Scripture is interpreted in light of contemporary events and the 
environment within which a group exists. Religious ideas are critically evaluated and 
reformulated to explain and offer solutions to a perceived condition or crisis, one which 
threatens a particular religious community and its divinely promised destiny. The use of 
religious dogma is often selective, chosen to illustrate the world view of the group and to 
justify their attempts to alter the existing socio-political status quo. Accordingly, the most 
emphasised elements of revealed traditions are those which concern themselves with 
struggles against oppression, differentiation of a religious community and eschatological 
visions of religious destiny. Ideology also has a variety of objectives: it is at once an 
attempt to differentiate the group from society generally and from other, secular vehicles 
38 See R. Cox, Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, 1969. The term is attributed to the French philosopher 
Destutt de Tracy in his Elements of Ideology, 1795. See E Kennedy, Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of 
Ideology, 1978. 
39 For a discussion of religious and secular ideologies and the formulation of a category of'religious 
nationalism' see M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, Ch. 2, 'Competing Ideologies of Order', 1993. 
40 B. Lawrence, Defenders of God, 1989, p. 101. 
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of protest; it may also be aimed at expanding a group's following; and it offers both an 
alternative vision of reality and a justification for any attempt to bring about this 
alternative reality. Ideology may also be disseminated in a variety of different ways, such 
as sermons and printed tracts - both of which can be greatly amplified and spread by using 
the very tools of modernity such as audio cassettes, radio, television and the internet. 
The specific interpretation of religious dogma and its relationship to the 
contemporary world is the province of a group's leadership, although the extent to which 
the sources of ideology are older, established, 'fore-father' figures such as Sayid Qutb, 
Hasan al-Banna or the Rabbis Kook, or 'younger', active ideologues or leaders such as 
Sheikh Fadlallah or Meir Kahane may vary considerably. Older figures may provide the 
basis for a belief system and intellectual concepts for following generations, while younger 
ones tend to relate these visions directly to contemporary religious, political and social 
circumstances. Whatever the source, religious ideological platforms provide essential 
objectives and justifications, while playing a pivotal role in decisions regarding the timing 
and location of acts of violence, along with the choice of tactics and targets. Ideological 
formation may be seen to be composed of the following five key constituent components: 
A Golden Age Myth; the perception of a 'theft' of culture; scripturalism; a Manichean 
world view; and a messianic vision (of varying intensity) based on the imminence of an 
expected messianic era. 41 Within different groups certain elements may be emphasised 
more than others, although each element can be considered a constant for all group types. 
2.3.1 Golden Age Myth 
The myth of a 'Golden Age' of harmony and abundance is a common feature of 
most religious belief systems and certainly of the revealed religions. This universal myth 
concerns itself with the wholeness and peace that communities throughout the ages have 
felt to be the 'ideal' human condition. 42 For Jews it might be the Davidic period when the 
old Kingdom of Israel was at its zenith. 43 In Christianity the early primitive Church is 
41 These variables are a modified version of those set out by Jeffrey Kaplan, see his "The Context of American 
Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case of the 'Identity Christian' Church of Israel", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. V, # 1,1993, pp. 42. -43. 42 See M. Eliade (trans. R. Sheed), Patterns in Comparative Religion, 1958, pp. 382-385. 43 In preparation for this moment the Temple Institute in Jerusalem (amongst other activities) designs and 
constructs priestly vestments and other paraphernalia relevant to worship in the Temple of the Davidic era. 
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frequently an inspiration, as is (for American groups) early Puritan America. For many 
Muslim intellectuals this is most frequently the formative period of Islam when the 
community was ruled by Mohammed or the Rightly Guided Caliphs. 4For violent groups, 
however, the perception of a crisis implies that this Golden Age cannot be achieved 
peacefully, instead it must be brought about through armed struggle. Exactly when the 
Golden Age will be delivered varies according to group. In the case of some messianic and 
apocalyptic groups, the advent of the Golden Age and redemption are imminent, while in 
most cases it lies at a distant, frequently ill-defined point in the future, one that can only be 
reached through years of steadfast 'cosmic' struggle. 45 Paradoxically, many violent 
religious groups see their struggle as ultimately leading to peace, and that violence 
perpetrated in the contemporary world serves merely to purify that world and ensure that 
what follows will be a better world devoid of violence. 46 The specific content of the myth 
itself can vary widely depending on the precise theological leanings of the group and what 
the group regards as worthy of reconstruction or emulation, a process determined by the 
group's environment. Within Judaism and Islam there is less variation, and in both cases 
the myth has informed actual political programmes. In the case of violent Christian groups, 
far greater theological variation has led to a situation where "[t]he range of possible 
utopias of the past to choose from is almost unlimited, and Identity quarters have delved 
deep into a largely imagined history to reconstruct scenarios of former bliss. "47 
All Golden Age myths, however, share certain common features. Apart from 
representing an idealised world obtainable through devotion and struggle, they are 
concerned with a time that ended due to a combination of a 'fall from grace' and the 
actions of some malevolent 'other'. Both of these forces endure still in one form or `8 
Apart from private donations the Institute receives funding from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry 
of Education, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Jerusalem City Hall. See C. Coughlin, A Golden Basin Full 
of Scorpions, pp. 240-242. 
44 See I. M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 1988, Part I& pp. 880-883. 
45 As Rapoport notes however "Clearly, one can believe that a messianic era is predestined and that the day of 
deliverance is neither near nor predictable", Messianic Sanctions for Terror', p. 198. 
46 M. Juergensmeyer, 'The Terrorists Who Long For Peace, The Fletcher Forum, Winter/Spring, 1996, pp. 1- 
11. 
47 J. Kaplan, 'The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology', p. 44. 48 For a brief discussion of the 'Other' as it applies to the monotheistic faiths see F. Osman, Monotheists and 
the'Other': An Islamic Perspective in an era of religious pluralism', The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXVIII, # 3- 
4,1998, pp. 353-363. For the concept of moral disengagement as it relates to modern terrorism see A. 
Bandura, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement' in W. Reich (ed. ), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, 
Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, 1990. For a secular, 'non-kinship' dichotomy see A. Rapoport, The 
43 
another and their physical manifestation provides an identifiable source of grievance and 
thus a focus for violence. The Golden Age myth is also a way of making the history of the 
various faiths contemporary -a process whereby historical, religious events are recast 
into 
contemporary forms. This is done in a variety of ways including the phraseology of the 
group, the group's nomenclature and the symbols it employs, all of which create a direct 
and more immediate link between the past and the present. 
2.3.2. Threat to Culture49 
Most violent religious groups (and many non-violent ones) have a perception that 
their traditional culture is under assault, and in certain cases has been actively eroded and 
threatened for a considerable period of time. The threat to culture itself is shaped by 
political events both in the distant past and the immediate present - the gap in time is of no 
consequence because the threat is seen as a constant. 50 The broader phenomenon of 
religious radicalism may be defined as the rejection of surrounding cultural norms and 
values that are not considered authentic to a religious tradition, and the vacuum created by 
this rejection is filled by intensifying key elements of the religious tradition' - an alien, 
hostile culture is thus 'displaced'. In many cases the perception of a threat thrives not on 
religious tradition but on complex conspiracy theories which offer an all embracing (if 
implausible) and systematic explanation of the threat posed to a religious community. 52 
Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, 1995, Ch. 4, 'The Attitudinal Perspective: We and 
They. 
49 Culture in this sense refers to the anthropological and sociological meaning of the word which denotes all 
forms of human activity which are not concerned with biological perpetuation of the species - customs, habits 
of association and religious observances. A fundamentalist religious system encompasses all these as well as 
the biological origins of the species. Furthermore, culture here will follow the Anglo-French tradition of 
regarding 'culture' and 'civilisation' as synonymous. 
so This is in line with C. Geertz's thesis that culture is a socially constructed and historically transmitted 
network of symbol 'systems'. See The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, 1973. 
51 C. S. Liebman, 'Extremism as a Religious Norm', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. XXII, # 
7,1983. 
52 For an early theoretical examination of conspiracy as part of extremist belief systems see S. Lipset & E. 
Raab, The Politics of Unreason, 1970. For more recent examinations of the phenomenon see D. Pipes, The 
Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, 1996, and M. Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and 
Power in American Culture, 1999. Conspiracy theories are particularly pronounced amongst right wing 
American Christian groups. As Aho has noted, there are two forms of historical rhetoric, accidentalism and 
conspiratorialism. Accidentalism is the form favoured by academics, and is well represented by evolutionary 
theory, where history is decided by chance. By contrast conspiratorial historical rhetoric identifies a grand 
design or plan. In this sense all religious perceptions of history can be considered 'conspiratorial'. J. Aho, The 
Politics of Righteousness, 1990, p. 88. 
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For Jewish groups, this belief draws on a long history of persecution both during biblical 
times and during the Diaspora following the destruction of the Second Temple -a 
persecution that only abated (but did not cease) with the creation of the state of Israel. In 
the contemporary period, these events are recalled and viewed within the context of the 
threats posed by Arab states and sub-state groups to the newly re-acquired promised land. 
For many Christian groups, it is a (comparatively) more recent process involving a Zionist 
and governmental conspiracy against a white Anglo-Saxon Christendom. For Islamic 
groups, the threat is largely that of Western imperialism, both cultural and political, and its 
indigenous proponents throughout the Muslim world. Israel and Judaism are also perceived 
as both a threat and an insult which is in league with the Christian West. For all 
denominations there is a belief that traditional values must be defended and propagated 
lest they be destroyed forever by modern, 'ungodly' actors and processes which were 
unleashed by the enlightenment and continue unabated in the present. 53 This threat of 
'secular culture' is perceived as eroding traditional values and also as sanctioning practices 
which are regarded by religious communities as taboo. In this regard violent groups 
perceive their struggles as defensive in nature unlike their opponents who conversely 
identify them as an aggressive threat to the existing order. 
2.3.3 Scripturalism 
Concepts of a Golden Age and theft of culture cannot be formulated in a vacuum as 
they must be based upon and legitimised by textual sources. The ideologies of all the 
groups examined is rigorously defined by scripture and religious tradition, and there exists 
a symbiotic relationship between scripture and reality. Contemporary events are often re- 
cast into a scriptural reality, bridging the gap between past and present. This re-casting 
serves both to mobilise the group itself and to place the 'enemy' within a mortal, cosmic 
struggle which is much greater than mere temporal history. Flexibility in ideology is 
allowed by the vast scope of these sources, and the degree to which various components 
are selected, interpreted and emphasised. There are many religious messages which 
condone violence, and although these are in the minority, once they have been brought to 
53 For an example of similar attitudes to blasphemy' in different religions see E. Sivan, "The Mythologies of 
Religious Radicalism: Judaism and Islam', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. III, # 3,1991, pp. 71-81. 
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prominence and related to the present social context they provide a divinely sanctioned 
justification for action. 54 This process is driven by the belief of fundamentalists that 
scripture does not only record the past but is equally relevant to the present and the future. 
It is not static but a historically constant process. 
Certain themes within the various religious traditions are continually employed, 
such as the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein in Shi'ite theology or the role of the high 
priest Phineas in Judaism. Similarly the ambiguity of some religious lore means it can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways or used out of context. One of the myths permeating the 
Christian Right in America is that of the Phineas Priests'. Based on the old testament story 
of the high Priest Phineas, a myth has been created that there is an unbroken chain of 
Phineas Priests who have operated throughout time eliminating the enemies of God. While 
the biblical story exists and is drawn upon by both Jewish and Christian groups, the myth 
was created in Richard Hoskin's book Vigilantes of Christendom (1990), a work 
contending to be fact. 55 The common theme here is the need to base ideological 
perspectives in scripture and the accepted inerracy of these texts. Each of the revealed 
religions possesses clearly defined canons of scripture and decisive commentaries where a 
believer may find immutable doctrines, stories and bodies of law. These scriptural 
interpretations are then reinforced by related symbolic acts in order to mobilise the group 
and any prospective constituency. This complex process of scriptural justification makes 
tradition reality. 
2.3.4 Manichaean World Hew 
Part of the process of ideological formation is the adoption of what might be called 
a Manichaean world view which divides humanity dialectically into a righteous 'us' and a 
non-believing 'them'. 56 These two groups are all encompassing and they allow for no 
54 A good example is Sayyid Qutb's revival of the seventh century doctrine ofjahiliyya. See Qutb, S., 
Milestones, 1978. 
ss While there is evidence to suggest the existence of a group or groups using such a name the influence of yet 
another book on the Christian Right is obvious. In an effort to distance his Church of Israel from vigilante 
violence Pastor Dan Gayman has offered a critique of this idea based on I Samuel 15: 23. D. Gayman, 
Watchman 3, Summer 1991, p. 7. 
56 The word Manichaean (or Manicheaen) is derived from Manichaeanism, a religion established in 3rd century 
Iran by Mani which was fundamentally dualist in nature. It is interesting to note that throughout its history 
Manichaeanism numbered Augustine as one of its adherents before he converted to Christianity. See G. 
Widengren, Mani and Manicheaenism, 1965. 
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exceptions, an individual is either one or the other. Moreover the 'us' represent the 
followers of God, while the 'them' represents the enemies of God or the friends of Satan, 
who by scriptural definition must be fought and ultimately converted or destroyed. 
Because of their association with God, the righteous themselves are ultimately assured of 
victory. Conflict has thus been elevated to a 'cosmic' level where there exists only "an 
ultimate good and evil, a divine truth and falsehood"57 , and 
it is a conflict which 
transcends all earthly struggles. The use of such a distinction is primarily to mobilise and 
radicalise support and to create 'the other' -a process not unique to religious violence but 
common to all conflicts throughout time. 58 In the words of Hizballah's Sheikh Fadlallah, 
for example, "Muslims are to embark on an 'Islamic Revolution' under the guidance of 
religious officials, the 'ulama', whose knowledge and integrity guarantee the ultimate 
triumph of Islam over the Satanic force of disbelief. 09 Similarly, a Hamas communique, 
issued in response to the American military build up in Saudi Arabia following Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait, described it as "another episode in the fight between good and evil". 
The communique continues to identify a sectarian threat to culture and described a 
"hateful Christian plot against our religion, our civilisation and our land. r60 An Aryan 
Nations brochure claims that "there is a battle being fought this day between the children 
of darkness (today known as the Jews) and the children of light (God), the Aryan race, the 
true Israel of the Bible. , 61 Such distinctions are amplified by de-humanising the 'enemy' 
with titles such as 'mud-people', 'dogs' or 'beasts'. 62 When the enemy is no longer seen as 
being human, an important restraining factor on violence is removed. Despite this clear 
division, certain groups of non-believers are more frequently attacked for reasons of 
accessibility, symbolism and the degree to which they pose a threat to the group's 
continued existence and traditional values. 
57 M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, p. 155. 
sg "The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as 
possible the act of killing from the act of murder by making the former an act deserving all honour and praise". 
Quoted in R. Holmes, Firing Line, 1985, p. 360. S9 The Middle East, July 1989, p. 13. 
60 Hamas communique # 64, September 26 1990. 
61 This is Aryan Nations, pamphlet distributed by Aryan Nations (also available on the internet), n. d. 62 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 95. 
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2.3.5 Messianic Expectation 
As was shown in Chapter One, all the revealed religions contain a messianic 
promise and this promise plays an important part in the conduct of violence. For messianic 
groups the prominence of eschatological traditions as a motive for action is obvious. For 
other group types, it is both an accepted and essential part of their belief system, and a 
valuable source of rhetoric. Messianic ideas of renewal play an important part in cosmic 
time and provide a promise of ultimate victory - regardless of how difficult a struggle may 
appear at the moment. Ideas of cosmic war between 'good' and 'evil' and the idea that the 
adherent is the member of a persecuted, righteous few, are most explicitly conveyed in 
messianic texts and traditions. Messianic ideas, as with other scriptural themes can be 
brought to prominence by linking them to mortal activity. Rabbi Avraham Isaac Kook, for 
instance, altered mainstream Jewish messianic perceptions by arguing that the coming of 
the Messiah and Redemption for the Jewish people could be accelerated through human 
agency. Such beliefs can become the central feature of a violent programme as it does with 
the messianic group type. Although it does not form the dominant theme in most group 
ideologies, messianic expectation are still an important part of the revealed message. The 
messianic idea is a powerful, if frequently latent, one and may even be found in the only 
case where a successful violent religious revolution has taken place. Perhaps most 
important of all, messianic ideas and expectations are flexible, allowing for change 
according to alterations in political circumstances. If a messianic expectation is 
disappointed, the belief system itself may even be strengthened and renewed (if a group 
remains intact) through a process of rationalisation. 63 
Z. 3.6 The Legitimisation of Violence 
The formation of an ideology which justifies the conduct of violence is a central 
feature of modem extremist religious groups and one which is related to the concept of 
'divine struggle' contained in the revealed religions. Religious groups tend to perceive 
themselves as 'holy warriors', engaged not in some 'illegal', low intensity struggle, but in a 
63 This is a process known as 'cognitive dissonance', a theory first advanced in L. Festinger, W. Riecken & S. 
Schachter, When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the 
End of the World, 1956. 
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just, cosmic war. `' As noted in Chapter One the revealed religions each contain a tradition 
of Holy War, an important element of which is that a war must be considered 'just' and 
therefore legitimate. As Aho notes of the military ethic contained in almost all religions: 
"any complete military ethic... contains the following three components: a vocabulary of 
acceptable motives for engaging in war and an inventory of legitimate goals toward which 
violence might be directed; the preferred attitude or response to be assumed toward war; 
and approved ways of fighting. "65 This is similar in many respects to the traditional 
Christian conception of just war theory, the basic elements of which are: a just cause (to 
regain something wrongfully taken, to punish evil or to defend against actual or planned 
aggression); a right authority initiating the war; a proportional use of force relevant to the 
issue; war should be undertaken as a last resort; the purpose should be peace; and it should 
be undertaken with a reasonable chance of success. 66 While this conception dates from 
Ambrose and Augustine it has been revived and related to the twentieth century most 
notably in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr. 67 
While this model is Christian in origin, Jewish and Islamic traditions contain 
similar features and these form an implicit feature of the process of legitimating violence 
employed by contemporary religious groups. 68 In Judaism, the concept of religious war 
derived from the Old Testament reflected the early struggles for identity of the Israelites. 
The various wars which result in the establishment of Judea are waged with the co- 
operation of God, frequently against overwhelming odds, a situation which resonates with 
the contemporary era. 69 The medieval religious scholar Maimonides formalised the 
" In a similar fashion secular terrorists such as the IRA regard themselves as soldiers and have consistently 
argued that they be accorded the same rights as other combatants. 65 J Aho, Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious Symbolisms of Religious 
Violence, 1981, p. 9. 
66 The primary difference between Christianity and Islam is that while Islam does not consider war as a means 
of first resort it requires less stringent justification than Christianity. See D. Brown, Muslim Ethics in 
Comparative Perspective', The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXIX, II 2, p. 189. 
67 See for example Niebuhr's 1940 essay Why the Christian Church is Not Pacifist. 
68 See for example J. Kelsay & T. Johnson (eds. ), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical 
Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, 1991, and J. Ferguson, War and Peace in 
the World's Religions, 1977, Chs. 6,7 & 8. For a discussion on the relationship between just war theory and 
terrorism generally see J. Dugard, 'International Terrorism and the Just War', in D. Rapoport & Y. Alexander 
(eds. ), The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, 1982. It should be noted that most 
Islamic scholarship concentrates on the functional aspects of war conduct and not on issues concerned with its 
commencement. See K. El Fadl, 'The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry Into Classical Sources', The Muslim 
World, Vol. LXXXIX, II 2,1999, p. 157. 
69 J Ferguson, War and Peace, 1977, pp. 78-83. 
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concept of a Jewish religious war to include "the war against the seven tribes, the war 
against Amalek, and a war to deliver Israel from aggression. "70 As one scholar has noted of 
war in Islam "[t]echnically there is no 'war' in Islam in the modern sense of the word. It 
was always 'holy war', a jihad. Thus calling of the believers to battle was always just in the 
name of Allah.. . The jihad 
in this sense represents in Muslim Law what is known among 
Westernjurists as just war. "7I 
The issue of a just cause is frequently cited by groups in the form of a threat to 
culture (something wrongfully taken), to punish evil (the Manichaean enemy) or to defend 
against aggression (defending culture). The right authority is found within the group's 
leadership in the form of a cleric or a charismatic divine. The proportional use of force 
often contained in theories of just war is a less applicable feature, although it does 
manifest itself for some groups in terms of preserving the group, appealing to a 
constituency or simply for reasons of practical constraints. 72 War is seen as a last resort 
because either political methods have been tried and failed, or because the nature of a 
polity leaves no other course for expressing dissent but violence. As discussed above, the 
ultimate objective of the Golden Age is peace, not so much dependent on a reasonable 
chance of success, but actually on a guarantee from God. As with scriptural interpretation 
attitudes towards just wars and military ethics are highly selective and prone to alteration 
by environment. 
2.4 Leadership 
Group leadership is extremely important not only because of its relationship to the 
formation of group ideology but also because of its subsequent influence on the practical 
areas of timing, location, targets and tactics. It is in the realm of leadership where 
scriptural imperatives are confronted by, and adapted to, the practical constraints and 
problems of the temporal world. It is this dual process of confrontation and adaptation 
which will determine what form a group will ultimately take and also its propensity to 
endure and survive. Leadership pronouncements and texts are also a useful barometer of a 
70 ibid., p. 91. 
71 M. Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Muslim International Law, 1940, p. 20. 
72 Classical Islamic scholarship tend to view 'proportionality' more in terms of weighing possible evils against 
potential good. See K. El Fad], 'The Rules of Killing at War', p. 147. 
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group's intentions and attitudes towards its environment. The barometric nature may be 
explicit, such as Hamas's (and other groups) statements that revenge attacks would be 
carried out following the 1994 Hebron massacre, or more subtle such as the increasingly 
apocalyptic tone of Aum Shinrikyo's publications following the group's spectacularly poor 
performance in the 1990 Japanese elections. 73 Texts such as Faraj's Neglected Duty, 
Juhayman's 'Seven Letters' and Kahane's They Must Go are designed not only to justify 
violence within the context of a corrupt and failing society but also to offer potential 
solutions. By contrast the novels The Turner Diaries and Hunter by William Pierce are 
intended not only as a critique, but also as a tactical and operational blueprint for 
conducting a racist religious revolution. 74 Statements made by leaders (and groups in 
general) also take advantage of the full panoply of both the media and information 
technology thus reaching a larger and more varied audience. Most importantly the 
manipulation of group dynamics by leaders has a profound influence on the manner and 
degree of violence a group pursues. 
Various leadership typologies for religious groups have been advanced. For Islamic 
groups, H. R. Dekmejian offers four types: Mahdist, where a leader claims divine descent 
according to Sunni or Shi'a eschatology; Marjaist, where a dominant political and legal 
position is adopted by the Shi'a clerical establishment; Mujaddidist, where a 'renewer' 
familiar to Sunni revivalist movements appears (usually every century) to lead the faithful 
although without a claim to divinity; and collegial or bureaucratic leadership. 75 While 
such a categorisation can obviously not be applied directly to Christian and Jewish groups, 
it does contain certain useful elements which may be seen as common to all the revealed 
religions. All religions provide examples where a dominant intellectual cleric provides 
active leadership and/or a blueprint for action. There are also examples where a single 
charismatic 'divine' leads, and also where leadership is collective as in the collegial or 
bureaucratic form. These leadership forms are not mutually exclusive, although there is a 
direct link between the type of leadership and the type of group. Nor do specific leadership 
73 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World., The Incredible Story of Aum, 1996, p. 48. 74 It is claimed that the Order derived its strategy from the Turner Diaries. See B. Hoffman, 'Right Wing 
Terrorism in the United States', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism, Vol. I, # 1,1987, p. 8. 73 R. H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, pp. 60-64. This list actually represents a synthesis of two typologies 
put forward. 
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types evolve from a vacuum as there is an evolutionary process determined by the very 
environment in which they exist. For the purposes of this study then, the leadership of 
violent religious groups will be divided into three distinct types; ideologues, charismatic 
leaders and collegial leadership. 
2.4.1 Ideologues 
Ideologues, or religious authorities, are generally not directly involved with 
operational matters and may even deny a direct association with a violent group, but they 
exert significant influences through their sermons, publications and rulings. 76 Indeed, an 
ideologue may be unintentional in that his ideas are adopted later by individuals with 
whom they have no relationship, as exemplified by the influence of Shabtai Ben Dov on 
the Jewish Underground. Ideologues may even exert a posthumous influence, living on in 
the form of their published works and influencing succeeding generations of dissent. It 
may be said they perform the role of 'spiritual' but not 'active' leadership. Many religious 
movements have a central religious ideologue who is linked to the religious establishment 
(an easier distinction to make in Judaism and Islam), or they may ignore existing bodies of 
juridical opinion and draw their inspiration directly from scripture. An illustration of the 
former is the role played by Sayyid Muhammed Husayn Fadlallah in Lebanon. Despite 
Fadlallah's apparent connections with Hizballah, he is not part of the leadership, and yet 
for many Lebanese Shiites by the early 1980s he had become "an infallible moral and 
political compass "7', a position true to this day, even extending far beyond Lebanon itself 
BY contrast, the 'self-taught' religious leader such as Juhayman Utaybi or Shoko Asahara, 
are more generally associated with charismatic activism due to their implicit rejection of 
existing religious judicial opinions on violence. 78 In fact, ideologues perform the important 
role of legitimating acts of violence as it is they who explain contemporary events and 
invest them with religious meaning. Individuals who do not have the sanction of a 
76 
BY the same token state actors, particularly in Muslim countries, can also deploy religious ideologues in Order to justify policies and to discredit those of violent groups. An interesting example is the fatwa delivered b FgYptian 
religious authorities against suicide and dissociating the phenomenon from martyrdom. M" Kramer, 'The Oracle of Hizballah, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah', in R. S. Appleby (ed. ), Spokesmen 
for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, 1997, p. 120. ljtaYbi 
did study for a edina under the tutelage 4bdWlah 
al Baz, the two clase 
at the 
hed on 
Islamic 
issues and Utaybi was expelled in 1974, 
of Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn 
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government or broader society to engage in violence find it helpful to have access to a 
higher morality, represented by religion. Clerical sanction is critical for the conduct of 
religious violence itself, particularly so when none of those directly involved are religious 
authorities. The proposed Dome of the Rock attack by the Jewish Underground, for 
example, was shelved in 1982 because none of the rabbis consulted would approve the 
79 plan, and without such approval the participants were unwilling to act. 
2.4.2 Charismatic 
In his Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Max Weber stated that the 
term 'charisma' should be applied to "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he [sic] is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. "80 Charismatic 
leadership can also be seen as the result of a variety of different factors, including a 
situation of social crisis, the character of the leader, the leader's ability to alter values, and 
perceptions of legitimacy. 81 Charismatic leaders set themselves apart through an intimate 
knowledge of religious scripture and tradition and also by exhibiting personal qualities 
which command considerable respect and loyalty from followers, reinforced through 
highly effective communication skills. One observation made of contemporary Islamic 
leaders, but equally true of all the faiths, is that "they are people who exude a moral 
authority that is politically persuasive to a great many people in their respective societies, 
particularly to the 'downtrodden' ... who 
harbour deep resentment over the broken promises 
of their... regimes. "82 Once a charismatic bond' has been established between a leader and 
his followers the leader exercises an increasing degree of influence on the normative 
orientations of his group, and perhaps on those outside the group. Unlike other systems of 
authority, charismatic leadership can exert a significant (or complete) influence over a 
person's value systems. 83 
79 E. Sprinzak, 'Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel', in 
Fundamentalisms and the State, p. 476. 
80 M. Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, 1946, p. 358. 81 See for example R. H. Dekmejian & M. J. Wyszomirski, 'Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahdi of the 
Sudan', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. XIV, # 2,1972, pp. 194-199. 
82 J. Miller, 'The Charismatic Islamists' in M. Kramer (ed. ), Middle East Lectures: Number Two, 1997, p. 39. 
83 A Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, 1961, pp. 203-204. 
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There is little doubt that prominent ideologues, such as al-Banna, the Kooks and 
Qutb, fit the charismatic personality type to a certain extent, but they were never the 
declared instigators of organised, revolutionary religious violence. While an ideologue of 
prominence may be regarded as 'charismatic' (indeed, most are), they do not fall into this 
particular category of 'charismatic leadership' because actual control of group activity is 
not vested in them. Charismatic leadership in the context of religious groups can be an end 
in itself or eventually lead to a collegial leadership system. 8' In those cases where 
leadership remained charismatic, such as those of Utaybi, Kahane or Asahara, the group 
tends to be set on a direct collision course with the state, endangering the existence of both 
group and leader. By the same token, once the charismatic leader is removed, the group in 
most cases can no longer sustain itself. In situations where charismatic leadership gives 
way to a collegial form the prospects for group security and longevity are increased. 
Charismatic leadership in the context of violence is arguably a more volatile form of 
leadership than collegial structures because authority rests with an individual who is the 
sole interpreter of divine instruction and for this same reason charismatic leadership is also 
more prone to emphasis on messianic and apocalyptic expectations. 
2 4.3 Collegial Leadership 
As noted above, collegial leadership frequently grows out of charismatic 
leadership. The founders of groups are frequently charismatic in nature and if the group is 
sufficiently large, pragmatic in its beliefs and does not actively court destruction, then the 
charismatic form will be succeeded by a collective leadership. Collective or collegial 
leadership tends to be the most common form, resulting in greater flexibility in decision 
making and recourse to action, and a more sophisticated organisational structure which is 
difficult for the state to penetrate. Indeed, the nature of a collegial leadership is a key 
indicator of the breadth of an organisational network. Within various collegial leaderships 
mechanisms may be established to bridge different views, thus further reinforcing group 
cohesion and identity. 
" In this regard Dekmejian sees the progression for Islamic groups thus: "Generally, the founders of Islamist 
societies tend to be charismatic while their successors are bureaucrats types operating within a collective 
leadership", H. R. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, pp. 62-63. 
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The collective form is also hierarchical in nature, involving at the top a level where 
decisions on targets are taken and justified according to religious doctrine. This role is 
frequently adopted by a cleric or groups of clerics such as that which presided over the 
activities of the Egyptian al-Jihad at the time of the Sadat assassination, headed by the 
blind Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Judaism and 
Christianity. Beneath this exist a variety of different sub-departments each charged with 
responsibility for a certain specific area such as propaganda or operations. Such structures 
are necessary to co-ordinate and focus the resources and activities of groups with a large 
membership and relatively broad agenda. The collegial form helps ensure group survival 
and is also useful for resolving internal dissent. When a prominent leader is killed, for 
example, the succession must be as quick and uncomplicated as possible in order to ensure 
group cohesion and operational direction. 
2.5 Timing 
The timing of religious violence is important for both temporal and spiritual 
reasons, and so is the group's perception of time itself. There are many dates which hold 
enormous religious significance which are potentially very propitious times for violence 
including specific eschatological dates such as the beginning of the Islamic century and the 
ends of Christian millennia, and anniversaries of martyrdoms or the expected arrival of 
messianic figures. Other anniversaries may relate to post-scriptural times and include acts 
of inter-communal violence such as the 1994 Hebron massacre, the assassination of more 
contemporary 'martyrs', or large scale political events such as the formation of the state of 
Israel or the Second Gulf War. These are what might be described as reactive or revenge 
attacks. A related issue is the perception of time held by a group. As has been noted long 
ago with regards to group violence "[t]he Innermost structure and the mentality of a group 
can never be clearly grasped as when we attempt to understand its conception of time in 
the light of its hopes, yearnings and purposes. "85 Religious perceptions of time identify a 
continuity between past, present and future, and while there may exist a timetable for 
action, tactical goals can be suspended in order to ensure group survival. Due to the 
multiplicity of reasons behind the timing of religious violence, the area will be divided into 
85 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, 1991, p. 209. 
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four different categories. Firstly will be anniversaries of specific events usually celebrated 
as part of a religious festival. Secondly is the category of political or tactical timing. The 
third category is reactive or'tit for tat' violence which follows no predictable pattern and is 
motivated largely by revenge. Fourth and finally are dates relating specifically to messianic 
redemption which are derived from revealed eschatology. 
2.5.1 Anniversaries 
Anniversaries may be dates of long term historical significance, often marked by 
some form of religious festival, or they may commemorate violent acts perpetrated within 
living memory of the group. 86 The most important of these represent a previous experience 
of oppression or struggle endured by a religious community which holds direct resonance 
in the present. 87 These include events such as the anniversary of the martyrdom of al- 
Hussain, the third Shi'a Imam, at the battle of Karbala in 680 C. E, marked each year by the 
festival of Ashura. The Ashura festival is often observed with displays of self-inflicted 
wounds which indicate a willingness to martyrdom, and by martyrdom plays. Religious 
festivals such as this also provide opportunities for groups to aggravate political and inter- 
communal discord by striking during festivals of those of another denomination, 
particularly at places of worship. 88 What is most significant about long term anniversaries 
is a widespread experience of religious fervour which enables militant groups to mobilise 
their followers and potentially other support within their religious community. 
Anniversaries of more recent events are usually acts of revenge. For example, on 
November 27 1994, Hamas killed a Jewish settler, Rabbi Ami Ulami, to mark the first 
anniversary of the death of Khaled Zit, a Hamas commander killed by the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF). The same group was responsible for a dual stabbing and a suicide bombing 
on the six and twelve month anniversaries respectively of the 1994 Hebron massacre. On 
April 19,1995, the Alfred Murrah building in Oklahoma city was bombed, two years after 
86 For an earlier examination of anniversaries in a secular context see B. Cordes, W. Fowler & G. Petty, 
Potentially Significant Dates for Terrorists and Anti Nuclear Extremists, N-1865-DOE, 1982. 87 M. Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Ashura in Twelver 
Shi'ism, 1978, pp. 231-234. gg Baruch Goldstein's attack on the Ibrahim mosque for example was conducted during the middle of Ramadan 
and also during the Jewish festival of Purim, and the FIS hijacking of an Air France plane coincided with Christmas 1995. 
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the destruction of the Branch Davidian compound at Waco Texas. 89 As these examples 
show, the length of time between an original event and the response may vary 
considerably, either as a result of lengthy preparations or as deliberate attempts to once 
again reinforce a group's belief system in a calculated, causal fashion. Yet operations may 
vary over a span of time and geography which target groups find difficult to foresee and 
prepare against. Anniversaries serve the purpose of reinforcing the importance of the past, 
both on the group itself and also on the target community. 
2.5.2 Political or Tactical Timing 
While the concepts of political or tactical timing may appear more familiar to an 
examination of the conduct of secular violence, they are also of great importance in the 
religious context. For religious groups, as with others, alterations in the political status 
quo, domestic or international, may be in the form of threats to be countered or 
opportunities to be taken. Therefore tactical timing may be offensive or defensive in 
nature. Frequently a group is moved to action in order to forestall a government crack 
down, or in order to take advantage of propitious circumstances such as glaring evidence 
of state failure, the conduct of local elections, a military intervention, the visit of a foreign 
head of state, or the conduct of a 'peace process'. Political processes such as the Camp 
David accords and the ensuing Israeli-Palestinian peace process may even be interpreted in 
a religious light and thus engender action. 90 Decisions regarding tactical timing also reveal 
much about a group's leadership dynamics and how seriously the leadership regards 
various changes and events in their environment. Concurrent with this process is the 
group's desire to strike a balance between survival, and threats to the achievement of their 
objectives posed by the state. 
It is also significant that the Oklahoma City bombing occurred on the day the American Revolution formally 
began with the battle of Lexington and Concorde in 1775 and on the day of execution for another right wing 
extremist Richard Wayne Snell. As Mc Veigh later stated, " Any able-bodied adult male, any patriot, is 
responsible for defending his liberty. Just like the minutemen of the revolution", Sunday Times, April 21,1996. 90 In this regard for Jewish groups any political process involving the'land of Israel' is inherently religious. 
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2.5.3 'Reactive' or Tit for Tat' Violence 
These are by far the most numerous and least predictable for the obvious reason 
that they are neither date nor location specific. They are conducted in response to political 
events and acts of violence mostly revolving around revenge. Revenge is a powerful 
motivation, particularly in cases where a group purports to be the protectors of a religious 
community. Examples abound, ranging from smaller scale, local attacks, to larger, 
international incidents. The type of these incident depends upon the degree of group 
sophistication, the ease with which it can project violence, and the seriousness with which 
it regards a particular incident. Once again this form of violence is reflected in group 
nomenclature - the Jewish group 'Terror Against Terror' (TNT), and the label attached to 
much violence perpetrated by Jewish groups during the 1980s of 'vigilante terrorism'91 
show the importance of revenge as a motive in certain contexts. Similarly many Islamic 
groups name operational units after members who have been martyred by the enemy, as 
exemplified by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade of Hamas which is named after a 
Palestinian hero of the 1935 Arab Revolt. The purpose of such nomenclature is again the 
reinforcement of group agenda and group outlook, symbolically linking the name of a 
victim to the response demanded by the group. This pattern of violence can become 
cyclical when a suicide bomber is employed in a revenge attack, at once avenging previous 
martyrs and creating a new one who can then be woven into the rhetoric of justified 
sacrifice and 'sacred war'. 92 
2.5.4 Endtime Events 
A few anniversaries promised by religious tradition, be they specific or open to a 
variety of interpretations, are of enormous eschatological significance. Unlike the 
anniversaries mentioned above, Endtime events are forward looking, anticipating a 
fundamental change from a temporal world order to a spiritual one. Events such as the 
reappearance of the Mahdi, the reconstruction of the Jewish Temple or the Second Coming 
91 See E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim 
Underground' in D. C. Rapoport (ed. ), Inside Terrorist Organisations. 
92 As Juergensmeyer notes religious war may be seen as a blend of sacrifice and martyrdom, "where one 
sacrifices members of the enemy's side and offers up martyrs of one's own", M. Juergensmeyer, 'Sacrifice and 
Cosmic War', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed. ), Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1991, p. 111. 
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form integral parts of redemptive processes and they are open to the involvement of human 
agency. Messianic expectations have led to large, popular social movements at various 
times throughout history and frequently these have become violent. 93 Each religious 
tradition possesses its own varied calculations as to when the time of messianic 
redemption will occur. The attack on the Grand Mosque in 1979, for example, was carried 
out during the first hour of the first day of the Muslim year 1400, the time in Shi'a theology 
traditionally associated with the appearance of the Twelfth Imam. The Ayatollah 
Khomeini was lauded by some of his followers if not as the Mahdi, then as a messenger 
related to him who heralded the return of the Mahdi. 94 In Christianity - although there is no 
strict scriptural basis for such a belief - the millennium is frequently the focus for 
messianic expectations, as can be seen in the rhetoric and ideology of Aum Shinrikyo and 
other groups. 95 Jewish messianic prophecy is concerned with the appearance of the 
messiah which will be preceded by various prophetic events such as the reconstruction of 
the Temple. 96 
The significance of violent acts performed in order to hasten Endtime events lies 
not so much in the physical destruction caused, but in their overwhelming psychological 
effects and the popular reaction they are capable of unleashing. To members of a religious 
community, Endtime events represent the culmination of all prophecy and of temporal 
history itself. And while only a very small percentage of religious violence can be classed 
as primarily messianic in nature, the significance of messianic redemptive messages in all 
the revealed religions is enormous. The most dramatic of these acts are those that aim to 
bring about redemption in a single stroke such as the various plots to clear the Temple 
Mount, despite the fact the messianic promise itself is seen as an ongoing process. The 
unifying features are a sensation of imminence combined with pre-existing paradigms 
which guide the actions of believers. Where these paradigms are ambiguous (as almost all 
93 See for example: M. Grant, The Jews in the Roman World, Chs. 11-15,1973; N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the 
Millennium, 1970; and P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898,1958. 
94 E. Sivan, 'Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution', International Journal for 
Middle Eastern Studies, 21, p. 12. 
95 See D. Thompson, The End of Time: Fear and Faith in the Shadow of the Millennium, 1996. % See for example G. Buchanan, Revelation and Redemption: Jewish Documents of Deliverance From the 
Fall of Jerusalem to the Death of Nahmanides, 1978, and J. Frankel (ed. ), Jews and Messianism in the 
Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning. Vol. 7 of Studies in Contemporary Jewry, 1991. 
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are) a group must make choices concerning which myths to adopt and how a messianic 
plan should be implemented. 97 
2.6 Location 
The location of acts of religiously inspired violence is also an important 
consideration, as is the broader concept of 'sacred space'. Two categories of location 
suggest themselves, that of 'Holy Places', and that of a tactical, temporal variety. Places of 
religious significance are frequently the scene or even the cause of religious violence. 98 
Indeed, as David Rapoport has noted, ethnic and religious groups have in part gained their 
identity through the control of particular places over time. 99 This applies not only to 
specific sites of enormous scriptural significance such the Grand Mosque or the Temple 
Mount, but also to more geographically complex areas such as Hebron, Jerusalem or the 
'Holy Land'. The situational or geographical overlap in Holy sites between the revealed 
religions makes this situation more complex and more volatile. The symbolic and 
ideological motivation of holy places may even be seen in group nomenclature - as 
exemplified by the 'International Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Islamic Holy 
Places', which issued a communique claimed responsibility for the 1998 U. S. embassy 
bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam. 100 Location may also be governed simply by the 
nature of the target, defined around tactical value or temporal significance. Religious 
violence directed against a specific communal group, country or group of countries, may 
find numerous symbolic locations in the form of embassies, aircraft, military installations 
and personnel, and civilians. The two categories of location examined here will be those of 
religious significance, either associated with scripture and religious history or with the 
cultural history of a particular people, and that of temporal significance, either associated 
with tactical practicality or as a symbolic component of a secular enemy's society and 
power. 
97 D. C. Rapoport, Messianic Sanctions for Terror', p. 210. 
98 Most historians of religion regard devotion to 'sacred space' as one of the oldest and most universal of 
religious practices. For an examination of the sacredness of'place' in religion see M. Eliade, Patterns in 
Comparative Religion, pp. 367-387. 
99 D. C. Rapoport, 'Observations on the Importance of Space in Violent Ethno-Religious Strife', paper 
presented at the seminar Religious and Ethnic Conflict', University of California, Riverside, April 28,1995. 
00 Alternatively the 'Army for the Liberation of the Islamic Sanctities'. A1-Hayat, 8 Aug. 98 - BBC/SWB, 
ME13301, MED/1, August 10,1998. 
60 
2.6.1 Religious Significance 
The location for certain acts of violence is significant because they are regarded as 
sacred by one or more of the antagonists in the 'cosmic struggle'. Indeed it is the 
commonality of many sacred sights to the various revealed religions which makes their 
combined examination so interesting. The Middle East itself contains all the major sacred 
sights of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (including the probable locations of all potential 
messianic events contained in Jewish and Christian eschatology), and what is now called 
the state of Israel contains all those of significance which are sacred to more than one of 
the revealed religions, in particular Jerusalem (the important exception being right-wing 
American groups who regard the U. S. as the new promised land). As well as sites of long 
term historical import, other locations of religious significance include all places of 
worship. Attacks on these locations such as the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron or attacks on 
synagogues and Jewish cemeteries by American right groups magnify the degree of 
offence caused to a target group. Historically these symbolic attacks and the reactions they 
cause are not new. When Jerusalem was conquered at the end of the first crusade in 1099 
many Crusaders felt they were avenging the sacking of the Holy Sepulchre by the Fatamid 
Caliph Al-Hakim ninety years earlier and after the conquest the communal insult was 
compounded when a cross was erected on the roof of the Dome of the Rock. 101 Similar 
patterns have been repeated in religious conflicts throughout the ages. 
2.6.2 Temporal Significance 
The majority of attacks carried out by religious groups are made against targets 
which are of an avowedly temporal nature. In many respects this does not effect their 
symbolic nature or psychological effects, although the sacredness of a target will amplify 
the effect and reaction to an attack. Temporal locations may be significant because they 
are the site of concentrations of the enemy, or because they represent the physical 
embodiment of the cosmic foe such as government facilities, embassies or military 
installations. Along side these 'high value' temporal locations are other, seemingly more 
101 AI-Hakim allegedly renamed the Church Kanisat al-Qumama - 'the Church of the Dungheap'. C. Coughlin, 
A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions, p. 169. In a similar vein of insult the Israeli flag was raised above the 
Dome after its capture in 1967, only to be removed on the orders of the then defence minister, Moshe Dayan. 
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mundane ones such as transport systems and other basic public infrastructure. A similar 
process is engaged by secular groups, as typified by left-wing organisations which attack 
the basis of capitalist society and those which perpetuate that society. 102 In the case of the 
latter, prediction and prevention are more difficult due to the sheer number of targets to be 
protected. The symbolic value of such locations cannot be underestimated, representing in 
many cases the physical embodiment of the power and stability of a society itself. 103 These 
are examples of 'cultural centres' in a society which are "concentrated loci of serious acts; 
they consist in the point or points in a society where its leading ideas come together with 
its leading institutions to create an arena in which events that most vitally affect its 
members' lives take place. "104 Attacks on such targets not only have a powerful 
psychological impact on the general populace but also challenge the claims to legitimacy 
made by both state and society. 
2.7 The Targets 
Whatever the mechanisms which compel a group to turn towards violence, one of 
the first steps is to decide which people will be targeted. 105 Ideology is certainly an 
important indicator in this regard, but so too are the context within which a group operates, 
the opportunities that present themselves, the constraints that exist and the group's overall 
objectives. 106 Target groups may be defined simply along the lines of religious belief, or 
along those of political significance, but in both cases they are perceived as threatening the 
true faith. While it is true for some religious groups that the "absence of a constituency in 
the secular terrorist sense leads to a sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a 
102 Within left-wing groups there has been a similar variation in tactical procedure brought about by ideology, 
leadership and various constraining forces. See M. Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as 
a Product of Strategic Choice', in W. Reich (ed. ), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, 
States of Mind, 1990. 
103 M. Juergensmeyer, 'Terror Mandated by God', Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997, p. 19. 
104 C. Geertz, 'Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power', in C. Geertz (ed. ), Local 
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology, 1993, p. 122-123. See also E. Shils, 'Charisma, 
Order and Status' American Sociological Review, April 1965. Shils states that these cultural centres (unlike 
spbolic religious locations) have "nothing to do with geometry and little with geography". 
'S Targets in this case refers to people, the other primary category of target type physical targets in the form 
of locations, having been examined above. Psychological targets are not considered here. 
106 For the role of ideology in target selection see C. Drake, 'The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target 
Selection', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. X, # 2,1988. 
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virtually open ended category of targets" 107, certain group types favour certain types of 
targets depending upon their capabilities and declared objectives. Target groups may 
include members of other religions and 'apostates' of the same religion, simple but all 
embracing distinctions created by a Manichaean outlook. The latter group frequently 
includes religious moderates and what may be described as 'co-opted' religious 
establishments as well as members of the political hierarchy and the repressive apparatus. 
The 'apostate' label is a powerful rhetorical device for revolutionary groups as deviation 
from a religion is frequently perceived to be a worse crime than ignorance of it. 
tos 
Scripture provides a rich source for identifying and describing target groups, and in some 
cases defining appropriate punishments and creating contemporary associations with 
scriptural enemies. When examining target selection, it is important to recognise the gap 
between the rhetoric employed by a group to define and demonise a target group and those 
targets which actually become the victims of violence. 
2.7.1 Other Religions 
As befits a group of religions with a long history of inter-communal violence, other 
religions are frequently the targets of religious groups. The common feature of such targets 
is that they are believed to pose a threat - both theological and physical - to the manifest 
destiny of a 'chosen' people, a threat which frequently transcends time. The most obvious 
contemporary examples of sub-state group inter-communal violence include: Israeli Jews - 
especially settlers - and members of the Jewish Diaspora targeted by Islamic groups and 
also Christian groups; Palestinian Muslims, and to a lesser extent Christians, targeted by 
Jewish groups; and what might best be referred to as the 'Christian West' - primarily the 
U. S. and her allies, long a target of Islamic groups. Scriptural and historical identifications 
of enemies are commonly evoked which establishes a direct continuity between the divine 
word and contemporary circumstances. Israeli Jewish fundamentalists, for example, have 
107 B. Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative, RAND P- 
7834, RAND, Santa Monica, p. 3. A similar situation can be seen in secular terrorism and violence where it 
has been noted that "the most accessible targets [in a corrupt society] are human beings and it is all too easy to 
expand the concept of enemy to encompass anyone who is not actively involved in overthrowing the society. " 
G. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures, 2nd. edn., 1989. 
108 In Islam for example there is a hadith transmitted through the Prophet's uncle Al-Abbas which says 
"Whoever changes his religion, kill him. " The death penalty for apostasy is not mentioned in the Quran and 
opinions vary as to the appropriate punishment. See J. W. Bowker, Voices of Islam, 1995, p. 100-105. 
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likened the Arabs to the biblical Amalekites who were wiped out by the order of God as a 
punishment for their treachery and cruelty towards the nation of Israel. 109 The Arabs have 
been identified as similarly 'treacherous and cruel', and, it is claimed, are direct 
descendants of the Amalekites thus providing a scriptural justification for their 
extermination. 110 Christian groups such as Aryan Nations refer to Jews as 'the children of 
Satan (or darkness)' that must be destroyed. "' Similarly, militant Islamic groups frequently 
label Christians as 'Crusaders', evoking traditions of the first bloody attempts at oppression 
by the Christian West of Muslim lands. 112 
2.7.2 Apostates 
An equally common target group - and in many cases both a more threatening and 
accessible one - is that of apostates. Again scriptural parallels and justifications are 
commonly employed to bridge the space between past and present. Shi'a Muslims, for 
example, evoke the character of Yazid, the 'false' Umayyid caliph, responsible for the 
martyrdom of Hussain at Karbala, when referring to 'un-Islamic' leaders. "-' In Egypt, the 
despotic historical figure of the 'pharaoh' has been used to describe the incumbent ruler, 
and American right-wing Christian groups refer to the federal government as the Zionist 
Occupation Government (ZOG), a manifestation of the 'Jewish Antichrist' - Jews ''. 
themselves being identified as the first apostates. The label of apostasy is as useful and 
irrefutable as that of 'non-believer', imbuing the victim, as it does, with qualities offensive 
to God, thus making the victim's demise an act pleasing in the eyes of God. It is important 
to note that this group also includes those targeted because they are publicly moderate, 
109 See Exodus 17: 8-16. "Then the Lord said to Moses, 'Write this for a memorial in the book and recount it 
in the hearing of Joshua, that I will utterly blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under the heaven". 
(Exodus 17: 14). 
110 See for example the article by Rabbi Israel Hess published in the student magazine of Bar-Ilan University 
entitled "Genocide: A Commandment of the Torah", Bar Kol, February 26,1980. 
11 "We believe that there are literal children of Satan in the world today.. . that the caananite 
Jew is the natural 
enemy of our Aryan (White) Race. This is attested by scripture and all secular history" (my italics), The 
Aryan Nations Website, http: //www. nidlink. com, September 29,1998. The theological justification offered for 
this statement comes from Genesis 3: 15,1 John 3: 12, 
12 See for example K. Armstrong, Holy Wars: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World, 1988. A 
group alliance announced in February 1998, the 'International Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders', 
illustrates this last example well. 
113 For example, Khomeini's identification of the Shah of Iran as Yazid. See D. Brumberg, 'Khomeini's Legacy: 
Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice' in R. S. Appleby (ed. ), Spokesmen for the Despised, pp. 22,30,38. 
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because they are key members of the regime which a group finds itself struggling with, or 
because they are part of the security apparatus which keeps this regime secure or in power. 
2.8 Tactics 
The actual tactics employed by violent religious groups are, by and large, the same 
as those employed by violent secular groups. The key determinants are the group's 
ideological orientation and goals, and the context within which it operates. Consequently 
the tactics employed might range from those of an almost pacific nature such as the 
provision of welfare services or participation in a political process, to an array of 
conventional and unconventional violent activities. The employment of conventional 
methods such as bombings and shootings by religious groups however, has certainly been 
more prolific and destructive than that of violent secular groups, reflecting both the nature 
of their struggle and their world outlook. "4 Seen within the mythological context of 'holy 
war' it has also been noted that "[t]he exact manner in which God's hosts go about 
subduing the world is relatively unimportant, as long as it is done with sufficient ferocity 
to effectively communicate the immensity of His rage. i15 Once again context and group 
type are major determinants of the mode and scale of violence employed. The larger and 
more mature a group then the broader the scope for employing different means. By the 
same token, group size and organisation are not the sole determinants of sophistication. 
Some of the larger scale acts of violence perpetrated in the 1980s and 1990s have 
ostensibly been the work of a small group - the Oklahoma city and World Trade Centre 
bombings are prime examples. 116 
The construction of more powerful improvised explosive devices has meant that 
bombing has remained the most commonly used tool in the religious extremists arsenal. 
This is tempered by the fact that the area of greatest concern is the possibility that religious 
groups will acquire and use some form of unconventional weapon. This is worrying 
primarily because religious groups are widely believed to have fewer normative constraints 
1 14 In 1995 for example while religious terrorists committed only 25 per cent of international terrorist incidents 
they were responsible for 58 per cent of the fatalities. See B. & D. Hoffman, 'Chronology of International 
terrorism, 1995', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VIII, # 3,1996, pp. 87-127. 
115 J. Aho, Religious Mythology and the An of War, p. 156. 116 This is the phenomenon of the so-called 'amateur terrorist'. See B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 185, 
302-204. 
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with regard to violence, because for a variety of reasons unconventional technology is 
more accessible than before, and also because unconventional weapons possess a unique 
symbolic, religious value. In the words of the French sociologist Jacques Ellul, the use of 
unconventional weapons by groups such as Aum Shinrikyo is an example of the 
'democratisation of evil': "an increasing number of people among us is acquiring 
instruments that can hurt our neighbours or unknown people.. . 
This is the democratisation 
of evil. Means that were once reserved for the powerful ... and which once constituted their 
privilege, are now within the reach of all of us. "11 Such weapons may be seen as 
approximating the scriptural felling hand of God, and their effects similar to those brought 
about by the various cataclysms associated with Endtime myths. Although examples of 
actual unconventional usage by a religious group are limited to those conducted by the 
Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, there are many other recorded incidents which suggest this 
is an area of greater concern than it ever was with secular terrorism and violence. What 
must also be considered when examining the tactics employed is the actual trajectory of 
the violence. Groups may escalate or de-escalate according to alterations within their 
operational context. A group might, for example, believe that the degree of persecution 
which they face or a change in the socio-political balance warrants a rapid escalation in 
violent activity. These considerations must be made with a view to what a group is 
attempting to achieve and the timetable by which it is operating. 
2.8.1 Conventional 
The tools of violent religious groups are virtually the same as those which have 
been employed by secular groups. Differences, however, exist in the scale and apparently 
indiscriminate nature of their deployment, and a propensity in a number of cases to accept 
'martyrdom' in the process. 118 Because the struggle is a sacred one, large scale casualties 
are desirable, partially contradicting previous adages concerning secular terror such as 
117 J. Ellul, What I Believe, 1989, p. 60. "g It is important to note that suicide attacks are not confined to religiously motivated violence. Significant 
exceptions are the Sri Lankan LTTE and the Turkish PKK. For an analysis of religious and secular suicide 
bombing see R. Gunaratna, 'Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat', Janes Intelligence Review, Vol. XII, # 4, 
2000, pp. 52-55. 
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"terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. " 119 Apart from traditions 
of, and sanctions for violence, all three religions (particularly Christianity and Islam) 
possess potent traditions of martyrdom, but it is the activist Islamic tradition which has 
seen the greatest expression in the contemporary era, accounting for all revealed religious 
suicide bombings. The most common forms of attack are shooting and bombings, the latter 
representing by far the lions share of fatalities caused by religious violence. '20 Other 
modes include kidnappings, hijackings , stabbings, 
intimidation and bank robberies. While 
most of these merely borrow the tools of modernity for practicality's sake, others such as 
stabbings (while obviously less efficient) may have resonance with symbolic, historical 
precedents such the Shi'ite Assassins or the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii. 
The environment within which a group operates is also an important consideration 
for a tactical programme. A group such as Hizballah which operates in a relatively 
permissive security environment has been able to employ heavy weapons and extensive 
large scale guerrilla tactics. Most other groups which do not operate in such contexts tend 
to employ whatever weaponry is available en situ or can be smuggled in from elsewhere 
under the group's own auspices or with the help of a sympathetic state sponsor. The tactics 
in such cases are correspondingly subdued, and tend to remain proportional. In this respect 
groups which have members that belong to the security apparatus of the state may have 
opportunities to pilfer national armouries. Moreover certain tactics such as extensive, large 
scale bombing campaigns cannot realistically be pursued in a comparatively non- 
permissive environment due to limited resources and fears of security crack downs which 
may even threaten the group's survival. 
2.8.2 Unconventional 
Religious groups also appear to be the most likely candidate to employ 
unconventional weapons because of their absolute, Manichaean world outlook, and 
119 B. Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict' in D. Carlton &C. Schaerf (eds. ), 
International Terrorism and World Security, 1975, p. 16. It should also be noted that the'warning message', a 
'mitigating device employed in some secular bombings is never used by religious groups. 
120 See for example the various instalments of the RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism 
published in Terrorism and Political Violence. 
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because of the scriptural resonance many of these weapons possess. 121 All accounts of the 
apocalypse offer examples of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, accounts of plague 
and pestilence, and the cleansing properties of fire and unconventional weapons can be 
seen to represent these various Endtime disasters foreseen in much scripture. Apocalyptic 
fire in the form of nuclear weapons which will transform the wicked into ashes under the 
feet of the righteous''`', or create the "lake of fire burning with brimstone"123 into which 
the `beast' and his armies will be plunged. The mysterious felling power of the hand of 
God can be identified in the form of radiation devices, nerve and chemical agents, and the 
ancient scriptural idea of `plague' could be manifested in the form of biological 
weapons. 124 All these weapons have scriptural parallels if interpreted appropriately, and 
their mere existence and availability for use (whether at the state or sub-state level) can be 
seen as a partial fulfilment of prophecy. 
Whether extremist groups will employ unconventional weapons has been a 
topic of debate amongst specialists for many years, a debate which intensified following 
the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attacks. 125 The general contention that extremist use of 
unconventional weapons is of particular concern since 1990 rests on two concurrent 
trends: the growing availability of unconventional weapons and materials, and the 
increasing number of groups with extreme ideologies. 126 Actual incidents, however, have 
been slow to manifest themselves, and following the Tokyo attack there has been no 
evidence that the incident has inspired imitative behaviour as other tactics such as 
121 For the purposes of this thesis the term unconventional weapons will include nuclear explosive devices and 
radiological contaminants, lethal chemical agents and lethal biological agents (toxins and pathogens). It will 
not include large high explosive devices or attacks on critical infrastructure. 
122 Malachi 4: 3. 
123 Revelation 19: 20. 
124 The fifth plague from the book of Exodus (9: 1-7) for example is commonly assumed to be Anthrax. 125 Some examples of the literature concerned with this debate include: R. Purver, Chemical and Biological 
Terrorism: The Threat According to Open Literature, 1995; W. Laquer, Post-modern Terrorism', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. LXXV, # 5,1996, pp. 24-36; B. Roberts (ed. ), Terrorism With Chemical and Biological 
Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses, 1997; E. Sprinzak, 'The Great Superterrorism Scare', Foreign 
Policy, # 112,1998, pp. 110-124; A. Carter, J. Deutch & P. Zelikow, 'Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the 
New Danger', Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXXVII, # 6,1998, pp. 80-94; A. Falkenrath, 'Confronting Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Terrorism', Survival, Vol. XL, # 3,1998, pp. 43-65; K. Kamp, J. Pilat & J. Stern 
with a response by R Falkenrath, 'WMD Terrorism: An Exchange', Survival, Vol. XL, # 4,1999, pp. 168- 
183; J. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, 1999; and J. Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 2000. 
126 W Laqueur, 'The New Face of Terrorism', Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXI, # 4,1998, p. 171. 
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hijacking, kidnapping and barricade and hostage taking have in the past. 127 If there is a 
consensus on extremist groups employing unconventional weapons it would seem to be 
that the most likely candidates are religiously motivated groups, especially those with a 
strong messianic or apocalyptic message, ethnic groups motivated by race hate or revenge 
and small anti-social groups alienated from society. 128 While the first of these categories is 
avowedly religious in orientation, the second could very well have a clear religious 
affiliation and the third - if not a religious group or splinter - would almost certainly draw 
upon the secular apocalyptic. The second and third categories would therefore have an 
ideological structure and justificatory process similar to that laid out above. What this 
thesis intends to add to the debate is a holistic understanding of the appeal unconventional 
weapons have to extremist religious organisations and the constraints governing their use 
and the broader applicability of these observations to organisations which are not 
specifically religious in orientation. 
2.9 Categorisation of Groups 
While the identification of these six elements reveals patterns of behaviour and 
perception, their examination alone does not shed much light on a particular group's 
objectives and the related issue of the group's propensity to engage in violence. The six 
elements of religious violence therefore will be used to analyse the behaviour of ten case 
studies in three different group types, mainstream, core and messianic. Each group type 
category will include one primary example from each of the revealed religions (except for 
the mainstream category as outlined above) which will be examined in depth, and these in 
turn will be supported by the greater body of evidence available from other cases. Various 
categorisations of violent extremist groups have been offered in the past. James Q. Wilson, 
for instance, offers three incentive based categorisations: 'issue oriented' or protest groups 
which pursue a single specific objective; ideological or revolutionary groups which offer a 
comprehensive rejection of the existing status quo and a future replacement; and 
redemptive, moralistic group which concentrate primarily on changing the lives of group 
127 B. Jenkins, 'The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View? ', in B. Roberts (ed. ), Hype or 
Reality? The "New Terrorism" and Mass Casualty Attacks, 2000, p. 244. 
128 E. Sprinzak, 'On Not Overstating the Problem', in B. Roberts (ed. ), Hype or Reality?, pp. 6-7, and K. 
Campbell, 'On Not Understanding the Problem', in Hype or Reality?, pp. 30-34. 
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members. '29 Such a categorisation is problematic when considering a broad array of 
religious groups. While Crenshaw claims that "[r]eligious or sacred terrorism falls into this 
[redemptive] category"130, most religious groups do offer a critique of the temporal polity 
and posit a religiously based alternative. While there are group typologies offered for 
specific manifestations of religious violence - most notably that offered by H. R. 
Dekmejian13' for Islamic groups, and that by J. Kaplan13` with regard to Christian groups - 
these suffer from the obvious and necessary drawback of communal particularism. An 
alternative form of typology is offered by E. Sprinzak which examines the forms of 
terrorism. These include revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, 
racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism and youth culture terrorism. These are not mutually 
exclusive and encompass both secular and religious violence. 133 As will be seen below 
when the three group types are elaborated upon they represent a synthesis of existing 
typologies in terms of group and form. 
As with all group structures the three chosen are dynamic and adaptive. The space 
between these categories is thus permeable and a group may move from one form to 
another in the same way a group may change its leadership structure or the tactics it 
chooses to employ. Indeed, changes in leadership may lead a group to move from one 
category to another. Such movements are governed by the environment within which they 
exist and operate, or more simply by the passage of time. Indeed the significance and 
impact of contemporary religious violence is largely the result of the passage of time as 
technological advances have brought rapid developments in the areas of communications, 
transport and weaponry. 134 Groups may even interact or co-operate with, or be related to, 
others in different categories. There is, for example, an undeniable relationship to be found 
between the mainstream Aryan Nations organisation and various core and messianic right- 
wing Christian groups, such as the Order, as there is between Kach and its various off- 
shoots, or the broad influence in Muslim groups of the Muslim Brotherhood. While there 
129 J. Q. Wilson, Political Organisations, 1973, pp. 48-51. 
130 M. Crenshaw, 'Theories of Terrorism', p. 20. 
131 Islam in Revolution, 1995. 
"2 Right Wing Violence in North America', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VII, # 1,1995. 133 ESprinzak, 'Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization', 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VII, # 1, pp. 22-37. 
134 G. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 25. While Wardlaw does not discuss religious terrorism specifically the 
obvious similarity between the secular and religious here is note-worthy. 
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are superficial similarities between categories - core groups, for example, are small in size 
but so are many messianic ones - each is made distinct in its own right, by differing 
attitudes towards the six parameter elements. The following section will explain in detail 
the criteria which delineate each group category and also offer some preliminary 
observations on the relationship between the three group categories and the six primary 
elements. 
2.9.1 Mainstream Groups 
Mainstream groups tend to possess a larger popular support base than the other two 
group types, a support base frequently swelled because they offer simple solutions to 
apparently intractable social, economic and political problems and engage in extensive 
social welfare activities. The leadership structure of mainstream groups is bureaucratic due 
to their size and the core premises of the group established by prominent ideologues both 
past and present. Leadership, however, may have originally begun as a charismatic form, 
and elements within the leadership structure may well be regarded as charismatic. Due to 
their size and activities such groups often seek involvement in the mainstream political 
process if the circumstances are suitable. The four primary cases chosen for the 
mainstream category are Aryan Nations, Kach and Hizballah and Hamas. Each of these 
groups arose from vastly different, specific crisis environments and consequently have 
different relationships to the conduct of violence - Kach and Aryan Nations, for example, 
have never embarked on declared, systematic violent campaigns, primarily for reasons of 
group survival, although they have been instrumental in inciting and justifying violence. 
Similar patterns are discernible in the social relationships of all four groups and their 
attitudes towards the place of violence in socio-religious change. 
The Mainstream group category is important because it represents an evolutionary 
form whereby a mixture of violence and socio-political involvement are employed to 
achieve objectives. To borrow terminology employed in examinations of political Islam, 
they embrace both revolutionary and reformist ideological poles. 135 It is evolutionary in 
nature because it is a form that groups may move into having exhausted the possibilities of 
las See for instance 0. Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 1994, pp. 24,77-80, and G. Keppel, Muslim 
Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, 1985, pp. 16-20. 
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violent struggle and embraced an opportunity to transform themselves. Such groups 
frequently find it convenient to conduct violent activities through a 'military wing' or 
through direct affiliates in order to conceal the involvement of the parent group. In a 
decentralised example such as that of Aryan Nations violence may be conducted by an 
'affiliated' (yet independent) organisation which is acting with no tactical or strategic 
guidance from the parent group. Mainstream groups in such cases perform the function of 
providing the ideological raw material for violent splinter groups consisting of disaffected 
individuals who have rejected the programme of the parent movement as being too 
quietist. 136 Generally due to their size, longevity and relatively broad agenda, groups in this 
category may also have links to other groups through the influence of common beliefs or 
of common personalities. '37 
2.9.2 Core Groups 
Core groups are similar to mainstream groups in terms of a revolutionary approach 
although they generally eschew political involvement and have a smaller popular support 
base. This last point is not to say there is no widespread sympathy for their actions, merely 
that their scope of action, which is basically limited to violence, has a corresponding effect 
on membership structure and numbers, and on the group's claims for legitimacy. 
Organisationally such groups do not possess large memberships primarily for security 
reasons, and also deem structured popular support as unnecessary due to their rejection of 
mainstream political processes. Leadership may be exclusively charismatic or exhibit a 
bureaucratic dimension depending on the group's course of action and longevity. The three 
main cases for the core category are Eyal, the Order and the PIJ. The core group type also 
covers a spectrum of professionalism -a phenomenon more noticeable in groups which 
stress the primacy of violent struggle. 138 Groups such as the primary cases and others may 
have varying degrees of success (and certainly ambitions) in a limited, domestic context, 
but they tend not to engage in activities beyond their primary area of geographical concern 
136 The Order is a good example. As Richard Butler, founder of Aryan Nations explained of them "In their 
view the program... to reach the masses of our people through truth, logic, and reasonableness would never be 
allowed because the media are controlled by our enemies. " Washington Post, December 26,1984. 
137 In the case of Jewish groups the relationship between the JDL, Kach, Kahane Chai and Eyal is instructive. 138 E. Sprinzak, From Theory to Practice: Developing Early Warning Indicators for Terrorism, 1998. 
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due to their size and capabilities. Others such as those belonging to the so called Bin 
Laden network' may be effective on a large scale (physically and psychologically) in an 
international context. Generally speaking their relatively small size and cellular structure 
makes them comparatively more difficult to detect. '39 
2.9.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic Groups 
The last category, messianic groups, is certainly the most radical and also the least 
common. 140 The primary cases chosen for this category are the Jewish Underground, Aum 
Shinrikyo and the Saudi Ikhwan. These also tend to be small in size (there are of course 
exceptions. Aum Shinrikyo for instance had a large international following, although the 
numbers engaged in, or cognisant of, violence were relatively small) and governed by a 
charismatic leadership. The elements of mass support and social welfare are almost always 
absent''" and the activities of the group centre around the conduct of symbolic violent 
actions which have more to do with actively participating in a redemptive process 
promised by scriptural prophecy than with instituting a new temporal order. The keys to 
violent messianism are the perceptions that the messianic age and all the trials and 
tribulations associated with it are not only imminent but are also subject to human agency. 
As D. C. Rapoport notes "[o]nce a messianic advent is seen as imminent, particular 
elements of a messianic doctrine become critical in pulling a believer in the direction of 
terror. " '4` The particular elements centre around the acceptability of extra-normal violence 
and also that believers need to prove to themselves (and/or their God) that redemption is 
still relevant. The messianic group type is the most likely to employ specific messianic 
dating traditions when considering the timing and location of violence. Because of this 
attitude towards the purpose of violence and their small size, such groups seldom have the 
139 The logical extreme of this is an act perpetrated by an individual in isolation from a group. While these are 
the most difficult to detect they should not be dismissed as aberrations as in most cases some form of group 
affiliation can be observed. 
140 It should be noted that Dekmejian's definition of a messianic group concerns itself more with puritanical 
revivalism rather than the quest for active messianic redemption. See Islam in Revolution, p. 60. 
141 The obvious exception is Aum Shinrikyo which at its peak had a membership of about 40,000 people in 
many different countries and which was responsible for a large business empire. Having said this it is important 
to note that those responsible for planning and committing violent acts constitute an identifiable central core. 
142 D. C. Rapoport, Why Does Messianism Produce Terrorism?, unpublished paper read at the eighty-first 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 1985, abstract. 
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opportunity to reach maturity - indeed this would be contrary to their belief that the end of 
the temporal order is not only assured but is also imminent. 
At the same time many messianic groups do exhibit a tendency to relate their 
messianic objectives to the temporal political situation, indeed their perception of a 
redemptive crisis environment is generally driven, or at least informed by, temporal 
political events. A quick examination of the three primary cases illustrates this well. 
Before the plot to destroy the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount could be carried out, 
the Jewish Underground concerned itself with bombing and shooting a limited range of 
'conventional' targets. '43 Aum Shinrikyo contested a Japanese general election and had 
organised a shadow government for after the apocalypse. '44 And despite the Saudi Ikhwan 
declaring a Mahdi in the Grand Mosque, Juhayman Utaybi's programme of action was as 
much one of messianic expectation as one which employed religious rhetoric to condemn 
the perceived iniquities of the Saudi regime and demand the institution of an Islamic 
government similar to that which existed in seventh century Arabia. Nonetheless, all three 
were moved to conduct or plan violent acts which transcended those imagined by other 
group categories. 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to establish the scope of this thesis and to outline the 
framework for analysis which will be applied to examine the phenomenon of revealed 
religious violence. The six key components of this framework span the process of 
rationalising and justifying violence to the practical considerations governing violent 
conduct, and it is these six components which will form the basis of the ensuing chapters. 
The first of these is the formation of an ideological programme, drawing on religious 
traditions and contextualised within a specific, contemporary crisis environment. This 
ideological programme defines a group's world view and provides the sanctions for violent 
activity. The second is the role of leadership which exerts an enormous degree of influence 
tai In the words of one commentator "a close study of the Underground suggests that while it was mainly 
shaped by the millenarian theology of Yehuda Etzion, it ended up with rugged vigilante terrorism". E. 
Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', Inside Terrorist Organisations, p. 207. 
144 Aum's resounding electoral failure certainly contributed to the group's attitude towards extra-normative 
violence. 
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on the formation of ideology and in all cases the form that leadership takes will determine 
a group's programme of action and by extension its course and longevity. The third 
component is time, both the group's perception of time itself and the role of timing in 
carrying out violent acts. The fourth factor is the role of location in terms of both sacred 
spaces and the temporal practicalities of where to strike for maximum effect. The fifth 
element is the identification of target groups, basically those who pose the contemporary 
threat or crisis and defined as part of the ideological programme using religious imagery. 
The final component is the tactics employed to achieve the groups objectives. These may 
be non-violent in the form of political mobilisation, they may be conventional tactics or, in 
extreme cases, they may even be unconventional in nature. These six components will be 
used to examine ten case which represent a cross section of revealed religious extremist 
groups which have arisen in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The case studies in 
turn have been divided into three distinct categories, mainstream, core and 
messianic/apocalyptic which will enable comparisons to be made both within religions and 
between them. The starting point for understanding any organised violent religious 
movement is an examination of the processes involved in adapting and interpreting 
traditional messages within a contemporary crisis milieu and reformulating these messages 
into an ideology which justifies violence. 
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Chapter III 
The Formation of Ideology 
The objective of this chapter is to consider the process whereby violence is deemed 
necessary in terms of a group's overall strategy and declared objectives, and then is 
rationalised through the selective construction of an ideological programme. All the cases 
examined spring from belief systems which have similar scriptural messages, an 
eschatology of some form and justifications for violence against an identifiable other. The 
process of rationalisation for these groups is therefore dependent upon selectively 
interpreting existing religious traditions within a contemporary context and selecting those 
elements which provide clear sanctions for violence, according activism a divine and 
immutable legitimacy. The degree to which different elements within this justification are 
emphasised between group categories and also within them depends upon the 
environmental context in which a group exists and its perception of the historical role it 
sees itself as playing. These differences, however, are largely a matter of emphasis rather 
than the holistic, fundamental religious message. 
As shown in Chapter Two, five common components of religious extremist 
ideology have been identified but within these five there is much scope for variation. 
Mainstream groups by virtue of their involvement in mainstream society must ensure that 
their ideological message, while clearly defining the boundaries of the struggle (both 
physical and metaphysical), retains a strong temporal relevance. This is certainly true of 
Kach, even though it has been socially excluded, and of Aryan Nations which represents a 
relatively limited constituency. In the case of groups like Hizballah and Hamas, this 
message must also remain sufficiently flexible to allow for participation in mainstream 
politics in order to bridge their ultimate ideological objectives with day to day reality. For 
core groups, the issue of flexibility is of less importance and although the temporal 
dimension is still crucial because these groups identify themselves as 'revolutionary 
vanguards', the devotion to violent means in a grossly uneven struggle allows for more 
extreme expressions of religious rhetoric. For messianic and apocalyptic groups, the 
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ideological emphasis relies heavily on eschatological traditions and the group's role in the 
fulfilment of End-time prophecy. For these groups the scale and finality of the perceived 
struggle warrants an even more exclusive and immutable ideological programme 
3.1 Mainstream Groups 
3.1.1 Kach 
In terms of ideology the Kach movement represents the most significant and 
influential Jewish extremist group to this date. While the organisation itself has suffered 
from various setbacks - especially the death of its founder and primary ideologue, and 
proscription by the Israeli and U. S. governments - the ideological justifications for 
violence embodied in Kach have become highly influential in the contemporary Israeli 
extreme right. The justifications and rationalisations offered by Kach looked back to a 
previous era of Jewish militance through the lens of centuries of subjugation and 
persecution. Militance and extremism functioned as a form of revenge which would ensure 
the survival and prosperity of the newly recreated Jewish state. 
While Meir Kahane drew on a long line of Jewish activists for inspiration and 
ideas, "his theory of revenge is [both] unprecedented and new. "' The ideology developed 
by the Jewish Defence League (JDL), which demanded that Jews be protected wherever 
they were victimised, was unique. Before he moved to Israel and formed Kach, Kahane 
initially used his position as an associate editor of the Brooklyn Jewish Press to propagate 
his ideas on Jewish strength and the need to defend the Jewish faith with force in his 
weekly column. Equally, books based on the ideas expressed in the column further 
elaborated his ideology, spreading his ideas throughout the Jewish community, initially 
only in the U. S. but later in Europe, South Africa and Israel. Around the core of his ideas 
sprang a violently anti-gentile message which fed on the insecurities of Jews in the 
Diaspora, and especially those in Israel. Kahane's world view situated the Jewish people in 
' E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed. ), 
Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1991, p. 59. Interestingly Sprinzak notes similarities between 
the ideology of Kahane and that of the Franz Fannon - primarily the idea that the violence of the oppressed 
directed against the oppressors can heal the former's psychological wounds. See also B. M. Perinbam, Holy 
Violence: The Revolutionary Thought of Fran Fannon, 1982. 
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a hostile world where they were assailed by different enemies, but enemies united by their 
attempts to oppress or destroy the Jewish people and to frustrate the fulfilment of Jewish 
religious destiny. 
Golden Age Myth 
The Golden Age as perceived by Kach is both redemptive and traditional. It is 
redemptive in that, like the Gush Emunim, the organisation saw the establishment of the 
state of Israel and the 1967 war as direct evidence that the Jewish redemptive process was 
unfolding. The 1967 war was of particular significance resulting as it did in the conquest 
of biblical Judea and Samaria and in direct control over the Western Wall. It is traditional 
in that the core values emphasised by the group rely on obedience to the Halakah. Central 
to the achievement of this Golden Age is a willingness on the part of the Jewish people to 
repent. In 1973 and 1974, when he was leader of the JDL, Kahane expressed his 
redemptive ideas in two essays, Israel's Eternity and Victory and Numbers 23: 9.2 The 
basic idea centres around a relatively obscure biblical passage from Isaiah: "I, the Lord, 
will hasten it [the redemption] in its time"3, and upon the rabbinical interpretation "[i]f 
they, the Jews, merit it I will hurry it. If they do not merit it then it will come 'in its time'. "a 
Redemption is inevitable, but the haste and ease with which it comes about depends 
entirely on the behaviour of the Jewish people. 
If there is an historical Golden Age that fits with Kach's theories of revenge and 
legitimate violence then it is the 'revolutionary' period of the Maccabean and the first and 
second revolts. While separated by centuries (the Maccabean revolt began in the second 
century BC and the Bar Khokhba revolt ended in 135 AD) these events have a common 
thread of a religiously based revolt against gentile oppression: "[i]t was not in the role of 
Mahatma Ghandi that the Jews fought at Massada; the men of Bar-Kokhba and Judah 
Maccabee never went to a Quaker meeting. i5 Like so much of Kach's rhetoric, this 
2 1973 and 1984 respectively. 
3 Isaiah 60: 22. 
4 Sanhedrin 93. 
s M. Kahane, The Story of the Jewish Defence League, 1975, p. 99-100. The use of significant historical 
figures in Kach rhetoric is important. At his funeral for example Baruch Goldstein was compared by Rabbi 
Ariel to Samson and Judah the Maccabee. See U. Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle 
East, 1998, p. 120. 
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contains an explicit rejection of passive resistance and other non-violent strategies which 
had contributed to the miseries of the Jewish people for so long. The political dimension of 
this age is akin to that of the Davidic era where the Jewish people are ruled by a divinely 
sanctioned warrior and scholar king and a powerful priestly, judicial class. 
Theft of Culture 
While the Arab population of Israel was seen by Kach as the primary enemy and 
focus of aggression, the greater cultural threat was seen as coming from the liberal West. 
Judaism and Zionism were identified as being fundamentally different to liberal Western 
modes of thought and were described in dialectical terms. According to Kahane: "[t]he one 
represents spiritual life and the other death, the one truth and the other falsehood and 
delusion, the one blessing and the other curse. ,6 Politically, this idea was extended to 
claim that while Judaism is based on the idea that the truth is known, democracy is based 
on the idea that we cannot know the truth. Thus, the clearest political expression of 
Western liberal democracy is seen as a denial of religious identity and destiny. Kahane 
assertively called for the removal of gentile culture: 
"[c]leanse the Land of Israel of the foreign pollution of gentilized culture. The 
foreigners vomit their sickness onto us and we swallow it eagerly.. . Let us vomit them 
out and purge the Holy Land of any vestiges of impurity. "' 
The adoption of democracy by the state of Israel meant that the fulfilment of the Jewish 
messianic promise was severely jeopardised. In the words of one Kach leader, Baruch 
Marzel: "[we] feel God gave us in the six-day war, with a miracle, this country. We are 
taking this present from God and tossing it away. They are breaking every holy thing in 
this country, the Government, in a very brutal way. i8 This disdain, however, did not 
prevent Kach from actively participating in democratic politics. On the contrary, this was 
to be the route by which Kach could subvert and reconstitute Israeli society and politics. 
Concrete plans to more effectively preserve Jewish culture were enumerated in the 
group's political programme (one that was to be instituted if Kach ever achieved power). 
These included: a legal prohibition on marriage and sexual relations between Jews and 
6 M. Kahane, Uncomfortable Questions for Comfortable Jews, 1987, p. 179. 
7 Village Voice, October 2,1984. 
8 The New York Times, November 19,1995. 
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Gentiles, especially between Jews and Arabs which was "[t]he worst of the tragedy and the 
most dangerous"9; a complete overhaul of schooling curricula with a heavy emphasis to be 
placed on the study of Judaism and the creation of a sense of "Jewish pridei10; the media, 
both print and electronic, would play a similar role in promoting Judaism and Jewish 
nationalism and at the same time pornography would be banned in order to preserve "[t]he 
purity and sanctity of the Jewish soul""; missionary work in Israel would be forbidden; 
and general issues concerning traditional attitudes towards dress, dietary laws, and respect 
for the Sabbath. This comprehensive idea of cultural theft has survived the death of 
Kahane, and still retains the same historic resonance. In the words of Benjamin Kahane 
"[t]oday's cultural war is more intense than the Hasmonean one. The Hellenization has 
penetrated our lives very deeply and its ideas have influenced even the 'national' and 
religious public. " 12 
Scripturalism 
The scriptural underpinnings of Kach ideology are found primarily in the Old 
Testament, much of which deals with the various struggles of the Jewish people against 
other religious and tribal enemies and also with the deviations and perfidy of Jews 
themselves. Examples of the first category include the Amalekites who are likened to 
contemporary Arabs. Examples of the second are numerous and typified by verses such as 
Jeremiah 2: 13: "[f]or My people have committed two evils; they have forsaken Me, the 
fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns - broken cisterns - that can hold no 
water [sic]. "13 Kach even justified the selectivity of their religious rhetoric. Of the ruling 
"[w]hat is hateful to you do not do unto your fellow people", Kahane urged that such 
teaching was inappropriate in such difficult and critical times. 14 Kahane went further with 
reference to 'apostate' Jews by saying "[t]he Torah says to burn out the evil from our midst. 
Indeed, the Rabbis of the Talmud bring down the verse, "and thou shalt love thy fellow 
Jew as thyself' in order to explain why we must kill the Jew who is deserving of death in a 
9 M. Kahane, Uncomfortable Questions, p. 206. 
10 Ibid., p. 268. 
1tM. Kahane, Uncomfortable Questions, p. 271. '2 B. Kahane, 'A Cultural War', in M. Ben Horin (ed. ), Baruch Hagever, p. 256 13 M. Kahane, Jews and Jews, http: //www. geocities. com/Athens/1651/writings/jew_jew. htm. 14 R. Mergui & P. Simonnot, Israel's Ayatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in Israel, 1987, p. 87. 
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humane way. "15 In Kahane's Listen World, Listen Jew, the humiliations perpetrated against 
the Jewish people are described as hillul hashem or 'profanation of the name' (of God). 16 
Acts such as ending the exile or protecting Jews, this is Kiddush hashem or 'sanctification 
of the divine name'. '7 In the outlook of Kach, injustice and evil are proof that God is absent 
from the world. By contrast, "God's victory and revenge over His enemies, the evildoers" - 
through the instruments of his faithful servants - proves that "[v]erily there is a G-d Who 
judges on earth! (Psalms 58: 12). r18 
Manichaean World View 
The primary focus of Kach's Manicheaen world view are the gentiles, for it is they 
and their predecessors who are responsible for the sufferings and humiliations of the 
Jewish people. As one observer notes: "Kahane's hostility to the Gentiles may not be the 
cardinal presupposition of his political theology, but it is certainly its most dominant 
emotional and psychological theme. "19 In this way the movement defined the Jewish 
people as distinct from the other peoples of the world who were not merely ambivalent 
about the Jews, but were at best hostile to, at worst bent on the destruction of the Jews -a 
supposition with ample historical evidence to support it. In terms of violence itself, 
Kahane saw the world simply in terms of good and evil, making the argument that 
"[v]iolence against evil is not the same as violence against good. i2° Violence in the course 
of protecting Jewish interests was simply 'love of Jewry' (ahavat Yisroel) which led 
Kahane to proclaim that "Jewish violence in defence of Jewish interests is never bad. "Z' 
The secondary focus is against apostate or irreligious Jews. When referring to 
secular Israelis, Kahane frequently employed the term 'Hellenist'. It is important to note 
that in English this term is not a literal translation from the Hebrew, which apart from the 
's The Jewish Press, August 31,1984. 
16 Hi/1ul hashem must be avoided because it breaks the third commandment. The phrase is used to denote 
anything which might bring disgrace to Judaism or the Jewish people. 17 In Leviticus 22: 32 the Israelites are commanded not to profane God's name, and the rabbis taught that the 
Lord's name could be sanctified in three ways: prayer, excellent conduct and martyrdom. The last has always 
been the ultimate expression of Kiddush hashem. 
18 M. Kahane, Revenge - The Jewish Approach, http: //www. geocities. com/Athens/1651/writings/venge. htm. 19 E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe', p. 50. 
20 M. Kahane, The Story of the Jewish Defense League, p. 141. 21 ibid. p. 142. 
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cultural dimension also connotes betrayal. 22 At the time of the Maccabean revolt, Jews 
who conformed to Greek culture and religion were considered traitors and some were 
executed. 23 The Hellenists in the contemporary world are closely identified with the 
modernism of Western gentiles. Other references, especially those applied to Arabs, were 
far less subtle. At assemblies held by Kach at the Hebrew University branches in Haifa and 
Acre, Kahane would open with the greeting "shalom Jews, shalom dogs", the latter part of 
the salutation directed at Arabs in the audience. 24 The dehumanising process was taken to 
the extent that Kach ideology denied there were good and bad Arabs, instead there were 
only 'stupid' and 'clever' ones - the former openly declared their desire for the destruction 
of Israel and the latter merely disguised their true intentions by talking of compromise and 
coexistence. The idea of expelling Arabs from Israel was also described in more than 
secular political terms: 
"[t]he Arabs of Israel represent Hillul Hashem (defamation of God) in its starkest 
form.. 
. Their transfer 
from the land of Israel... is a religious issue, a religious 
obligation, a commandment to erase Hillul Hashem... Let us remove the Arabs from 
Israel and bring the redemption. "25 
Messianic Vision 
The messianic world view of Kach is similar to that held by the Gush Emunim and 
most of the Israeli religious right both past and present. This world view centred around 
the sovereignty of the Jewish people over the whole land of Israel, a sovereignty granted 
"by virtue of the promise of the almighty and the historical fact of tenure and unbroken 
hope of return based on that promise. , 26 Territories 'liberated' during the 1967 war were as 
much a part of this promise as any other, Jewish settlements should be allowed throughout 
the land of Israel and all the 'liberated' lands should be integrated into Israel proper. 
Moreover, the capture of the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest site, further identified these 
22 R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or'Shalom Jews, Shalom 
Dogs)', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. IV, # 1,1992, p. 56, fn. 42. 
23 In 1983 three Kach activists were interviewed by Ha'aretz and described a night of violence against Arabs 
and Arab property in Jerusalem and Hebron. Kahane later expressed approval of their actions and lauded them 
as Maccabees', Haaret. - November 27,1984. 
24 R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism', p. 56. 
25 M. Kahane, They Must Go, 1981, pp. 275-276. 
26 M. Kahane, Listen World, Listen Jew, 1983, p. 137. 
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victories with the Jewish redemptive process. Kahane, however, was to a certain extent 
more extreme than the Rabbis Kook. For Kahane, Jewish sovereignty solves only the 
problem of exile and not that of redress for the damage caused to the Jewish people by 
gentiles over time immemorial. Revenge was thus an integral part of Kahane's ideological 
message - not just reactive revenge but historical revenge. Kach's vision of 
history, 
especially the emphasis on legitimisation of violence in the face of ongoing tragedy, has 
been described as 'catastrophic messianism'. 27 The term implies both the redemptive 
message of the organisation, as well as the overwhelming role violence and suffering (at 
the hands of gentiles or at the hands of a disappointed and vengeful God) play in Kach's 
outlook. While there is no firm messianic programme many of the proposed actions of 
Kach such as the expulsion of the Arab population, the institution of religious law and the 
removal of the Muslim presence from the Temple Mount28 may certainly be seen as steps 
towards the fulfilment of messianic prophecy. Where the Kach ideology can be described 
as messianic it is certainly activist in orientation. Indeed, Kahane is quoted as saying in 
1980: 
"[a] horrible world war is coming, tens of millions of people will die. It will be the 
apocalypse. God will punish us for forsaking him. But we must have faith. The 
Messiah will come.. . The amount of suffering we endure will 
depend upon what we 
do between now and the end. That's up to us - it's not up to God. X29 
The formation of Kach's ideology sprang from the belief that the Jewish people 
have always been oppressed by gentiles and that this has never been more true than in the 
contemporary period. This belief established a clear dialectic outlook and identified an 
equally clear threat to Jewish culture. The ideology was amply supported by previous 
historical experiences which appeared to reflect contemporary events, and by the selective 
use of Jewish religious tradition, drawing primarily on militant concepts. Of equal 
27 E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe', pp. 51-54. Alternatively, as Gershom Scholem notes "Jewish 
messianism is in its origins and by its nature - and this cannot be sufficiently emphasised -a theory of 
catastrophe. This theory stresses the revolutionary, cataclysmic element in the transition from every historical 
present to the messianic future". The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality, 
1971, p. 7. 
2S The Muslim Holy sites according to Kahane would be "carefully removed" to another location, presumably 
outside Israel. Kahane, Uncomfortable Question, p. 272-273. This contrasts with Kahane's arrest and 
detention in 1980 for plotting to bomb the Temple Mount mosques. 
29 Quoted in R. I. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', The New York Review of Books, 1986, p. 19. 
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importance was the underlying expectation of Jewish messianic redemption which, it was 
felt, the establishment of Israel and the Six Day War had done so much to realise. Kach's 
ideological programme then establishes a pattern common to many of the following 
groups, that of preserving and embellishing religious identity and aiding in the realisation 
of religious destiny. 
3.1.2 Aryan Nations 
The Ideology of the Aryan Nations may best be described as a form of Christian 
Identity theology but is also heavily influenced by Nazi ideology and symbolism. 
30 The 
organisation was originally formed around William Butler's Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian, one of the several hundred ministries which loosely compose the Christian 
Identity movement. The basic ideological tenets revolved around the belief that the true 
chosen people of the twelve tribes of Israel are not Jews but are "Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, 
Teutonic, Scandinavian [and] Celtic peoples of the earth", that Jews are the literal off- 
spring of Satan, that blacks (and all other non-white "mud peoples") are sub-human, and 
that the U. S. Government (or Zionist occupation Government, ZOG31) is illegal, being 
tainted by its association with a global, anti-Aryan, Jewish conspiracy, described in one 
publication as "[t]he Communist Jewry US/UN de facto Government. "32 
The formation of this basic' theology spans two centuries and follows a 
complicated path, indicative of a process reflected in the lack of a rigid Identity orthodoxy 
and the decentralised nature of the movement. The primary core of the ideological 
framework, the idea that 'Aryans' are the direct descendants of the Lost Tribes of Israel, 
comes from nineteenth century British Israelism. This idea in its original, quietist form was 
understandably a popular one in late Victorian society, reflecting at the time the self- 
righteous superiority of what was then the world's greatest imperial power. Many of the 
30 The adherence of Aryan Nations and other groups to Nazi ideology is another example of the diversity of 
American religious militants. Reverend Michael Bray, convicted of bombing abortion clinics, and an ardent 
and unrepentant supporter of violence against abortion shares the view of a U. S. government conspiracy to 
subvert moral values, but he has equated President Clinton and the U. S. government to Hitler and the Nazi 
regime. M. Juergensmeyer, 'Christian Violence in America', Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, July 1998, Vol. 558, p. 90. 
31 Alternatively there is the Church of the Creator 'JOG' (Jewish Occupation Government) or Identity pastor 
Paul Hall's BOG (Babylonian Occupation Government). 
32 See Fed'Gov Media Conspiracy, http: //www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic/anthrax. html. 
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adherents of this idea were members of the mobile bourgeoisie of British society and so 
British-Israelism was disseminated throughout the Empire. It was through Canada, and 
more specifically the writings of Rev. W. H. Poole, that British Israelism found its way into 
the United States where it became entwined with a virulent anti-Semitism and transformed 
itself into what is now called Christian Identity. 
Golden Age Myth 
While the ideology of Aryan Nations identifies two biblical Golden Age states - 
those of before the fall from Grace and the time following the Tribulation33 - the most 
commonly identified Golden Age effectively concerns itself with racial purity within a 
more or less familiar social context. As one of the goals of Aryan Nations states: 
"[t]o ordain and establish a state representing a voice and will of the Aryan Race as a 
DIVINELY ORDAINED, SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT PEOPLE, separated from 
all alien, mongrel people in every sphere of their individual and national life. "34 
The myth is concerned more with circumstances than a desire to return to an identifiable 
historical period. As one Aryan Nations publication opines "we have but one hope for 
redemption, that is to return to our own ordained life order as is pointed out in 2 Chr. 7-14 
[sic]. "35 The Golden Age in reality becomes a more familiar scenario replete with all the 
trappings of modernity and 'civilisation' but devoid of certain racial groups, corrupt and 
intrusive government and other destructive influences such as drugs and homosexuality 
which have contributed so much to the decadence and decay of modern society. In this 
respect the proposed 'Aryan National State' "permits the participation of governed in 
government... [and] population has a common racial root, common language and a 
common understanding of right and wrong. "36 If indeed an immediate historical Golden 
33 A third time identified by Identity theology is the era before the Babylonian exile. See for example G. 
Winrod, 'Killing the Jews', The Winrod Letter, # 212, Sept. 1982. 
34 R. G. Butler, The Aryan Warrior, http: //www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic1-AryanWarrior. htnil. 
35 Aryan Nations pamphlet, Declaration to Regain a National State, n. d. 2 Chronicles 7: 14 reads "If my 
people who are called by My name will humble themselves, and pray and seek My face, and turn from their 
wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin and heal their land". (NKJV) 36 See R. G. Butler, The Aryan Warrior. This web site contains sections that deal with Property, Industry and 
Finance, Aryan Youth, Aryan Women, Aryan Law, The Army, Constitution and World Outlook, Culture, 
Agriculture, Education, Christianity and the Aryan Vision of God, Economics, Jewish Communism, Attitude 
to Other Religions and Citizenship. Each of these is illustrated with a Nazi propaganda poster. 
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Age is harkened back to, it is the American Revolutionary period, an era of 'great patriots' 
37 
marked by a religiously defined attempt to reorder society according to the will of God. 
Threat to Culture 
The idea of the white Aryan as the bearer of 'true' culture is common throughout 
white supremacy movements both secular and religious. In the case of Christian Identity 
ideology generally, and that of Aryan Nations in particular, the notion of cultural theft - in 
this case of a religious birthright and destiny - is as old as history itself. But the theft is not 
a single event divorced from the present, it is an ongoing, evolving process, one in which 
the government is complicit, and resulting in an America where "millions of whites watch 
in abject dismay and hopelessness as their great culture, heritage and civilisation evaporate 
in the teaming, stinking, seething milieu of so many alien races, cultures and Gods. "38 
Proof of this threat is offered in numerous Aryan Nations pamphlets and publications, 
leading to the common conclusion that "[w]e [the white race] are the most endangered 
species. 09 These ideas have been held constant over time. After an Aryan Nations 
member's armed assault on a Jewish day care centre in 1999, Richard Butler stated in his 
defence that "[t]here's a war against the white race. There's a war of extermination against 
the white male. tv40 
There also exists the belief that the white race is the object of a form of genocide 
through a campaign of deliberate race mixing. 4' The governmental conspiratorial element 
of Aryan Nations ideology predicts a radical alteration of American society at some 
undisclosed point in the future "beginning with the slaughter of every good Christian man, 
woman and child of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian - Aryan Nations. v942 The number 
and variety of Aryan Nations declared enemies ensures that few aspects of 'white' culture 
remain untainted, and that the only way this culture can be reclaimed is through violent 
struggle. The primary assailant against white Aryan culture is assumed to be the Jew, and 
37 See R. G. Butler, The Aryan Warrior. 
38 Aryan Nations Newsletter, # 42,1982. 
39 Aryan Nations pamphlet, The Death of the White Race, 1981. 
40 Miami Herald, August 12,1999. 
41 See for example Calling our Nation, # 25,1989. By this logic Jewish claims to being victims of genocide 
are fraudulent. 
42 See Fed'Gov Media Conspiracy, http: //www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic/anthrax. html. 
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by extension the Jews influence throughout government, finance and popular culture. Part 
of the Aryan Nations creed claims that "[t]he Jew is like a destroying virus that attacks our 
racial body to destroy our Aryan culture and the purity of our race. "43 The perceived 
influence of Satanic Jewish forces over the American government also implies that the rule 
of law is redundant: "[t]he ADL-JDL alien mongrel scum openly brag of their aggressive 
war upon our existence and that the present courts are 'their courts"'A, and because of this 
the secular law of the state must be replaced by "[t]he Law of our God, as given to all the 
prophets, [which] declares that the murderer forfeits his life before God and men. t, 45 
Scriptural ism 
The scriptural dimension of Aryan Nations Ideology is both eclectic and narrow in 
scope. The primary documents are the Bible and the constitution, both in their original 
form 'devoid of any and all unlawful amendments and alterations. ' 46 Numerous and 
disparate examples are employed in order to demonstrate the basic tents. '? Liberal 
interpretations and textual ambiguities in this respect are important. The idea that 
Revelations 2: 9, "I know your works, tribulation, and poverty (but you are rich); and I 
know the blasphemy of those who say they are Jews and are not, but are a synagogue of 
Satan", is proof of the satanic genealogy of the Jewish people is tenuous. However, 
religious proofs are seldom found in isolation and further evidence is offered of Jews being 
the 'synagogue of Satan' 8, and of Cain being the first offspring of Eve and Satan. 
49 Blacks 
and other non-white races are identified as 'mud peoples' and animals, the usual scriptural 
basis for this being the creation of animals in Genesis 1: 24.5° Injunctions against other 
groups, such as homosexuals, are also identified. Selected passages are used to justify the 
use of violence against the state, especially Luke 22: 36, and Mathew 21: 12 where Jesus 
43 Aryan Nations 'We Believe', AN website. 
44 R. G. Butler, The Aryan Warrior. 
45 ibid. 
46 While the constitution cannot be regarded as 'scripture' in the technical sense, it is a vital document for 
placing the group within an existing and accepted secular legal and socio-historical tradition. 
47 One of the options displayed on the Aryan Nations website is "Where to look in the Bible on Negroes and 
Jews". See http: //www. nidlink. com/%7Earyanvic. The organisation also provides'proof of the insidious 
nature of Jewish beliefs. See Why Jews are Persecuted for Their Religion, Aryan Nations Pamphlet, n. d.. 
48 Revelations 3: 9. 
49 Genesis 3: 1 & 3: 15, John 8: 35 and I John 3: 12. The most coherent theological exposition on this theory is 
that offered by Dan Gayman in his The Two Seeds of Genesis 3: 15,1994. 
50 V. Larson, 'Christian Identity', Christian Research Journal, 1992, pp. 20-24. 
87 
physically removes the money changers from the Temple. 
51 The relatively tenuous nature 
of these 'proofs' is disguised by their selective nature and to a certain degree reinforced by 
the mystical ambiguity of the language used. Their eclectic nature reflects the overarching 
themes of'racial origin' and 'final battle'. The most commonly employed books are those at 
the beginning of the Old Testament and those at the end of the New Testament, Genesis, 
Exodus and Revelations. 52 
It is important to note that secular literature plays an equally important role in both 
promoting this basic ideology and placing it firmly into a contemporary context. When 
Christian Identity doctrine was initially being formulated, it was secular organs and tracts 
such as Henry Ford's Dearborn Independent, and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
which provided the anti-Semitic emphasis. 53 Patriotic texts from the era of the American 
Revolution are also of great importance. Writers, such as John Locke, are invoked to prove 
that a state of war exists and that there exists no judge from whom justice can be sought: 
"[w]e, the remnant of the Aryan Race, shall again remove the blind fear that binds us 
in the cesspool of Jewry and acknowledge that we are in a state of war individually 
and collectively, and that there exists no common judge on earth to whom we can 
appeal. "54 
Scripturalism may also be used in an inverted form. Aryan Nations publications have 
shown examples of Jewish scripture which are anti-Christian or heretical in nature. 55 It is 
also important to note that Aryan Nation's theology can best be described as shallow, the 
group relies on other more intellectual examinations and expositions offered by Identity 
thinkers such as Dan Gayman and concocts almost none of its own. 
51 New York Times Magazine, January 8,1995. 
52 The gospels are generally used to show Jesus' disapproval of the Jewish people. More unusually the Dead 
Sea Scrolls are cited as a validation of'Christian Israel Identity'. The difficulty in deciphering the scrolls and 
the restrictive practices placed on them is regarded as a conspiratorial attempt to prevent the 'truth' of the 
scrolls from being revealed. See http: //www. nidlink/--aryanvic/dss-scrolls. html. 
33 It is interesting to note that the Hamas charter also makes mention of the Protocols: "Their plan is embodied 
in the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' , and their present conduct 
is the best proof of what we are saying". 
Charter of Hamas, 1988, Ch. 5, Art. 32, p. 30. The earliest known conspiratorial anti-Jewish tract dates from 
3rd century BC in the form of a book dedication by the Egyptian High Priest at Heliopolis to King Ptolomy 
Philadelphus. See M. Grant, The Jews in the Roman World, 1973, p. 24. 
sa R. G. Butler, The Aryan Warrior, http: //www. nidlink. cony/--aryanvic/1-AryanWarrior. html. This particular 
web page begins with the injunction 'Graphics intensive; read John Locke while it loads'. 
ss See for example Fed, Gov Media Conspiracy, http: //www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic/anthrax. html. Two of these 
purported 'proofs' are Sanhedrin 59 a: "Murdering Goyim is like killing a wild animal" and Giffin 57 a: "Jesus 
is in hell and is being punished by being boiled in semen. Christians are boiled in dung". 
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Manichaean World View 
When the nascent ideology of the movement emerged in the 1940s, it stressed the 
'two seeds' doctrine to support the contention that whites are the descendants of the lost 
tribes. By this it is held that Aryans are descended of Adam and are thus the true Israelites, 
and that Jews are descended of a union between Eve and Satan, the result of which, Cain, 
becomes the first descendent of the Dark Prince. The Jews are thus transformed from the 
British-Israeli view of a group of non-believers who will have to be converted at some 
point along the way to redemption, to the literal descendants of Satan who must be 
exterminated. Similarly other races and social groups are depicted as 'sub-human'. All non- 
white races are thus 'mud peoples', and there are similarly derogatory characterisations for 
homosexuals and those who have deviated from the fundamental precepts of the Bible. 
56 It 
is, however, the association of Jews as being evil which provides the powerful Manicheaen 
dimension - not only are they the cosmic 'other' they are the literal descendants of the 
forces of darkness themselves - the so called "synagogue of Satan. 
07 The totality of the 
struggle and the major protagonists in it can be seen by statements such as those made by 
Thom Robb at the 1986 Aryan World Congress: "There is a war in America today. In one 
camp is the federal government headed by the Jew. Their goal is to destroy us. Our goal is 
to destroy them. There is no middle ground. There is only right and wrong. "58 
Messianic Vision 
The Apocalyptic and messianic ideas contained within the movement's ideology are 
an essential element in the scriptural message. The cosmic foe is seen to exist all around in 
the form of the federal government with all its attendant departments, authorities, rules and 
regulations, and in the Jewish and non-white communities. The omnipresence of these 
groups is proof of the immediate threat they pose to the Aryan race: 
56 For an examination of this demonology see J. Aho, This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy, 
1994, pp. 108-112. 
57 Revelations 2: 9. See also Revelations 3: 9 and John 8: 44. 
58 Thom Robb, keynote address, Aryan World Congress, Hayden Lake, Idaho, July 12,1986. Cited in J. Aho, 
The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, p. 76. 
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"[w]e believe there is a day of reckoning. The Usurper will be thrown out by the 
terrible might of Yahwah's people, as they return to their roots and their special 
destiny. We know there is soon to be a day of judgement and a day when Christ's 
Kingdom will be established on earth as it is in heaven. "59 
The final battle of revelations is seen as a race war. The totality of this struggle is outlined 
in numerous group publications, although the End is frequently portrayed in more temporal 
frames of reference: "[w]e will have a national racist state at whatever price is necessary. 
Just as our forefathers purchased their freedom in blood, so must we. We have to kill the 
bastards. v, 60 Identity then explicitly rejects the quietist fundamentalist Christian belief of 
the rapture when the faithful are lifted up into thin air to wait out the horrors of the 
Tribulation. The Identity believer must remain behind in order to ensure the fulfilment of 
God's will. 
The formation of Aryan Nation's ideology has been shaped by a sense of acute 
threat to the White race. This belief has been bolstered by a highly selective interpretation 
of the bible which sees the Aryan race as the true chosen people and simultaneously 
identifies the Jews as the literal offspring of Satan and other races as sub-human. 
Furthermore, the interrelationships between these groups and the US government is seen in 
a severely conspiratorial light. As with Kach and other groups, the Golden Age sought is 
linked to the group's messianic expectations -a cataclysmic final struggle with 'the forces 
of darkness' defined in the Manichaean outlook will result in a purified and perfected 
society. Unlike Kach, Hizballah and Hamas, the Aryan Nations rejection of mainstream 
societal participation means that the group's ideology relies more heavily on the 
expectation of the final struggle. 
3.1.3 Hizballah 
The ideology of Hizballah may best be described as Shi'ite pan-Islamist, one which 
is informed to a certain extent by religious and political links to the republic of Iran. 61 The 
59 Aryan Nations Website. 
60 Aryan Nations Newsletter, # 42,1982. 
61 The earliest of these links date back to the early sixteenth century when Iran's new Safavid ruler decided to 
make Shi'ism the official religion of his new state. H. Cobban, 'The Growth of Shi'ite Power in Lebanon and its 
Implications for the Future' in J. Cole & N. Keddie (eds. ), Shi'ism and Social Protest, 1986, p. 139. 
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proximity of Hizballah's ideology to that of Iran is demonstrated by the group's 
subscription to Khomeini's theory of al-wali al-faqih (government by the 'just 
jurisconsult'), whereby the decisions of the ; just jurisconsult are to be obeyed in the absence 
of the twelfth Imam. 62 Both the ideological lineage and clerical hierarchy of the 
organisation reflect the principle teachings of Twelver Shi'ism and the centrality of 
religious jurisprudence. The ideology of the group has also been greatly moulded by its 
context, primarily the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the subsequent Israeli presence in 
southern Lebanon, and also the broader historical legacy of Shi'ite political and socio- 
economic marginalisation within Lebanese politics and society. The pan-Islamic ideology 
stresses a phased, incremental strategy whereby foreign influence and interference will be 
removed from Lebanon, an Islamic Republic will be established in Lebanon, Jerusalem 
will be liberated and ultimately a wider Islamic community (Ummah) will be created 
beyond Lebanon's borders. 
Golden Age Myth 
In terms of this long term strategy, the ultimate historical Golden Age can be seen 
as a mixture of the first Muslim community at Medina and the high water marks of various 
Muslim dynasties through the ages. In the more immediate term, the ideal sought is a an 
Islamic state within Lebanon. As for the community of the oppressed beyond the borders 
of Lebanon, Hizballah expects "all the oppressed to be able to study the divine message in 
order to bring justice, peace and tranquillity to the world. , 63 Thus the Golden Age begins 
by the gradual expansion of Islamic government, much as it did between the 7th and the 
15th centuries, which creates an ever growing zone of justice and liberty, peace and 
tranquillity. This pan-Islamic ideology is also dependent upon the group's unity with 
revolutionary Iran, the importance of which can be seen in Sheikh Fadlallah's statement 
that "we should first defend the Islamic Revolution and Iran before considering the 
formation of a second Islamic state. "TM Part of the pan-Islamic mission is the liberation of 
Jerusalem (al-Quds), an objective which adds an eschatological dimension to the group's 
struggle against Israel. Jerusalem is the only major Islamic Holy place not controlled by 
62 See A. R. Norton, Amal and the Shia: Smiggle for the Soul of Lebanon, 1987, pp. 167-187. 
63 ibid. 
64 Al-Haqiqa, November 3,1987. 
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Muslims and as such forms an historical and contemporary symbolic focal point 
for 
Hizballah and many other militant Islamic organisations. 
a:. 
Theft of Culture 
During the 1970s, three different sets of crises conspired to give rise to a sensation 
of cultural threat amongst Lebanese Shi'ites. The first was external in the form of secular 
Western influence (and later direct military interventions in 1958 and 1983) and the 
intrusions of secular Arab politics. The second and third were domestic -a growing 
Muslim population in a society where the Maronite-led Christians controlled a 
disproportionate amount of political power and wealth under the 1943 National Pact. The 
Shi'a community had always occupied an inferior socio-economic position within the 
Maronite dominated confessional system, a position reinforced by the static nature of the 
political system, leading to the adoption of powerful rhetorical tools such as the 
'disinherited' and 'dispossessed'. Subsidiary to this was endemic financial corruption within 
the political system which helped further alienate the Shi'a. In terms of this the Shi'a of 
Lebanon extended their cultural ties with the Shi'a communities of Iraq and Iran - 
especially at the level of clerical leadership. From the inception of Hizballah Islamic 
government has been held. to be the only form which "is capable of guaranteeing justice 
and liberty for all", and of "preventing further... attempts of imperialistic infiltration into 
our country. ', 65 The advent of such a political system would certainly ensure the Shi'a 
cultural identity. Over time the primary threat to culture has varied according to political 
context and is best seen by examining Hizballah's physical enemies. Initially the Christian 
militias, Palestinians and rival Muslim militias, then later the foreign elements of the Multi 
National Force (MNF) and until the present Israel, and always supported by a conservative, 
anti-western dogma. 66 
J- 
65 'An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program', The Jerusalem Quarterly, # 48, pp. 111-116,1986. 
66 The moral and cultural superiority of Islam (and indeed all religions) is a powerful tool in justifying 
violence. For example the spiritual leader of al-Gamma, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, has spoken against tourist 
boats and hotels as 'sinful' and claimed that "the lands of the Muslims will not become bordellos for sinners of 
every race and colour". Los Angeles Times, March 5,1993. 
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Scriptural ism 
The centrality of scripture for Hizballah is shown most obviously in the name of 
the group itself, derived from the Quran and meaning the followers of Allah in contrast to 
the followers of Satan (hi_b-ush-Shaytan). 67 As with all overt symbols employed by 
religious groups this helps to reinforce both the legitimacy and sanctity of the group. 
Violent actions carried out by Hizballah are also justified in minute details by Hizballah 
leaders as being in accordance with Islamic norms of morality and justice. There is no 
shortage of such justifications, an extreme example being the claim that the ultimate 
destruction of Israel is a Quranic 'fact'. 68 Many of these leaders themselves are the 
foremost Shi'ite scholars in Lebanon respected for their learning and understanding of 
religious interpretation, even when their interpretations seem to contradict Islamic 
teachings. Condoning the method of suicide bombing is a good example. Suicide is never 
mentioned in the Quran, but is strongly condemned in Hadith69, and the accepted 
theological view is that suicide is a great sin. In this instance, suicide is not identified as 
such but as martyrdom, an experience that is both acceptable and extremely resonant in 
Shi'ite tradition. Hostage taking is another action which has no obvious precedent in 
Islamic law and which the Hizballah leadership of the 1980s had great difficulty in 
justifying. 7° Scriptural justifications and defence for actions in the case of Hizballah must 
also be looked at in regard to performance. Justifications for more extreme acts of self- 
sacrificing operations were more forthcoming than those for hostage taking and 
kidnapping because it was more scriptually contentious and required justification .71 
One 
scriptural image and identity, that of the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein at the battle of 
Karbala in the 7th century, has also helped add popular legitimacy to martyrdom 
operations. Not only does this example sanctify the role of martyrdom in conflict, it is also 
a powerful symbol of struggle against tyrants. Annually the martyrdom of Hussein is 
celebrated by the Shi'ites during the festival of Ashura which is not just a religious 
67 B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, 1988, p. 123. 68 Sheikh Abu Al-Waheel Al Ansari, 'The Termination of "Israel": A Quranic Fact', Nida'ul Islam, # 20,1997. 69 "Whoever throws himself from a cliff and commits suicide is throwing himself into the fires of 
hell... Whoever kills himself with a weapon will hold that weapon stabbing himself forever in the fire of hell. " 
Hadith Bukhari 7: 670. 
70 According to Sheikh Fadlallah it was "forbidden to kidnap or kill an innocent person because one has a 
score to settle with a head of state", FBIS, March 12,1986. 71 See M. Kramer, 'The Moral Logic of Hizballah', in W. Reich (ed. ) Origins of Terrorism, 1990. 
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occasion but one which practically and symbolically recalls the historical, political status 
of the Shi'ites as an oppressed and deprived community. The current suffering of the 
community is thus recast into an ongoing historical persecution. As one commentator has 
observed, the 'Karbala paradigm' lies at the centre of Shi'a history as it set the Shi'a apart. 
"Kerbala [sic] casts a long shadow; for the faithful it annulled time and distance. 02 
Furthermore in the early 1970s, Musa al Sadr had brought a new interpretation of Karbala, 
altering it from a sorrowful reminder of Shi'a isolation and defeat to a celebration of 
defiance in the face of forced submission to injustice. 73 
Manichaean World View 
The Manicheaen dimension of Hizballah ideology divides the world into 
mustakbirun (the oppressors) and mustad'afun (the oppressed). 74 The struggle between 
these two communities is perceived as one which can only be conducted through 
revolutionary struggle and activism. This divide is intensified by the view the organisation 
has of itself. Hizballah does not see itself as a party but rather as a "mission" or "a way of 
life. 05 In the words of Abbas al-Musawi "[e]very Muslim is automatically a member of 
Hizballah, thus it is impossible to list our membership. i76 Perhaps even more extreme is 
the statement that "[t]here are two parties, Hizballah's or God's party, and the Devil's 
party. "" Due to Hizballah's pan-Islamic ideology any threat to Islam is also condemned in 
basic religious terms. Thus the Iran-Iraq war was seen as a struggle between 'truth and 
falsehood' where an Iranian victory would aid Hizballah in the pursuit of its aims. 78 In the 
words of Sheikh Fadlallah: "[the Iran-Iraq war] is a war waged by the entire world of 
blasphemy against Islam. "79 Despite this distinction, Fadlallah is careful to explain this 
dichotomy in a less inflammatory fashion. He claims that jihad is defensive and that its 
objective is not 'negation of the other' but rather that "Islam recognises the Other. During 
72 F. Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, 1986, p. 138. 73 ibid. p. 142. 
74 M. Ranstorp, Hizb Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, 1997, p. 46. 75 Ibrahim al-Amin in al-Harakat a1-Islamiyya fr Lubnan (Beirut, Dar al-Sanin), 1984, pp. 145-6. 76 La Revue du Liban (Beirut), 27 July 1985. 
77 Mahmud Nurani, formerly Iran's charge d'affaires in Beirut, Monday Morning (Beirut), 14 January, 1985. 78 M. Kramer, Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah', in D. Menashri (ed. ), 1990,105- 
30. 
79 Tehran Home Service, 1030 GMT, 29 Jan. 88 - BBCISWB, ME/0063, February 1 1988. 
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the early days of Islam, the Other took religious form, as the People of the Book'. So Islam 
does not negate the Other; it invites the Other to dialogue. "80 
Messianic Vision 
The messianic vision of Hizballah is effectively that of traditional Twelver Shi'ism. 
There is no expectation of imminence and the twelfth Imam will reveal himself in due 
course. Combined with this expectation is the fate of Imam Musa al Sadr who disappeared 
on a trip to Libya in 1978. The Imam played a pivotal role in raising Lebanese Shi'ite 
political consciousness and militance during the 1970s and his as yet unexplained 
disappearance has led not only to his elevation as an almost saintly figure of martyrdom, 
but in some circles to suggestions that he has become the hidden Imam with the 
corresponding messianic expectations surrounding his expected return . 
81 Allied to this 
tradition and combined with the group's violent hostility to Israel is the religious myth that 
the Jews will ally themselves with Al-Dajjal (Anti-Christ) at the end of time who will then 
be killed by Eesa bin Maryam (Jesus) and the Muslims during a final battle. 82 The 
destruction of Israel is not seen as an immediate goal. As Fadlallah has noted, "we must 
persecute Israel for a hundred years if necessary"83, and while Jerusalem will be returned 
"in this connection we think in great periods of time. "84 The organisation is, however, far 
more concerned with the more immediate temporal task of gradually establishing an 
Islamic republic in Lebanon by arguing for the end of the confessional system of 
governance and ultimately the creation of a wider Islamic community beyond Lebanon. 
The organisation's perception of time is messianic in nature, although this messianism is 
not considered immediate, merely the expected culmination of history. 
The formation of Hizballah's ideological programme has been defined from the 
outset by the historically subordinate and oppressed status of the Shiite community in 
Lebanon. The profound influence of the Iranian revolution on the founders of the 
80 M. Soueid, 'Islamic Unity and Political Change: Interview With Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah', 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXV, # 1,1995, p. 64. 
8' For more on Musa al Sadr see F. Ajami, The Vanished Imam, and A. Norton, 'Musa al-Sadr' in A. Rahnema 
(ed. ), Pioneers of Islamic Revival, 1994. 82 Sheikh Abu Al-Waleed AI-Ansari, 'The Termination of "Israel": A Quranic Fact', Nida'ul Islam, # 20,1997. 
83 Quoted in M. Kramer, Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah', in D. Menashri (ed. ), 
The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 1990, p. 125. 
84 ibid. 
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movement and the adoption of revolutionary Iranian ideology have been reinforced by 
Iranian ideological, material and spiritual support for the organisation on all levels. While 
they have been reformulated within the specific context of Lebanon, Hizballah's basic 
ideological components reflect those of contemporary Iran. As Hizballah has developed 
into a significant military and political force within Lebanon and as the Lebanese security 
situation alters, certain elements of the group's ideological programme such as the 
Manichaean view may have to be altered according to its tactical, political programme. 
3.1.4 Hamas 
Ideologically, the Islamic resistance movement Hamas owes much to the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood in that it began as a chapter of it. The Ikhwan established a presence 
in Palestine during the 1936-39 Palestinian revolt when Al-Rahman al-Banna, Hassan Al- 
Banna's brother, came to Palestine to aid in the revolt. In 1946, the Ikhwan established 
their first group in Jerusalem with the avowed purpose of preventing the Zionist enterprise. 
Soon after, the organisation gained the support of leading nationalist figures such as the 
Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood passed 
through a period of violent struggle during the 1948 war and then a long period of quietism 
until the Intifada when Hamas was officially created. In terms of ideology Hamas reflects 
that of the Ikhwan as the movement declares itself to be the 'political wing of the 
Brotherhood'. 85 
Hamas has quickly expanded and is now the foremost Islamic fundamentalist 
movement in the occupied territories, participating in violent actions as well as the 
provision of social services and, to a lesser degree, indirect involvement in mainstream 
politics. This extensive involvement in Palestinian society stems from the 1973 
establishment of the Mujma al-Islami (the Islamic Centre) in Gaza by Sheikh Yassin. 86 The 
ideology is strictly Sunni Muslim but remains flexible: 
gs See Hamas charter, 1988, Chapter 1, Article 2. 
In 1979, Israel granted a licence to operate the centre and by the early 1980s "it was one of the most 
powerful institutions in the Gaza Strip, boasting a number of affiliated mosques, libraries, kindergartens and 
clinics. " See Z. Abu Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and the Origins of Hamas' in R. Appleby, Spokesmen for the 
Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, 1997, p. 223. 
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"[i]ts outlook on all aspects of life is inspired by the principles of Islam, from which 
it draws its ideas and conceptions. Tapping this huge resource of ideology, however, 
does not limit the Movement's ability to practice a considerable amount of 
pragmatism and flexibility without necessarily having to deviate from its basic 
Principles. 87 
The ideology of Hamas is thus formulated to support the general objective of 'Establishing 
88 the Islamic State' and the strategic objective of'Liberating the Whole Palestinian Land'. 
Golden Age Myth 
The practical, temporal Golden Age sought by Hamas is the eventual establishment 
of an Islamic state in Palestine. In this regard, Hamas's programme can be seen as an 
appropriated and Islamicised version of the PLO's nationalist objectives. 89 While homage 
is paid to the example of the first Islamic community: "[b]y adopting Islam as its way of 
life, the Movement goes back to the time of the birth of the Islamic message.. . 
for Allah is 
its target, the Prophet is its example and the Koran is its constitution"90, little is offered in 
the way of exact detail as to how this might be brought about. This, however, is 
unimportant, the essence of the message is that Islam is the sole force which can reverse 
the injustices and evil of the contemporary period by "defeating [the false] and vanquishing 
it so justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved" until "the state of Islam" is 
established. 91 The exact details are unnecessary because the religion itself is associated 
with justice and equality - two of the major requirements of any successful form of 
governance. The ultimate message of a Golden Age is one familiar to general Sunni 
eschatology when Islamic history culminates in the Day of Judgement. In terms of 
realising the immediate temporal objective of an Islamic state in Palestine, Hamas is 
constrained by its unwillingness to participate in the existing Palestinian Authority (PA) 
and the peace process, even if this stance at times seems ambiguous. 92 While the group 
87 El-Hamad & A1-Bargothi (eds. ), A Study in the Political Ideology of The Islamic Resistance Movement 
(HAMS), 1987-1996,1997, p. 11. 
$s ibid., p. 12. 
89 S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistance, 2000, p. 43. 
90 Hamas charter, Chapter 1, Article 7. 
91 ibid. Chapter 2, Article 9. 
92 Z. Abu Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and the Origins of Hamas', pp. 244-245. 
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regards itself as the most legitimate leader of the Palestinian people it rejects recognition 
of Israel and the political objectives espoused by the PLO. 
Threat to Culture 
Similar to the Golden Age myth, the perceived threat to culture is a powerful 
ideological tool. Hamas believes that Israeli policy in Palestine aims at "ruining the Islamic 
nation as a whole in a ferocious war that involves all fields of thought, politics, ethics, 
economy and society and takes as a goal the very spirit and capabilities which enable the 
nation to stand and face challenges. i93 The Hamas charter contains a broader admonition 
aimed at the Islamic community generally: "[t]he Islamic world is on fire. Each of us 
should pour some water, no matter how little, to extinguish whatever one can without 
waiting for the others. 04 This current threat to culture is also compared to previous ones 
posed by the Crusaders and the Tartars. The threat to culture is countered not only by the 
provision of educational programmes and the general task of 'Islamising society', but by 
direct, selective military action. The threat to culture is also directly associated with 
deprivations faced by Palestinians in the Occupied territories -a cosmic concept has thus 
been translated into a day to day reality by the effects of Israeli policies such as inadequate 
educational facilities and health care. The most striking of these is the fact that many 
Palestinians living in the occupied territories (especially Gaza) are effectively refugees, or 
descendants of refugees, for who 'theft of culture' is also directly associated with theft of 
property and possessions. This is reinforced on a daily level by the visible presence of 
Jewish settlers and soldiers and the view of Israeli control as 'oppression' is constantly 
expressed in the group's phraseology and symbolism. 
Scripturalism 
Hamas like many Islamic organisations defines itself in terms of Islam: "[t]he 
movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and 
understanding of the universe, life and man. 05 From this basic premise Hamas illustrates 
its ideas and communiques with Quranic references, Hadith and the example of prominent 
43 El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi (eds. ), A Study in the Political Ideology, p. 22. 94 Hamas charter, Preface. 
95 ibid. Chapter 1, Article 1. 
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martyrs. Each of the major ideas and themes contained within the charter for example are 
supported by appropriate scriptural references. Quranic sources are used to prove that 
certain acts such as the liberation of Palestine, and jihad in the pursuit of this cause, are 
religious duties for every Muslim. Indeed, the group's attempt to differentiate itself from 
the secular nationalism of the PLO has led to slogans such as "the Quran is the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. "96 The Hamas charter also refers to 
Palestine as 'Islamic waqf land', regarded as a religious trust given to the Muslims until the 
end of time, and it is a religious duty of every Muslim to liberate this land through jihad. 
Manichaean World View 
The Manicheaen element in Hamas ideology is aimed at both Israelis (and their 
supporters) and apostates. This ideological stance has been realised through killings of 
Israelis and also of Palestinians, primarily those considered guilty of collaboration. Hamas 
identifies itself as in the vanguard of the struggle against the "warmongering Jews", and 
also declares that "[l]eaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed 
be he who does that. "97 The Jews are characterised as all powerful: 
"[u]sing their wealth they [have] unleashed revolutions all over the world... through 
their financial resources they have been able to control the imperialist nations.. . 
They 
were behind the First World War, whereby they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate 
state.. . and they were 
behind the Second World War.. . they established the 
U. N. and 
the Security Council... in order to dominate the world. "98 
It is interesting to note that this view of a global and historical Jewish conspiracy is almost 
identical to that espoused by much of the American extreme right. 99 The Hamas charter 
and Hamas's Arabic website for example refer to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as an 
96 Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic 
Jihad, 1994, p. 78. 
97 Hamas charter, Chapter 4, Article 32. "For Who so shall turn his back unto them on that Day, unless he 
tumeth away to fight, or retreateth to another party of the faithful, shall draw on himself the indignation of 
Allah, and his abode shall be hell; an ill journey shall it be thither", (Quran 8: 16). 
98 Hamas charter, Article 22. Other organisations identified by Hamas as carrying out Zionist wishes are 
Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs and B'nai B'rith. 
99 Nor is this view new to modern political Islam. Sayid Qutb referred to a Jewish conspiracy which dated 
back to the time of the Prophet, a conspiracy linked to a broader design which reflects the'solidarity of 
unbelievers'. See D. Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, 1996, pp. 125 & 186. 
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historical reference. 1°° The Hamas charter also contains a traditional note on inter- 
communal relations which significantly modifies any instinctive Manicheaen stance: 
"under the wing of Islam it is possible for the followers of the three religions.. . to coexist 
in 
peace and quiet with each other. Peace and quiet would not be possible except under the 
wing of Islam. Past and present history are the best witness to that. "10' While milder than 
some expressions which advocate only extermination, this scriptually based tradition still 
assumes a second class citizen status for other peoples of the book and the primacy of 
Islamic religion and legal systems. 102 
Messianic Dimension 
Hamas ideology contains a messianic message to the extent that Sunni Islam itself 
may be said to contain one. The messianic age is not to be precipitated and the 
establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state is not part of a messianic process. To the 
extent that a messianic vision exists it is merely employed to add a sense of the eternity of 
the struggle with the Zionist oppressor expressed in the idea that Palestine is an 'Islamic 
wagf land' given to Muslim generations 'until judgement day'. 103 As with so many 
religious groups the emphasis on messianic beliefs places the organisation in a 
confrontational, time constrained position, largely out of step with temporal reality. The 
events of Sunni messianic fulfilment will unfold according to Allah's timetable, an attitude 
common amongst core Sunni Islamic groups. For the Egyptian al-Gamma, for instance, the 
ideal form of government is also the Caliphate, a system which embodies both religious 
belief and the conduct of politics, this is seen as the only hope of approximating God's will 
on earth in a largely secular world . 
104 The only possible exception is martyrdom achieved 
through suicide bombing, although in these cases the revelatory experience is purely a 
personal one and the implications for the group's overall ideology are negligible. 
100 It is interesting to note that The Protocols have been produced in more different editions in Arabic than any 
other language including English, and no refutation, unlike many other languages, has yet been published in 
Arabic. 
101 Hamas charter, Chapter 4, Article 32, "The Islamic Resistance Movement is a Humanist Movement". 
102 Ironically the application of such a system would simply result in a reversal of the current situation. 
103 Harnas charter, Chapter 2, Article 11. 
104 Ansari, H. N., `The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics', International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. XVI, 1984, p. 136. 
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The ideological programme of Hamas is based on the thinking of the Muslim 
Brotherhood within the Palestinian context. Resistance to the Israeli 'occupation' is 
justified as a religious obligation reinforced using Islamic religious traditions. The Golden 
Age sought is an Islamic Palestinian state, similar in most respects to the expectations of 
the other mainstream Islamist groups. The uncertain nature of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process and the acknowledged inability of Hamas to achieve its objectives through 
violence alone may require the group to alter its ideological emphasis to allow it to (for 
example) participate directly in mainstream politics, a potential shift which will be made 
easier by the group's flexibility and pragmatism. Yet Hamas works in an incremental and 
patient fashion to re-Islamise Palestinian society and make it ripe ultimately for religious 
revolution. 
3.2 Core Groups 
3.2.1 Eyal 
The short life span and relative youth of Eyal mitigated against the group 
developing a detailed ideological framework. To the extent that the members of Eyal were 
drawn from the same milieu as most of the Israeli extreme right and that their ideological 
influences were Kahanist, there exist a great many ideological similarities with Kach, and 
a radical departure from this outlook was unnecessary. The founder of Eyal, Avishai 
Raviv, was not merely a disciple of Kahane but was one of the rabbi's favourites 
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, and the 
group may be seen as merely a violent splinter of the parent organisation - indeed Eyal 
claimed to be "more militant and radical that the original Kahane movement. " 106 But Eyal 
also represents a deeper, messianic trend of the Jewish extreme right which combined 
Jewish messianic belief and Jewish nationalism in the light of the most recent threat to 
these historical processes - peace agreement and land settlement with the Palestinians and 
surrounding Arab states. The assassination of Rabin was therefore an attempt to smooth 
the path of the long-standing promised messianic process. 
ios A fact which helped divert suspicion from Raviv's involvement with the Shin Bet. 
1°6 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the 
Rabin Assassination, 1999, p. 266. 
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Golden Age Myth 
In line with most of the Jewish extreme right, Eyal envisaged a Davidic era Golden 
Age where a complete Eretz Yisrael has been realised and the rule of Jewish law 
instituted. Due to the group's immaturity and limited intellectual concerns, however, the 
more realistic and achievable Golden Age was identified as being an Israeli state devoid of 
Arabs and left-wing Jews, or at the very least a reversal of the concessions thus far granted 
to the Palestinians by the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the reimposition of direct 
Israeli rule over the occupied territories or their outright annexation. To this end 
harassment of these parties (primarily the Palestinians) and any activity which promised to 
thwart the peace process were regarded as righteous activities which would help lead 
ultimately to an 'ideal' society. 
Theft of Culture 
As a group drawn from the Kahanist movement, Eyal's perception of a threat to 
culture was almost identical to that of Kach, defined by an external, usurping threat in the 
form of the Palestinians and by an internal threat (either malicious or merely misguided 
was unimportant) posed by liberal 'hellenists'. The primary threat which inspired the 
movement's formation was a collective one in the form of the progressive Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process. This involved both the external and internal threats in equal 
measure and posed the gravest danger to Jewish culture and so its disruption was regarded 
as of paramount importance. Attacks on, and harassment of, Arabs was certainly a constant 
of Kahanist ideology, as were confrontation with the Israeli liberal left and, at times, the 
secular state. However, Eyal represented a current within the radical Jewish right that felt 
the stakes had been raised to such an extent that the only way Israeli-Palestinian 
rapprochement could be halted was incitement and possibly direct action against the Israeli 
leadership. 
Scripturalism 
As part of the Kahanist milieu Eyal's ideological basis in scripture - to the extent 
that it can be identified - lies in the Torah, the Halakah and Meir Kahane's interpretations 
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of them. Apart from these scriptural sources, Eyal was also influenced by two obsolete 
Halakic concepts that had not previously been advocated and which were revived in 1994 
by rabbis in Israel and abroad: din rodef ('law of the pursuer') and din moser ('law of the 
informer'). 107 Din Rodef is the duty to kill a Jew who endangers the life or property of 
another Jew and din moser is the duty to eliminate a Jew who intends to turn another Jew 
over to non-Jewish authorities. It was debated by the group that these concepts could be 
applied to the Prime Minister (and deputy Prime Minister) because their policies would 
endanger Jewish lives and property. While these concepts were once obscure, their revival 
brought them fully into public consciousness and their relevance and applicability were 
debated extensively. 108 It is clear that Yigal Amir subscribed to this tradition. When asked 
in court by a judge if he had heard of the ten commandments Amir replied "[t]here is an 
admonition more important than 'Thou shalt not kill' and it's 'the saving of souls'. If 
someone goes to kill your friend, you are duty bound to kill that person first. " 109 
Manichaean World View 
The Manichaean world view of Eyal is two dimensional, seeing Arabs as the clear 
and obvious enemy but also those Jews who are an 'enemy to the Jewish people'. In a 
leaflet disseminated by Avishai Raviv, which exhorted Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers 
to disobey orders calling for the removal of settlers, he states "[a] soldier who does not do 
so is, in our eyes, like a Kapo, those who collaborated with the Nazis, and his sentence is 
death. "110 It was precisely this line of thought, supported by Halakic rulings, which led to 
the atmosphere of extreme incitement and which clearly motivated Amir and his actions. 
Demonisation of the Arab population followed the established Kahanist reasoning that 
they represented a security and demographic threat. The course of the peace process 
simply made this threat more severe and the establishment of a Palestinian state - because 
of the innate hostility of the Palestinian for the Jews - would inevitably lead to the 
destruction of Israel. As Amir stated at his trial: 
107 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 253-258. 
l° See M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin, 1998, Ch. 4. 
109 U. S. News and World Report, 20/11/95, Vol. CXIX, # 20, p. 70. 
110 See M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 218. 
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"[i]t is very interesting that an entire nation did not at all notice that a Palestinian 
state was being established with an army of terrorists, with whom we will have to 
fight in less than half a year or a year". " 
Messianic Vision 
Once again the messianic vision of Eyal is tied intimately to that of the Jewish 
extreme right generally. The peace process as pursued by Rabin was seen as a direct threat 
to the sanctity of a greater Israel which had been promised by God to the Jewish people. In 
much the same way as the Jewish Underground would later see the destruction of the 
Dome of the Rock as a way of getting the messianic process back on track, Eyal identified 
the disruption of the Peace process and ultimately the assassination of Rabin as essential 
steps to fulfilling messianic destiny. It has been rightly observed that Amir represented the 
direct off-spring of Gush Emunim and the Jewish Underground and to him Rabin "was the 
ultimate sacrifice to save the Jewish nation from collapse and the aspired messianic 
redemption from demise. " 112 
The ideological programme developed by Eyal was basically directly adopted from 
Kach, although the group planned to operate as a militant splinter not as mainstream 
organisation. There were, however, two important differences. The first - which affected 
the extreme right generally - was the revival of the Halakic concepts of din rodef and din 
moser which provided Jewish extremists with a scriptural rationalisation for killing other 
Jews. The second was the greater messianic emphasis of Eyal which identified the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process as perhaps the greatest impediment since the establishment of 
Israel to the realisation of the Jewish messianic promise. In this respect Eyal, like the 
Order, is a good example of the more extreme - if less articulated - ideological 
interpretations of a splinter group. 
... Voice of Israel, Jerusalem, 0800 gmt, 6 Nov 95 - BBC/SWB, ME/2454, MED/4, November 7 1995. 112 S. Peleg, 'They Shoot Prime Ministers Too, Don't They? Religious Violence in Israel: Premises, Dynamics 
and Prospects', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 20, # 3,1997, p. 243. 
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3.2.2 The Order 
The Order provides an interesting example of the eclectic nature of ideological 
formation within American Christian groups. 113 A clue to this eclecticism is provided by 
the varied backgrounds and group affiliations of The Order's members. The founder and 
leader of the group, Robert Mathews, for example, was a recruiter for the neo-Nazi 
National Alliance and also an activist within the Identity-affiliated Aryan Nations. Other 
members came from both the National Alliance, Aryan Nations and various Klan splinter 
groups. The ideological influences then contained the essential ingredients of a belief in 
White, Anglo-Saxon Christian supremacy and a conspiratorial and paranoid view of the 
U. S. Federal government. The ideology of the Order could in broad terms be defined as 
Christian Identity. This categorisation does, however, require serious qualification, for as 
Jeffrey Kaplan has stated: "Identity theology today is highly decentralised. There is no 
centre of orthodoxy, and in the Post-Wesley Smith era, no pre-eminent figure to tie 
together the fractious world of independent Identity churches. "' 14 
Golden Age Myth 
According to Mathews, the Order was founded in order to "pursue a more violent 
approach toward making the U. S. a pure white Christian country. "' 1' This, it was reasoned, 
would be achieved through the violent overthrow of the Government which has been 
completely subverted by Jews who are described as the sons of Satan who must be 
exterminated in a "racial and religious Armageddon. "' 16 The original objective was to 
establish what Mathews referred to as the 'White American Bastion'. This was the less 
radical idea whereby white Americans would be persuaded to move to the Pacific 
Northwest and through sheer weight of numbers, white's would (legally) command control 
113 The name the Order was conferred on the group by the FBI. The group members themselves variously 
referred to themselves as 'the company', 'the organisation' or'the Order', but for most of its existence the group 
had no official name. Mathews was inspired to give the group a German name, der Bruder Schweigen, a title 
borrowed from an old German soldiers poem. Mathews translated this as the silent brotherhood and the name 
was adopted comparatively late in the day. 
114 J. Kaplan, 'Right Wing Violence in North America', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VII, # 1,1995, 
p. 53. 
115 Washington Post, December 26,1984. 
116 ibid. 
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of political, social and economic institutions. 117 This is similar in many ways to Butler's 
vision of an'Aryan Nation'. Despite Mathew's efforts, the response to his call for migration 
was poor, and as time passed his frustrations with the state of American society persuaded 
him that a more radical programme was required in order to achieve a racially and morally 
pure America. 
Theft of Culture 
As with Aryan Nations the Order's belief in a theft of culture centres around the 
racial dilution of America and the consequent erosion of white, Christian values. This 
process, according to the Order, was orchestrated in Washington at the instigation of a 
global Jewish conspiracy. As Mathews stated in his 'declaration of war', "[o]ur heroes and 
our culture have been insulted and degraded. The mongrel hordes clamour to sever us from 
our inheritance, yet our people do not care. i11S The theft believed to be orchestrated by 
many parties. Many members for example believed they were the victims of discrimination 
through affirmative action programmes - programmes which favoured racial groups they 
despised and that were orchestrated in Washington, indicating a widespread belief of 
betrayal by their own government. As with many other elements of the racist right white 
culture is seen to be threatened by deliberate policies of race mixing instigated and 
encouraged by the Federal government and the media. This threat is not static but one 
which is seen as worsening with every passing day: 
"[s]uffice it to say this is not a white country and if something does not change soon, 
then before long Whites will be a very small minority in America... the day is coming 
when [our enemies] will attempt to murder the last true white man and carry the last 
true white woman and girls off for integration and sport. "' 19 
1 17 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, 1990, pp. 109-110. As the authors note this was already 
the case, simply that the population was not 'racially aware'. 
118 Reproduced in K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 422-423. On the reverse of the 
declaration Mathews attached a copy of an 'Open Letter to Congress' distributed by the National Alliance. The 
letter warns of revenge against Congress for wrongs perpetrated against the American people. The letter end 
with the lines "When the day comes we will not ask whether you swung to the right or whether you swung to 
the left; we will simply swing you by the neck". 
119 D. Lane, Tie-Coloured Treason, n. p., n. d. One Order training manual advised that no kinsman "raise his 
sword against ZOG until he has planted his seed in the belly of a woman ... 
kinswomen 
... should 
bear at least 
one warrior before putting their own life on the line". Quoted in J. Coates, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise 
of the Survivalist Right, 1987, p. 44. 
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Scriptural ism 
The scriptural basis of the Order was similar in content to that of Aryan Nations 
and many other Identity oriented groups. The primary emphases were on those verses 
which dealt with the satanic lineage of the Jews, the inferiority of other non-white races, 
and the permissibility, indeed the necessity, for white Christians to engage in armed 
struggle. As with many other elements of the extreme right, the second amendment was 
not only seen as a legal right but also as a biblical precedent - "[a]nd he that has no sword, 
let him sell his garment and buy one. " 12') Evidence of direct references by the group to the 
Bible are rare, although some do exist. It is reputed, for example, that before the July 1984 
Brinks armoured car robbery Richard Scutari recited the 91st Psalm. 121 This absence of 
scriptural exploration is largely because the group itself did not contain any members with 
a deep scriptural knowledge or interest in biblical exegesis, because the group's rapid move 
into activism left little time or desire for such pursuits, and also because individual 
members belief systems varied - Odinism played as much a role as Christian Identity in 
group teleology and ritual. 
Apart from these broad beliefs in Christianity and its Identity interpretation the 
group (and Mathews in particular) were profoundly influenced by William Pierce's novel 
The Turner Diaries which functioned more or less as a blueprint for action. 122 Many of the 
crimes committed by the Order, such as bank robberies and assassination of perceived 
enemies (including its own members), closely resembled some of the acts perpetrated in 
the novel. Mathews even structured the Order along the same lines as the'guerrilla' force in 
the book, recreating a similar structure, similar tactics and even similar ordination 
rituals. 123 Indeed, it is frequently claimed that The Turner Diaries is a form of bible' for 
120 Luke 22: 36. This verse is a good illustration of the selective nature of scriptural justification. Also in the 
New Testament is the verse "Put your sword in its place, for all who take the sword will perish by the sowed", 
Mathew 26: 52. 
121 Legend has it that the British 91st infantry recited this Psalm before the First World War battle of Bellau 
Wood and emerged from the engagement without a single casualty. See K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent 
Brotherhood, p. 277. 
122 Pierce denies any connection with the Order and maintains that (unproved) allegations that the Order 
provided him with funds to buy property are false. Other, 'operational' literary influences included: The Road 
Back, an instruction manual for establishing a terrorist group and ; Louis Beam's Essays of a Klansman which 
included a point system for Aryan warriors which assigned values to different targets and criminal acts. 
123 Mathews issued new members with copies of the book if they had not already read it. See K. Flynn & G. 
Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 235. 
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the American Christian Patriots. 124 The book, however, is far more an operational 
blueprint than an ideological tome - what ideological content it contains is presented in a 
crude and emotive way concerning itself almost entirely with White supremacy and the 
inferiority and perfidy of other races - especially blacks and Jews. In this sense, it is unlike 
most influential works which are either religious texts or intellectual analyses of certain 
religious texts or obligations. On the other hand, the book is eminently accessible to the lay 
reader and both the plot and the setting create a sensation of the everyday. In this respect 
then The Turner Diaries is a populist work of fiction that contains a broad appeal to most 
of the far-right-wing religious spectrum in America (and beyond) without being lumbered 
with complex theological argument and rhetoric. 125 Indeed Pierce chose this format 
because he believes that "modern American society finds the action novel more 
approachable than serious literature. 026 Nor is the Order the only group to draw 
inspiration from this book which has been cited as a major influence on Timothy McVeigh 
when he planned the Oklahoma city bombing. 127 It is also claimed that John William King, 
convicted in 1999 of dragging a black man to his death behind his pick-up truck, is 
reported to have said before he drove off "[w]e're going to start the Turner Diaries 
early. " 128 While not as important as the Turner Diaries, other novels which outlined terror 
campaigns in the U. S. are popular amongst right-wing extremists. For example, when the 
FBI raided Gary Yarborough's house they found a copy of Balefire by Kenneth Goddard - 
a novel about a terrorist assault on the 1984 Olympics - which had several passages 
underlined. 129 
124 Amongst others see B. Hofiman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States, 
R-3618,1986, p. 42. 
125 The inside page of a 1995 second edition claims that 198,000 copies have been sold since the book was 
first published in 1978. 
126 B. Whitsel, 'Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains', Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol. VII, # 4,1995, p. 121. 
127 Sunday Times, 
, 
21 April, 1996, and Time, 15 April, 1996. Ten days after the bombing itself Pierce 
predicted in a radio interview that "resentment generated amongst 'normal Americans' by Jews, politicians, 
homosexuals, minorities and 'female executives' would lead to more terrorism 'on a scale that the world has 
never seen before". ADL, Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far-Right 
Fringe, 1996, p. 110. Judge Matsch who presided over the Order trial also presided over McVeigh's. 
128 The Washington Post, February 16,1999. 
'29 J. Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America, 1994, p. 229. 
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Manichaean World View 
The Manicheaen world view of the Order is similar to that of most Identity 
adherents in that it dialectically divides the white, true people of God from all others. The 
typical enemies are the Jews, all other races (the ubiquitous mud people), and the US 
government which is identified as part of a global conspiracy against the white Christian 
peoples of the world. At the same time Mathews further divided his group and a smaller 
number of similarly minded individuals from the rest of the white race. Indeed, Mathews 
had little respect for the bulk of the American people because they had either connived in 
the decline of their race or they had done nothing about it, referring to the general white 
population as the 'sheeple'. In his last letter, Roberts explained that his original reason for 
seeking solitude in Metaline Falls was "because I was thoroughly disgusted with the 
American people. I maintained then as I do now that our people have devolved into some 
of the most cowardly, sheepish degenerates that have ever littered the face of the 
planet. " 130 In response to a question about people who claim to believe in the 'White 
people's movement' but fail to support it in any way, Richard Scutari has stated that a war 
for the very existence of the white race "calls for total compassion and protection for our 
Folk who support our cause and total ruthlessness towards those who do not. When the 
time is right, these people will be given a choice of either supporting the. movement in all 
ways or being eliminated. "131 
Messianic Vision 
The apocalyptic element within the Order's teleology accorded with radical right 
eschatology, and like so many like minded people during the warmer parts of the Cold 
War, this view was reinforced by the ever present possibility of an imminent nuclear 
apocalypse. 132 The apocalyptic element was also characteristically racist in orientation. In 
line with much Identity thinking and certainly in accord with the scenario which unfolds in 
The Turner Diaries the final apocalyptic struggle would occur between the chosen white 
130 'Robert Mathew Last Letter' reproduced in J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian 
Patriotism, 1990, p. 247. 
131 'An Interview With Bruder Schweigen P. O. W. Richard Scutari', n. p., n. d. 
132 It is reputed that on one occasion when Mathews saw a CNN test announcement claiming that WW III had 
begun he shouted at the television "We're not ready yet... The commies can't do this now! We're not in place 
yet! Just a few more months! ". See K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 382-383. 
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elect and a non-white horde led by a Jewish antichrist. 133 This battle itself would be the 
climactic moment in the Jewish conspiracy's attempt to take over the world, and as in the 
novel, would involve nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. While there was no 
specific timetable for the culmination of history (the Turner Diaries mentions the year 
1999 as the time when "the dream of a White world finally became a certainty)" 34 it was 
certainly a firmly held belief of most hard-core members. As one unrepentant member has 
stated "[t]hey [our children] will emulate the Warrior Archetypes... and then perhaps we 
will have enough warriors for the final battle, which is most assuredly heading our way. , 135 
For reasons outlined above the ideological programme of the Order, like Eyal, can 
only really be understood by inference, especially as the group at no stage seems to 
systematically developed nor recorded its ideological belief system. What can be inferred 
is that the group inherited most of its beliefs from Identity thought, especially that 
espoused by Aryan Nations, adding an activist dimension. This activism meant that the 
group would perform the function of a revolutionary vanguard, a self perception reinforced 
by the overwhelming strength and resources of the American state and the apathetic nature 
of the American population. 
3.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
Like Hamas, the PIJ began life as an offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike Hamas, however, the PIJ rejected the course of participating 
in social and political activities and developed a programme strongly centred on armed 
resistance, a programme which emphasised traditional ideas such as the desire for an 
independent, Islamic Palestine and a complete rejection of the Israeli state. The ideology 
of the PIJ thus stresses an uncompromising stance towards its enemies which is less 
susceptible to moderation because of the focus on armed struggle and external aid and 
influences - as exemplified by Iranian support. The ideological programme is also less 
flexible than that espoused by Hamas, although on a superficial level they might seem very 
close, if not similar. 
133 M. Barkun, Millenarians and Violence: The Case of the Christian Identity Movement', in T. Robbins & S. 
Palmer (eds. ), Millennium, Messiahs and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements, pp. 253-254. 134 A. Macdonald, The Turner Diaries, 1978, p. 210. 135 'An Interview With Bruder Schweigen P. O. W. Richard Scutari'. 
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Golden Age Myth 
Similar to Hamas, the immediate Golden Age sought by the PIJ is the destruction 
of Israel through a popular armed jihad and in its place the creation of an Islamic 
Palestinian state. 136 The vision of a liberated Palestine also includes all areas of Israeli 
influence. Unlike the declared objectives of Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat, the PIJ is 
"not fighting for an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital but to 
liberate the whole of Palestine, the Golan and south Lebanon.. . 
by resistance and not by 
conferences. " 137 As with other Islamic groups, the PIJ views the Islamic religious tradition 
as the basis for a revitalised community of believers, not just within Palestine but 
throughout the Muslim world. In the words of Ramadan Abdullah Shallah "from the 
beginning... I knew Islam as ideological belonging and as a path for civilizational 
renaissance for the Muslim nation. " 138 This pan-Islamic goal is of course the most distant 
but is intimately related to the Iranian revolution which inspired and activated it. 
Threat to Culture 
The PIJ views the Israeli state as the primary and direct threat to Palestinian culture 
and any potential Palestinian state. The consolidation of the Israeli state after the 1948 war 
and its further enlargement after the Six-Day war are seen as the two most serious and 
immediate events which threatened Palestinian and Islamic culture. In 1968, the Islamist 
author Tawfiq al-Tayyib wrote that while the 1948 war was a defeat for liberal Arab 
thought the 1967 disaster was a defeat for Arab socialist and revolutionary ideas. 139 
According to al-Tayyib, Israel represents a modern Western threat which can only be 
countered by Islam. 140 Fathi Shiqaqi and the leadership considered al-Tayyib's book to be 
one of the most important texts to be written after the 1967 defeat and an accurate 
136 E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', 1988, p. 11. "' AFP, October 24,1997. This quote was made by Ramadan Abdullah Shallah when addressing Palestinian 
refugees in the Yarmouk camp, Syria. 
138 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', 
Journal of Palestine Studies, XXVIII, II 4, p. 63. 
139 Tawfiq al-Tayyib, Al-Hall al-Islami ma ba'd al-Nakbatain [The Islamic Solution After Two Disasters], 
1979. 
140 ibid., p. 13. 
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assessment of the cultural threat faced by Islamic Palestine. 14 1 However, the organisation 
also views Israeli and Jewish 'corruption' as a threat to the greater umma beyond Palestine 
"to westernise it, to subjugate it, to enslave it, to paralyse its will, and to cast an eternal 
yoke over its neck. 042 According to Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Auda, the PIJ has a long term goal 
of "overcoming the crisis of the modem Western challenge" and a short term goal of 
"establishing the Islamic state and establishing the Islamic political power. " 143 The PIJ also 
regards democracy as against the nature of Islam. Thus, while the organisation has, at 
times, enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with the PLO and then the PA, The PIJ does not 
regard the goal of establishing a secular Palestinian state as in accord with the Islamic 
view of history. 144 
Scriptural ism 
The religious sources of the PIJ's ideology are similar to most other groups being 
drawn primarily from the Quran, Hadith and the Sunna. The use of these sources is also 
selective and geared around justifying violence against the oppressors of Islam and the 
Palestinian people in particular, in this context the Jews and their supporters, principally 
the U. S. administration. According to the PIJ, the waging of jihad is interpreted along the 
lines of the 'new' Shi'a doctrine propagated by Khomeini whereby there is a constant 
emphasis on holy war as an offensive symbol of activism. 145 Beyond these obvious and 
accepted scriptural messages, attempts have also been made to reinterpret scripture and 
religious tradition. In 1984, for example, Sheikh Tamimi wrote a book called The 
Disappearance of Israel: A Ruling of the Koran. 146 This work attempted to prove the 
importance accorded to Palestine in the Quran and that jihad would bring the Holy Land 
back under Islamic control and that the Jews would be banished from there. 147 In this way, 
14' Fathi 'Abd-al-'Aziz (al-Shaqaqi), Al Khomeini: al-Hall al-'Islami wal-Badil [Khomeini: The Islamic 
Solution and the Alternative], 1979, p. 28. 
142 Cited in Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 102. 
43 ibid., p. 103. 
44 E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', in D. Menashri, ed., The 
Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 1990, p. 12. 
143 E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact', p. 194. 
'446 Aman, n. p., 1984. 
147 http: //www. ict. orgil/, For a more recent rationalisation see A. Al-Ansari, 'The Termination of "Israel": A 
Qur'anic Fact', Nida' ul Islam, Issue - 20, September-October, 1997. Shiqaqi also spoke of a fatwa issued by 
the Ayatollah Khomeini which referred to the religious duty of bringing about the 'elimination' of the 'Zionist 
entity'. 
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both the day-to-day mechanics of the struggle and the ultimate objective form part of 
divine obligation and promise. 
While the leaders of movements, such as the PIJ, are well versed in scripture and 
capable of using it selectively, their members are frequently unaware of other, passive 
religious messages. During an interview a PIJ suicide bomber was asked if he had ever in 
the course of his life heard of a Quranic sentence forbidding the killing of woman, children 
and the elderly. The reply was "[t]here is no such sentence". The bomber continued his 
justification thus: 
"The prophet, what did he say? There is no way that when a Jew meets a Muslim he 
doesn't think of killing him.. . 
Other than that the Prophet, may he rest in peace, said 
that not even one hour should pass when a Muslim does not fight a heretic. We 
should not be idle for even one hour. " 49 
In this way the selective interpretation of scriptural messages becomes a new, extremist 
orthodoxy for the ill-educated rank and file of the organisation. 
Manichaean World View 
The Manichaean world view of the PIJ is derived from the obvious distinction 
between Muslim and non-Muslim, but more specifically between Muslims and Jews. 
Sheikh al-Tamimi has called for "the destruction of the Jewish state" and for Muslims to 
fight Jews "in an Islamic battle that will end your state so that it becomes part of history's 
residue. " 149 In the view of the PIJ, there is no room for coexistence between Arabs and 
Jews within the geographical bounds of Palestine. At a convention held in Chicago in 
December 1990 entitled 'Islam: The Road to Victory', Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Odeh described 
the Intifada as "the turning point in the struggle between good and evil. "150 Using such 
rhetoric, the Israelis are elevated from a malevolent occupying force to a cosmic evil 
which it is a religious obligation to fight. In a similar vein, Fathi Shiqaqi has described the 
struggle between Islam and the West as one between divine and satanic forces. The 
48 Harper's Magazine, 'A Terrorist Moves the Goalposts', Vol. CCXCV, # 1767,1997, p. 19. 
49 Cited in Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 1994, p. 92. 
150 Palestine Monitor, May-June, 1992. 
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vanguard of these satanic forces was Israel which in turn serves the global interests of the 
'great Satan', the U. S. 151 
Messianic vision 
No element within the PIJ holds an imminent messianic expectation and to the 
extent that one exists it is based loosely upon the expectations of Twelver-Shi'ism. This 
may appear surprising for a group which is Sunni in orientation but the derivation, as with 
other theological justifications, is a direct result of the influence of the Iranian revolution 
and Iranian clerical tradition. Since 1980 there has been a growth in the number of Sunni 
expositions on messianic expectation, and these will have had some influence on the 
eschatological beliefs of the PIJ members. Thus there is a non-time specific belief in the 
return of the twelfth Imam but this does not form an important part of group ideology. 
The ideological programme of the PIJ exhibits familiar themes to Hamas relating to 
the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state and the scriptural justifications for violent 
struggle against Israel, an enemy seen in dualistic terms. The PIJ, however, has been far 
more influenced by the Iranian revolutionary model than that of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the organisation sees itself as a form of militant revolutionary vanguard. This 
concentration on armed struggle which is reinforced by ideological exegesis has denied the 
group a degree of flexibility and this could prove problematic as the PIYs capabilities 
decline. If the group denies itself the opportunity to engage in mainstream activities and its 
military capabilities are degraded then its very purpose and existence are threatened. 
3.3 Messianic/ Apocalyptic 
3.3.1 Jewish Underground 
The Jewish Underground represents one of the most extreme manifestations of 
contemporary, active, Jewish messianism to date. While the group was an off-shoot of the 
more mainstream Gush Emunim settler movement and shared the same ideological roots, 
the Underground's interpretation of this ideology in light of political events was entirely 
more radical. The primary difference lay in the Underground's belief that the imminent 
15 1 Shiqaqi, Khomeini, pp. 46-47. 
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messianic redemption could be hastened (or at least put back on course) by a significant 
and highly symbolic act of violence rather than a more gradualist approach. Motivated by 
the messianic implications of Israel's gains in the 1967 war, and later by the apparent 
divine rebuffs of the 1973 war and the 1979 Camp David agreement, the Underground 
sought to bring the messianic process back on track through human agency. 
Golden Age Myth 
The Golden Age sought by the Jewish Underground was a redemptive and 
ultimately transcendental one. The process is identical to that expounded by Rabbi Kook 
the younger. According to Kook, the sacredness of the Land of Israel requires Jews to fulfil 
the 'commandment of conquest' whereby the land promised by God to the Jewish people 
must be settled and ruled. 152 This settlement is also considered a vital element in the 
messianic process and the inception of a transcendental Golden Age. After the phenomenal 
success of the 1967 war, Kook defined the state of Israel as a holy land, the entire nation, 
religious and not, were to recognise this fact, and the government was to conduct its affairs 
according to the Maimonides's 'rules of kings' and by the Torah. '53 For the Underground, 
the extension of this vision was provided by Shabtai Ben Dov who raised the possibility of 
re-establishing the biblical kingdom of Israel. In the words of Yehuda Etzion, the group's 
ideological leader: 
"[t]his is... the proper kingdom of Israel that we have to establish here between the 
two rivers [the Euphrates and the Nile]. This kingdom will be directed by the 
supreme court, which is bound to sit on the place, chosen by God, to emit his 
inspiration, a site which will have a temple, an alter, and a king chosen by God. 054 
Threat to Culture 
In the long term view of the Underground, Jewish culture had been under constant 
threat since the destruction of the Second Temple, the suppression of the second revolt and 
152 E. Don-Yehiya, 'Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of 
Gush Emunim', Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXIII, # 2,1987, p. 226. For the covenant between 
God and Abraham see Genesis 15: 18-21. 
153 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 153. 154 Yehuda Etzion quoted in E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 163. 
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the beginning of the Diaspora. Since that time the gentiles had periodically victimised the 
Jewish people, culminating in the most recent attempt during the Second World War. With 
the establishment of the state of Israel, Jewish culture, as far as Etzion and his colleagues 
were concerned, was once again consolidated and allowed to develop independently. 
Despite the various attempts by Arab states to extinguish the new state, it continued to 
thrive and even appeared to be moving towards fulfilling its messianic promise. Hence the 
primary threats were identified as being those posed by the presence of Arabs within Israel, 
the existence of Arab states around Israel, and gentile intransigence. However, with the 
signing of the 1979 Camp David accords, the secular government of Israel was identified 
as also posing a threat, albeit not one that warranted a violent response as later 
manifestations of the Jewish extreme right would believe. One of the defining features of 
the Underground ideology was Etzion's rejection of the Gush's sanctification of the secular 
Zionist state. As the parent group itself degenerated in the face of the Camp David accords, 
its ideological shortcomings were addressed by Etzion. To his mind the Israeli state was 
illegitimate because it had failed to become completely Jewish, to establish biblical Eretz 
Israel, to completely control the Arab population and to re-build the Third Temple. '55 It 
therefore posed an indirect threat to the fulfilment of the Jewish people's destiny. Culture 
in this case is associated directly with historical promise - culture is not merely a series of 
socio-religious and socio-political constructs but it is ultimately concerned with the 
realisation of divinely promised ethno-religious destiny. 
Scriptural ism 
The Jewish messianic promise has various scriptural sources, and it was the 
interpretation of these sources especially by Kook the younger which formed the core of 
the Underground's belief system. Kook interpreted the establishment of the Jewish state as 
the beginning of a promised messianic era, an interpretation apparently confirmed and 
reinforced by the territorial gains of the Six Day war. 156 Both the primary leaders of the 
group, but particularly Yehuda Etzion, were also influenced by the writings of a hitherto 
unknown ultra-nationalist thinker Shabtai Ben Dov who wrote of the possibility of re- 
iss Yehuda Etzion, 'To Fly at Last the Flag of Jerusalem', Nekuda, # 93, No. 22,1985. 
156 See Isiah 11: 12, "He will set up a banner for the nations, And will assemble the outcasts of Israel, and 
gather together the dispersed of Judah, From the four corners of the earth". See also Deuteronomy 28: 64. 
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establishing a biblical kingdom of Israel, the building of the Third Temple and the 
"institutionalisation of Jewish theocracy on earth. "157 What was unique about the writings 
of Ben Dov was that they spelled out a programme of active redemption - there was no 
need to await another `miracle' such as the 1967 war, all the conditions for redemption 
were in place, all that was required was action. After the biblical Davidic kingdom had 
been established government, religious practice and law would be governed at least in part 
by the proscriptions laid down by the medieval rabbi Moses Maomonides in works such as 
the Rule of Kings'. 
Manichaean World View 
Influenced by ideas of active redemption the Underground's Manicheaen outlook 
was obviously strong. The Jews are regarded as the chosen people, the gentiles are not, and 
this is what defined the Underground's dualist world view. For the Jewish Underground 
this belief has its origins in the teachings of Rabbi Kook the Elder, stating that "[t]he 
difference between a Jewish soul and souls of non-Jews - all of them in all different levels 
- is greater and deeper than the difference between a human soul and the souls of cattle. " 158 
This is one of the principal tenets of the Lurianic Cabbala, the school of Jewish mysticism 
which dominated Judaism from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries and 
upon which Kook's entire teaching was based. '59 In Etzion's own view: 
"[b]ut as for ourselves 'our God is not theirs'. Not only is our existential experience 
different from theirs but also from their very definition. For the Gentiles, life is 
mainly a life of existence, while ours is a life of destiny, the life of a kingdom of 
priests and a holy people. We exist in a world in order to actualise destiny. " 160 
As Ehud Sprinzak has noted Etzion believed that the distinction between the 'laws of 
existence and the laws of destiny' would have been made real by the destruction of the 
Dome of the Rock, elevating a secular nation state to a divine kingdom on earth. 161 
'S' Sprinzak, E., `From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 205. 
158 I. Shahak & N. Mezvinsky, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 1999, p. ix. 
159 ibid. According to this Cabbala the world was created for the sake of Jews and the existence of non-Jews 
was 'subsidiay. 
160 Yehuda Etzion, 'To Fly at Last', p. 165. 
16' E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 165. 
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Messianic Vision 
The messianic theme is the dominant one for the Underground. All the members of 
the group and the broader milieu from which they came believed themselves to be living in 
the era of Jewish redemption, the clearest proof of which was the establishment of the state 
of Israel and then the territorial gains made during the Six Day War, especially gaining 
control over the Western Wall. The members of the Underground furthermore identified 
themselves as in a position to dictate the pace of redemption through temporal activity - 
namely the destruction of the Dome of the Rock. The objective of the bombing was 
twofold: to clear the Temple Mount in preparation for the re-building of the Temple162, 
and to precipitate another Arab-Israeli war, and hopefully a superpower conflict which 
would force the Jewish Messiah to intervene to save his chosen people. 163 Leaving the 
veracity of messianic expectations aside, there can be little doubt that if the attack had 
proceeded as planned the results would certainly have been catastrophic and may indeed 
have "put us one step closer to an Armageddon". 164 The attack itself did not envisage 
immediate enormous casualties, but rather a divine transformation of temporal history. The 
aim was to perpetrate a symbolic act at a place of great religious significance for Judaism 
and Islam in the belief that an expected apocalyptic struggle between Jews and Muslims 
would begin and messianic redemption would rapidly unfold as a result. 
The Jewish Underground can be seen as a radical offshoot of the Gush Emunim 
movement and the group's ideological programme certainly reflects this. The apparent 
shortcomings of Gush's ideology which arose after the Camp David accords were 
addressed by the Underground which assigned greater importance to the direct role of 
human agency in the Jewish redemptive process and simultaneously rejected the belief that 
162 The idea that the re-construction of the Temple is an important part of the Jewish messianic age has been a 
common one since the end of the first revolt, and has received added attention since 1948. See for example G. 
W. Buchanan, Revelation and Redemption: Jewish Documents of Deliverance From the Fall of Jerusalem to 
the Death of Nahmanides, 1978 and J. Frankel, ed., Jews and Messianism in the Modern Era: Metaphor and 
Meaning, Vol. VII of Studies in Contemporary Jewry, 1991, especially pp. 34-67 and 197-216. Many 
Evangelical Christians believe that the re-construction of the Temple will be the catalyst for the final struggle 
predicted in revelations. See for example: Hal Lindsay, The Late Great Planet Earth, 1970, pp. 55-57; and 
Jerry Falwell, Nuclear War and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, 1983. 
163 See Bruce Hofnan's `Holy Terror', p. 283 (f t. 21) . 
The information that the Underground wished to 
provoke a cataclysmic Muslin-Jewish war was provided to Dr. Hoff-man by an American law enforcement 
officer knowledgeable of the incident. 
164 Rapoport, D. C., `Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror? ', in P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart (eds. ), 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 1987, p. 72. 
118 
the secular Israeli state was an essential component of this process. The result was an 
ideology which emphasised the imminence of the expected messianic era and 
simultaneously differentiated itself from the broader movement which held this belief by 
identifying a potential impediment to this process and planning its destruction. 
3.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
Aum Shinrikyo represents perhaps the most bizarre manifestation of an 
apocalyptic/messianic group in recent history. Although classified here as Christian 
because of the heavy influence of the Christian apocalyptic in Aum's theology, the group's 
belief system could best be described as composite, drawing as it does on other sources, 
primarily Tibetan Buddhism and Hinduism. 165 As the group became more isolated from 
society so the group's ideology became increasingly imbued with violent traditions and 
those which necessitated preparations for a 'final battle'. A series of ideological 
justifications for extreme violence were thus created, centred on the central messianic 
figure of the group's leader, Shoko Asahara, whose position as a self-proclaimed deity 
allowed a certain latitude in adopting new ideas. Like so many other organisations, clues to 
the group's perception of itself can be found in its name. Aum Shinrikyo is usually 
translated roughly into English as 'Aum supreme truth'. There are, however, more subtle 
interpretations. According to Shoko Asahara, Aum is a Sanskrit term which refers to "the 
creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. 066 Shinri is the Japanese word for 
truth and kyo that of teaching. The name of the group thus suggests it is in a position to 
teach the truth about the creation and destruction of the universe and all that passes 
between the two. 
165 It has been suggested that Tibetan Buddhism was chosen as the basis for Asahara's own form of Buddhism, 
Tanlra tiajrayana, because he wanted to differentiate it from that of a rival group, Agonshu. 
166 M. Mullins, 'Aum Shinrikyo as an Apocalyptic Movement', in T. Robbins & S. Palmer (eds. ), Millennium, 
Messiahs and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements, 1997, p. 315. The Aum or Om is regarded as 
the most sacred syllable in Hinduism, and is often regarded as the bra (seed) of all mantras because it contains 
all origination and dissolution. It is known as the pranava (reverberation), and it is the supreme aksara 
(syllable). 
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Golden Age Myth 
The Golden Age perceived by Aum Shinrikyo was revealed to Shoko Asahara in 
1985. The guru allegedly had been visited by the god Shiva who told him that he would be 
the 'god of light that leads the armies of the gods' and charged him with establishing the 
kingdom of Shambala, a mythical kingdom appearing in Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. 
Shambala is the archetypal ideal society consisting of people who have achieved psychic 
powers. His role as 'the god of light' within the myth is that of a messianic figure destined 
to defeat the armies of the infidel in a final war and then to establish the universal reign of 
Buddhism. 167 Asahara's short term Golden Age was to convert Japan into a state where 
Asahara reigned according to the principal of a unified state and religion. This was also 
known as the 'vision of Lotus villages' where peace and justice would reign supreme. 168 
The condition for these short and long term Golden Ages was that they should be inhabited 
solely by Aum believers through either a process of conversion or elimination. Although 
Asahara's teaching suggests that killing those opposed to Aum is both meritorious and 
necessary for the victim's salvation, most Aum publications suggest that non-believers will 
be removed through a series of cataclysmic wars and natural disasters to which Aum 
believers would be immune due to their higher level of consciousness and enlightenment. 
Threat to Culture 
The threat perceived by Aum differs from most other organisations because the 
group itself did not (and does not) represent a large community with a centuries old history 
and a clearly defined religious tradition. The 'culture' which was under threat then was that 
manufactured by the group itself, and one which they saw as the blueprint for human 
society post-Armageddon. In 1989, Aum was granted religious corporation status by the 
Tokyo metropolitan government which allowed the group a high degree of autonomy and 
helped to enhance its separate identity. 169 As time progressed and the group became more 
inward looking Aum believers increasingly felt that they were oppressed and persecuted 
167 M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum 
Shinrikyo', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. X, # 4,1998, p. 83, & D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: 
Armageddon in Tokyo, 1996, p. 66. 
158 M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today, p. 86. '69 It is estimated that there are about one 185,000 legally registered religious groups in Japan. 
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because they knew the 'supreme truth'. Obvious and well defined threats to the group came 
from critical journalists and also from the 'Association of Victims of Aum Shinrikyo', a 
body established by parents whose children were involved with the organisation. The 
Association's first lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto and his family were also the first external 
victims of Aum Shinrikyo. Similarly the group's first successful sann attack in the town of 
Matsumoto in 1994 was aimed at eliminating the judges presiding over a land fraud case 
which Aum was destined to lose. 170 As the Japanese state began to probe the illegal 
activities of the group it too became identified as a threat. While the sann gas attacks on 
the Tokyo subway can be interpreted as the first strike of Armageddon it can also be seen 
as a direct attempt to disrupt the investigations of the central government and its security 
apparatus by striking at the centres of state power. 
Scriptural ism 
Of all the messianic groups examined here Aum's scriptural base is by far the most 
eclectic, a phenomenon associated most closely with Christian groups rather than their 
Islamic or Jewish counterparts. Aum engages in what Michael Barkun has called an 
'improvisational' style of messianism and apocalypticism. 17 1 This means that a group draws 
upon eschatological traditions from different religions, secular lore and what is termed the 
cultic milieu172, resulting in what can be termed a composite belief system. As noted above 
Shoko Asahara's first influence was that of Tibetan Buddhism which he developed into his 
own esoteric form known as Tantra Vajrayana. Asahara later reinterpreted the Tibetan 
Buddhist concept of phowa, or transference of consciousness into legitimised murder at 
the bidding of the Guru himself. 173 In the early stages, when Aum was based around yoga 
and meditation, Asahara stressed enlightenment (gadatsu) and self-realisation (satori). 
170 The first attempt to use the gas was earlier that year when Aum members attempted to spray sann into a 
hall where Daisaku Ikeda, leader of the rival sect Soko Gakkai, was delivering a lecture. The attack backfired 
and nearly killed one of the perpetrators. 
171 M. Barkun, Politics and Apocalypticism', in S. J. Stein (ed. ), The Encyclopaedia of Apocalypticism, Vol. 
III, 1998, pp. 442-460. 
172 The cultic milieu is a large body of information composed of information rejected or not taken seriously by 
society at large. There is something about the rejection of this information which leads to questions about why 
it is accessible only to the chosen few. For early discussions of this concept see C. Campbell, 'The Cult, the 
Cultic Milieu and Secularisation', in A Sociological Yearbook of Britain 5,1972, and M. E. Marty, A Nation of 
Believers, 1976. 
"3 M. Watanabe, Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 84-85. 
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Publications at that time such as Psychic Power: The Secret Way of Its Development 
(1986), and Psychic Power: Its Secret Curriculum (1987) concentrated on the development 
of psychic power through yoga. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Asahara embroidered his Buddhist traditions 
with ideas drawn from the Christian Apocalyptic tradition. The ideological shift was 
apocalyptic in tone as expressed by many of the group's publications of the time: 
Doomsday'74 (1989), From Annihilation to emptiness (1989), The Truth of the Annihilation 
of Mankind, Declaring Myself the Christ (1991 and 1992), and Shoko Asahara: His 
Shivering Prophecy (1993). Predictions made in these publications and others predicted an 
increasingly imminent Armageddon in greater detail. Various prophetic traditions were 
also integrated to verify the timing of the Endtime such as those of St. Malachy and the 
sixteenth century French astrologer Nostradamus (Nostradamus: The Great Secret 
Prophecy, 1991). One of the stranger imponderables about Armageddon for Shoko 
Asahara was whether or not mankind could benefit from extraterrestrials. He believed 
UFO visits were a common occurrence, but they were not necessarily 'of benefit' to the 
human race. 175 While the eclectic nature of this ideological construct is clear, equally is the 
way in which eschatological themes - especially Christian ones - are emphasised as the 
organisation detached itself from the mainstream society and embarked on a direct 
collision course with the Japanese state. 
Manichaean World View 
In accordance with other extreme religious groups Aum viewed non-members as 
the 'other'. While this otherness was initially perceived in a patronising and benign way as 
the group became more violent and its belief system more apocalyptic, so the view of non- 
Aum members became one of non-believers who will not survive the day of destruction. 
While the specific enemies of the group (both real and rhetorical) will be fully examined in 
Chapter Seven, it is appropriate to note here that Aum regarded the U. S. government and 
elements of Japanese officialdom, politics, religion and royal family as near satanic foes. 
Similarly the Jews and Freemasons are held to be 'agents of darkness'. Conversion to the 
174 S. Asahara, Doomsday, 1989. 
175 D. E. Kaplan and A. Marshall, The Cull at the End of the World. The Incredible Story ofAum Shinrikyo, 
1996, p. 66. 
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group was regarded as the only way to move from the dark to the light and in light of the 
group's global outlook it is significant to note that Aum had offices and interests in eight 
different countries and an estimated 35,000 members in Russia alone 176. Thus while the 
group possessed a Manichaean outlook, which intensified with the passage of time, 
movement into the elect was encouraged and relatively easy. 
Messianic Vision 
Although apocalyptic ideas are unusual in Buddhism, as has been noted above, this 
eschatological gap was filled by the adoption of (predominantly) Christian end-time ideas. 
The 1989 Doomsday was essentially Asahara's commentary on the book of revelation. As 
the group grew and matured, this final struggle became both more vivid and more 
immediate. Moreover it had become unavoidable. In Aum's early stages the Golden Age 
could be achieved by enough people joining the group. Even though Asahara was writing 
about nuclear war in the late 1980s, he still claimed that such a conflagration could be 
avoided by the development of Aum. '77 These earlier theological emphasis on preventing 
the apocalypse were replaced by more dire apocalyptic visions, a result of a failure to enter 
mainstream politics and the increasingly inward looking nature of the group. The 
theological result is a vision which concerns itself with the survival of a small number of 
chosen people who will rebuild human civilisation according to the plan of Aum 
Shinrikyo. As time passed the sense of crisis became more intense for Asahara, as did his 
view of the apocalypse and his own role in it. In 1994, he told his followers of a vision in 
which he would become king and reign over Japan in three years time and not only that 
1997 would be shinri gannen, year one of 'the Age of Supreme Truth', but all those who 
opposed the Supreme Truth were to be killed. "S Finally, in March 1995, Asahara released 
Disaster is Approaching the Land of the Rising Sun'79 which predicted a great disaster to 
follow the Hanshin earthquake (which of course Asahara claimed to have predicted), 
setting the stage for an almost imminent apocalypse. 
176 U. S. Congress, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum 
Shinrikyo, Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, October 31,1995, p. 21. 
177 S. Asahara, Initiation, 1988. 
178 M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 91. 179 Sometimes'A Doom is nearing the Land of the Rising Sun'. 
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The formation of Aum Shinrikyo's ideology exhibited a propensity to evolve over 
time in reaction to changing circumstances, a process made possible by the eclectic nature 
of the group's belief system and the centrality of Shoko Asahara to its formation. As the 
group rejected mainstream society so the world beyond the group was seen in an 
increasingly Manichaean light and the messianic and apocalyptic elements of the group's 
ideology were developed and refined. Over time then Aum's ideology changed a great deal, 
a process less likely in an organisation based solely in a single, orthodox revealed tradition 
such as the Jewish Underground or the Saudi Ikhwan. 
3.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan 
The Saudi Ikhwan represents the only significant example of a contemporary 
Islamic extremist group motivated primarily by an active messianic programme. 180 
Although there had been numerous messianic Islamic movements in the past, the Saudi 
Ikhwan arose precisely at a time when revolutionary, militant Islam, especially in Iran, was 
emerging as a political force in the Middle East. The formation of the Saudi Ikhwan's 
ideology was to a certain extent context-specific, but the underlying causes of militance 
and the heavy eschatological content of the Ikhwan's message was far from confined to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and resonated throughout the entire Muslim world. 181 
Golden Age Myth 
The Golden Age sought by the Saudi Ikhwan conforms to the ideal type of 
puritanical, religious society similar to that of the first Islamic communities in seventh 
century Arabia, and common to many contemporary Islamic groups. The political 
dimension of this age, however, could be identified as existing as recently as the twentieth 
180 Dekmejian notes that there are two other contemporary Sunni claimants to Mahdiship: Shukri Mustafa of 
al-Takfir wal-Hijra and Taha al-Samawa of Jama'at al-Muslimin lil-Takfir. See his Islam in Revolution, 1994, 
p. 62. 
181 It is interesting to note that in the immediate aftermath of the Grand Mosque take-over Sunni literature on 
the subject of the Mahdi condemned it as a Shi'a heresy (for example Abd al-Karim al-Khatib The Awaited 
Mahdi and Those Who Await Him, 1980, and Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Ata, The Awaited Mahd!: Between Truth 
and Superstition, 1980. In recent years however Sunni works have begun to appear which accept the Mahdi's 
validity and the imminence of his return to a world which has embraced ignorance. See for example Hamzah 
al-Faqir, Three Whom the World Awaits: The Expected Mahdi, the False Messiah, Messiah Jesus, 1995, and 
Amin Muhammad Jamal al-Din, The Life-span of the Islamic Community and the Nearness of the Appearance 
of the Mahdi, 1996. 
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century. Before the establishment of the Kingdom of Saud in 1932, the Ikhwan provided 
the military force needed to overcome opposition to a unified kingdom. The Ikhwan 
portrayed themselves as defenders of the faith and supporters of the Sharia and, as such, 
they soon found themselves in conflict with the comparatively tolerant and modernising 
royal regime. 182 The contest was an unequal, if prolonged one, and resulted in the triumph 
of the new regime. It has been suggested then that while doubtless a totally devoted 
believer and while using religious rhetoric and imagery to convey his message, what 
Juhayman was really doing "was fighting to restore the Ikhwan's position in the country's 
polity.. . 
Their message was one of opposition to the House of Saud and the ruling elite's 
alliance system, as well as the proclamation of the long-awaited Mahdi. i183 For Juhayman, 
the revival of this Golden Age would be achieved through the appearance of the Mahdi 
who would rule over this idealised society. 
Threat to Culture 
The cultural threat perceived by the Ikhwan was the spiritual pollution of Islamic 
society in Saudi Arabia by the West, and the associated decline in standards of religious 
practice and observance by Saudis themselves. The themes contained in the 'seven letters', 
the Ikhwan's primary polemic, include the necessity for Muslims to overthrow corrupt 
rulers, the need to establish a puritanical society based on the Quran and the Sunnah, and 
to protect the community from unbelievers and foreign influence. '84 When the Grand 
Mosque was seized, Utaybi allegedly accused the royal family of corruption, excessive 
travel abroad and the consumption of alcohol. He also demanded that the kingdom reject 
the corruption of 'foreign ways' which had been imposed on Saudi society by the 
modernising policies of the House of Saud. 185 Juhayman also expressed opposition to 
foreign interference, and Western influence also has a historical parallel with the earlier 
Ikhwan. In fact, Juhayman believed ibn Saud had 'deceived' the Ikhwan by not leading 
them on a jihad into surrounding countries but instead made an alliance with the 
182 See D. Holden & R. Johns, The House of Saud, 1981, Chs. 6&7. 183 J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi 
People', The Muslim World, Vol. LXXX, # 1, p. 8-9. 
184 H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 135. 185 S. Mackey, The Saudis: Leide the Desert Kingdom, p. 231. 
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'Christians". The growth of the Saudi oil economy during the 1960-1970 period and the 
Saudi regime's unwavering opposition to communism strengthened these relationships, 
especially with the U. S. and Britain. The self-proclaimed Mahdi, al-Qhatani, is also 
reputed to have preached against modernisation during the siege of the mosque, 
demanding the elimination of television, the broadcasting of music on radio, the 
disbanding of all football teams, the banning of women from all public work places and 
the expulsion of foreigners. '87 The threat to culture is an interesting one in a country where 
religion plays such a pivotal role within the state itself. Since the house of Saud was 
established, Saudi Arabia has never embraced any political ideology other than religious 
monarchy. 188 Compared with other Muslim countries such as Syria and Egypt the cultural 
threat would seem less. Utaybi though was adamant in his condemnation of both the 
regime and the state ulema: 
"[d]o not seek the law from those who have no beards or the state ulema. They will 
only make matters more difficult for you. They will not tell you the truth. They will 
only tell you what the government wants. " 189 
Script ural ism 
What makes the scipturalism of the Ikhwan uprising appear so extreme is the 
degree to which religion was already imbued within Saudi Arabia. The Saudi constitution 
and Saudi jurisprudence are based on Wahabi religious scripture and lore. As one 
commentator noted soon after the uprising at Mecca: 
"Islam is far more than a mere rhetorical subject for the ruling elite. It pervades 
social customs and interactions. It dominates images and attitudes. It motivates 
policies and is used to justify them. And it embodies the system of values upon 
which the legitimacy of the regime rests. " 190 
186 J. Kostiner, 'State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post Desert Storm Phase', MERIA Journal, 
# 2, July, 1997, p. 1. 
187 W. Dietl, Holy War, 1983, p. 222. 188 F. A. Sankari, 'Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia' in A. E. H. Dessouki (ed. ), Islamic Resurgence in the 
Arab World, 1982. 
189 From The Call of the Brethren, cited in The Financial Times, April 28,1980. 190 A. Dawisha, Saudi Arabia's Search for Security, 1980, p. 10 
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While Juhayman's vision of a perfect Muslim society rested upon conventional 
interpretations of the Quran and the Sunnah, his belief in the identity of the Mahdi and the 
circumstances surrounding his manifestation were drawn from various Hadith. Two in 
particular are of note. The first concerns the identity of the Mahdi: "[i]f there were but one 
day remaining for the world, God would lengthen that day until he sends to it a man from 
my [Muhammad's] house and community. His name will be the same as mine. i191 Al- 
Qhatani apparently satisfied this prediction. The second, which concerned the 
circumstances of the Mahdi's manifestation, viewed Muslim history as a degenerative 
cycle which moved from Prophethood to the Caliphate, to illegitimate kingship and then to 
tyrannical kingship and finally returning to the Caliphate. The transition from one era to 
the next is decided by God and the Mahdi will appear at the end of the period of tyrannical 
kingship. Once the Mahdi appears all Muslims will pay him allegiance while the 
unbeliever's army would vanish. According to the same Hadith "the earth would open to 
engulf the army of unbelievers who will come to dislodge the Mahdi. i192 The messianic 
significance of these traditions will be further examined below. 
Manichaean World View 
The Saudi Ikhwan's world view was clear, literalist and extreme. It is perhaps best 
expressed in elements contained in the seven letters, themselves a contextualised and 
selective interpretation of Islamic traditions. One of the aims of the Ikhwan was to 
establish a "puritanical Islamic community that protects Islam from unbelievers and does 
not court foreigners. " 193 In this light foreigners (primarily identified as 'Christians' in the 
form of Americans and British), obviously fall into the category of'infidel' from the dar al- 
harb(house of war) who are to be opposed and destroyed by the faithful themselves or 
through the divine agency of the Mahdi. The second category of peoples to be opposed is 
that of apostates. The seven letters proclaims that there is a "duty to reject all mushrikun - 
worshipers of the partners of God, including worshipers of Ali, Fatimah and Muhammad, 
the Khawarij, and even music and technology. " 194 The Ikhwan thus rejected not only other 
191 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 1967, Vol. 2, pp. 159-165. 
'`n A. Al-Yassini, Religion and the State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 126. 
193 Quoted in H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 135. 
194 ibid. 
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faiths and schismatics within their own faith, but also any Muslim who wholeheartedly 
embraced the tools and chattels of modernity. Victory against such varied and numerous 
forces could only be guaranteed by a dramatic and overwhelming divine intervention such 
as that promised by the Mahdi. 
Messianic Vision 
Utaybi alluded to the Mahdi in the group's first publication, and these ideas were 
developed more fully in a third numbered pamphlet which appeared during Ramadan 
1979, entitled 'Call of the Ikhwan'. In this pamphlet, various traditions of variable 
credibility and historical similarities are examined and the imminence of the Mahdi's 
arrival confirmed. Notable amongst these is a selection from Ibn Khaldun's social history, 
the Mugaddimmah, which states 
"a man of the people will go forth, fleeing to Mecca. then some of the people of 
Mecca will come to him ... and they will swear allegiance to 
him-And an army will 
be sent against him from Syria but will be swallowed up in the earth in the desert 
between Mecca and Al-Madina. i195 
The Hadith mentioned above concerning the evolution of Islamic history, the appearance 
of the Mahdi and the destruction of an invader's army was also of pivotal importance. A 
review of the writings of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahabbi 
doctrine, shows that he accepted this Hadith. Moreover, Sheikh al-Wahhab devoted an 
entire chapter in one of his major works to the Mahdi and his awaited 196 
Another tradition claims that the Mahdi will bear: 
"the name and patronymic of the prophet (Muhammed bin Abdullah), will be of his 
tribe (the Quraish) and will appear some six to ten years before the Anti-Mahdi or 
Antichrist, who will be destroyed by Jesus Christ when he descends to restore the 
peace of Muhammed. i197 
As obvious (if archaic) as they might seem, the Saudi security services did not detect (or 
take seriously) this specific geographical reference nor the heavy overtones of violent 
opposition with which it was combined. 
195 Ibn Khaldun, The Mugaddimah: An Introduction to History, 1958, Vol. 2, pp. 165-166. 
196 A. Al-Yassini, Religion and the State, p. 127. 
197 D. Holden & R. Johns, The House of Saud, p. 520. 
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The ideology of the Saudi Ikhwan was developed in opposition to the perceived 
apostasy of the Saudi regime. The extreme nature of this ideology however, one which 
placed the burden of reform on the acceptance of the Saudi people (and all Muslims 
generally) of one of the group's members as the expected Mahdi. This messianic emphasis 
reflected both Juhayman Utaybi's assessment of the degenerative state of Saudi society and 
the ripeness for messianic redemption, and also his inability or unwillingness to consider 
an ideological programme which placed less emphasis on redemption and more on 
addressing the various cultural threats through a form of revolutionary vanguard or a 
broader organisation. 
3.4 Conclusion 
While this chapter has examined a seemingly disparate collection of groups from 
three separate religious traditions certain patterns suggest themselves. At a basic level all 
of them are striving for a 'better' world, often one which is achieved by stages, and one 
which depends simultaneously upon a group's relationship to the society within which it 
exists and the degree to which secular life and society are rejected. This Golden Age is a 
reformulation of an idealised past, derived form religious history which it is believed can 
be transposed onto contemporary society and which will transform that society into a more 
just and equitable environment conforming with divine law. In all cases the perception of a 
theft of culture is extreme and the group sees itself in state of siege in opposition to some 
collective 'other'. The extent to which a cultural system is seen to have been eroded and the 
breadth of the category of 'other' both depend upon the extremity of the group's perception 
of isolation and the relevance of temporal existence. The scriptural sources and religious 
traditions used to construct a group's ideology are at once potentially very broad and at the 
same time limited in terms of what is actually chosen. All groups are highly selective in 
their use of religious tradition and this selectivity depends heavily on the group's world 
view. An organisation of the messianic/apocalyptic type will concentrate on those sources 
of religious lore which deal with eschatology. For another group such as one from the core 
or mainstream categories eschatology is still an important part of religious tradition but it 
is far from being central, and so other sources are drawn upon - albeit in a selective fashion 
which emphasises the justice and permissibility of engaging in violence. The development 
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of a Manichaean world view clearly defines the identity of the true believers and the 
malign other which must be removed in order for the ultimate success of the struggle. This 
dichotomy is again reinforced by the reinterpretation of religious history which directly 
links past struggles to those of the present. As noted above the messianic vision of a group 
and the degree to which it is emphasised varies according to group type but is present 
throughout, offering a final and divinely promised triumph over both temporal and 
spiritual iniquity. The formulation of violent religious ideologies is dynamic and 
dependant on the crisis environment. Changing political, military and social circumstances 
may dictate the need for a group to alter its ideological programme to cope with new 
constraints or crises or to take advantage of some new opportunity. And both the 
development and adaptation of an ideological system as well as the operational activities it 
is used to justify is the province of a group's leadership. 
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Chapter IV 
Leadership 
While the basic elements of group ideology already exist in the form of religious 
traditions and texts, it is their actual selection and interpretation by the leaders of these 
groups which gives them their specific message and agenda. As Scott Appleby has 
described this process, an extremist religious leader is one who "reaches into the past, 
selects and develops politically useful (if sometimes obscure) teachings or traditions, and 
builds around these... an ideology of and a program of action. "1 Although this chapter 
identifies three distinct types of leadership - ideologues, bureaucratic and charismatic - 
these types may overlap and combine in different ways. For example, a group may have 
influential ideologues, both living and dead, and settle on a bureaucratic operational 
leadership. By contrast a group may have a primary ideologue who is simultaneously the 
group's charismatic leader. While these relationships will be explored further below 
several themes appear to remain constant. The first is that ideologues provide an in-depth 
and contemporary religious critique of secular society - and in many cases justifications for 
violence - and as such provide the essential re-examination of religious tradition in the 
light of contemporary crises. The second theme is that charismatic leadership is essentially 
more radical because authority is limited to a single individual. By contrast bureaucratic 
leadership is more likely to be more moderate due to the variety of views represented. The 
third theme is that radicalism in leadership contributes to the early demise of a group 
while the opposite is true of bureaucratic structures. The exact combination of leadership 
forms determines how these themes interact. 
While the above themes suggest rigid patterns within group types this is not 
necessarily always so. The functions and activities of mainstream would suggest both the 
role of ideologues and bureaucratic leadership and that is certainly the case with all the 
mainstream case studies. The importance of a charismatic ideologue varies greatly, for 
1 R. S. Appleby, Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, 1997, p. 4. 
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example the death of Meir Kahane was a far more severe blow to the organisation than 
would be the death of Sheikh Fadlallah or Ahmad Yassin. By contrast the death of an 
ageing and seemingly ineffectual ideologue such as Richard Butler could severely diminish 
the influence of Aryan Nations or his replacement by a young charismatic successor could 
revive the fortunes of the organisation. The small size and violent orientation of core 
groups would seem to require a bureaucratic structure to ensure group survival and this is 
certainly true of the PIJ. Where the leadership is basically charismatic, as in the case of the 
Order, destruction is invited, and although Eyal is an atypical case in part because it failed 
to develop, the failure to develop a bureaucratic structure would certainly have proved 
costly. In all the cases where a bureaucratic structure is adopted, the existence of an 
internal and external leadership as manifested by Hamas and the PIJ ensures a degree of 
security but also allows for internal dissent. Messianic and apocalyptic groups generally 
have charismatic leadership types often with a divine or semi-divine identification, 
although in the case of the Jewish Underground this did not prove to be the case, and the 
sheer size of Aum Shinrikyo necessitated a degree of bureaucracy. 
4.1 Mainstream 
4.1.1 Kach 
The primary ideologue and active leader of the Kach movement (until his death in 
1990) was rabbi Meir Kahane. It was Kahane's writings which established the ideological 
foundations of the movement and his charismatic leadership, first of the Jewish Defence 
League (JDL), then of Kach and later posthumously through a variety of Kach off-shoots, 
which has helped define much of the political activity of the radical Jewish right in Israel 
and the U. S. since 1990. Before examining Kahane himself, it must be noted that many of 
Kahane's ideas have prominent modem intellectual forebears. Theoreticians, such as Leo 
Pinsker and Theodor Herzl, developed the idea that Zionism and a separate Jewish state 
was the only alternative to the growing anti-Semitism of their time, an anti-Semitism 
which would only lead to the end of Judaism. This catastrophic element of Jewish 
ideological thought declined with the Zionist enterprise in Palestine during the 1930s and 
was almost entirely absent after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Kahane's 
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catastrophic ideas were not new, they were simply reformulated to explain the most recent 
threat to Judaism as Kahane saw it. 
Kahane's ideological roots follow quite closely the development of Zionism itself. 
Kahane had grown up within the Revisionist movement as he was a Betar` member and his 
father, Rabbi Charles Kahane, was active within American Jewish revisionism. Kahane 
had even met Vladimir Jabotinsky once in the late 1930s when he visited the Kahane's 
home. In 1947, Kahane was arrested for the first time after picketing the British Foreign 
Minister, Ernest Bevin, over Britain's pro-Arab policies. 3 In 1968, Kahane began his 
political career when he formed the JDL in New York, and when he moved to Israel in 
1971 his support for influential political Zionists continued, as did his virulent opposition 
to the religious Zionist agenda. Perhaps Kahane's greatest political hero was Menachem 
Begin, former commander of the Irgun and later Israeli Prime Minister, and like many in 
the Jewish religious right Kahane was elated when Begin won the 1977 election. But this 
elation lasted only until the signing of the Camp David Accords: "[t]he heart of the Begin 
tragedy is that a man who was a symbol, for half a century, of Jewish pride and strength, 
surrendered Jewish rights, sovereignty and land out of fear of Gentile Pressure. "4 The event 
transformed Kahane, discrediting his major favourites within mainstream Israeli politics 
and by extension Israel's democratic government itself. After 1978, Kahane became even 
more extreme in his rhetoric and calls for action than before, stung by what he saw as a 
betrayal of the Zionist enterprise and the possibilities this held for a new catastrophic 
phase in Jewish history. 
Before 1984, Kahane's personality was a stumbling block to political success. 
Although his writings were incisive and contained a definite appeal to a growing segment 
of the Israeli electorate, Kahane's public image was of a blustering, emotive and publicity 
hungry demagogue. 5 The introduction of ethnic issues into Israeli politics in the early 
1980s and the social cleavages created by the Lebanon war both helped to radicalise 
Israeli politics and to make Kahane's ideas more acceptable. Kahane, as a demagogue, 
2 An acronym of Berit Trumpeldor': Covenant with Trumpeldor. Betar was a youth organisation founded by 
Jabotinsky. 
3 R. Friedman, The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane - From FBI Informant to Knesset Member, 1990, p. 9. 4 The Jewish Press, October 20,1978. 
5 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the 
Rabin Assassination, 1999, p. 200. 
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consistently incited violence through various publications and mass rallies (as mainstream 
public opinion turned against the organisation though, access to media outlets became 
increasingly difficult). 6 In June 1980, Kahane wrote in his Jewish Press weekly column 
that: 
"(h)undreds of Jewish lives will be lost, Gd forbid, unless the government 
immediately moves to ... create a terror-against-terror group that will spread 
fear and 
shatter the souls of the Arabs in Eretz Yisrael". 
Although complicit in the creation of a Jewish Terror Against Terror (TNT) network, 
Kahane was always careful to distance himself from direct involvement. As one Israeli 
police official has stated "[h]e created the climate for his supporters to act in. 0 Indeed, in 
1987 at the onset of the Intifada, it seemed to many that Kahane's warnings about the 
Arabs had been proved to be accurate, and that yet another attempt was being made to 
destroy the Jewish state. To some Kach followers, it was also a sign that the catastrophic 
redemptive process of'forty years' was about to be fulfilled. 
Meir Kahane derived his justifications for violence from scripture and his 
familiarity with Jewish religious tradition allowed him to be both selective and exhaustive 
in his reasoning. 8 Kahane professed to believe in a literal reading of the Halakah, and 
despite the fact that there are thousands of orthodox rabbis and scholars to read the 
Halakah and explain them, he asserted that only he knew'the truth'. This certainty in part 
explains why he did not refer to other Halakic authorities either living or dead. 9 Such a 
belief led him to make statements such as: 
"[w]hy is it that we do not comprehend that it is precisely our refusal to deal with the 
Arabs according to Halakic obligation that will bring down on our heads terrible 
6 When Kahane became a member of parliament after the 1984 elections an unofficial ban by media directors 
resulted from a broadly held desire to prevent him from disseminating his views. Kahane was not permitted to 
appear on television or radio programmes, newspapers would not allow him to express (or defend) his views, 
his statements were not reported and press conferences and events organised by Kach were not covered. 7R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', New York Review of Books, 1986, p. 18. 8 In 1975 Kahane was sentenced to one year in prison. Of this experience he has been quoted as saying: 
"Prison was a real joy, I read the Torah all day". R. Friedman, The Sayings of Meir Kahane', p. 18. 9 More specifically Kahane saw himself as the ultimate authority on political issues. There were of course 
rabbis that agreed with him but not in an open, political fashion. See E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's 
Radical Right, 1991, p. 216. 
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sufferings, whereas our courage in removing them will be one of the major factors in 
the hurrying of the final redemption? "10 
Like all ideologues and religious leaders Kahane possessed the ability to invoke ancient 
scriptural and historical concepts to describe contemporary phenomena. 'Apostate' Jews 
thus became 'Hellenists', Arabs become modem versions of the biblical Amalekites, drugs 
were likened to a social 'locust plague', and the death camps of the holocaust and the 
policies of the Israeli Ministry of Education identified as the "twin fires of Molech. "" 
One of the key concepts Kahane derived from scripture was the revival of Jewish 
strength and the associated need for Jewish revenge. His much vaunted popular cry for a 
'fist in the face of the gentile' is symbolised through the organisation's emblem -a clenched 
fist within a star of David. To Kahane, the Holocaust and all the anti-Jewish pogroms 
which preceded it, had not only seriously damaged the Jewish people, but they were the 
direct result of Jewish weakness and submission. While the establishment of the state of 
Israel was an important step towards redressing these historical injustices, only revenge 
upon the gentiles could fully restore the pride and mission of Judaism. For Kahane, the 
purpose of Jewish violence was to: 
"destroy the Jewish neuroses and fears that contribute so much encouragement to the 
anti-Semite as well as Jewish belief in its own worthlessness. We want to instil self- 
respect and self-pride in a Jew who is ashamed of himself for running away. " 12 
Pride and identity could thus be generated through violence against a world which had 
habitually sought the persecution or destruction of the Jewish people since the earliest 
biblical times. 
Kahane was certainly a leader in the charismatic mould - as well as being the 
architect of 'Kahanist' ideology - although he did not have any pretensions as a divine 
figure. He did, however, see himself in the role of a prophet. This is especially so after 
1980 when his books and interviews are replete with warnings of'the coming catastrophe'. 
The extent to which these were heart felt beliefs rather than mere political rhetoric born of 
'0 M. Kahane, TheyMust Go, 1981, p. 272. 
" Molech was a deity worshipped by the biblical Ammonites, one feature of his worship being the burning of 
children. 
12 M. Kahane, The Story of the Jewish Defense League, 1975, p. 142. 
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an increasingly frustrated situation is difficult to tell. As one observer of the group has 
commented: 
"[ilt is very hard to tell how deeply the leader of Kach believed in his own 
predictions, and whether we had here an article of faith of a prophet in the tradition 
of Jeremiah, or an expression of a troubled person who knew no one took his 
theories seriously. "13 
Kahane was also a charismatic figure of the media age. He understood how to use the press 
and electronic media to raise the public profile of himself and mobilise around his cause. 
In 1981, when Gush Emunim supporters were being removed from the Yamit area by the 
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), various delaying tactics were employed. A group of Kach 
activists locked themselves in an air raid shelter with weapons, explosives and poisons and 
threatened to kill themselves. In a high media drama, Kahane, at the request of Menachem 
Begin, personally convinced them to leave peacefully. 14 Following 1984, curbs on his 
access to the media diluted this effect for potential new supporters, but his appeal to 
existing supporters altered little because of effective internal communications channels 
within the movement itself. 
While Kahane certainly had an important (if narrow) popular appeal for a certain 
period of time, his political future was severely curtailed by legislation and Israeli popular 
opinion. Kahane's inflammatory rhetoric was most potent in periods of political and 
military crisis when his dire predictions proved to be on the verge of coming to pass. 
Crisis, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely and prophecies and predictions must be 
realised to have any real credence. Furthermore, the prevailing mood of the majority of the 
Israeli population has been one in favour of the rule of law, and if not a high sensitivity to 
attacks upon and murders of Palestinians, then certainly one to those committed against 
Israelis. Moreover the Israeli police, the IDF, and the security services were seen by the 
Israeli public as effective in curtailing Arab terrorism, further delegitimising vigilantism. 
As Sprinzak notes of Kahane's end "[a]t the time of his New York assassination, on 
13 E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Meir Kahane' in M. Juergensmeyer (ed. ), 
Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1991, p. 54. 14 G. Wolsfeld, 'Collective Political Action and Media Research Report', Jerusalem Quarterly, # 31,1984, pp. 
140-141. In 1984 however, after the discovery of the Jewish Underground, the majority of Gush Emunim 
members and leaders dissociated themselves from the use of vigilante justice. In particular efforts were made 
to distance the group from Meir Kahane and Kach. 
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November 5,1990... Kahane was a marginal figure with little national appeal. i15 The 
assassination, however, did not remove the violent core of Kahane followers, nor Kahane's 
posthumous influence. The teachings of the rabbi have influenced a broad array of right- 
wing rabbis, even if they have had no direct association with Kach. These have sanctioned 
violent acts, primarily against Arabs, and praised acts of anti-Arab violence. 16 
Following Kahane's assassination the organisation began to fracture. The split 
between Kach and Kahane Chai (Kahane lives) was largely an issue of leadership 
personalities and not one of ideology or political direction. Rabbi Abraham Toledano 
succeeded Kahane as the leader of Kach, but he had never been selected as a successor by 
Kahane (indeed, no-one had) and some American immigrants were unhappy about having 
a Sephardic (Moroccan) leader. " Most of these left to form Kahane Chai under the 
leadership of Kahane's son Binyamin, who is reported as claiming that under Toledano 
"the movement's institutions no longer have any legal authority. " 18 The 1994 Hebron 
massacre and the ensuing ban of Kach and Kahane Chai had major consequences for the 
leadership of both groups. Within days of the ban most of the senior leaders of the two 
groups had been arrested with the exception of Baruch Marzel, leader of Kach, who was 
not taken into custody until early April 1994.19 Some were placed under administrative 
detention, many more had their weapons confiscated, while others had their physical 
movements restricted. Such actions paralysed the entire leadership at a stroke. Other 
measures included the dismissal of individuals from military service, increased 
surveillance of individuals, confiscation of property owned by the organisation, closing 
15 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 216. 
16 At the funeral of Baruch Goldstein, for example, Rabbi Ariel Yisrael commended the Doctor's actions 
comparing him to Judas Maccabeus and Samson describing him as a martyr. Yehudiot Ahronot, March 18, 
1994. It is also interesting to note that during his trial Yigal Amir said that his way of befriending women was 
led by the question 'what do you think of Baruch Goldstein?. The girls answer would determine whether Amir 
would pursue a relationship. See R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: 
Critical Appraisal', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. IX, # 4,1997, p. 101. 17 See E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 234. Toledano was arrested in November 1993 when he was 
caught smuggling military equipment into Israel from the U. S. Investigators decided that this equipment was 
intended for use when the movement would 'go underground'. ibid. p. 235. 18 Voice of Israel, 1400 gmt, 24 Mar. 91 - BBC/SWB, ME/1030, A/10, March 26,1991. Binyamin was 
himself assassinated by Palestinian gun men near the Jewish settlement of Ofra on December 31,2000. 19 New York Times, April 4,1994. 
137 
meeting places, prohibiting the distribution of organisation literature and the prohibition of 
fund-raising or public displays. 20 
Violent acts such as that committed in Hebron resulted in state repression, 
something Kahane and most other leaders acknowledged. As Kahane said shortly after his 
election to the Knesset: 
"[t]he Attacks by Arabs against Jews constantly are a thing against which revenge 
must be taken. I have pleaded with members of Kach not to take such actions not 
because it is a bad thing but because they have no support. It's a suicidal thing. But 
whoever does it certainly is committing an act of sanctification of God's name. "21 
It would be impossible to mount an overt violent campaign through an above ground 
organisation such as Kach, and while Goldstein's action was far from being ordered by the 
group he belonged to, the nature of Kach and its rhetoric, his affiliation with Kach and the 
obvious approval the group showed for his actions, were all sufficient to justify the 
banning of Kach and its offshoots. However, Kahane's ideas live on in a hard core of right- 
wing Jewish settlers, through the (albeit banned) various off-shoots of Kach and also in 
institutions such as the Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea in Jerusalem. 
The leadership of the Kach movement crossed over several categories. Meir 
Kahane can simultaneously be labelled the chief ideologue of the group and also a popular 
and effective charismatic leader. The size of the organisation and its range of activities 
necessitated a bureaucratic leadership structure, but this was subordinate to Kahane. The 
assassination of Kahane produced a serious leadership crisis within the organisation, 
exemplified by the split which followed soon after, and the vacuum which was created has 
yet to be filled by an individual of Kahane's charismatic appeal. His legacy, however, has 
certainly endured as it is possible to identify a Kahanist ideology which dominates and 
permeates the contemporary Jewish extreme right. 
20 The Israeli government also considered refusing entry to foreign members of the organisation. Jerusalem 
Report, March 24,1994. 
21 Washington Post, March S. 1984. 
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4.1.2 Aryan Nations 
The current leader of Aryan Nations and head of the related Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian is Reverend Richard Butler. 22 Butler was educated at Los Angeles City College 
in aeronautical engineering and eventually worked for the Lockheed aircraft company as a 
senior manufacturing engineer. 23 Butler was a disciple of Wesley Smith, an influential 
identity leader in California, and Butler claims that his church is a continuation of that 
established by Smith. 24 What Butler added to Swift's theology were his own personal 
wartime experiences in India which led him to believe in a mythical, superior, Aryan 
diaspora, and his perception of government failure. In 1973, Butler moved to Hayden Lake, 
Idaho, and there established his ministry and the Aryan Nations compound. Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, the Hayden Lake compound became a focal point for the radical right in 
the US, especially the annual 'open house' gatherings which involved weapons and survival 
training as well as exchanges of ideas and debate over ideology and strategy. Such 
gatherings, however, failed to provide the Identity movement (specifically) with any sense 
of orthodoxy or centralised structure, nor did they enable Butler to establish himself as the 
overall leader of a united Identity movement. 25 Leadership of Aryan Nations in the form of 
Butler and his lieutenants can be said to exist somewhere between the charismatic and the 
collegial form - Butler retains an overall position of authority as figurehead of the group 
but due to the breadth of activities and to a certain degree Butler's advanced age, many 
responsibilities have been devolved to senior members of the group. 
The distinguishing feature of leadership throughout the Christian Identity 
movement generally is its fragmentary nature. While there are populist figures which 
loosely fit the role of the ideologue such as Pete Peters, Louis Beam26 and Dan Gayman, 
22 The titles 'Reverend' and 'Pastor' as used by figures in America's extreme racist right add a veneer of 
legitimacy but are frequently unrelated to their depth of scriptural knowledge or to actual religious 
qualifications. 
23 The apparent normality of Butler's career until he devoted himself exclusively to Aryan Nations is not 
uncommon in the American extreme right, and in many cases this superficial normality has allowed believers to 
roceed to acts of violence undetected by the authorities or the community within which they five. 
4 "We are the continuing direct-line Church of Jesus Christ Christian as originally founded by Dr. Wesley 
Smith of Lancaster, California. After Dr. Swift's death, the church has been carried on by Richard G. Butler". 
Aryan Nations Website, 'Foundation Biography of Aryan Nations'. 2' Two other significant (and representative) Identity leaders are Pete Peters, head of the LaPorte Church of 
Christ in LaPorte, Colorado and Pastor Dan Gayman, head of the Church of Israel in Schell City Missouri. 26 Beam has served as Aryan Nations 'ambassador at large' and was responsible for setting up the'Aryan 
Nation Liberty Net' in the 1980s. 
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these cover the spectrum of Identity thought and none seek to establish themselves as an 
ideological figurehead for violent action. 27 Aryan Nations can be seen in this light. While 
Butler was certainly the organisational and ideological force behind the movement, he has 
failed to maintain and strengthen this position by not 'delivering the goods' -a common 
criticism levelled at those who preach struggle but fail to act. While the administrative 
leadership structure could be described as collegial, this dimension has been plagued by 
disloyalty, personal conflict and greed. 28 Aryan Nations has produced one of the radical 
right's most potent populist martyrs29 in the form of Robert Mathews, although he rejected 
Aryan Nations for its passive stance. While such figures do appear from time to time in the 
American religious right, there is a total absence of characters which can be described as 
charismatic in the true sense. 30 As one unrepentant member of the Order has opined: 
"[t]he cause of this malady [within the movement] is the inadequacy and 
incompetencies [sic] of our so-called leaders. Or more accurately, the lack of 
competent leaders. The conventional methods and courses our diverse factions have 
utilised for the past few decades have proven to be a failure. 1131 
In the 1990s, Butler's popularity and fortunes have declined considerably. This is 
mainly because of the caution he has always shown towards violence. As Jeffrey Kaplan 
notes: "he preached a violent message while refusing to sanction - or even discuss - the 
possibility of acting on his words. "32 Butler's closest brush with the law came when he was 
one of the star defendants at the 1989 Fort Smith conspiracy trial. During the trial Butler's 
legal position as head of the group was far from secure - several members of the Order, 
including Robert Mathews had been members of Aryan Nations and the printing press used 
in the Order's first counterfeiting operation allegedly belonged to Aryan Nations. At the 
27 Dan Gayman for instance represents the more passive end of the Identity spectrum. Since 1987 Gayman has 
preached accommodation with the state, based upon the ideas of submission to secular authority contained in 
Romans 13, and a rejection of violence. See Church of Israel, 'Articles of Faith and Doctrine', pamphlet 
published by the Church of Israel, January 10,1987. 
g After Carl Franklin and Wayne Jones resigned in 1993 Franklin stated in a letter that he and Jones left 
because they hadn't received a paycheque in over two years. ADL, Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles 
and Voices on America's For Right Fringe, 1996, p. 19. 
29 Gordon Kahl, David Koresh and Vicky Weaver may also be seen in this light. 
30 The obvious exceptions are those associated with cults such as David Koresh of the Branch Davidians and 
Jim Jones of the People's Temple. The violence of such groups however is almost exclusively internalised. 
31 G. Yarborough, Alert Update and Advisory, n. p., 1993. 
32 J. Kaplan, 'Right-Wing Violence in North America', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VII, # 1,1995, 
p. 53. 
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end of the trial, however, Butler was acquitted of all charges. The acquittal seemed to 
reinforce the opinion of many right-wing militants that Butler was a paper tiger, unwilling 
to dirty his hands in conducting the Lord's work. While Robert Mathews and the Order 
were engaging in activism, claims by Butler that "[i]t's possible that Aryan nations were 
behind those bombings [in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho in Fall 1986]. I don't know the name and 
face of every Aryan Nations member in the country and what they do"33, showed a 
determination to remain within the law. In light of this it is notable that Aryan Nations was 
not a major recipient of the Order's 'fund transfers' acquired in various bank robberies and 
there is evidence that Mathews did not hold Butler in particularly high regard. 34 
As Butler's popularity continued to wane through the 1990s, likely successors to his 
position and other leadership figures also began leaving the movement. In the summer of 
1993, security head Wayne Jones and chief of staff Carl Franklin (Butler's nominated 
successor) resigned from the organisation. 35 In January the following year, Butler's new 
deputy Charles Tate and his wife Betty (Butler's secretary) also left. 36 Louis Beam, former 
Texas Klan Grand Dragon and Aryan Nation 'ambassador at large', had been mooted as a 
replacement for Butler but he has shown a corresponding lack of interest in adopting such 
a role. Butler himself is now in his early eighties and as one commentator of the U. S. 
extreme right has noted "[t]here appear to be few realistic prospects for the movement to 
long survive Butler's demise. 07 Despite this fact only recently Butler has been given the 
sobriquet "the elder statesman of American hate. "38 During the summer of 1998, at a 
gathering of Identity followers at Hayden Lake called the 'Hitler Congress', the hitherto 
little known figure of Pastor Newman Britton was named Butler's successor39 but it is still 
unclear, however, what form of leadership role he wishes to adopt and whether he wishes 
33 Cited in ADL, Damger: Extremism, p. 19. 
34 T. Martinez & J. Gunther, Brotherhood of Murder, 1988, pp. 270-271, fn. 22. 's Carl Franklin is an interesting example of the relationship between Aryan Nations and the Order, and the 
importance of inter-personal relationships between the extreme right in the U. S. generally. Franklin was 
married to Davis Lane's sister and together the Franklin aided Lane before and after he became a fugitive. 36 The Tate's left to join their son-in-law, Kirk Lyons who runs a non-profit legal foundation called CAUSE 
which provides legal assistance to white supremacists. CAUSE is an acronym for Canada, Australia, United 
States, South Africa and Europe, all places where Lyons believes the civil liberties of whites is under threat. 
37 J. Kaplan, Right-Wing Violence in North America', p. 54. 
38 Los Angeles Times, January 10,1999. 
39 Heart of Darkness, BBC-Discovery Channel production. 
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to preserve the organisation as it is, or guide it more firmly into the mainstream (or, less 
likely, away from it). 
The leadership structure of Aryan Nations can be seen as similar to that of Kach. 
There exists a central figure who performs the function of both ideologue and charismatic 
leader. Once again to the extent that a bureaucratic structure exists, it is primarily because 
of organisational necessity. Although Richard Butler is still the indisputable leader of 
Aryan Nations and a powerful voice within the right-wing extremist community, Butler's 
failure to unite the disparate elements of this community and his unwillingness to actively 
condone or organise violent activities has led to doubts regarding his fitness to lead the 
group. Such a course would inevitably lead to the group's destruction and the most likely 
course is that Butler will be succeeded by a younger leader who will have to prove 
sufficiently charismatic and erudite to ensure that the group does not fracture and 
continues (or expands) its levels of activity, and that the organisation's ideology does not 
stagnate. 
4.1.3 Hizballah 
The leadership structure of Hizballah can be described as collegial, although there 
are significant ideologues who are not directly involved with operational matters. The most 
widely acknowledged senior ideologue of Hizballah is Sheikh Muhammed Hussein 
Fadlallah. The Sheikh's popularity is not limited to the Shi'a community of Lebanon and 
his religious stature extends far beyond Lebanon. In the mid-1980s tape recordings of the 
Sheikh's sermons were being ordered from throughout the Lebanese Shi'ite diaspora and 
beyond. 40 Today the sheikh's sermons may be accessed on the internet. Fadlallah's position 
as an ideologue within the Lebanese Shi'ite community is further reinforced by his 
declared detachment from Hizballah, his high standing as a clerical authority and his 
relatively moderate stand within Lebanese politics and communal relations. 41 These 
characteristics enable him to maintain a high public profile and to function as a conduit for 
the ideas and rationales of the movement to the outside world. In this respect Fadlallah 
does not identify Hizballah as a specific and closed organisation: 
40 M. Kramer, 'The Oracle of Hizballah' in R. S. Appleby (ed. ), Spokesmen for the despised, p. 83. 41 See for example Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, 'An Islamic Perspective on the Lebanese Experience', 
Middle East Insight, Vol. VI, #1 &2, pp. 18-26. 
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"we do not constitute an organised and closed party in Lebanon, nor are we a tight 
political cadre. We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the 
solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam. , 42 
Because of his detachment, Sheikh Fadlallah does not represent a single point of 
ideological orthodoxy, nor a significant operational leader. Hizbollah possesses an almost 
exclusively clerical leadership which is heavily influenced, both in terms of theology and 
decision making, by Iran, the Iranian clerical leadership and the legacy of the Iranian 
revolution. 43 The influence of Ruhollah Khomeini as an ideological figurehead has been a 
feature of the group since its inception, and many leaders within the group have received 
their religious training in Qom in Iran and earlier Najaf in Iraq. Iranian support of all kinds 
has also been essential from the inception of the group, resulting in an organisation which 
closely is aligned to Iran in material, ideological and spiritual terms, and has at times 
appeared to be no more than an Iranian proxy. As Husayn al Musawi stated in 1984: 
"[w]e are faithful to Imam Khomeini politically, religiously and ideologically. In 
accordance with Khomeini's teaching.. . Our struggle 
is in the East and the West.. . Our 
goal is to lay the groundwork for the reign of the Mahdi on earth, the reign of truth 
and justice. "44 
Such a statement encapsulates the general programme of the organisation without 
shackling it to specifics -a necessary state of ambiguity given the constantly changing 
political situation within Lebanon. The acknowledgement of the importance of Khomeini 
and the Iranian revolution was soon after echoed in the open letter describing the Hizballah 
program: 
"[w]e are the sons of the umma [Muslim community] - the party of God [HizbAllah] 
the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran... We obey the orders of 
one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih [jurist] who fulfils all the 
necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him! "45 
42 'An Open Letter: The Hiizballah Programme', The Jerusalem Quarterly, # 48, Fall 1988, p. 114. 43 See for example Ranstorp, M., `Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision Making and 
Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions', Terrorism andPolitical Violence, Vol. VI, # 3,1994,303- 
339. 
44 Al Kifah al Arabi, January 9,1984. 
45 'An Open Letter: The Hizballah Programme', pp. 113. 
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The current leader of Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah, has proved to be adept at 
steering the organisation through a highly fluid political situation in Lebanon. Between 
1992 and 1996, he had already pragmatically changed his stance from wanting to continue 
the political struggle against Amal and tension with Syria's Lebanese agenda, to an 
understanding that he must co-operate more closely with Syria and occasionally with 
Amal. As Martin Kramer noted: "[h]e is capable, knows how to make very deep strategic 
analysis and he understands the Israeli political set-up. He definitely follows what goes on 
here, knows how to bore into the weak spots. "46 Nasrallah began his involvement with 
Lebanese militance when he joined Amal at the age of fifteen. A year later he travelled to 
Najaf in Iraq where he began his religious studies, although these were cut short two years 
later when Iraq cracked down on Najaf 's Shi'te seminaries and expelled its Lebanese 
students. When he returned to Lebanon he became part of a small group called El Rava 
('the Mission'), whose spiritual leader was Sheikh Fadlallah. 47 
By 1982, when Iranian diplomats began co-ordinating the various Shi'ite militias 
into what became Hizballah by causing defections from Amal and merging existing loose 
organisations, Nasrallah had already established himself as a military commander. 
Following the end of the internecine conflict between Hizballah and Amal in late 1988 and 
early 1989, Nasrallah left Lebanon for the Iranian city of Qom. His studies there are widely 
believed to have been a superficial attempt to accord him religious as well as military 
authority: 
"[w]estern experts express doubts about the depth of his religious studies ... 
Nasrallah 
is an extremely religious figure, but is not considered a man of religion in the full 
sense of the word. He knows how to use religion as a political lever. But for 
example, he does not establish rulings of Islamic law. 1,48 
By the early 1990s Nasrallah was appointed to a senior position on the organisation's 
Majlis al-Shura, and when the secretary-general's position became vacant following 
Hussein Musawi's assassination by the Israelis in 1992, he was a logical candidate. 
Nasrallah has proved a popular and effective Secretary-General, having been re-elected to 
the position three times. His status was further enhanced when his son Hadi was killed 
46 Quoted in Yediot Ahronol, April 19,1996. 
47 ibid. 
48 Yediot Ahronot, April 19,1996. 
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while participating in an Islamic Resistance guerrilla operation against the Israelis in 
September 1997, a sacrifice for the movement that few other senior leaders have made. In 
July 2000 Nasrallah was elected man of the year in Lebanon and Syria "for his courage and 
wisdom which led to the historic victory over the Zionist regime in the south of 
Lebanon. , 49 
The leadership of Hizaballah is certainly collegial in orientation, reflecting the 
Iranian structure of a Majlis al-Shura, with significant ideologues, living and dead, who 
provide the group's overall religious world view. This system came about largely as a result 
of Iranian influence but also reflected the needs of an extensive organisation that has 
become involved in an increasing number of activities over time. This expansion of the 
group, and especially the leadership restructuring of 1989, has resulted in decentralisation 
of decision making. The position of Secretary-General is certainly one of 'first among 
equals' and the personality and beliefs of successful candidates for the position provide a 
good indication of the group's world view and strategy at any point in time. In this light the 
biannual election process for the Consultative and Executive Shura can be seen as not 
merely a rotation of responsibility amongst senior members but also reflects internal 
struggles between more moderate and extreme factions, especially how to safeguard its 
hard won political, social and military gains and exploit the post-Taif Lebanese 
environment in alignment with its own ideological agenda and Iranian political interests. 
4.1.4 Hamas 
The leadership of Hamas is a direct outgrowth of the leadership of the Palestinian 
Muslim brotherhood. While the Brotherhood followed policies of active resistance during 
the Palestinian revolt, the 1948 war and the 1956 war, the rise of secular nationalist and 
Baathist parties during the 1950s led to a change in agenda. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, the organisation maintained cordial relations with both the Israeli government and 
the Jordanian authorities, and under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, concentrated 
on building its infrastructure - in particular the Islamic centre founded in 1973 - and 
expanding its social base through mosques, schools and universities. The outbreak of the 
Intifada in December 1987 presented the Brotherhood with a dilemma, and it became 
49 IRMA, 0017 gmt, 6 July 2000. 
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obvious that a programme of non-violence was not tenable in the face of widespread and 
spontaneous Palestinian resistance, the expectations of the younger generations of the 
movement, and the advent of rival Islamist resistance movement, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad. 
In December 1987, a meeting took place of what would become the first leadership 
of Hamas, led by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and including other notables such as Abd-al-Aziz 
al-Rantisi and Ibrahim al-Yazuri. Yassin had already done much in the preceding two 
decades to create Islamic socio-economic structures in the Gaza strip and worked hard to 
instil in Palestinian society da'wa, or religious preaching and education. 50 Yassin was both 
a charismatic figure and had long been the senior Muslim Brotherhood leader in the Gaza 
Strip and this background informed his political and religious discourse, influenced by 
Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and the Palestinian example of Sheikh Izz al-Din al- 
Qassam. Yassin's prominence, however, does not come from any new theological or 
doctrinal vision but rather "from his role within the political context of the Palestinian 
issue. "51 Although Yassin's arrest in 1989 severely limited the Sheikh's capacity to issue 
instructions and manage the day to day running of the group, he has remained a powerful 
symbolic leader. 
Yassin's ideology was inspired by traditional Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, 
especially justifications for the use of violence and the importance of nationalism. Yassin's 
view on the first issue is traditional in that he believes violence should be employed to end 
oppression and corruption and to establish justice. His views on nationalism, inspired by 
those of al-Banna, held that the issue of Palestine is essential to the broader Islamic 
struggle and that without an Islamic basis any attempt to liberate Palestine or to defeat the 
forces of unbelief generally were doomed to failure. 52 While Yassin remains one of the 
most significant, derivative ideologue's for Hamas, other externally based religious figures 
have served to justify subsequent developments in Hamas doctrine and dogma. First 
amongst these is the Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is based in Qatar, and has 
been labelled the supreme Mufti of Hamas. Qaradawi, for example, has rejected the 
5('S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistance, 2000, p. 19. 51 Z. Abu-Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmad Yassin and the Origins of Harnas', in R. S. Appleby (ed. ), Spokesmen for the 
Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, 1997, p. 252. 52 ibid. pp. 243-244. 
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religious ruling that Arab states could make peace with Israel if it served Muslim interests 
and claimed instead that as long as Israel continued to occupy Muslim land and to shed 
Muslim blood then it could not be regarded as having peaceful intentions. 53 He also 
provided the fatwas for the 1996 suicide bombings and the March 2000 decree legitimising 
the kidnapping of Israeli civilians. 
Although Hamas would reconstruct its leadership bodies because of arrests and 
deaths, the initial collegial form of a consultative council (Majlis al-Shura), whose 
members reside not only within Gaza and the West Bank but also beyond the geographical 
confines of Palestine, has persisted in one form or another. The most important of these 
reconstructions occurred in 1989 when Yassin and other Hamas leaders were arrested, 
creating an internal leadership crisis. The crisis was resolved through co-operation 
between Hamas activists from the U. S. led by Musa Abu Marzuq, and activists in Jordan, 
and the ensuing detailed and complex organisational restructuring meant the end of 
Yassin's position as a the supreme authority. 54 This new structure stressed the supremacy 
(and corresponding security) of the external over the internal leadership. Thus, while there 
are ideologues, both past and present which inform the religious dimension of the group's 
programme, the operational and functional leadership element is fundamentally collegial, 
divided between those inside Palestinian territories and those outside. 55 
With the advent of Palestinian self-rule a new generation of younger Hamas leaders 
has emerged. These are the so called 'Intifada graduates', who were in their thirties and 
forties at the outbreak of the uprising, were familiar with the secular nationalist discourse 
and often enjoyed direct links to Palestinian Authority (PA) officials. 56 This moderation 
was born of a pragmatic realisation by the Gazan and West Bank leaderships that the 
movement would have to participate with the PA if it wished to preserve itself and pursue 
its ideological goals, unlike the external Harnas leaderships that did not have to contend 
53 S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 109. 
sa ibid., p. 58. 
55 It should be noted that an influential ideologue in this case may not be associated with the group. For 
example in April 1997 the Imam of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi said that 
"Martyrdom seeking (suicide) operations which the Palestinians carry out against Zionist targets are 
religiously sanctioned". Radio of Islam - Voice of the Oppressed, 0530 gmt, 10 Apr. 97 - BBC/S WB, 
ME/2890, NEED/4, April 11,1997. 
56 W Kristianasen, 'Challenge and CounterChallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo', Journal of Palestinian 
Studies, p. 26. 
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with the daily reality of PA control. The Gaza leadership hoped to play roles in health and 
education and even proposed the establishment of a political party through which Hamas 
could run in the Palestinian legislative elections proposed under Oslo. 57 Significantly this 
moderation did not extend to the group's perception of jihad which maintained that armed 
resistance would continue against Israel until the occupied territories (including East 
Jerusalem) were evacuated, settlements dismantled, and a Palestinian state established in 
these areas. Although the Gaza leadership would later concede to limited cessations of 
hostilities in order to maintain good relations with the PA, the public, uncompromising 
stance ensured broad support. 58 
Differences between the Gaza leadership and the external leadership grew 
following the signing of Oslo H. The PA was eager to involve Hamas in the legislative 
elections set for January 1996 and eased various restrictions which had been placed on the 
group. The PA and Hamas also negotiated a sixteen point agreement (made public by the 
PA but denied by Hamas), the essence of which was that the PA would accept Hamas as a 
legitimate political participant if the organisation refrained from armed action. From 
September 1995 to February 1996, Hamas (and the PIJ) observed an undeclared cease-fire. 
Differences in opinion between internal and external leaderships pose problems for a 
group as a whole, but do not necessarily imply a split or serious divisions. In response to 
the questions about these differences in opinion during early 1996, one Jordanian based 
Hamas leader tactfully claimed that: 
"[t]he differences of opinion are a healthy sign reflecting the movement's vitality. A 
movement whose members are educated and politically enlightened cannot be 
expected to operate within rigid frameworks, but the rule we follow is that the 
movement's members abide by its positions and policies. "59 
In an attempt to reach consensus within the movement, Gaza moderates met 
members of the outside leadership in Khartoum in October 1995. No agreement was 
reached at this meeting or during a second also held in Khartoum, although the 
arrangement with the PA continued. Before the elections were conducted discussions 
57 ibid. 
58 W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and CounterChallenge', p. 26. 59 A1Hayat, 11 Mar. 96 - BBCISWB, ME/2559, MED/7, March 13,1996. In this case the official was 
Muhammad Nazal. 
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about a Hamas political party, Hizb al-Kalas al-Islami, were postponed and the Gaza 
moderates pulled out of the race. 60 The indecisive manner in which the movement 
approached the elections did little in terms of group support, which polls revealed had 
reached a low point of about ten per cent. 61 The whole episode, however, showed rifts 
between the group's internal and external leaderships and a corresponding rift amongst the 
membership. Around half the movement's supporters voted against the wishes of the 
external leadership, and as a reward for observing the terms of their unofficial agreement 
with the PA, Hamas was granted permission to open a public bureau in Gaza City. 
This leadership crisis was further effected by the status of specific individuals. 
Sheikh Yassin and Abd al-Aziz Rantisi remained in Israeli jails and Abu Marzuq was 
imprisoned in the U. S. In the West Bank, there was no common consensus at all, neither 
moderate like the Gaza one, or more hard-line like that in Amman. In the words of Sheikh 
Bassam Jarrar, one of the West Bank's leading Islamist thinkers, there was at the time "no 
centralised leadership in the West Bank, and no decisions common to the West Bank and 
Gaza. Here it's a case of everyone deciding for himself. "62 The position of the various 
leaderships was further complicated by the assassination in Gaza of the Qassam brigade's 
chief bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash, on January 5 1996. Two suicide bombings were 
conducted in Jerusalem on 25 February and 3 March 1996 in retaliation, killing forty-five 
people and wounding eighty-six. The attacks put Arafat and the PA under enormous 
pressure to destroy Hamas (and the PIJ who also conducted operations at this time). They 
also revealed a degree of factionalism within the organisation itself. The attacks were 
claimed by a group calling itself the 'squads of the new disciples of the martyr Yahya 
Ayyash'63, and after the March 1996 attack they issued a leaflet announcing that they had 
completed their retaliation in response to the killing of Ayyash but urging the al-Qassam 
not to issue any statements regarding the end of military operations, thus implying that 
60 One member, Imad al-Faluji, who was allegedly expelled from the movement for his close relations with the 
PA, ran as an independent Islamist. He was elected as a member of the PLC for Gaza (Jabalia district). Six 
other seats were won by Hamas sympathisers. 
61 Support at this time was usually about thirteen per cent. Some observers believe this figure could be 
considerably higher considering the group has pulled 30-40 per cent of the vote within professional and 
student organisations in the period 1994-6. 
62 W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and Counterchallenge, p. 28. 
63 Voice of Israel, 1325 gmt, 25 Feb. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/254, MED/1,26 February, 1996. 
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they were a splinter acting independently of the main organisation. 64 On March 5,1996 
two founding Gaza members, Ibrahim Yazuri and Muhammad Shamma'a, called for an end 
to the attacks and shortly before his arrest later in the month Hamas' Gaza spokesman, 
Mahmud Zahhar, denied the responsibility of Gaza's leadership and hinted that the external 
leadership was responsible. 65 Following these pressures the Hamas representative in Jordan 
issued a statement to the effect that Hamas had not ceased or suspended operations and 
that appeals made to the military wing by the Gaza leadership "do not express the 
collective view of the movement's leadership. , 66 These actions revealed a major difference 
in approach by the internal and external leaderships and also the loyalties of various 
segments within the al-Qassam itself. 
The rifts between the internal and external leaderships were mended somewhat in 
early 1997. In April, Abd-al Aziz Rantisi was released from jail and returned to Gaza and 
in May Abu Marzuq returned to Amman. Both were influential leaders and together they 
were able to forge a consensus on three primary issues. Firstly, there would be no conflict 
with the PA. Secondly, armed operations would only be conducted in retaliation and would 
be directed primarily against soldiers and settlers. Thirdly, Hamas would work hard to 
become a player in the peace process seeking financial and diplomatic support from Arab 
and Muslim states. The agreement was given an unexpected and added impetus by the 
bungled assassination by Mossad on the head of Hamas's political bureau in Amman, 
Khalid Mishal in September 1997. As a consequence Israel was obliged to release Sheikh 
Yassin to Jordan. 
After returning in triumph to Gaza the Sheikh embarked on a four month tour of 
the region to strengthen support for Hamas. He visited Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, the UAE and Yemen. Yassin was warmly received by heads of 
state and in some cases donations were forthcoming. This approval was mirrored in 
extensive media coverage and indicated the degree of frustration with the stalled peace 
process throughout the Muslim world. In Gaza, Yassin reaffirmed the three main priorities 
noted above. Of the PA he noted that "we are one nation. We're fighting the same goal, and 
64 IDF Radio, 0935 gmt, 3 Mar. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/255 1, MED/2, March 4,1996. 65 Sunday Times, March 10,1996. 
66 Al Hayat, 11 Mar. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2559, MED/7, March 13,1996. 
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we have one enemy so we have no choice but to unite. , 67 In relation to operational 
resistance, he noted that Israel had been the first to attack civilians and so Hamas could 
retaliate in kind. He also stated that Islam and international law both have prohibitions 
against attacks on civilians and stated that "I'm asking the whole world to call on Israel to 
stop attacking our civilians, and, if they do, we'll reciprocate. It's their decision. "68 While 
Yassin noted that the military wing of the group makes its own decisions he also noted that 
the political leadership laid down the general parameters for action. 69 The Sheikh's role is 
largely that of a figurehead and unifying force. In the words of one founding member: 
"[t]he sheikh is very popular and he is widely admired by his supporters... if there is a 
difference of opinion and the sheikh indicates that he sides with a particular stance, 
the second party will agree and accept the outcome. i7° 
The conditions for ending violent action, however, remained fundamentally the same - the 
establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. Specifically this meant Israeli withdrawal 
from all the areas it had occupied since the 1967 war, the release of all Palestinian 
prisoners, the dismantling of all settlements, the establishment of a Palestinian capital in 
East Jerusalem and a guarantee from Israel of non-interference in the affairs of the 
Palestinian state. Israeli refusal of these conditions would make Israel solely responsible 
for the consequences. 
While the leadership of Harnas was reasserting itself, other events were compelling 
them to reassess their approach. In March and September 1998, three top ranking 
operational leaders were killed in Ramallab and Hebron. Although the Israelis were 
directly responsible, suspicions of PA collusion and intense Israeli and PA crackdowns 
limited the ability of the group to respond. The signing of the Wye memorandum on 
October 23,1998, seemed to end the hopes for Hamas inclusion in a broad based 
Palestinian leadership and further Israeli redeployments were made conditional on the PA's 
ability to curb 'terrorist' groups and their infrastructure. The imprisonment of Hamas 
members and leaders certainly weakened the organisation, but there still remain significant 
elements of the Palestinian population which sympathise with the movement and its 
67 W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and Counterchallenge', p. 31. 68 ibid. 
69 W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and Counterchallenge', p. 31. 
70 R. Gaess, 'Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab', Middle East Policy, Vol. VI, # 1,1998, p. 116. 
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opposition to the Oslo agreement. As both the internal and external leaderships are aware, 
while there is little or no progress in the peace process Hamas remains the only viable 
voice of opposition and as long as the two leaderships maintain a common agenda, Hamas 
will remain an effective opposition. The external leadership, however, controls the internal 
and it is the external that more clearly represents the group's proclaimed goals, thus 
providing scope not only for further division within the group but also escalation of the 
struggle. 
The leadership structure of Hamas is predominantly collegial with important roles 
played by charismatic ideologues. The collegial structure arose from a need to manage a 
large organisation with disparate activities ranging from social welfare activities to 
resistance operations. This collegial structure is further complicated by the existence of 
both an internal and external leaderships - the former operating at the centre of the struggle 
with all the attendant security risks this brings and the latter outside, where there is a far 
lower risk and more direct access to sympathetic governments where they are based. While 
this dual leadership system helps ensure group survival and external support, the different 
circumstances within which each exists has led to differences of opinion, and it is the 
maintenance of this fluid consensus which will determine the success of the group in the 
future and its incremental strategy of resisting on the social, political and military fronts. 
4.2 Core 
4.2.1 Eyal 
The leadership structure of Eyal is made problematic by the short life span of the 
organisation and its relatively small membership. Any examination of the group's founder 
and leader, Avashai Raviv, is further compounded by the fact that from 1987 he was a Shin 
Bet informer. Avashai Raviv's position as leader of Eyal and security service informer is 
certainly unusual, however, his beliefs and activities make his position far less easy to 
categorise than they might appear. Raviv had been actively involved in the Jewish extreme 
right before he started working for the Israeli security services, indeed it was these 
activities which gave the Shin Bet the leverage necessary to make Raviv an agent. 
However, even after he had been recruited, Raviv maintained his own personal agenda and 
152 
frequently acted without orders or in contradiction to given orders. The leadership of Eyal 
then seems to have aspired to become a collegial one, but in the short term Raviv was the 
sole organiser and instigator of action. Eyal was certainly influenced by past ideologues of 
the Israeli extreme right, most notably Meir Kahane. 71 
Avashai Raviv began his involvement with the radical right in his early teens, 
spurred to involvement by the Israeli withdrawal from the eastern part of the Sinai 
peninsula in 1981.72 He took part in Gush Emunim marches, distributed literature, 
harassed left-wing Israelis and by the age of seventeen he had was arrested on suspicion of 
assaulting Arabs. In 1987, he was approached by Shin Bet while he was being held in a 
cell following his arrest at a Kach demonstration. While Raviv was still a student at Tel 
Aviv university, he attracted attention to himself in 1993 by demanding that the Arab 
president of the university student association resign because an 'Arab cannot be trusted'. 
73 
Raviv was eventually expelled after which he moved to Kiryat Arba and continued his 
studies at Bar-Ilan University, a renowned more right-wing centre of learning. Raviv was 
also a considered self publicist, organising events with an eye to maximising media 
exposure. As one commentator has noted: 
"Raviv's main task was the promotion of an image, the image of a wild, anti- 
democratic, felonious and outlaw ideology. And, with GSS prodding, and the willing 
co-operation of key Israeli media personnel, that image took hold. 04 
Although he served as a Shin Bet informer, Raviv was hardly an easily controllable 
source. The Shamgar commission report noted that he was 'insufficiently restrained' by his 
handlers who often helped him organise provocative acts designed to enhance his 
credibility within the extreme right. 75 Raviv frequently disobeyed his handlers, ignoring 
warnings to tone down his incitement and violent activities, reported late and was 
generally undisciplined. Despite this unpredictability Raviv was a very valuable source that 
the GSS felt it could not do without in the increasingly volatile Israeli political climate, 
71 While undoubtedly part of the Kahanist milieu, the author rejects the assertions made in the immediate 
aftermath of the Rabin assassination that Eyal was the operational arm of Kach. See for example Israel TY, 
Channel 1,1800 gmt, 9 Nov. 95 - BBCISWB, EE/D2458IME, November 10,1995. 72 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin, 1998, p. 215. 
73 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 265. 
74 Jerusalem Post, December 15,1998. 
75 Jerusalem Post, November 14,1997. 
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noting that "the benefits of his actions outweighed the harm. 06 As noted, Raviv even 
formed Eyal without consulting his handlers and they were suitably unimpressed. 
" 
Quoting a Shabak agent's report: "The 'subject' reported on the formation of'Eyal' after the 
fact. Given his background and habit of post facto reporting, he was given a tough talking 
to. 08 
Beyond the leadership of Raviv, there exists the disparate ideological leadership of 
the Jewish radical right. The revival during the early 1990s of the 'obsolete' Halakic 
precepts of din rodef and din moser by certain rabbis can be seen as creating a general 
climate of rabbinical sanction for violence against Jews. On the eve of Yom Kippur, a few 
days before Rabin was shot, a group of Meir Kahane's disciples gathered outside the Prime 
Minister's official residence and chanted an ancient curse known as the Pulsa da-Nura. 
According to Jewish lore if ten rabbis so cursed a man he would die within thirty days. A 
Jerusalem rabbi, embellished the curse by shouting: 
"[a]nd on him, Yitzhak son of Rosa, known as Rabin, we have permission to demand 
from the angels of destruction that they take a sword to this wicked man to kill him 
for handing over the Land of Israel to our enemies, the sons of Ishmael. 09 
Although Amir was almost certainly ignorant of the curse, the assassination was to some 
proof that divine retribution for perceived wrongs could be requested and granted. This 
particular call for Rabin's death and the judgement that he was din rodef was not limited to 
Israel. In June 1995, Rabbi Abraham Hecht of Brooklyn stated that according to Halakah it 
was allowed to kill Rabin because the policies he was pursuing were endangering Jewish 
lives. 80 Although Hecht later retracted his statement and sent a letter of apology to Rabin, 
76 ibid. 
77 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 221. 
78 ibid. 
79 C. Coughlin, A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions: The Ouest for Modern Jerusalem, 1997, p. 147. For 
another account see M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, pp. 90-91. The alleged leader of 
the group, Avigdor Eskin, was later charged under the prevention of terrorism Act for expressing his 
satisfaction with the effectiveness of the curse and was sentenced to four months imprisonment. In December 
1997 he was arrested again on suspicion of a plot to throw a pig's head into the Temple Mount during 
Ramadan. 
8° ADL, Extremism in the Name of Religion: The Violent Record of the Kahane Movement and Its Offshoots, 
p. 2. 
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his statement can only be seen as incitement within a Jewish community with close ties to 
the Israeli extreme right. 81 
The issue of rabbinical sanction was of vital importance to Amir. When 
interviewed by the state investigators following the assassination Amir stated: 
"[i]f not for a Halakic ruling of din rodef against Rabin by a few rabbis I knew about, 
it would have been very difficult for me to murder. Such a murder must be backed 
up. If I did not get the backing and I had not been representing many more people, I 
would not have acted. i82 
This, however, is not quite the same as having a direct command. Although he told 
investigators that he had discussed the issue of din rodef with several rabbis none had 
given him unequivocal permission. Dror Adani, Yigal Amir's friend and one of the three 
primary conspirators in the assassination claimed during interrogations that Amir had sent 
him to obtain Halakic approval from Rabbi Moshe Tzuriel at the Sha'alvim Yeshiva. Rabbi 
Tzuriel denied that he spoke with Adani or anybody else about the issue although he had 
written an essay in the past which condemned those Israeli leaders responsible for the 
peace process. 83 Amir even stated that he was disappointed with these rabbis and that he 
did not admire any prominent rabbi of his generation. 84 He did, however, go on to discuss 
with the investigators the biblical precedent of the high priest Phineas and he told them 
that on the day of the assassination he had been reading this particular story. While Yigal 
and Haggai Amir apparently willingly confessed their crimes and revealed the names of 
co-conspirators during the first two days of their arrest they were unwilling to reveal he 
names of Rabbis who had ruled that the Halakah allowed the murder of Rabin. 85 
Although it is difficult to prove that specific rabbis, both within Israel and without, 
actually condemned Rabin (and Peres) to death, the language used by many was 
unambiguous. In such an environment of Halakic judgement and provocative rhetoric, it 
now seems obvious that it would only be a matter of time before a religious student, a 
81 More recently it has been reported that extremist settler youths have sought a sanction of din rodef against 
Prime Minister Barak. See Israel TI , Channel 2,1930 gmt, 8 Nov. 99 - BBC/SWB, ME/3689, MED/4, 
November 11,1999. 
82 Quoted in Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 277. 
83 FBIS, FBIS-NES-95-226, November 23,1995. 
84 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 280. 
85 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 178. 
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member of one of Israel's extremist groups, or some other individual drew his own 
conclusions and decided to act - in much the same vengeful way that Baruch Goldstein 
acted. Many more examples of rabbinical incitement have followed Rabin's assassination. 
In January 1996, the Shin Bet arrested an ultra-orthodox Rabbi, Arye Friedman, who had 
repeatedly stressed the need to kill Shimon Peres at the earliest possible opportunity and 
"that the only reason he had not assassinated Peres is his obligation to his family. , 
86 
Although Yigal Amir apparently acted on his own accord, Avishai Raviv's opinion 
of Amir's action is instructive: 
"[w]e admire this lad for his sincerity, for standing behind his words. .. This man 
Rabin is responsible for the murder of hundreds of Jews and is another victim of 
peace. Therefore there must be an end put to this destructive process which is 
causing a great deal of tension and has now led to the assassination of Rabin. "87 
Following the assassination, Raviv escaped prosecution and disappeared into relative 
obscurity, at once shunned by the extreme right after his exposure, no longer of any use to 
the GSS, and reviled by most Israelis as an important element within the incitement 
campaign that led to the assassination of Rabin. After a long period of relative obscurity 
however, Avishai Raviv was charged in April 1999 with 'failing to prevent a crime' and 
'support for a terrorist organisation. 88 What is perhaps most important about this particular 
example is the existence of young men, frustrated by the course of the peace process and 
imbued with the Kahanist ideology who are willing to act upon their beliefs. Certainly 
Raviv survived as long as he did because of GSS patronage, escaping prosecution on 
numerous occasions and receiving funds and encouragement. However, his ideological 
leanings, contacts and training had little if anything to do with the security services and it 
is not inconceivable that with greater security precautions a similar group might evolve 
and flourish (however briefly) in response to some new and inevitable crisis spawned by 
the floundering peace process. 
The leadership of Eyal rested with a single individual, although he could not be 
described as an ideologue in his own right and can only tenuously be described as a 
charismatic personality. The short life span of Eyal meant that no leadership structures had 
" FBIS, FBIS-TOT-96-010-L, February 16,1996. 
87 FBIS, FBIS-NES-95-215-S, November 6,1995. 
88 Ha'aretz, April 30,1999. It is unclear why the charges did not include 'establishing a terrorist organisation'. 
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been established and Avashai Raviv functioned as an organiser and strategist. The group's 
ideology was Kahanist and the only variation of this belief system was the adoption of the 
Halakic concepts of din rodef and din moser. If the group had been allowed to grow and 
mature, however, it is likely that a collegial structure would have been adopted, controlling 
the activities of cellular groups. 
4.2.2 The Order 
As with Eyal, the Order was a short-lived organisation with a small membership 
and a barely codified, largely adopted ideology. The founder of the group, Robert 
Mathews, possessed a charismatic personality and a plan of action (albeit one which varied 
over time) which formed the nucleus around which the group coalesced and as such was a 
popular leader with tactical and strategic vision. Although some of Mathews plans of 
actions were challenged on occasion, and a degree of collegial leadership was introduced 
when various activities and responsibilities, such as paramilitary training, were organised 
and conducted by those deemed best qualifies for the task, at no stage was his position as 
paramount leader seriously disputed. Furthermore, after his death during a siege in 1984, 
Mathew's position as one of the more prominent martyrs for the right-wing white 
supremacist cause was assured. 
Unlike some of the older ideologues and leaders amongst the American right-wing 
milieu, Robert Mathew's puritan streak and ideological formation began early. As a young 
man he became active in right-wing circles and joined the avowedly anti-Communist John 
Birch Society. At the age of fifteen, Mathews joined an Arizona tax protest unit, a move 
which he later claimed led to his West Point application being rejected. 89 Later, while still 
at high school, he discovered Mormonism which provided him with the basis of a 
millenarian belief system centred on the North American continent, and when he was 
seventeen, to the increasing distress of his parents, he converted to the Mormon church. 90 
Four years later, Mathews had his first organisational experience of the racist survivalist 
right when he formed the 'Sons of Liberty', a paramilitary organisation established in 
Phoenix Arizona, an experience which deepened his involvement in militant resistance to a 
s" I. Coates, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right, 1987, p. 47. 
90 For coverage of Mathew's formative years see K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, 1990, 
Chapter 1. 
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perceived programme of world domination. 91 In 1973, while still involved with a revived 
form of the Sons of Liberty, Mathews was prosecuted for tax evasion, and the following 
year he first explored the Pacific north-west resolving to move to this 'promised land' as 
soon as possible, far from the prying eyes of an intrusive government and the depredations 
of urban American life. 
Mathew's ideological influences were varied and adopted over a long period of 
time. His initial political beliefs were chiefly anti-Communist, guided by the John Birch 
society. In 1980, his views were altered when he encountered a book entitled Which Way 
Western Man? by William Gayley Simpson. 92 Simpson had adapted Nietzsche's ideas of 
natural selection and racial superiority and applied them to modem society. He believed 
that the white, Christian race was in danger of extinction because of integration with other 
races and the book outlined ways which preserve the sanctity of the white race such as 
segregation and Jewish deportation. Which Way Western Man was a thoroughly 
documented, more scholarly work than most others on the subject and the book had a 
profound influence on the development of Mathews belief system. 93 While Mathews had 
visited Hayden Lake and knew Richard Butler and many of the other members of the 
congregation (some of whom would later join the Order), he did not adopt the precise 
strand of Christian Identity belief which Butler espoused. Mathews did, however, adopt 
much of the racist doctrine from the movement and its predecessors as well as dabbling in 
Odinism. 94 The ideological strands which inspired action were thus extremely close to 
mainstream Identity beliefs. 
Perhaps the greatest literary influence on Mathews was William Pierce's The 
Turner Diaries. And as some commentators have claimed, the history of the organisation 
may be seen as an attempt to recreate the events depicted in the book. 95 James Aho has 
even drawn an interesting parallel between the personalities of Mathews and the lead 
91 ibid., pp. 46-50. Mathews was also an active member of the Young Republicans at this time and was deeply 
concerned at the accession of the Peoples Republic of China to the U. N. Security Council in 1971. 
92 1978. The book was published by William Pierce's National Alliance. Another influential text in the same 
vein and also published by the National Alliance was Wilmott Robertson's Dispossessed Majority. 93 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 105-106. Simpson's book and Spengler's Decline of 
the West are the two books Mathews mentions in his final letter. 94 ibid., p. 109. See also J. Kaplan, 'The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case 
of the "Identity Christian" Church of Israel', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. V, # 1, fn. 45. 
95 M. D. Wiggins, The Turner Diaries: Blueprint for Right-Wing Extremist Violence, 1986. 
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character of the book, Earl Turner. While Pierce can be seen as a form of ideologue, his 
position as such is problematic. His book is a novel, not a religious tract or interpretation, 
and while regarded as a seminal text for the extreme right in general, it is not part of an 
on-going religious tradition or the central text for a specific religious movement. Indeed, 
the ideological complexity of the American Christian Right is well illustrated by the fact 
that William Pierce himself is not an Identity adherent. 97 Pierce instead subscribes to his 
own creation of 'Cosmostheism' which explicitly rejects Christianity and other revealed 
belief systems, and is instead a basically secular philosophy which lauds the advancement 
and primacy of the white race. While on the surface Cosmotheism is a secular hybrid of 
Darwinism, Nietzsche, Spengler, Nazi ideology and Teutonic mythology, Pierce maintains 
that all these ideas and sources are integral parts of a 'single great truth' which transcends 
secular philosophy and provides "a spiritual understanding of its mission. "98 Pierce is 
dismissive of Christian Identity's adherence to conspiracy theories which suggest Jewish 
plots to rule the world, beliefs which he ridicules as 'paranoiac' and 'low-brow. Indeed, in 
the novel which follows The Turner Diaries, Hunter, the Christian Identity movement is 
portrayed as a collection of ill-educated country hicks who are obsessed with the idea that 
Jews are the agents of Satan. 99 
Beneath the charismatic guiding figure of Mathews, the leadership structure of the 
Order was reasonably fluid and the group's short life span did not allow for greater 
complexity or for a rigid hierarchy with delineation of function. As the driving force 
behind the organisation, Robert Mathews remained the undisputed figurehead throughout 
the group's existence, and almost all challenges to this leadership were made for 
operational reasons. Some members, for example, criticised Mathews implicit trust of 
certain initiates (in many cases a criticism which was well warranted) and his lack of 
strategic caution (especially when assassinations were seriously discussed). Perhaps a more 
96 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, 1990, pp. 63-64. 
97 Mistakes in this regard are made even in academic literature. See for example H. Kushner, Terrorism in 
America: A StructuredApproach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat, 1998. "[t]he anti-government 
extremists of today have become known to each other through the efforts of an outspoken, notwithstanding 
articulate, Identity adherent, William Pierce" (my italics), p. 68. 
98 ibid., p. 122. 
9' Their are, however, points of agreement which even Pierce concedes. These include the belief that Jews 
control American society through media ownership, that American society is handicapped by liberal 'white 
guilt' and that immigration policies are undermining 'white' America. 
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serious threat to Mathews leadership came from a hoax. In October 1984, three men 
disaffected with Butler's inactivity left Hayden Lake to embark on a crime spree of their 
own. When they left they obtained a copy of the Aryan Nations mailing list and circulated 
a letter claiming that an FBI operation was in progress to entrap right-wing leaders. The air 
of suspicion which this generated meant that some prospective beneficiaries of the Order's 
largesse refused to meet Mathews and "some who did meet walked away convinced, 
ironically because of his unusual depth of fervour, that Mathews was indeed an FBI 
plant. i 1°° 
In the case of the Order the concentration of leadership responsibilities in a specific 
individual contributed both to the success and ultimately the demise of the organisation. 
Mathew's personality and personal good fortune had much to do with the degree of respect 
members had for him and the extent to which they were willing to become operationally 
involved. By the same token, Mathews occasional acts of operational carelessness and his 
faith in friends and acquaintances provided the FBI with invaluable leads and informants 
which ultimately led to the demise of the group. To a certain extent Mathew's death made 
him into a martyr figure, but Pierce's questions "how will the Jews cope with a man who 
does not fear them and is willing, even glad, to give his life in order to hurt them? What 
will they do when a hundred good men rise to take Robert Mathew's place? i1°t, which 
echoed feeling throughout the right-wing milieu were never answered because the 
'revolution' did not continue. While Mathews was doubtless a natural leader, his lack of 
experience and miscalculation of his adversaries meant that the Order could not hope to 
mature or expect a longer life-span. 
The leadership of the Order was concentrated in a charismatic individual. Although 
tasks were delegated for complex operations and there was occasionally dissent amongst 
members over Mathew's style and strategy, no clear leadership challenge was made during 
the short history of the group. It is unlikely that the group would have survived long 
enough to establish a functional, collegial leadership system, the most probable course 
being a strategy of 'leaderless resistance'. While it is certain that Mathews personality was 
crucial to recruitment, group cohesion and operational planning, it is also clear that his acts 
100 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 382. 101 ADL, Research Report, William Pierce: Novelist of Hate, 1995, p. 5. 
160 
of carelessness and implicit faith in group members were serious contributing factors to 
the group's demise. 
4.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
The PIJ arose from the same social crisis milieu as Hamas although its strategy and 
ideological allegiances were different from the outset. The first generation of the PIJ's 
leaders were Palestinian students in Egypt who had rejected the ideology of the Palestinian 
Muslim brotherhood and were profoundly influenced by both the Iranian revolution and 
the militancy of Egyptian Islamic organisations, especially the Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad 
Organisation) and Tamer wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight). 102 These founding 
members, Fathi Shiqaqi, Abd al-Aziz Odah and Bashir Musa proposed a new ideological 
programme whereby the liberation of Palestine was a precondition of Islamic unity and not 
the other way around. Their admiration for the Iranian revolution was at the time unique 
for an Islamic Sunni movement, as was their belief that the revolution provided a model 
for the entire Arab world. Although it was a Shi'ite concept, the group also accepted the 
principle of 'the leadership of the men of religion' (vilayet-i-faqih), and it is these, 
especially Khomeini, which became the group's primary ideologues. 103 In 1988, in 
response to the group's initial activities, Shiqaqi and Odah were expelled to Lebanon where 
they moved further into the Iranian orbit by developing close ties with the Iranian Pasdaran 
contingent based there and with Hizballah. 
The chief ideologues of the PU are drawn from the usual panoply of Islamist 
thinkers. The literature and experiences of al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Rida, 
Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Malik Bin Nabi, Tawfiq 
al-Tayyib, Muhammed Baqir al-Sadir, Ruhollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati, Hassan Turabi 
and Muhammad Fadlallah are all mentioned as being influential by the leaders of the 
PIJ. 1°4 These ideas and influences were absorbed and reformulated by Fathi Shiqaqi in 
102 Both these groups emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid- I970s. Also of influence was the 
Salih Sirriyya group which launched the 1974 attack on the Egyptian technical military academy. 
103 In March 1979 Shiqaqi wrote a book entitled Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative which 
lauded Khomeini and the revolution and which was banned by the Egyptian authorities. Shiqaqi himself was 
arrested and detained for three months. 
104 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Peace Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah 
Shallah', Journal of Palestine Studies, XXVIII, # 4,62. Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Shami, Gaza, March 
25,1999. 
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light of the particular circumstances of the Palestinian Islamic struggle and reproduced as a 
coherent, contextualised ideological programme. Three of these, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid 
Qutb and Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, can be regarded as the most influential. 
Hassan al-Banna is viewed as the leader who founded the modern Islamic 
renaissance movement. His importance for the PIJ (and many other Islamist groups) lies in 
three areas: revival, organisation and upbringing. Not only did al-Banna found the Muslim 
Brotherhood from which so many Islamist groups have come from, but he was also 
responsible for the content of the organisation's ideology, goals and means. Sayyid Qutb's 
influence lies in identifying the challenges to Islam and proposing ways of meeting these 
challenges. Unlike al-Banna, Qutb developed the ideas of non co-operation with, and 
active opposition to existing regimes. It was Qutb who first formulated ideas of 
revolutionary Islam and, of greater importance to the PIJ, the concept of the Islamic 
vanguard'. 105 Qutb's works, especially Milestones, written in prison, provide the long term 
ideological basis for the PIJ, articulating as it does the idea that change cannot be brought 
about except through the overthrow of authority and the replacement of the Imams of non- 
belief. Qutb equated the state of the modem world with that of the Jahaliyyah, or state of 
ignorance which existed prior to Islam, except this new jahaliyyah is based on the rejection 
of God's sovereignty on earth and the adoption by men of elements of God's authority. 106 
Changing this state cannot be gradual or a long term process and the medium of change 
shall be a "'believing elite', a new Koranic [sic] generation (such as the generation of the 
first companions of the prophet Muhammad) that is capable of leading the society of belief 
against the society of nonbelief. i107 This believing elite is also referred to by Qutb as 'the 
vanguard', and it is the model espoused by him which has been adopted by many Islamic 
revolutionary groups including the PIJ. 108 
The primary source of inspiration for the movement, and the character which 
places the Islamic struggle within the Palestinian context, is Sheikh Izz-al-Din al- 
Qassam. 109 Al-Qassam was actively involved in resisting French colonisation in the mid- 
los Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 1994, p. 97. 
106 S. Qutb, Milestones, 1978, Introduction. 
107 H. Hanafi, Al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya [Islamic Fundamentalism], 1989, p. 50. 
108 S. Qutb, Milestones, 1978, Introduction. 
109 For a full history of Al-Qassam see B. M. Nafi, 'Shaykh'Izz AI-Din Al-Qassam: A Refonnist and a Rebel 
Leader', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. VIII, # 2,1997, pp. 185-215. 
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1920s (where he was sentenced to death in absentia) after which he fled to Haifa in 
Palestine. In Haifa, he preached in a mosque and from the very beginning advocated 
resistance to British colonialism and Zionist settlements - "Jihad against Britain and its 
Zionist agents. "' 10 Al-Qassam saw Britain and Zionism as two halves of the same enemy - 
in much the same way that the PIJ sees Israel and America. He believed that violent 
struggle, and not passive resistance, was the only way to achieve freedom and 
independence, and this was epitomised by his slogan 'God's book in one hand and the rifle 
in the other'. In late 1935, al-Qassam led a force of about 800 men towards the hills of the 
West Bank and at the battle of Yaabad near Jenin his force was routed and al-Qassam 
himself martyred. This confrontation became the catalyst for the Arab revolt which erupted 
in 1936. In a similar way, the PIJ saw its operations shortly before the Intifada as the 
catalyst which began the uprising, and more symbolically as an example of a'revolutionary 
vanguard'. The PIJ is also similar to al-Qassam's organisation in the secrecy with which 
both organisations conduct their activities and in their rejection of direct dialogue with the 
powers to which they are opposed. ' 1' As with Hamas, al-Qassam has become a revered 
symbol for the PIJ, being elevated to almost saintly status. 
The leadership of the PIJ can best be described as collegial. The organisation itself 
is more a series of loosely affiliated factions rather than a single, cohesive group. Of these 
the Shiqaqi faction has been the most active and has maintained the higher profile. Fathi 
Shiqaqi was profoundly influenced by the Iranian revolution and by the writings and 
teachings of Ruhollah Khomeini himself. Until 1967, Shiqaqi was a Nassente. The Six 
Day War pushed him out of the orbit of secular nationalism, however, and towards the 
religiously oriented Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid-1970s Shiqaqi was disillusioned by 
the shortcomings of the Brotherhood, and at the same time his ideological thinking was 
becoming heavily influenced by the writings and sermons of Khomeini and these beliefs 
were expressed in his book Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and Alternative. Shiqaqi was 
particularly impressed by Khomeini's illumination of the cultural clash between the 'nation 
of Islam' on the one hand, and on the other the "satanic forces of the West represented by 
1 10 N. Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism, 1982, p. 40. 
111 Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Ga a, p. 100. 
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Israel. "' 12 Shiqaqi spoke of the fatwa issued by Khomeini which declared the elimination 
of the 'Zionist entity' as a religious duty for which money generated by alms should be 
allocated. 113 Parallel to this was the adoption by the group as a whole of one of Khomeini's 
central tenets which was the constant emphasis on jihad as a symbol of activism. 
114 Nor 
did Shiqaqi regard military actions as regrettable. In an interview following the January 
1995 Beit Lid bombing, which killed twenty-one Israelis (twenty of them soldiers), he 
allegedly chuckled when he called the operation "the biggest military attack ever inside 
Palestine", and part of a defensive war: "[w]e are only defending our right to live in our 
homeland. "115 According to Sheikh Tamimi, the Iranian revolution reinforced the adage 
that "Islam was the solution and jihad was the proper means. "1 16 In a similar fashion, the 
experience of the Egyptian Jihad Organisation has influence the PIJ's perception of jihad, 
especially that articulated in Muhammad al-Faraj's The Neglected Duty. Fathi Shiqaqi was 
assassinated in Malta by Israeli intelligence in October 1995. He was succeeded by Dr. 
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who was educated in the West, obtaining a doctorate in 
Islamic economics from Durham University and later teaching courses on the Middle East 
at the University of South Florida in the U. S. 117 
The stance of the PIJ in the 1990s towards Israel and the peace process, and the 
group's close connection with Iran, can be demonstrated by statements made by Shallah 
following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Most notably, Shallah stated "I am not sorry 
for the killing of Rabin who is the world's number one terrorist.. . 
lt is the blessing of the 
martyr leader Fathi Shiqaqi's blood. "' 18 Shallah, however, does not appear to possess the 
same degree of influence as Shiqaqi and this has had a corresponding effect on the 
potential for unified leadership. As noted of Shallah "[h]e has not the charisma and 
intellectual or organisational skills as Fathi Shiqaqi and this has influenced the 
112 E. Rekhess, 'The Terrorist Connection - Iran, The Islamic Jihad and Harnas', Justice, Vol. V, May 1995, p. 
2. This view is shared by current members of the group's leadership that I have interviewed more recently. 
13 E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', in D. Menashri (ed. ), 
The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 1990, p. 195. 
114 ibid. 
"' G. Robinson, Doctor Jihad', World Press Review, Vol. XLII, # 4, p. 46. 
116 E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact', p. 196. 
"' While at South Florida he was also director of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think 
tank on Muslim religious and political issues connected to the PIJ. 
118 Reuters, November 5,1995. 
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organisation's position and activity. "119 The position of the PIJ's internal leadership, like 
that of Hamas, also depends upon the attitudes of the PA and Israel. At the same time, the 
external leadership is also concerned with the attitudes and influence of those countries in 
which the PIJ is based, especially Syria which exerts a considerable degree of control over 
the PIJ leadership in Damascus, and Iran which also exerts a great deal of ideological and 
financial influence. Either way, unless there is a radical alteration in the group's leadership 
strategy, the organisation will remain a politically marginal group. 
The leadership of the PIJ can best be described as collegial with an elected 
secretary general as figurehead. The relationship and structure of the leadership is further 
complicated by the factional nature of the group (although this case study is primarily 
concerned with the Shiqaqi faction), and by the existence of internal and external 
leaderships. The internal and external division is primarily a function of group survival 
although, like Hamas, there are disagreements between them because of differing 
circumstances and pressures. If the group is to venture into mainstream politics, the 
decision will be made by the internal leadership and could result in a split between those 
favouring a softening of the organisations strategy and those committed solely to violent 
struggle. 
4.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic 
4.3.1 Jewish Underground 
The leadership of the Jewish Underground is most accurately described as 
collegial, although the decision to attack the mosques on the Dome of the Rock can be 
ascribed to two individuals who dominated the processes of rationalisation. The 
Underground had two primary ideologues, one - Rabbi Kook the younger - was the 
spiritual figurehead of Gush Emunim from which the organisation split, but his redemptive 
ideas were further radicalised by the adoption of the more imminent redemptive writings 
of a little known author, Shabtai Ben Dov. While one of the leading figures of the group, 
Yehuda Etzion, can certainly be described as charismatic, no member of the organisation 
119 Harakai al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, http: //www. ict. org. il 
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assumed a divine or prophetic authority and consequently none felt sufficiently qualified to 
unilaterally authorise the operation, and so the issue of rabbinical sanction became a 
pivotal one. 120 
The members of the Jewish Underground came from Gush Emunim and it is 
therefore unsurprising that the central ideologue of the group should be the Gush's primary 
thinker Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. Kook had succeeded his father, Rabbi Abraham Isaac 
Kook, and further developed his ideas which centred around the belief that the 
contemporary age was a messianic one, and that the entire biblical Eretz Israel would be 
incorporated into the state of Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel was an 
important step towards this goal, but for almost two decades following 1948 the fulfilment 
of messianic prophecy was not merely incomplete but constantly under threat. The Six Day 
War radically altered this perception and provided both the spiritual inspiration for Gush 
Emunim and a general sense of the otherworldly in Israeli society. Rabbi Kook's position 
as a form of prophet was entrenched by this event. A short time before the 1967 war, the 
rabbi addressed his students at the Merkaz ha-Rav Yeshiva in Jerusalem and berated the 
sins of the nation for abandoning Hebron and Bethlehem to Arab control, and the partition 
of'Eretz Israel'. In the light of the Israeli victories some four weeks later, the Rabbis' words 
appeared almost prophetic, bolstering his position even further and reinforcing the Gush's 
message of redemption. 121 
Although the ideas of both the rabbis Kook were extremely influential on all the 
members of the Underground, the crucial concept of active national redemption was 
discovered by Yehuda Etzion in the writings of Shabtai Ben Dov. 122 Ben Dov, who was a 
minor civil servant in the department of Industry and Commerce, not a rabbi, had 
developed an all-inclusive theory of active redemption for the state of Israel which openly 
considered the possibility of re-establishing the biblical kingdom and constructing the 
120 One of the important reasons for the de-radicalisation of the Gush Emunim itself was the decline of 
charismatic leadership following the death of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook in 1982. The other two reasons were 
the 'materialisation' of the movement's members and the rise of'technocrats' within the organisation. See E. 
Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, pp. 219-220. 
121 Rabbi Zvi Yehuda ha-Cohen Kook, 'This is the State the Prophets Had Envisaged', Nekuda, # 86, April 26, 
1985, pp. 6-7. [Cited in E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 148, fn. 3. ] 
122 Inter-personal relations are interesting in this regard. According to Coughlin Etzion's uncle was secretary 
to Yitzhak Shamir when Shamir was commander of the Stern gang and Ben Dov was also a member. C. 
Coughlin, A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions, p. 236. 
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Third Temple. 123 His ideas covered many aspects of this reformed society including the 
need for territorial expansion in order to fulfil Abraham's covenant with God, the 
establishment of Jewish law in Israel and the need for moral and spiritual purification - in 
short the transformation of Israel into "a holy people and a holy state. " 124 Such thinking 
represented a radical and extreme departure from accepted Gush Emunim ideology which 
accepted the role played by the secular Israeli state and rejected interference with the 
messianic timetable. Ben Dov would have remained in obscurity if his writings had not 
been discovered by one of the founding members of the Underground, Yehuda Etzion, who 
was not only profoundly influenced by them but devoted a considerable amount of time to 
their publication. 125 
The signing of the Camp David accords in 1978 was a major setback for Gush 
Emunim, representing as it did a reversal of the messianic process and a perceived betrayal 
of the process by the Israeli government. While most members and leaders of the 
organisation were left confused, two - Yehuda Etzion and Yeshua Ben Shoshan - 
interpreted the Accords in a purely messianic fashion. These two men reasoned that the 
Accords were not merely the result of Menachem Begins personal weakness, they were a 
sign from God that something more symbolic was obstructing the redemptive process and 
reasoned that this was the presence on the Temple Mount of the Muslim Dome of the 
Rock. It is reported that at the meeting when the Dome of the Rock attack was outlined in 
detail Yehuda Etzion adopted a "tone and spirit [which] were prophetic and messianic. "126 
Throughout history there have been Jewish militant leaders with messianic pretensions. 
The leader of the second Jewish revolt which began in 132 AD, Simeon Bar Kokhba, was 
proclaimed by certain rabbinical authorities to be the awaited messiah, a title that he 
exploited to the full and which no doubt influenced the revolt's ferocity and 
determination. 127 Indeed, Etzion has drawn a parallel between himself and Simon Bar 
123 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim 
Underground', in D. C. Rapoport (ed. ), Inside Terrorist Organisations, 1988, p. 198. 
124 ibid. Sprinzak notes that Ben Dov's writings were in 'the tradition of the ultra-nationalist poet Uri Zev 
Greenberg (1896-198 1). 
125 ibid. Ben Dov died in 1979. 
126 Sprinzak, E., `From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 199. This information comes from the 
court documents of Etzion's trial. 
127 Grant, M., The Jews in the Roman World, 1973, p. 248. 
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Kokhba128, although this is quite different from claiming to be the Messiah as Bar Kokhba 
did, or claiming to be some other form of divine messenger (as opposed to instrument). 
But Etzion was never sufficiently charismatic to substitute for a rabbinical authority and 
the other members of the group who were more cautious never considered him a 
sanctioning authority. Nevertheless, at the beginning, because the process was still 
regarded as inevitable, planning for the operation (which would take some time anyway) 
proceeded. 
While Etzion and Ben Shoshan were key figures in the group and the prime 
instigators of the Temple Mount plot it is also interesting to note that their operational 
input into revenge attacks such as that on the Islamic college in Hebron in 1983 was 
minimal. Their primary concern was with their messianic plan and when this was 
indefinitely shelved in 1982 their expectations were challenged. Although Etzion was 
involved in the planning of the Underground's first terrorist operation, the revenge attack 
on five Arab mayors in June 1981, neither he nor Ben Shoshan played major roles in the 
group's next attack on the Islamic College in Hebron. Nor were they significantly involved 
in proposing or planning the aborted bombing of the men's dormitory at Bir Zeit University 
in Ramallah, or the attempt to blow up five Arab buses in April 1984 which ultimately led 
to the group's complete arrest. The leading figure in these operations was Menachem Livni, 
an engineer and captain in the army reserve, a friend of Etzion whom Ehud Sprinzak has 
described as the most 'balanced' member of the group. 129 What emerged was a form of 
collegial leadership, one which had both messianic and vigilante proponents who involved 
themselves in planning according to their preferences and their perceptions of the crisis 
environment. 
The other dimension to leadership arose from the fact that none of the group were 
rabbis, and clerical sanction was considered essential. The Dome of the Rock attack was 
shelved in 1982 primarily because none of the rabbis consulted would approve the plan 
and without such approval the participants were unwilling to act. 130 While it is unclear 
128 C. Coughlin, A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions, p. 237. 129 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 199. 
13° Sprinzak, E., `Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel' in M. E. 
Marty & R. S. Appleby (eds. ), Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies and Militance, 
1993, p. 476. 
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how much of the plot was known by the Gush's rabbis, all the other operations carried out 
by the Underground were blessed by them. 13' According to Etzion, one rabbi, Eliezer 
Waldman even volunteered to participate in the first operation. 132 None of the members of 
the Gush Emunim Underground were authoritative rabbis, and most members had made it 
clear from the outset that they would not act without the approval of a recognised rabbi. It 
is indicative of the group's marginalisation that none of the religious authorities 
approached, including Gush Emunim's mentor, rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, would bless the 
Temple Mount operation despite their approval of smaller scale acts of terrorism. The only 
members willing to proceed regardless were the instigators, Etzion and Ben Shoshan, but it 
was not an operation that only two men could realistically conduct. 
Rabbinical sanction with regard to the Temple Mount does, however, have a 
disturbing precedent. When Israeli troops captured the Temple Mount in 1967 it has been 
reported that the Army's chief Rabbi, Schlomo Goren, suggested to the senior officer 
present that the Dome of the Rock should be blown up forthwith. He allegedly told Major 
General Uzi Narkiss "[y]ou don't grasp what tremendous significance this would have. This 
is an opportunity that can be taken advantage of now, at this moment. Tomorrow it will be 
too late. " 133 Although other sources deny this ever happened, it is what the Rabbi said, in a 
taped speech at a military convention: 
"[c]ertainly we should have blown it up... It is a tragedy for generations that we did 
not do so... I myself would have gone up there and wiped it off the ground completely 
so that there was no trace that there was ever a Mosque of Omar. " 134 
Many leading clerics in the redemptionist camp condemned the Underground's 
plot. One of these, Rabbi Zvi Tau, stated of the Underground: 
"[t]hey have the blatantly idolatrous idea that by blowing up the mosques they will 
force the Master of the Universe to redeem Israel. This is the thinking of small- 
minded, superficial students of Kabbalah who... are led by curiosity into the sacred 
precincts and cause great pain. i135 
131 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 171. 132 ibid. 
133 AP, December 31,1997. 
134 ibid. 
"s A. Ravitsky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism, 1996, p. 134. 
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Such condemnation, however, was not universal as indicated by Schlomo Goren and the 
willingness of rabbis to sanction other violent acts. Faced with a crisis, even comparatively 
moderate rabbis have been prepared to sanction violence. Following the brutal murder of a 
Beit El settler in 1993, for example, members of Yesha's rabbinical council ruled that 
shooting Palestinian attackers was justified and that no legal barriers should constrain their 
legitimate actions. 136 Nor was the religious establishment entirely unsympathetic to the 
messianic dimension of the Underground - in the mid-1980s the Chief Sephardic Rabbi, 
Mordechai Eliyahu, allegedly visited members of the Jewish Underground and wrote an 
official letter supporting the demand to build a synagogue on the Temple Mount. 137 
Since their release from prison the leaders of the Underground are unrepentant, but 
the active messianic message appears to have been discarded. After serving seven years for 
his activities in the Underground, Etzion established a new organisation, Chai Ve-Kayam. 
While Etzion has expressed no remorse for his part in the violent operations of the 
Underground, he does not advocate violence in the 1990s. Violence should only be 
resorted to when the Jewish people are 'psychologically ready'. 138 Chai Ve-Kayam is thus 
intended to be a mass revival movement which will prepare the Jewish people for 
redemption. This does not mean, however, that active messianism has been utterly 
discredited - on the contrary it is courted by organisations such as the Temple Institute - 
and there may be further significant reversals of the messianic process resulting from the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process which are regarded as warranting active messianism. In 
this regard one of the most important features of the Underground was that the plot existed 
for more than four years and was only revealed by accident. 
The leadership of the Jewish Underground can be described as loosely collegial. 
While Yehuda Etzion was the driving force behind forming the organisation and planning 
the attack on the Dome of the Rock, the indefinite postponement of which led to other 
members assuming the leadership of vigilante operations. Neither Etzion nor any other 
member of the group was sufficiently charismatic to assume total control of the 
136 See E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 230. 137 E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, 1991, p. 352, fn. 25. Sprinzak noted that Meir 
Kahane confided to him that Eliyahu was one of the only rabbis he 'really respected' and that Eliyahu had read 
and approved of all Kahane's books. 
138 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 224. 
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organisation and none harboured messianic or divine pretensions, a situation which 
necessitated rabbinic approval in operational matters. While the basis of the group's 
ideology lay in the teachings of the rabbis Kook, the radical element was derived from a 
contemporary, Ben Dov, who explored the idea of active messianic redemption and the 
possibility of realising this imminently. 
4.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
At a basic level the leadership of Aum Shinrikyo can be seen as being embodied in 
one man, Shoko Asahara, who was both a charismatic figure and chief ideologue and who 
functioned as a self-deified guru. Partly due to the size of the organisation and the variety 
of its activities, there also existed a bureaucratic dimension whereby various 'ministries', 
headed by the members of Asahara's inner circle, performed specific functions according 
to the whims and dictates of the leader. As Asahara became increasingly convinced of his 
divinity so his rhetoric became more extreme and the group was willing to engage in a 
greater number of violent activities. The progression of the group itself to increasingly 
extra-normative activities had a direct relationship to Asahara's perception of himself and 
his own role in history. 
Shoko Asahara was born as Chizou Matsumoto in 1955. Plagued from birth by 
almost total blindness, Asahara attended a school for the blind where he enjoyed the 
obvious advantage of partial sight over the other pupils, and where a domineering and 
bullying personality type first manifested itself. After school he became an acupuncturist 
and in 1977 he experienced his first alienation from a society in which he sought to play a 
leading part when he failed the Tokyo University entrance exams. 139 In 1978, he married 
and started a business selling Chinese herbal medicine and in 1982 he was charged with 
selling fake medicine which proved disastrous for his business. 140 A year before this, he 
had joined a Buddhist Yogic new religious movement called Agonshu which he left in 
1984 to found his own yoga circle. 141 Soon after, Asahara adopted the mantle of a 
139 Asahara had claimed that he wanted to be Prime Minister. See M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in 
Japan Today: A Chronology and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo', Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Vol. X, # 4, p. 82. 
140 ibid. In 1976 Asahara had been charged and fined for bodily injury when an acupuncturist. 141 D., Thompson, The End of Time: Faith and Fear in the Shadow of the Millennium, p. 255. 
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charismatic leader when he claimed he had a vision in which he was a messianic figure 
from an apocalyptic Buddhist tradition, 'the god of light who leads the armies of the gods'. 
The initial aim of Aum was withdrawal from society but by 1988 Asahara was preaching 
that the world had reached a `final degenerative stage' and he began drawing heavily on 
Western apocalyptic traditions, primarily because the Eastern traditions which had hitherto 
been dominant could not provide the theological underpinnings of impending doom 
offered by Christianity. This culminated in the 1989 publication of an interpretation of the 
Book of Revelations which predicted Armageddon within a few years. 142 These ideological 
shifts were closely associated with the course of Asahara's life. There is evidence that he 
led a largely failed existence until the formation of Aum, although even then failure 
dogged him. In the 1990 Diet elections, Aum ran twenty-five candidates including 
Asahara, and contrary to expectations all were heavily defeated. For a man who had always 
found failure difficult to deal with, public humiliation on this scale must have been 
particularly galling. 143 Many observers believe that it was this defeat which effectively 
placed the sect at war with the world. 
As Aum Shinrikyo developed, Asahara's perception of himself (and therefore that 
imposed upon the group) became more and more messianic. In 1991, the group published 
Asahara's book Kirisuto sengen (Declaring myself the Christ) and in 1991 the successor 
volume Kirisuto sengen Part 2 (Declaring myself the Christ Part 2). 144 These texts and 
related articles likened Asahara's life to that of Christ and his disciples. As with Christ, 
Asahara felt himself persecuted : "[als you know, Aum has received illegal and unfair 
bashing from the state and society because of the false image created by the mass media's 
fabricated articles and reports"145, and the perception of persecution became a defining 
feature of Aum's relations with the outside world. Asahara drew other parallels between 
142 Ibid., p. 260. 
143 This failure may also have had particular resonance with Asahara's childhood when he unsuccessfully ran 
for class head on several occasions. See R. Lißon, Destroying the World to Save it: Aum Shinrikyo, 
Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism, 1999, p. 15. 
144 Aum Shinrikyo offers, amongst other proofs Shoko Asahara's messianic promise, a message from a'non- 
believer' (i. e. non-member of the group) who claims his semi-mystic grandfather identified Asahara as the 'He' 
who will appear in order to "change the world". This prophecy was told to the grandfather before the second 
world war by the leader of the Omoto sect, Onisaburo Deguchi. See'The Person Who Was Prophesied' on 
Aura's website - http: //www. aum-shinrikyo. com/english/masons/deguti. htm. 145 S. Asahara, Declaring Myself the Christ, http: //Aum-shinrikyo. com/english/christ/04. html. This claim was 
supported by quoting John 15: 18-27, "If the world hates you, you know that it hated me before it hated you". 
172 
himself and Jesus, relating his own version of turning water into wine, healing the sick and 
'carrying diseases' whereby he absorbs the ailments of others and gives them his energy. '46 
The near or actual deification of cult leaders or `gurus' is certainly not new. 
Recruits to Aum Shinrikyo were forced to watch Shoko Asahara's talks on video for hours 
in solitary confinement, his hair and nail clippings were revered and they also reported to 
have drunk his bath water. '47 This latter practice has numerous historical parallels and 
Norman Cohn presents similar examples from dark and early middle Age Europe. In the 
eighth century, St. Boniface recorded a messianic figure called Aldebert whose followers 
treasured his nail parings and hair clippings as "miracle-working talismans. "148 The 
eleventh century Messianic figure Tanchelm distributing his bath water amongst his 
followers "some of whom drank it as a substitute for the Eucharist, while others treasured 
it as a Holy relic. , 149 Asahara's development of this practice was to charge large amounts 
of money for these miraculous curatives, turning them (along with other treatments and 
'medicines') into a major source of revenue for the group. As distasteful or comic as this 
may seem such devotion to a messianic leader is of particular concern when the group 
turns to violence. 15' ' 
The 'self-fulfilling nature of Asahara's increasingly apocalyptic prophecies was an 
important factor in directing the course of group violence. As one commentator has 
suggested these prophecies: 
"locked the religion into a scenario from which it had little way out unless something 
drastic happened in the period leading up to 1997, and specifically 1995 which 
Asahara had marked out as the year when the slide to destruction would begin. "151 
Towards this late stage Aum was faced with a choice of either rescheduling the apocalypse 
(problematic because of the increased interest the Japanese police were taking in the 
group, and for reasons of legitimacy), suffering a form of 'great disappointment' (which 
146 S. Asahara, Declaring Myself the Christ. 
147 D. Thompson, The End of Time, p. 266. It has also been reported that Aum procured a DNA/RNA 
synthesiser so that Asahara's DNA and lymphocytes could be replicated and sold as part of another ritual. See 
M. Leitenberg, 'The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents', in B. Roberts 
(ed. ), Hype or Reality: The "New Terrorism" and Mass Casualty Attacks, 2000, p. 167 & fn. 24. 
148 N., Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 43. 
149 Ibid., p. 49. 
150 It is important to note that the first external murders committed by Aum were of a lawyer, who was suing 
the group for false advertising over claims made about the gurus by-products, his wife and child. tsi I. Reader, A poisonous cocktail? Aum Shinrikyo's Path to Violence, 1996, p. 93. 
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would certainly have deprived the group of some legitimacy and would require an 
alteration in ideology) or the group could act to precipitate the end. The guru gave his 
blessing for this last option, one in which the group already had a measure of experience. 
Aum had previously shown itself willing to murder opponents and uncooperative 
members, the group had long been experimenting with various biological and chemical 
agents, and at Matsumoto in June 1994 the group had already deployed sann. 
While Asahara existed as the divine leader of Aum Shinrikyo, the rest of the 
group's leadership structure was effectively a mirror image of Japan's national 
government. 152 Aum's shadow government structure contained twenty-one different 
ministries and agencies under the Supreme leadership of Shoko Asahara. 153 The group 
clearly saw itself as the sole inheritor of a post-apocalyptic world and the organisational 
structure of the group would provide a blueprint for an entirely new society, although one 
which was not radically unfamiliar in terms of its format, merely different in terms of 
ideology and practice. The illegal activities of the group were conducted according to 
ministerial responsibility, and the selection of ministers was made by Asahara according to 
their skills and their loyalty to the guru. For example, Hideo Murai, a trained physicist 
became Aum's Minister of Science and Technology; Kiyohide Hayakawa, an 
environmental architect, became Aum's Construction minister and his closeness to Asahara 
led to develop contacts in Russia for the group's militarization programme; Tomomasa 
Nakagawa, a physician, became head of the Household Agency where one of his roles was 
to act as personal doctor to the guru and his family; and Tomomitsu Niimi, who headed the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. Parallel to this quasi-government structure was a spiritual one, 
again headed by Asahara. Members on this level were classified according to seven ranks 
of enlightenment and all pledged complete allegiance to Asahara. The structure was 
pyramidic in composition with the six layers below Asahara composed of monastic 
152 One Japanese commentator believes this was a result both of the group's utopianism and also its inward 
looking paranoia generated in part by a hostile media and at times by hostile communities. See N. Inoue, cited 
in M. Mullins, 'Aum Shinrikyo as an Apocalyptic Movement' in T. Robbins and S. Palmer (eds. ), Millennium, 
Messiahs and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements, 1997, p. 317, fn. 3. 
153 These were the Household Agency, the Secretariat, the ministries of Defence, Science and Technology, 
Health and Welfare, Home Affairs, Healing, Construction, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Intelligence, 
Distribution Supervision, Vehicles, Justice, Post and Telecommunications, Labour, Commerce, Justice, the 
Eastern Followers Agency, the Western Followers Agency and the New Followers Agency. 
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members and the bottom layer of lay members only. 154 This structure provides a more 
accurate representation of the group hierarchy than the political one with various ministers 
existing at different levels of enlightenment according to their proximity to Asahara. 
Of the various ministers and other high ranking disciples some have managed to 
keep their faith in Asahara and his teachings while others have not. Aum's former Minister 
of Internal Affairs', Tomomitsu Niimi, Aum's chief chemist, Masami Tsuchiya, and the 
group's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fumihiro Joyu, have remained devout. 155 On the other 
hand the man who ran Aum's clinics, Ikuo Hayashi, and the group's 'Minister of 
Intelligence', Yoshihiro Inoue, have recanted and co-operated with the Japanese authorities 
in the hope of a more lenient sentence or at least to avoid the death penalty. In December 
1999, the charismatic Joyu was released from a Hiroshima prison after serving a three year 
sentence for perjury over a land purchase by the sect. Joyu was, and still is, one of 
Asahara's most loyal lieutenants and regards the guru as a messiah. 156 Since Asahara's 
arrest, decision making in the group has been managed by a group of six, including Joyu 
and one of Asahara's favourite daughters, Rika. It is assumed by many Aum experts that 
Joyu will assume the leadership role and that using his charismatic personality and 
leadership position will reinvent the organisation (perhaps by changing its name and 
altering the focus of its teachings and activities) thus allowing it to survive new legislation 
aimed at curbing the group's activities. '57 
The leadership structure of Aum Shinrikyo was composed of a divine charismatic 
leader beneath which lay a collegial structure to manage the group's wide range of 
activities and to function as a government in waiting for a post-apocalyptic world. This 
ministerial system was also a means for Asahara to reward favourites and to maintain a 
low level of inter-agency rivalry. Asahara's unquestioned position and divine status meant 
that he was in a position to sanction a wide range of violent activities, and his apocalyptic 
belief system meant that he considered violent activity on a large scale. Asahara's position 
1 54 D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, 1996,102-103. 
Iss Joyu represents an unusual development in charismatic leadership having developed a devoted following of 
young woman outside the cult. See Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 168. A similar phenomenon, albeit on a lesser 
scale has occurred to Yigal Amir, see The Searle Times, August 12,1996. 156 S. MH., December 29,1999. 
157 S. M. H., December 30,1999. 
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as chief ideologue further cemented his position as paramount leader and also played a 
personally pivotal role in governing the group's violent activities. 
4.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan 
The leadership of the Saudi Ikhwan was charismatic in nature, confined to a 
primary activist ideologue, and a secondary one, who was accorded messianic status by 
being declared the expected Mahdi. What makes this case of interest is that the primary 
leadership figure, Juhayman ibn Saif al-Utaybi, did not feel compelled to adopt the 
position of Mahdi himself, but seemed content to apply traditional indicators of the 
Mahdi's identity which accorded more closely with another, Muhammed ibn Abdullah al 
Qahtani. The small size of the group, its short life span and somewhat limited objectives 
ensured that no collegial form of leadership would develop. 
The paramount leader and primary ideologue of the Saudi Ikhwan was Juhayman 
Utaybi. Utaybi was the grandson of an earlier Saudi Ikhwan militant killed at the battle of 
Sabalah in 1929 by the forces of Abdul Al Saud, thus disposing him to oppose the Saudi 
regime by descent judged by the customs of tribal vengeance. As a young man he joined 
the Saudi National Guard, rising to the rank of corporal before he left in 1972 after 
eighteen years of service, having discovered that his religious beliefs and practices were 
incompatible with military life. It is also at this stage that his resentment of foreign 
involvement in the Saudi kingdom arose. After his service with National Guard he enrolled 
at the Islamic University of Medina where he became a student of Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn 
Abdullah al Baz. Al-Baz represents the most immediate and powerful influence over the 
formation of Juhayman's socio-religious outlook, and he also represents the point of 
departure between the official doctrine of the state ulema, and the ideas formulated by 
Juhayman. In one of his pamphlets, entitled The Ikhwan, Juhayman laments the 
marginalisation oftrue' Muslims in Saudi Arabia: 
"[t]hey slander us from all quarters and tell lies about us. We are Muslims who 
wanted to learn the Shari'ah [sic] and quickly realised that it could not be learned in 
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government controlled institutions.. . We 
have broken with the opportunists and the 
bureaucrats. i 158 
Al-Baz was by no means a moderate, advocating a return to the letter of the Quran 
and the sunna. 159 The deviation arose because Juhayman applied purist teachings of al-Baz 
rigorously to the Saudi regime and found that it had deviated from the true path of Islam. 
Al-Baz is also instrumental at two later stages of the life of the Ikhwan. In 1978, following 
the publication of the group's first important pamphlet, 160 Juhayman and ninety-six others 
were arrested in Riyadh for disseminating treasonable materials. Instead of a public trial 
they were questioned closely by al-Baz, and in his capacity as President of the Council of 
Ulema Al-Baz concluded that the views held by Utaybi and his followers were not 
treasonous and they were released on the understanding that they would engage in no more 
public activism. After the Grand Mosque had been seized the following year Al-Baz led 
the general clerical decision granting the King a fatwa which permitted him to clear the 
mosque by force. 161 Within the political environment of Saudi Arabia, it is not difficult to 
understand that many of the ulema and other elements were sympathetic to some of 
Juhayman's beliefs and were happy to "use him as a stick to beat the Al-Saud. 062 
Juhayman's opinion of Al-Baz was that he had failed Islam by serving the regime: "Bin Baz 
may know his Sunna well enough, but he uses it to support corrupt rulers. " 163 
Juhayman certainly fits the charismatic leader type. It is claimed that he "possessed 
a magnetic personality, piercing eyes and great courage, " all of which brought him tribal 
respect and obedience from his young followers. 164 Juhayman was also responsible for 
writing three of the 'seven letters', the pamphlets which outlined the group's religious 
15' Juhayman Utaybi, Da Vat Ikhwan, Kafya Bada'at wa Ila Ayna Tasir, reproduced in A. Al-Yassini, Religion 
and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1983, p. 126. 
159 In 1965 al-Baz claimed that the sun moved in orbit, and that the earth was stationary and spread out by 
God. He later denied claiming that the earth is flat, merely 'static'. 
160 Rules of Allegiance and Obedience: The Misconduct of Rulers', Kuwait City, n. d. 
161 Authority was found in the verse "Do not fight them in the Holy Mosque until they fight you inside it, and 
if you fight them you must kill them for that is the punishment of the unbelievers". J. Buchan, 'The Return of 
the Ikhwan - 1979' in D. Holden & R. Johns, The House of Saud, 1981, p. 522. '62 J. Buchan, p. 519. 
163 The Financial Times, April 28,1980. 
164 H. Dekmejian. Islam and Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 1995, p. 135, from an 
anonymous Arabic tract, "Ahdath al-Haram Bayn al-Haga'iq wal-Abatil" (The events of the Grand Mosque 
between truth and lies), Sawt al-Talrah, May 1980, pp. 120-122. 
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objections to Saudi rule, as well as a concluding commentary and poetry. 16' However, 
while Juhayman was undoubtedly a charismatic figure in his own right, he did not declare 
himself Mahdi but assigned this mantle to his brother-in-law, Muhammad bin Abdullah 
Qahtani. Qahtani was a twenty-seven year old theology student and his name resonated 
with the messianic traditions employed by the group mentioned in Chapter Three. 
Apparently a female member of the group dreamed one night that the Mahdi was among 
them and that it was Qahtani. 166 His exact role in the attack on the Grand Mosque remains 
confused, although it is certain that Juhayman addressed the assembled masses and 
enjoined them (and the rest of the Muslim world) to recognise Muhammed as the Mahdi 
before listing the group's other demands. According to the 'seven letters manuscript', 
Qahtani is the author of letter number seven and it is certain that Qahtani was a central 
member of the group and that the belief of other followers, including Juhayman, that he 
was the Mahdi, was very real. Indeed, even Sheikh ibn Baz noted after the attack that 
Qathani exhibited enough of the expected signs for impressionable believers to be taken in. 
These included his and his father's names (both the same as the prophet's), his tribe, and 
the fact that he proclaimed himself a descendant of the prophet. 167 What is most important 
to note is that his claim fell so immediately on deaf ears throughout the Muslim world. 
This is easily attributable to his sudden appearance (no period of expectation), his 
anonymity beyond his own organisation and the violent, almost secular and heretical way 
he chose to announce his arrival. 168 The Saudi ulema's. fatwa sanctioning the use of force to 
clear the mosque contained as its second element a discrediting of Qatahani's claim. This 
rested on a hadith which states "[h]e who comes to you while you are unanimous in your 
opinions and wants to divide you and disperse you, strike off his neck. 069 Any members of 
the Ikhwan who still believed in his divinity were ultimately to be disappointed when his 
body was found amongst the dead at the end of the siege. 
165 H. R. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, 1995, p. 135. Translations of these letters have appeared in a variety 
of sources. For the best English version see J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in the Saudi Arabia: 
Juhayman Al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', Muslim World, Vol. LXXX, t 1,1990, pp. 9-15. 
166 J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', p. 520. 
167 J. Kechichian, 'The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia', 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, # 18,, 1986, p. 60. 
16a As early as the eleventh century the Fatamid Caliph Al-Hakim declared himself Mahdi. Al-Hakim 
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and his return is still expected by the Lebanese Druzes. See S. 
Runciman, The History of the Crusades, Vol. I, 1951, pp. 35-36. 169 FBIS, 'Ulama Issued Fatwa', November 26,1979, p. C4. 
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Although examples of Sunni messianism are rare (two of the four fundamental 
collections of Sunni traditions make no mention of the Mahdi at all, and the Sunni faith 
generally treats the concept of Mahdi much less specifically than the Shi'a) there is a 
twentieth century precedent from 1977 when the Egyptian Group Takfir wal-Hijra 
(Repentance and Holy Flight) declared its leader, Shukri Mustafa, to be the Mahdi. 170 
Mustafa was executed in the same year and although other imprisoned members of his 
group do not believe him to be immortal, they do believe that "because God had ordained 
him and his group to restore Islam, he would not die before accomplishing this `divine 
mission'. "171 Interestingly both Shukri and Juhayman's groups were labelled as khawarij, a 
derogatory term referring to the Kharajites, early schismatics in the Muslim community. 
Juhayman survived the siege of the Grand Mosque and along with sixty-two other activists 
he was executed on January 9,1980. While ultimately an isolated incident primarily of 
concern for the Saudi regime, the emergence in the late twentieth century of a puritanical 
Sunni group with a leader claiming to be the awaited Mahdi not only reinforces the 
durability of redemptive religious ideology in Islam, but also poses as the most recent 
precedent for messianic protest against what is perceived to be a corrupt and deviant 
society. 
The leadership of the Saudi Ikhwan centred on two individuals, one the chief 
ideologue and strategist and the other, the declared Mahdi. Of these two the ideologue and 
strategist, Juhayman, was the most influential, responsible for founding the organisation 
and for the majority of ideological output and strategic planning. The relatively small size 
of the group and its short life span militated against the development of any more 
sophisticated leadership structure, as did the group's messianic belief system which 
anticipated a divine transformation of temporal society rather than a political one. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The function of leadership in extremist religious groups is primarily that of 
defining and refining the group's ideological programme and strategy within a particular 
170 D. C Rapoport, `Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements' in M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (eds. ), 
Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economics and Militance, 1993, p. 449. 
171 Ibrahim, S., `Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary 
Findings', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. XII, 1980, p. 437. 
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crisis milieu. For all groups the basic ideological content is drawn from ideologues, either 
past or present, who- establish the basic links between religious justifications for violence 
and contemporary socio-political environments. For all ideologues personal biography 
functions as an indicator of ideological inclinations. In the case of present ideologues these 
may serve as a form of ideological compass for a collegiate leadership, or the role of 
ideologue may be assumed by a charismatic leader. A collegial system of leadership better 
serves the complex activities of a large organisation and is also less prone to becoming 
radicalised and also helps insulate a group from attacks upon the leadership. Typically as a 
programme of action is radicalised so the longevity of a group is constrained, thus a 
general observation is that the more complex a leadership structure both in terms of its 
ideological influences and operational responsibility, the greater the group's chances of 
survival and of ultimately diversifying its activities. In cases where a collegial leadership 
system is split between one that is internally based and one which is external there is scope 
for disagreement based on differing perceptions of the operational environment and 
obligations to sponsors. In the case of charismatic leadership where the various functions 
of leadership are concentrated in a single individual the propensity for that individual to 
adopt a more radical course of action is higher, but conversely the removal of such 
individuals is bound to have a more dramatic effect on the group itself, generally resulting 
in its demise. The life experience and personality of a leader is also important in 
influencing the development of ideology and strategy, and once again where the leadership 
is concentrated in a single individual the effects of life experience on group activity are 
magnified. An important part of leadership is defining the time frame within which group 
objectives are to be achieved and when exactly operational activity is to occur, both 
according to traditional religious calendars and timetables, and in reaction to events within 
the crisis environment. 
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Chapter V 
Timing 
Once the leadership of an extremist religious group has defined its strategy in light 
of ideological beliefs, a decision must be made regarding when the group will act. As 
outlined in Chapter Two there are four primary categories of timing which will be 
considered. While each group shows a tendency to favour a particular kind of timing 
rationale, all exhibit a propensity to employ a variety of timings and in some cases the 
timing motivations may even overlap for a single action. Furthermore, all groups possess a 
perception of time itself and how this relates to, and similarly governs, their struggle. 
Time, in this case, is seen in cosmic terms with an identifiable beginning, middle and end, 
and where exactly, on this linear spectrum, a group sees itself as being at will in many 
respects determine its course of action. This may range from an imminentist messianic 
perception, which decries the need for long term planning and political activity, to one 
which is gradualist and sees the struggle as one of centuries, not merely in the military 
sphere but also in the social, political and even economic arenas. 
The relationship of mainstream groups to time is governed by their overt 
participation in society. They are, therefore, inclined to emphasise anniversaries of specific 
events, and to engage in politically timed actions. Reactive actions are also employed 
dependent on the environmental context but while Endtime messages form part of their 
ideological system, these are not emphasised. Environmental variations are important. 
Whereas Kach and Hizballah have engaged in politically timed activities, Aryan Nations 
(due to the absence of a politically motivated and mobilised constituency) has abstained. 
Similarly, because of the environment in which it operates, Hizballah's activities have 
provided the group with a large number of short term anniversaries and a wider range of 
events to react against. Core groups engage in the first three types of timing but their desire 
to alter the existing socio-political order precludes acts timed to precipitate the Endtime. 
Both Eyal and the PIJ, however, exploited the symbolic nature of time, especially 
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anniversaries and political tactical timing, to a far greater extent than the Order. The short 
life span of Eyal, however, mitigated against the group fully expting anniversaries or. 
reactive timing in the same way that the PIJ has. While messianic "and apocalyptic groups 
are concerned primarily with Endtime events and the timing of their action to coincide 
with or precipitate these events, circumstance and environment may lead to a certain 
degree of variation. The Saudi Ikhwan certainly expended effort to time its actions to 
coincide with Islamic eschatology but both the Jewish Underground and Aum Shinrikyo - 
for different reasons however-. - deviated from focusing solely on eschatological timing and 
timed some of their acts for tactical or reactive reasons. 
5.1 Mainstream 
5.1.1 Kach 
The timing of the majority of Kach's violent, group actions was largely political and 
tactical in nature, although there was certainly a heavy element of reactive violence and 
other timing types perpetrated by individuals affiliated with the group. Underlying this was 
an imminentist, catastrophic view of time itself, although in hindsight this can be seen, in 
most cases, less as a corethessianic belief, and more as tool for encouraging political 
support for the group. The distinction between specific timing categories for Kach is 
frequently blurred. While those activities organised and orchestrated by the group such as 
provocative marches through Arab areas and political rallies can be seen as political and 
tactical in nature, they were often in response to specific acts of Arab violence. While 
Kahane advocated revenge as an underlying ideological concept, when employed by Kach 
members as a motive for timing attacks, there is no clear evidence that this activity was 
organised or condoned by the leadership. Other acts of violence committed by individual 
members or small groups, apparently without the direct assent of the group's leadership, 
were carried out at times of specific anniversaries or as a part of a messianic timetable, 
however, these were in the njinority. 
The perception of time developed by Meir Kahane centred around the imminence 
of crisis and the idea of catastrophic messianism. The idea that time was running out for 
the Jewish people was developed while Kahane was still in the U. S. during the late 1960s. 
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In 1968, while most Jews were still reeling from the successes of the Six Day War, Kahane 
was discussing the disaster he saw looming before the Jewish people. He reasoned that as 
economic recession took hold in the U. S. and as moral and social mores declined, it was 
only a matter of time before the Jews once again became the scapegoat of a failing 
society. ' Jewish survival, according to Kahane, while difficult throughout history, had now 
become impossible outside the state of Israel because only there could the Jews be assured 
that they were a majority that could not be blamed for the traditional woes of Western 
society. 2 The messianic idea, however, was not date specific and did not cope well when 
economic, social and political crises both in the U. S. and in the world at large failed to 
materialise. And during the 1980s, the idea of catastrophe was expressed in terms of the 
security and demographic threats posed by the Arab Israeli and Palestinian populations, as 
well as the more accepted security threat posed by the Arab world at large. Those 
exceptional cases where the idea of a messianic timetable were given an operational form 
will be discussed below. 
The timing of most mainstream acts conducted by Kach, such as demonstrations 
and marches, can be seen as political and tactical in nature, although there was frequently 
a reactive dimension. As noted earlier, electoral support for Kach rose as the security 
situation in Israel deteriorated, a situation which Kahane was acutely aware of and which 
he readily exploited. A Kach demonstration, calling for the exclusion of the Arabs during a 
climate of general public security concern, could garner a certain degree of support. For 
example, a demonstration in the northern Israeli town of Afula after the double murder of 
two Israeli teachers in July 1984 helped to dramatically increase support for Kach - the 
success of such actions depended on a deteriorating security environment. In the absence 
of such a situation, the street politics of Kach - especially provocative visits to Arab 
villages - were marginalised until the official ban of the party effectively made them 
illegal. 
Even before Kahane was preaching 'terror against terror', revenge had long been a 
central message of Kahane's ideology. Kahane was moved to write that: 
1 M. Kahane, Never Again, A program for Jewish Survival, 1972, pp. 74-100. 
2 ibid. pp. 101-104. 
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"[n]o trait is more justified than revenge in the right time and place. G-d himself is 
called Nokem, Avenger: 'The Lord is a zealous and avenging G-d. The Lord avenges 
and is full of wrath. He takes revenge on his adversaries and reserves wrath for his 
enemies' (Nachum [sic] 1: 2). "' 
Most interesting is the historical role which revenge itself plays in Kahane's ideology, the 
need not only to avenge current acts of violence but to seek a wider vengeance for 
centuries of wrongs committed against the Jewish people. Kahane's operational logic for 
this theory found expression early, especially following the massacre of Israeli athletes at 
the 1972 Munich Olympics when Kahane planned an unsuccessful attack on the Libyan 
embassy in Brussels. '' Kahane first expounded his theory of 'terror against terror' in 1974, 
whereby an anti-terrorist group would be established which would retaliate after every 
incident. In this process the rabbi was influenced by one of his historical heroes, David 
Raziel, the first commander of the Etzel Underground during the late 1930s. Raziel was 
responsible for the introduction of Jewish counter-terror in 1937, and his strategy was to 
make Arab civilians pay for the deaths of Jewish civilians. ' Kahane also suggested two 
possible relationships such a group could have to the government: "the [Israeli] 
government should never acknowledge its existence or it can deal with it on the same basis 
as the relationship between the PLO and the Arab host governments. i6 Kahane also 
extended his call for revenge to include attacks on those Arab states which harboured or 
offered support to the PLO. ' Kahane's ideas did not change much over time and in one of 
his later books, Uncomfortable Questions for Comfortable Jews8, he promised that if he 
was elected as Israel's leader he would establish anti-terror groups which would operate 
globally in defence of Jewish interests -a kind of vigilante Mossad. In 1979, the Jewish 
3 M. Kahane, Revenge - The Jewish Approach, http: //www. geocities. com/Athens/1651/writings/venge. htm. 
Kahane also cites psalms 94: 1- "A G-d of vengeance is the Lord". 
4 Friedman, The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane - From FBI Informant to Knesset Member, 1990, pp. 
149-153. The plot was exposed at Ben Gurion airport when weapons and explosives were discovered by 
Israeli security. 
s Kahane tactfully ignored the fact that Raziel's successors, including Menachem Begin, had renounced 
indiscriminate violence by the early 1940s. 
6 M. Kahane, The Jewish Idea, 1974, p. 14. In November 1974 Kahane and three other defendants were 
convicted, and awarded two year suspended sentences, for attempted arms smuggling. The arms were part of 
a plan to establish a counter terror group in Europe to fight Arab terrorists, New York Post, November 22, 
1974. 
7 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the 
Rabin Assassination, p. 209. 
8 M. Kahane, 1987, p. 269. 
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Defence League (JDL) issued a similar call in the United States. 9 It is therefore 
unsurprising that it was Kach activists which composed the group 'Terror Neged Terror' 
(Terror Against Terror, TNT), an organisation that operated in the early 1980s and 
personified the reactive form. 10 
Although violence perpetrated by Kach or Kach members on specific long term 
religious anniversaries was rare, the case of Baruch Goldstein in this context is highly 
significant. Goldstein opened fire on Muslim worshippers gathered for Friday prayers on 
February 25 1994, at the Ibrahim mosque in Hebron during Ramadan. The attack was also 
timed to coincide with the middle of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and during the 
Jewish festival of Purim which celebrates the fifth century deliverance of the Jewish 
people by Mordechai and Esther from their Persian enemy Haman. 
lt Alone and without 
orders, Goldstein perpetrated the most damaging act of any Kach activist, the net results of 
which were the outlawing of the group and a major Palestinian terror backlash. Despite 
this, Goldstein remains a hero (indeed, to many a saint) to the Israeli extreme right, and the 
date of the massacre has become an important part of their calendar. Although rare within 
Kach, mystical associations of specific short term anniversaries have taken on new 
meaning since the death of Kahane himself. In November 1990, a gunman killed two 
Palestinians after receiving news that the rabbi had been killed, and in November 1992, 
four teenage members of Kahane Chai killed one Palestinian and wounded seven others in 
a grenade attack in Jerusalem. '2 Perhaps of greater note after Yitzhak Rabin's assassination 
Herbert Sunshein, Kach's then fund raising officer, commented that: 
"Rabin's death proves that God is in the world. You know how it proves that He is in 
the world? Today, is 5 November? On 4 November, when Rabin was shot, at the 
9 In the words of a JDL document: "... what is needed is a secret, underground strike-force which will eliminate 
those very individuals that threaten our very existence. The time is long overdue for the birth of such a group". 
See ADL, Report on Kahane Movement and its Off shoots, Nov. 21,1995, p. 47. 
'('TNT's motivation was remarkably similar to the vigilante beginnings of the Jewish Underground. 
" B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 1998, pp. 103-104. Hoffman further suggests that Goldstein saw himself in 
the mould of a'modern day saviour' within the context of the Purim myth. A Kahane Chai statement after the 
event called the massacre a'Purim deed' and mourned the death of the'martyr Barukh [sic] Goldstein who 
consecrated the name of God by his death as Samson did at the time', See IDF Radio, 1105 gmt, 25 Feb. 94 - 
BBC/SWB, ME/1932, MED/2, February 26,1994. 
'2 R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical Appraisal', Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. IX, # 4,1997, fn. 5, p. 103. 
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same time, at 10.00pm (2000 GMT), on the Western calendar Me'ir [sic] Kahane was 
assassinated. God's hand is in the world. 03 
Considering the concept of catastrophic messianism, the mainstream nature of 
Kach made participation in acts of active messianism problematic, and, considering the 
political nature of the organisation, to a certain extent contradictory. Nonetheless there are 
significant examples. In 1980, Kahane spent nine months in administrative detention in 
Ramla prison for participating in a plot to destroy the Dome of the Rock - nor was he the 
only Kach member to consider forcing the culmination of the messianic timetable. In 
1982, Yoel Lerner, a senior figure within the Kach movement, planned to bomb the Dome 
of the Rock but was arrested by Israeli security services. During his incarceration, Kahane 
wrote an essay entitled Forty Years14 which outlines a redemptive timetable becoming the 
ideological basis for his concept of catastrophic messianism. According to Kahane's 
reasoning, after the nation of Israel had been established in 1948, the nation would have 
forty years in which to repent and precipitate the redemption. The 1967 war could be 
regarded as proof that God was prepared to assist in the project, while the various set backs 
of the 1970s showed that the Jewish people were prepared to sabotage their own destiny. 
The importance of the task was reinforced by suggesting extreme penalties for failure in 
fulfilling it: 
"My people; my dear and foolish people! We speak of your life and those of your 
seed... Choose wisely! The magnificence is there for the asking. The horror will be 
yours for the blindness. Choose life, but quickly; there is little time. The forty years 
tick away. " 15 
From 1980, Kahane's works referred increasingly to the coming 'catastrophe'. How 
seriously the organisation (and Kahane himself for that matter) took these warnings is 
unclear, but the passing of this date does not seem to have caused major ideological 
problems for the group. Perhaps of greater concern is the messianic element in the timing 
of the Hebron massacre. The death of Kahane in 1990 represented a major point of crisis 
to Kach members and this sense of crisis was compounded by the 1993 Oslo accords. For 
Baruch Goldstein, the affect of these crises was to demand of him a dramatic, redemptive 
13 FBIS-TOT-96-001-L, November 9,1995. 
14 M. Kahane, Forty Years, 1983. 
's ibid., p. 7. 
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act. The Hebron massacre has been described as "an expression of messianism in crisis,, 16 
and while Goldstein's action were atypical in an organisational sense, from the point of 
view of a messianic individual imbued with Kahane's teachings they made perfect sense, 
fulfilling the need to 'kick start' a promised messianic process. 
5.1.2 Aryan Nations 
The most important element of timing for Aryan Nations is that of a perception of 
time itself. The group itself has not been directly responsible for violent acts which exploit 
the symbolic dimension of either short or long term anniversaries, and while Aryan 
Nations does contain a strong millenarian dimension, this is not date specific and has 
occasioned no acts of violence designed to hasten this process. Despite this an examination 
of the relationship between timing and action within the wider American extreme right 
milieu - of which Aryan Nations is an important mainstream representative - is 
appropriate. This is largely because of the heterodox nature of (especially) Christian 
Identity belief and also the decentralised nature of organisations such as Aryan Nations and 
the belief systems which they espouse. 
The use of anniversaries by the Christian Identity movement concerns those of a 
long term nature rather than long standing religious festivals. 17 This is basically because of 
the eclectic nature of the movement, and in the case of Aryan Nations and other elements 
which extol neo-nazism, the importance of the Third Reich alongside the selective 
interpretation of Christianity. The importance of heterodoxy is well illustrated by the 
example of the Oklahoma bombing which occurred on the anniversary of the destruction 
of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco Texas. The bombing was also on the 220th 
anniversary of the American Revolutionary War battle of Lexington, harkening back to the 
original struggle against tyranny and the perceived purity of the immediate revolutionary 
16 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 241. 
" It should be noted however that Kerry Noble an 'elder and ordained minister' of the Covenant, Sword and 
Arm of the Lord has warned the Federal Government that they should not provoke organisations associated 
with the Identity movement during three times of the year: Mid-April with the association with Easter and the 
resurrection; mid-August, historically a time of persecution for Jews and thus of the'real Jews!; and 
September and October during the feast of Tabernacles, regarded as a time of miracles. See K. Noble, 
Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City, 1998, p. 225. 
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period18. There are similar anniversaries to Waco, all of which centre around the death of 
people 'resisting' ZOG, such as Gordon Kahl in 1983, Robert Mathews in 1984 and the 
Weaver family in 1992. These become the martyrs for the cause and provide conspicuous, 
if largely untested anniversaries for violence. While the adoption of neo-Nazi ideology 
provides less scope for anniversaries, there are a couple in the form of the dates for the 
birth19 and death of Adolf Hitler. 2° 
One of the defining features of Identity theology is that the Last Days are imminent 
and the Aryan Nations certainly subscribes to this view. The Endtime, however, is not date 
specific, instead it is thematic, relating more to the decay of society, and the increasing 
power of the perceived enemies, especially the Jews and by extension the US federal 
government. The Endtime itself is seen in racial terms with the Aryan elect pitted against 
their various non-Aryan enemies and their misguided Aryan accomplices. Preparations for 
this process are largely defensive involving a withdrawal from society and preparation for 
armed conflict. Like most groups, Aryan Nations realises that any action taken by the 
group would be a form of organisational suicide and inaction is justified by arguments 
about the strength of the enemy and that the Last Days, while imminent, are not yet 
arrived. Action in these cases falls to groups or individuals such as the Order and Timothy 
McVeigh, who are dissatisfied with what they perceive as passivity and a betrayal of their 
ideals, regarding the time as ripe for action. 
Due to the ideologically fragmentary nature of the Christian Identity movement it is 
worth noting that the U. S. extreme right-wing contains other millenarian traditions. Within 
Odinism, for example, there exists an historical myth cycle centred on Ragnarok, an event 
in which the old world is destroyed and the new created21. The marked similarity between 
18 The bombing also occurred on the day of the scheduled execution of Richard Snell, a member of the 
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord who had been tried and convicted of the murder of an Arkansas state 
trooper in 1984 and the execution style murder of pawn broker who he mistakenly identified as Jewish in 
1983. The death sentence was given for the second of these crimes in 1985. 
19 The Turner Diaries describes the 'dream of a White world' coming true in 1999,110 years (according to the 
'chronology of the old era) after the birth of the 'Great One'. 
20 Hitler has also been identified as the prophet Elijah, the return of whom plays a part in Judeo-Christian 
eschatology. See J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, 1990, Appendix I, 'Adolf 
Hitler Was Elijah', pp. 234-235. 
21 See RB. Anderson, Norse Mythology. A different version of Ragnarok contains elements of the rebirth of 
the dead God, Baldur, an event which has a strong correlation with Christian eschatology. See R. B. Anderson, 
The Religion of our Forefathers, containing all of the myths of the Eddas, Systematised and Interpreted, pp. 
413-38. 
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Ragnarok and Judeo-Christian apocalyptic visions means that it is compatible with 
traditional Christian apocalyptic beliefs held by the extreme Christian right. An example of 
an individual subscribing to this is David Lane, at various times Colorado state organiser 
of Aryan Nations (1981) and later as Aryan Nations 'propaganda minister'. Lane later 
joined the Order, and although he would later claim that his Odinism and the Christian 
Identity beliefs of most other Order members were 'incompatible' 22, this did not prevent 
him from being an important member of the group, nor from being an influential figure in 
Identity circles despite being incarcerated. Again, concepts like Ragnorok are not time 
specific and rely on the interpretation of current events in view of religious tradition. 23 The 
acceptance of such belief systems at once requires a broader understanding of Identity 
eschatology and further illustrates the unorthodox nature of Identity belief systems. 
5.1.3 Hizballah 
The timing of the violence of Hizballah differs from the more pacifist Aryan 
Nations in that the group advocates and actively pursues a programme of armed struggle 
parallel to participation in mainstream Lebanese politics. Symbolic actions carried out on 
religious anniversaries help reinforce the group's message both to its own constituents and 
to outsiders as does the conduct of reactive violence. Coexisting with these timing 
attributes is the general strategy of resisting the Zionist presence in the region and 
supporting Islamic resistance movements within Palestine, and so the tactical and political 
dimensions of timing are essential for promoting the multi-tracked political agenda of the 
organisation. While the group is Shiite and so subscribes to Shiite eschatology, Hizballah's 
gradualist perception of time means that messianic timing is not a motivating factor in the 
immediate sense. 
The use of symbolic anniversaries has been an important feature of Hizballah's 
existence serving to reinforce both internal and external loyalties. When the group 
officially announced its existence in September 1984, the date chosen was the second 
22 D. Lane, 'Divided Loyalties', NSV Report, Vol. VIII, # 3, (July/ September. 1990), pp. 1-2. See also D. 
Land, '88 Precepts', WAR 11/1, (n. d. ), pp. 22-23. 
23 Despite this non-specificity the FBI has claimed in a 1999 report that "Extremists from various ideological 
perspectives [including Identity adherents and Odinists] attach significance to the arrival of the year 2000, and 
there are some signs of preparations for violence". Project Megiddo, http: //www. fbi. gov/library/megiddo/ 
publicmegiddo. pdf. 
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anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, a public recognition of Hizballah's 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause24. Other contemporary anniversaries such as Martyr's 
Day and Jerusalem (al-Quds) Day have been constructed by the group to serve as a locus 
of attention for broader concepts. Martyr's day marks the 1982 suicide bombing of the 
Israeli army's Tyre headquarters25, while Jerusalem day - fixed by Khomeini on the last 
Friday of Ramadan - is a protest at Israel's unification of the Holy City. Both are marked by 
public rallies and speeches urging Muslims to prepare themselves for the confrontation 
with Israel. The most significant religious anniversary is that of the Ashura festival which 
commemorates the seventh-century martyrdom of the Imam Husayn. 26 Ashura 
commemorates the major features which define Shi'ism, those of struggling against tyranny 
and oppression, ideas which translated especially well in the context of the Lebanese 
Shi'ite community. The Ashura festival has been appropriated by Hizballah as an 
expression of sectarian and group loyalty, and as a vehicle for stressing the traditional 
religious antipathy for the current primary enemies of Islam, the United States and Israel. 27 
The political and tactical timing of Hizballah militance has been oriented around 
the strategic objectives of removing foreign influence from Lebanon, establishing an 
Islamic state in Lebanon, resisting Israel (commonly expressed through the objective of 
liberating Jerusalem), and participation in realising a wider Islamic community outside 
Lebanon. To this end, the first Hizballah operations, the suicide bombings against 
American, French and Israeli targets were directed at removing the presence of the Multi 
National Force (MNF), and at ending Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. These 
attacks forced the U. S. and France to withdraw from Lebanon, and Israel to withdraw to a 
small, self-declared 'security zone' in the south. Similarly the taking of Western hostages in 
the 1980s was conducted to bring pressure to bear on Western governments serving 
Hizballah and Iranian interest. When hostage taking no longer served these interests their 
release was both part of Iranian attempts to rehabilitate its international reputation and 
24 M. Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, 1997, p. 50. 
25 Hizballah's martyr's day is not to be confused with Lebanon's martyr's day which falls on May 6. 
26 On the traditional significance of the martyrdom of Husayn see M. Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam: 
A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism, 1978. 
27 During the October 1983 Ashura celebrations in the town of Nabatiyeh an Israeli convoy disrupted the 
procession causing severe offence and in the ensuing riot two Shi'ites were killed marking what one observer 
has called the'final provocation' of the Israeli presence in Lebanon. See H. Jaber, Hizballah: Born With a 
Vengeance, 1997, p. 18. 
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made conditional by Hizballah to maximise political and military leverage within 
Lebanon. 28 With the stabilisation of Lebanese politics during the 1980s culminating in the 
1989 Ta'if Accord, Hizballah activity re-focused on Israel, primarily in the area of the 
'security zone', and simultaneously replacing the then discredited expectation of Iranian 
victory in the Gulf War with support for Islamic movements in Palestine. The constant 
guerrilla operations against Israeli forces in the security zone (while also serving Syrian 
and Iranian interests) were not only tangible evidence of Hizballah's claim to liberate 
Lebanon from the Israeli occupier, but in the face of Israeli retaliation (usually in the form 
of air strikes) to serve the political objective of Hizballah being the protector and provider 
of the Shi'a population of Lebanon. 
Reactive attacks for Hizballah are important not only as a means of displaying the 
group's vitality after any setback, but also reinforce the message that jihad is fundamentally 
defensive in nature. Within the context of the guerrilla campaign conducted in the security 
zone, Israeli operations - especially those that harm Lebanese civilians - are responded to 
vigorously, not only by strikes against Israeli military personnel but also by rocket attacks 
against Israeli civilian centres in the Northern Galilee. Hassan Nasrallah has justified these 
last actions by stating: 
"[a]fter the enemy targets villages and civilians, the Islamic Resistance fires rockets 
at settlements in occupied northern Palestine according to the Koran [sic] verse: If 
then anyone transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress ye likewise against 
him. "29 
The scale of revenge attacks by Hizballah, as with most other organisations, is proportional 
to the damage caused. As such, the assassination of the group's Secretary-General, Abbas 
Musawi, in 1992 not only resulted in escalated attacks in the security zone and artillery 
attacks on Israeli communities, but also in the alleged bombing of the Israeli embassy in 
Buenos Aires the following month. 30 In 1994, heavy Israeli strikes against a Hizballah 
28 M. Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, p. 191. 
29 Voice of the Oppressed, 1315 gmt, 30 Jul. 93 - BBC/SWB, ME/1756, A/5, April 2,1993. 30 E Inbar & E. Rekhess, 'Israel', in A. Ayalon (ed. ), Middle East Contemporary Survey, 16 (1992), 1994, pp. 
517-518. The Operation was called 'Child Martyr Husayn' after the son of Hasan Musawi who died with his 
father. 
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training camp at Ayn Dardara resulted in an attack on the Jewish community centre in 
Buenos Aires. 
Like other mainstream groups, Hizballah believes in the ultimate success and 
justice of the organisation's goals but at the same time remains pragmatically flexible as to 
when these goals might be fulfilled. In this respect one of the keys to the group's survival 
has been its gradualist approach and its strategic flexibility in the face of new constraints 
and opportunities. Hizballah's perception of time is thus a relatively open one determined 
by historical inevitability, on one hand, and by political circumstances on the other. 
Hizballah has always realised that the achievement of its goals will be a protracted process 
and that many travails will have to be endured before they are realised. In the words of the 
former Secretary-General, Sheikh al-Tufayli, "we know that we will not triumph in one or 
even several years but have prepared for a battle of centuries. i31 As Sheikh Fadlallah has 
noted of the more esoteric objectives of the group such as the liberation of Palestine "in 
this connection we think of great periods of time. 02 The shift away from violence towards 
political participation has served to emphasise the gradualist approach, as Nasrallah has 
commented on the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon: 
"we must [not] be hasty and impose such a solution by force. We prefer to wait for 
the day that we succeed in convincing our countrymen by means of dialogue... that 
the only alternative is the founding of an Islamic state. 03 
5.1.4 Hamas 
Hamas's perception of time and the timing of its acts of violence is similar to that 
of Hizballah, albeit within a different context which accounts for certain subtle 
differences. Hamas has a gradual approach to their struggle which has been expressed 
consistently since the founding of the organisation. Developments within the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process, however, have meant that a trend has begun to specify when the 
goals of the organisation will be achieved, significantly within the life time of the post- 
Intifada generation of leaders. The timing of many of the group's acts of violence are 
tactical and political in nature, driven by precise political imperatives. On a parallel path to 
31 Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 GMT, 19 Feb. 1992, BBC/SWB, ME/1309,20 Feb., 1992. 
32 Der Spiegal, April 1,1985. 
33 E. Zisser, 'Hizballah in Lebanon: at the Crossroads', MERIA Journal, # 3, September 1997, p. 4. 
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these motivations exists reactive events which are designed to avenge violence against the 
organisation and the Palestinian community as a whole, and it is often these events which 
become anniversaries that occasion further acts of violence in the future. 
As with many religious groups that are not governed by imminent messianic 
expectations, Hamas has a gradual perception of the struggle in which it is engaged. The 
Hamas Charter states that: 
"[f]ighters... will come forward in response to the call of duty while loudly 
proclaiming: Hail to Jihad. Their cry will reach the heavens and will go on being 
resounded until liberation is achieved, the invaders vanquished and Allah's victory 
comes about. 04 
This sentiment has frequently been reiterated by leaders of Hamas - patience (sabr) and the 
inevitability of victory are repeatedly stressed. In terms of waiting for the decline of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) as a political force it has been noted that: 
"[t]hose who are in a hurry try to eliminate their rivals so they can monopolise the 
stage. Hamas is not in a hurry. We know that the PLO's practice will inevitably lead 
to its downfall. There is no need... [for] confrontation. It is enough to wait. 05 
The analogy used to illustrate this is the collapse of communism, destroyed not through 
direct military confrontation but by allowing it to collapse under the weight of its own 
contradictions. In a similar vein, the struggle against Israel is seen as flexible: "We will 
never recognise Israel, but it is possible that a truce could prevail between us for days, 
months, or years. 06 
Despite this, Hamas clerics have made attempts to predict the year when an Islamic 
state will be created using scriptural sources. According to one senior Hamas official, there 
is no text in the Koran which suggests when an Islamic state will be created but there are 
two clues, one lies in the Hadiths and the other in a verse from the Quran. The Hadith says 
that every century a man will appear who renews the 'life of the religion'. The second clue 
comes from a study made by the Islamic scholar Bassam Jarrar, who based his ideas on the 
Sura Isra (the night journey) and the 'miracle' of the number nineteen. Jarrar's book says the 
34 Hamas Charter, Ch. 4, Art. 33, pp. 31-32. 
33 H. Hijazi, 'Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct. An Interview With Mahmud Zahhar', 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIV, # 3,1995,83. 
36 Al Quds, October 12,1995. 
193 
abolition of the state of Israel is a Quranic necessity and that it will be abolished in 2022 or 
2023. This will mark the beginning of the Islamic state. 
37 The underlying dynamic for 
specific date setting is an attempt to add momentum to the struggle by setting a precise 
goal to work towards in the not to distant future. While the passing of this date without the 
expected establishment of an Islamic state can be rationalised, date setting within a 
religious context provides a powerful incentive for escalating violence, especially in the 
context of life after Arafat and imminent Islamic revolution in adjacent lands. 
The timing of Hamas's programme of violent action is generally determined by the 
unacceptability of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and to a lesser extent, the conduct 
of the Israel-Palestinian peace process which potentially offers a permanent political 
solution to this injustice. Violence can be seen as a means of expressing extreme 
displeasure at the course of political events, especially the expansion of Israeli settlements. 
While these imperatives guide the political and tactical timing of violence it is still subject 
to various imponderables. In November 1993, for example, Sheikh Yassin issued an open 
letter from prison which raised the possibility of a temporary cease-fire with Israel of ten 
or even twenty years. He also suggested the idea of challenging the existing political status 
quo from within by participating in the political process. Any chance of such an approach 
being adopted was seriously threatened, however, by the Hebron massacre38. On the other 
extreme, the assassination of important operational figures, such as Yahya Ayyash, while 
providing incentives for revenge, curtails the ability to engage in violence as does (on a 
less dramatic level) a general tightening of the security environment. 
Some of the most extreme actions of Hamas have been reactive in nature, 
providing a series of short term anniversaries to be observed and escalating the violence 
employed in the struggle. The Hebron massacre of 1994 is perhaps the most serious trigger 
for revenge attacks by Hamas in the group's history. The attack was made during the 
Muslim Id celebrations and the symbolism of the date was expressed in the al-Qassam 
units forts official communique: "[y]ou turned the Id al-Fitr holiday into a black day so we 
37 Interview conducted by Dr. M. Ranstorp with a senior Hamas leader, Hebron, May 1999. See also'The 
Destruction of Israel by the Year 2022', Bassam Jarrar's website, 
http: //www. bailasan. conirinterview/bassam. htm. 
38 Even so, after the first revenge attacks had been conducted Musa Abu Marzuq echoed Yassin's moderate 
stance, although the precondictions for peace were the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and 
the dismantling of all settlements. 
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[have] vowed to turn your independence day onto hell. "39 While it is clear that Harnas (and 
the PIJ) were engaged in operational planning for terrorist attacks across Israel before the 
Hebron massacre, the massacre itself brought all this planning forward. Not only this but 
the nature of Goldstein's attack, against unarmed civilians in a place of worship, ensured 
that Hamas would observe fewer constraints in future attacks. In a pamphlet entitled "The 
settlers will pay for the massacre with the blood of their hearts" Harnas vowed to take 
revenge by taking "a life for a life. 'W) Five suicide bombings followed in the next eight 
months, killing thirty-five Israelis and wounding more than a hundred and thirty-five. The 
Tomb of the Patriarchs attack also provided a potent anniversary for Hamas. On February 
25,1996, Hamas claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Jerusalem, two years to 
the day after the Tomb of the Patriarchs attack and fifty days after the assassination of 
Yahya Ayyash. 4' The killing of Ayyash by Israeli intelligence provided another powerful 
motive for revenge and became the catalyst for a series of Hamas attacks. In a leaflet 
issued following the Jerusalem bombing (and a simultaneous bombing in Ashqelon), the 
bombers claimed that "[t]he attacks were carried out in loyalty to the Engineer who fell 
fifty days ago... we consider it a strike at those who stood behind the decision to 
exterminate the Engineer. "42 Another attack in Jerusalem on March 3 was also claimed by 
the same group "in loyalty to the blood of the martyr Engineer Yahya Ayyash", and in the 
same communique announced "[w]ith this operation our response to the killing of the 
Engineer ends", and unilaterally declared a three month cease-fire. 43 
The general programme of Hamas violence itself can be seen in a reactive context 
to the extent that Hamas perceives its struggle as a defensive one. In response to a question 
concerning how the decision to employ suicide bombings was made, a senior Hamas figure 
has stated that "[t]he goals and objectives are to stop the occupation and it began by using 
simple methods, but the spark came from the Israeli side. The more violent the Israeli side 
39 AI-Qassam communique distributed in the Occupied Territories, April 7th, 1994. 
40 ibid. 
41 Voice of Israel, 0730 gmt, 25 Feb. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2545, MED/1, February 26,1996. 42 Jerusalem Media and Communications Press Service, 1310 gmt. 25 Feb. 96 - BBC/ SWB, ME/2546, 
MED/i, February 27,1996. Other experts claim the attacks were also in response to reports of a deal with the 
PA, revenge for the assassination of Fathi Shiqaqi and were "also a response to all Israel's actions against our 
people's struggles inside and outside of our homeland", see MBC 77,1800 gmt, 26 Feb. 96 - BBC/ SWB, 
ME/2547, MED/1, February 28,1996. 
43 Jerusalem Media and Communications Press Service, 100 gmt, 3 Mar. 96 - BBCISWB, ME/255 1, MED/1, 
March 4,1996. 
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was, the more stronger Hamas reacted. "''`} The response to the killing of senior members of 
Hamas or Palestinian civilians in particular have been presented by the group as legitimate 
acts of self defence which, in turn, clears the group of any responsibility for Israeli 
reprisals for its actions. 45 This fits with the general perception of jihad as primarily 
defensive in nature, a struggle against injustice and oppression, which is a defining feature 
of many Islamic groups. 46 
5.2 Core 
5.2.1 Eyal 
Although responsible for few overt violent acts the dimension of time is important 
for both Eyal's short history, and for the most significant act perpetrated by one of its 
members, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. While the majority of Eyal's activities, such 
as demonstrations against a left-wing Israeli government and harassment of Arabs can be 
seen as tactical and political in nature, the Rabin assassination and the incitement which 
underpins it conforms to the concept of messianic time, the fulfilment of which is seen as 
being frustrated whenever the integrity of the 'Land of Israel' is threatened. Again, the short 
life span of the group and its penetration by the General Security Services (GSS) were 
factors in determining when Eyal conducted its activities, but this second consideration 
was minimised by Avashai Raviv's unpredictable and independent nature. 
The political nature of many of Eyal's actions was revealed by the extent of media 
attention which the group not only received but actively courted. Had the group existed 
longer perhaps significant anniversaries such as the date of the Hebron massacre may have 
become part of the groups ceremonial reinforcement activities, but as it was the 
organisation did not last long enough or develop the structural depth required to elaborate 
its mythology. '" Not unlike Kach, Eyal, and especially its leader Avashai Raviv, engaged 
44 Interview with senior Harnas leader in Hebron conducted by Dr. M. Ranstorp, May, 1999. 
as S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, 2000, p. 66. 
46 In the words of Sheikh Fadlallah: "when Islam fights a war it fights like any other power in the world, 
defending itself in order to preserve its existence and its liberty, forced to undertake preventative operations 
when it is in danger", Washington Post, June 4,1986. 
47 A possible exception to this has arisen since Amir's incarceration. On his 27th birthday a group of extremists 
led by Avigdor Eskin were involved in minor scuffles with the police as they gathered outside Bersheeba 
prison to celebrate, The Jerusalem Post, May 23,1997. 
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in provocative anti-Arab and anti-left-wing rhetoric, participating in, and contributing to 
the general climate of incitement to violence which many commentators believe 
responsible for the assassination of Rabin and the political backlash against the Israeli 
political left. One such action were the induction ceremonies for new Eyal recruits which 
Raviv held at the grave of Abraham Stern, leader of the 1940s right-wing group which bore 
his name. These events (and one in particular attended by a documentary crew) and others 
such as the presentation of the Rabin/Himmler collage by Raviv to a television crew at a 
demonstration in October 1995, were all designed to further aggravate a volatile political 
environment. 
With respect to the Rabin assassination, the perception of time was that it was 
running out. Rabin was identified as the chief architect of a peace process which, in the 
eyes of Israeli extremists, was grinding relentlessly on and would soon pass the point of no 
return, destroying all the gains made since 1948 and leaving what remained of Israel 
vulnerable as never before. As Amir himself said "[i]t wasn't a matter of revenge, or 
punishment or anger, Heaven forbid, but what would stop [the Oslo process]. "48 This is a 
similar line of thought to that followed by the Jewish Underground following the last 
major peace process engaged in by the Israeli government. In that earlier case, the solution 
was deemed to be an act of desecration aimed at the Palestinian Muslim community (and 
by extension Islam as a whole). The case of the Jewish Underground will be discussed at 
greater depth below but the perception of time running out for the successful conclusion of 
a messianic process is a common theme, the major difference in these two cases was the 
nature of the target chosen to reverse the process. 
5.2.2 The Order 
The timing of the Order's actives are best categorised as tactical in that they 
established an activist programme for the group and enhanced their operational 
capabilities, and apocalyptic in the sense that they wished to trigger a racist and religious 
revolution similar to that envisaged in the Turner Diaries. Actions arranged around 
anniversaries do not seem to have had much appeal to the group, and in any event there are 
practically none at this stage in history with sufficient resonance for Identity believers to 
48 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God. " The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin, 1998, p. 27. 
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warrant action. 49 The general perception of the Order was that they were laying the 
groundwork for resistance' in a cataclysmic struggle which lay in the not too distant future. 
The tactical timing of the Order's actions manifested itself in an ad hoc fashion as 
the group experimented with various forms of activities. Fairly early it was decided that the 
primary objective was to raise funds for a war chest through bank robberies and 
counterfeiting operations. The longer term plan then called for an escalation in group 
activities which would ultimately include attacks on the federal government. The two 
killings in which the group were involved were also timed to fulfil certain functions, albeit 
different ones. The first, the murder of Walter West, an Aryan Nations member, was 
carried out because the talkative West was regarded as security risk and the sooner he was 
eliminated the better. The second, the assassination of the Denver talk show host Alan 
Berg, was planned and carried out to prove that the "right-wing was not toothless", despite 
the objections of some Order members50. The gradualist timing of these operations was to 
give the organisation time to mature and not to carry out any action which might bring too 
much 'heat' down upon it. 
The Order's perception of time was that white Christian society had degenerated to 
such an extent that there was no viable course of action other than armed struggle. In 
keeping with the group's perception of itself as a form of revolutionary vanguard, the Order 
did not expect, nor court, widespread public sympathy. As Mathews said: "I am proud that 
we had the courage and the determination to stand up and fight for our race and our 
heritage at a time in our history when such a deed is called a crime and not an act of 
valour. i51 The apocalyptic perception of time was not only caused by the degeneration of 
American society but also by external events such as the establishment and prosperity of 
the state of Israel and the seemingly ever present threat of nuclear war. The idea that the 
final struggle is at hand is strikingly similar to that contained in The Turner Diaries. The 
book envisages the year 1999 (110 years after the birth of the 'Great One') as the point 
where the forces of white Christianity eventually `triumph' and the apocalyptic vision of a 
49 Although Gordon Kahl had been killed as recently as February 1984 the Order does not seem to have 
sufficient empathy with him to act in revenge. While Kahl remains prominent in Identity and right-wing 
martyrology there are no examples of revenge actions on the anniversary of his death. 
50 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, 1990, pp. 233-234. 51 Robert Mathew's Last Letter, J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness, Appendix I, 1990, p. 250. 
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world cleansed by flame and poison becomes a reality. 
52 While the short life span of the 
Order and its apparently limited impact seem at odds with grandiose plans for establishing 
a racial religious state, the group was infused with a belief in the inevitability and 
imminence of Armageddon and this expectation played an important part in the decision to 
turn to violence. 53 
5.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
The timing employed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad since its inception has been a 
mixture of tactical, political and reactive. The combination of these has been designed to 
weaken the state of Israel and to prove to the Palestinian populace that the organisation is 
not merely capable of resisting the occupation but also of protecting and avenging. In this 
respect, its actions are very similar to those of lamas, indeed certain operations have 
involved a degree of co-operation. While there is no messianic dimension to the timing of 
attacks by the PIJ, as with most groups the entire strategy is geared towards the realisation 
of a temporal golden age, a realisation which is helped by the group's perception of time. 
Like many religious organisations, the PU's perception of time is an open ended 
one. While concrete objectives are sought and tactical alterations might be called for due 
to changes in political circumstances, the primary objective remains the same. Thus the 
group sees its role as destroying and replacing Israel, a state built "on the ruins of a people 
who will chase them back with resistance and jihad until the end of time. i54 In a similar 
vein, the struggle is often seen in an historical light when victory, while assured, was slow 
in coming: "[t]he struggle, the fight between civilisations, and peoples, and nations doesn't 
finish in days and years you know, when the crusades were here it was two hundred 
years. .. we are not pressured to finish the struggle. , 
55 Such a belief serves both to reinforce 
the link between the present and noble, symbolic events of the past, and to avoid the 
52 
53 
MacDonald, A., The Turner Diaries, 1978, p. 210. A more extreme example of this logic may be found in the belief of members of the Covenant, Sword and Ann of the Lord, one of whose members stated: "I'm tired of waiting. If God doesn't start the riots soon and the collapse of our government, then I will". Quoted in K. Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, p. 85. 54, The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', sournal 
oS of Palestine Studies, XWIII, # 4, p. 70. Interview 
with Sheikh Abdullah Shami, the PIJ, Gaza, 25 March, 1999. 
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disappointment of failing to fulfil their objectives within a given time frame by placing the 
struggle in a cosmic context. 
The most significant and damaging political and tactical timing's of the PIJ have 
been those aimed at disrupting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The first major 
operation of the group (and the only one of significance carried out beyond the borders of 
Israel) which involved a shooting attack on an Israeli tour bus travelling from Rafah to 
Cairo, was carried out in response to embryonic developments in the peace process and 
especially attempts at "establishing a state for the Arabs through talks with the enemies of 
God. "56 In numerous addresses and publications, the PIJ leadership have condemned the 
various stages of the peace process and threatened further actions to try to disrupt it. At an 
address in the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk, south of Damascus in October 1997, 
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah stated that the PIJ would continue its suicide attacks on Israeli 
objectives "without respite" in order to liberate "the whole of Palestine, the Golan and 
south Lebanon", and that these areas would be liberated "by resistance and not by 
conferences. 07 The timing of attacks has also been governed by specific elements of the 
peace process. In November 1998, a car bombing near a market in Jerusalem was carried 
out according to Shallah "in retaliation for the Zionist enemy's crimes of continued 
settlement construction and Judaization going on in our occupied land. 08 In this regard, 
the group's objectives and those of its patron Iran coincide. In late July 1997, for example, 
it was reported that Iran would offer additional payments to the PIJ, above its existing 
budget, for each attack the group launched. 59 
Although religious festivals have not been used by the PIJ as occasions for 
violence, they are useful times to reinforce the religious message of the group and to 
relocate past myths firmly in the present context. For example, during the period of 
founding and deployment of the organisation in the occupied territories, public prayers and 
festivals were held in the Al-Aqsa mosque during the Night of Destiny (Laylat al-Qadr). 
56 Al-Duds Radio, 1121 gmt, 5 Feb. 90 - BBC/ SWB, ME/0682, A/1, February7,1990. 57 AFP, Damascus, October 24,1997. 
"Radio Monte Carlo, 1031 gmt, 7 Nov. 98 - BBC/SWB, ME/3379, MED/1, November 9,1998. 59 Ha'aretz, July 31,1997. 
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The object of these activities was 'to familiarise people with the idea of j ihad, rooting it in 
people's souls'. 60 
Like Hamas and Hizballah the PIJ has engaged in reactive operations either in 
response to an anti-Palestinian atrocity or the killing of a PIJ member. While this is a 
powerful motivating factor the rhetoric associated with it far exceeds the operational 
response. In November 1994, a journalist and the PIJ activist Hani Abed was killed 
(probably by Israeli security services) in a car bombing in Gaza. In response the PIJ 
employed a suicide bomber on a bicycle at an Israeli Defence Force (IDF) checkpoint in 
Gaza killing two soldiers. At a rally in southern Beirut a few days later, attended by 
members of the PIJ, Hamas and Hizballah, Fathi Shiqaqi praised both Abed and the suicide 
bomber and promised further suicide attacks in response to the elimination of Abed. 61 
Timing of an attack may also be due to a multiplicity of events. In January 1995, the PIJ 
detonated two suicide bombs at a bus stop where soldiers were waiting for rides killing 
nineteen people and injuring over sixty. The reasons included not just revenge for the 
killing of Hani Abed (and all the PIJ and Hamas martyrs), but also for the deaths of three 
Palestinian policemen at the Erez junction in Gaza, for Israeli policies of 'ethnic cleansing' 
and for the expansion of the settlements. 62 The motivation for revenge however is certainly 
constrained by the capabilities of the group and by the security environment in which it is 
operating. Following the assassination of Fathi Shiqaqi in Malta his successor announced 
that the movement would take revenge "for the blood of Shigaqi. i63 However, no revenge 
operation took place primarily because of the operational leadership vacuum caused by 
Shiqaqi's death and by increased Israeli and Palestinian security measures. This does not 
mean that the date of the assassination will not continue to retain significance but it does 
reflect the decline in operational leadership caused by Shiqaqi's death. 
60 The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', , p. 62. 
61 Maariv, November 13,1994. 
62 Al-Quds Radio, 1002 gmt, 22 Jan. 95 - BBCISWB, ME/2208, MED/1, January 23,1995 & Al-Quds Radio, 
1415 gmt, 22 Jan. 95 - BBCISWB, ME/2209, MED/1, January 24,1995. 631RNA, 1040 gmt, 30 Oct. 95 - BBCISWB, ME/2448, MED/14, October 31,1995. 
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5.3 Messianic /Apocalyptic 
5.3.1 Jewish Underground 
While the Jewish Underground was initially established around the idea of 
reanimating the Jewish messianic process by clearing the Temple Mount, the group settled 
into a pattern of 'vigilante' reactive operations. This does not mean the Underground lost 
sight of its messianic roots but rather could not cope with the more immediate concerns of 
Palestinian violence which the Israeli state appeared unable, or unwilling, to combat. As 
noted earlier, the issue of rabbinic sanction was not a problem for such operations as it was 
for the Temple Mount plot, and even while the broad issue of messianic redemption 
remained paramount, the necessity to act at any level was found to be overwhelming 
because of a sense of imminent threat. 
While the drawn out process of planning the attack on the Dome of the Rock was 
continuing, the group decided to act in a more conventional form in response to growing 
anti-Jewish violence in Hebron and, in particular, the May 3 1980 machine-gun and 
grenade attack by Arab gunmen on Hadassah House in Hebron which left six Yeshiva 
students dead. The revenge plan was to blow up five leaders in the Palestinian National 
Guidance committee. 64 The victims were deliberately not to be killed, however, they were 
to be maimed in order remain a living lesson 'to the others'. The following actions of the 
group were likewise reactive in nature. In July 1983, in response to the murder of a 
Yeshiva student, three Underground members conducted a grenade and machine-gun 
attack on the Islamic college of Hebron, killing three and wounding thirty-three. 65 The 
final operation of the group, the planned simultaneous bombing of five Arab buses, was a 
general response to an increased Arab terrorism in Jerusalem and Ashkelon which 
included attacks on Jewish buses. 66 
By far the most significant action of the group and the one which caused most 
alarm amongst the Israeli security establishment was the proposed attack on the Dome of 
the Rock. The group was formed in reaction to the 1978 Camp David accords with - 
64 It was widely believed that the PNGC had masterminded the Haddasah House attack. The attack itself was 
claimed by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's Unit of the Martyr Abu Safwat. 
65 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', in Inside Terrorist Organisations, p. 201. 
66 ibid., p. 201. 
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according to Menachem Livni, the operational leader of the group - the express purpose of 
destroying the Dome of the Rock, "and had nothing to do with revenge against Arab 
terrorism. , 67 While the attack did not have an exact programme to follow as with some 
Christian and Islamic messianic dating traditions, it was certainly guided by events in 
immediate living memory which made redemption a thing of 'the here and now' if not of a 
specific point in time. 68 The perception that messianic prophecy was being fulfilled and 
then reversed inspired the group into active messianism. However, it was active 
messianism that was both moderated by elements of the religious establishment and - 
despite the charisma of Yehuda Etzion - was never led or heavily influenced by a prophetic 
charismatic figure who claimed divine instruction. 
While there may appear to be a contradiction between the messianic objective and 
the vigilante practice of the group, those operationally involved did not see it as so. 
Yehuda Etzion was the instigator and main force behind the proposed attack on the Dome 
of the Rock, which would have brought redemption to the Jewish people, and was also 
involved in revenge attacks against the Arab population. When explaining his role in the 
mayor's bombing, Etzion stated: "[p]laning and executing the attack on the murder 
chieftains took only one month of my life, one month that started with the assassination of 
six boys in Hebron, and ended up in conducting this operation. "69 Etzion's life by this stage 
was devoted to planning redemption and yet he found the time and the desire to set one 
month aside to engage in a highly symbolic revenge attack. This underlines the reality that 
the group did not have a specific timetable70, and even though the Temple Mount 
operation was of enormous messianic significance it had yet to be approved and was in any 
event a step towards redemption and not the single event which would trigger an imminent 
apocalypse. 
67 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 198. 
68 It should be noted, however, that a possible specific date exists in the annual 'day of sorrows' which 
commemorates the destruction of the First and Second Temples. According to Jewish tradition the First and 
Second Temples were destroyed on the ninth day of the Jewish month of Av. 
69 Yehuda Etzion, 'I Felt an Obligation to Purify the Temple Mount', Nekuda, # 88, June 24,1985, p. 24. 
70 As with Christianity Judaism contains prohibitions on predicting the time of the End: "May the curse of 
Heaven fall upon those who calculate the advent of the Messiah and thus create political and social unrest 
among the people", Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 97a. 
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5.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
The timing of attacks by Aum Shinrikyo fall almost exclusively into the categories 
of political or tactical timing, and of anticipating messianic redemption, and in some cases 
the two proved complimentary. Although the motivation of revenge was also present in the 
tactical timing, it is almost entirely anticipatory in nature - that is, actions were sanctioned 
and carried out before an anticipated event had resulted in harm being caused to the 
organisation. Of all these, the timing of violence to accord with eschatological 
expectations is of the greatest concern, according as they did to a variety of different end- 
time dating traditions, in conjunction with both the specific and variable prophesies made 
by Shoko Asahara. 
Despite the apocalyptic nature of Aum Shinrikyo, the group engaged in acts of 
violence that were governed by tactical or political timing in reaction to threats, both real 
and imagined. The first murders committed by the group were of a lawyer, Tsutsumi 
Sakamoto, and his family because he was about to commence a law suit against the group 
on behalf of the Association of Victims of Aum Shinrikyo. Similarly the attempted nerve 
gassing of six judges at the city of Matsumoto in 1994 was carried about because they were 
about to hand down an unfavourable ruling in a land dispute in which Aum was involved71. 
In both these cases, as with the execution of dissenting sect members, action was decreed 
because the cult was about to face imminent legal problems. Certainly the most startling 
example of this practice were the Tokyo subway nerve gassings in March 1995, carried out 
in an attempt to forestall raids planned by the Japanese National Police72. News of the 
raids conformed to the perception (and Asahara's predictions) that the group were about to 
be persecuted directly by the 'forces of evil'. 
The most worrying aspect of Aum's perception of time was its intense 
millenarianism. Aum Shinrikyo never produced a precise timetable for Armageddon, and 
variable predictions were constantly made right up until the subway attack. All the 
predictions, however, contain the element of imminence - in a series of lectures in 1992 
71 D. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, 1996, p. 28. 
72 D. Brackett, Holy Terror, Ch. 7. Brackett alleges that the first hint of the raids was picked by two Aum 
members of the Japanese Defence Force who discovered that the JNP had requested three hundred gas masks 
and protective suits from the Army. They asked some questions and were than able to inform the Aum 
leadership of the planned raids. 
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Shoko Asahara predicted that Armageddon would occur by the year 2000 and that atomic, 
chemical and biological weapons would destroy 90 percent of the world's population. 73 In 
the 1995 book produced by Aum, A Doom is Nearing the Land of the Rising Sun, 
predictions of a third world war or enormous natural disaster are concentrated in the late 
1990s. The predictions in this book are occasionally confused. At one point Asahara 
suggests the 'final war' is imminent and at another he suggests that it will not break out 
until the 2040s. More specifically he predicts the demise of Japan which will either be 
'gulped down by the sea' and/or destroyed in a nuclear attack launched by the U. S. or U. N. 
some time between 1996 and January 1998.74 To quote one extract from an Aum pamphlet 
"[a]s we move toward the year 2000, there will be a series of events of inexpressible 
ferocity and terror.. . the 
lands of Japan will be transformed into a nuclear wasteland. , 75 
Despite the discrepancies, the general theme was clear - the old world would be destroyed 
and the new one would take shape around the turn of the millennium. 
The significance of the Millennium in Christianity has a profound eschatological 
significance - Jesus for example will rule for a period of a thousand years after the 
cataclysmic battles of the End-time predicted in the book of Revelation. 76 There also 
seemed to be a widespread but irrational belief that the year 2000 represented what 
Michael Barkun calls a "critical dividing point between two eras, "77 a belief inspired by 
changes in society, technology and politics, and propagated by advances in 
communications. 78 The end of the millennium also has enormous psychological 
ramifications for many people who are not necessarily affiliated with any particular 
religion causing an excitement and anxiety which has been dubbed `Pre-Millennial 
Tension'. 79 There seems to be no logical reasoning behind this, it is an accepted historical 
fact that the nativity did not occur in the year zero AD, nor do millennia have any 
scriptural significance leading up to the End-time - the Christian concept of Jesus' 
73 Thompson, D., The End of Time, 1996, p. 262. This exceeds the initial tribulation of the book of 
Revelations when `a fourth of the earth' will be accounted for (rev. 6: 9). 
74 ibid., p. 264. 
73 International Herald Tribune, March 27,1995. 
76 Revelation 20: 4-6. 
" M. Barkun, `Understanding Millennialism', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VII, # 3,1995, p. 3. 78 Most contemporary historians such as Richard Landes dismiss theories of messianic expectations occurring 
at the end of the first millennium, despite the work of revisionist scholars to say otherwise. See R Landes, 
Giant With Feet of Clay: Arguments against an Apocalyptic Year 1000,1996. 79 Thompson, D., The End of Time, p. xi. 
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thousand year reign for example occurs after his return. The common acceptance of such 
ideas however, especially in secular society, made this perception of time an attractive and 
persuasive ideological tool. 
Awn further embroidered this millenarian idea with other dating traditions. Most 
prominent amongst these were the apocalyptic prophecies of Michel de Nostradamus, a 
sixteenth century French mystic whose cryptic verses purport to predict important events in 
history. First translated into Japanese in the 1970s, Nostradamus's works had become best 
sellers and their incorporation into Aum's perception of time resonated with many potential 
recruits. 80 Nostradamus's predictions (or interpretations of them) were used as a partial 
justification for the attack on the judges in Matsumoto for the late twentieth century was a 
time when the world's judicial authorities would be 'out of control' which led Asahara to 
claim that judges who did not know right from wrong would "suffer a chemical change 
unthinkable in normal circumstances. "81 Shoko Asahara also quoted the prophecies of St. 
Malachi as proof that the End-time was nigh. 82 These prophecies are a list of 112 Popes 
from 1143 until the end of time, each identified by a motto and in most cases a year. While 
attributed to Malachi, archbishop of Armagh from 1132 until 1148, the list was long ago 
exposed as the work of a sixteenth century Flemish Benedictine, Dom Arnold de Wyon. 83 
Yet the popularity of the prophecies has if anything increased as the list shows a good sign 
of running out before the end of the twentieth century or soon after, thus bringing it into 
accord with Endtime beliefs centred on the turn of the millennium. According to current 
interpretations there will be only two more popes after John Paul H. The Vatican needless 
to say shows no interest in the prophecies but they do buttress an important psychological 
link between an observable earthly institution, the papacy, and the end of time. 84 The 
combination of these traditions and 'proofs' formed for many Aum members an 
indisputable body of evidence predicting Armageddon. 
80 A. Marshall & D. Kaplan, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Arim, 1996, p. 16. 
g' ibid., p. 138. 
82 D. Thompson, The End of Time, p. 271. 
83 For a translation of the list see Nicholas O'Kearney, The Prophecies of Saints Colum-Cille, Maeltamlacht, 
Ultan, Senan, Bearcan andMalchy, 1932, pp. 116-137. Evidence that the prophecies are a later creation can 
be found in translations of contemporary accounts of the life of St. Malachi which make no mention of them. 
See for example Lawlor, H. J. (trans. ), St. Bernard of Clairvaux's Life of St. Malachi of Armagh, 1920. 
84 The Papacy has long played a role as a character in Christian eschatology. See F. J. Baumgartner, Longing 
for the End. " A History ofMillennialism in Western Civilisation, 1999, and D. S. Katz & R. H. Popkin, Radical 
Religious Politics to the End of the Second Millennium, 1999. 
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5.3.3 The Saudi Ikhwan 
The timing of the sole violent act of the Saudi Ikhwan was overwhelmingly 
messianic in nature, according to accepted traditions of Islamic eschatology. In a sense 
however, there is also a political dimension to this attempt at redemption - expressed 
through the seven letters published by the Ikhwan - an element common to many messianic 
movements and which is concerned with renewal of a decaying and decadent society. 
While the Ikhwan failed and their promise of messianic fulfilment was universally rejected 
by the Muslim world, theirs was merely the most recent example of an ongoing historical 
phenomenon of religious revolt based around the Islamic eschatological calendar. 
On the first day of Hijra year 1400, November 20 1979, just before the dawn 
prayers Juhayman Utaybi and his followers seized control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. 
Apparently Utaybi's first act was to address the crowd and call upon them to recognise his 
brother-in-law, Muhammed al-Qahtani, as the expected Mahdi. The timing of the 
declaration was of enormous significance. In Islam, there is a widespread belief that the 
Twelfth Imam, who went into occultation (hiding) in the ninth century, will reveal himself 
at the beginning of the century according to the Islamic calendar. 85 Appointing the day of 
redemption has proved easier for Shi'ite theologians than the actual year because the Imam 
will remain hidden "for as long as God deems it necessary "86 - Islamic tradition expects 
the Mahdi at the beginning of a century, but which century is unclear. 87 The tradition itself 
is not however strictly adhered to, the messianic revolts in Yemen in 1836 and 184088 are 
just two examples, as are the Mahdist type uprisings in Sudan following 189889 - as with 
other religious groups circumstances such as poverty, oppression or radical political events 
may cause deviation from accepted scriptural timetables. 90 In previous centuries, the turn 
85 The Islamic year is based on a purely lunar year of twelve months of twenty-nine or thirty days. Because 
this is not adjusted to the solar calendar religious festivals and holidays advance around the seasons and so 
there is no fixed relationship between it and the solar year of the Christian or Gregorian calendar. 
Intercalation is forbidden in the Quran, 9: 37. 
86 Sachedina, A., Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism, 1981, p. 23. 
87 The Most commonly accepted day is that of Ashura, the anniversary of the Martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali 
(AD 680), grandson of the Prophet and third Imam. See Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 157-158. 
88 See B. Klorman, 'Jewish and Muslim Messianism in Yemen', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
22,1990, pp 201-228. 
89 G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, 1979, p. 101. 
90 For other, especially anti-colonial, Mahdist revolts see P. Partner, God of Battles: Holy Wars of 
Christianity and Islam, 1997, pp. 219-223,295-296. 
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of the century advent of Mahdia has been common, the most recent and spectacular 
example of which was the nineteenth century Mahdist revolt in the Sudan. The Sudanese 
Mahdia lasted from 1882 till 1898 and its origins, religious puritanism in the face of 
corrupt and inept central rule and clerical leadership, were very similar to those of the 
Saudi Ikhwan. 91 Like the Ikhwan, the forces of the Mahdia portrayed accepted 
eschatological imagery when the revolt reached its climax - the final battle which saw the 
defeat of the Mahdist forces at Omdurman was also seen in an extreme apocalyptic light 
with the British commander in chief, Lord Kitchener, identified as al-Dajjal, or the `Anti- 
Christ'. 92 
The political dimension of the seizure of the Grand Mosque and subsequent events 
in other parts of Saudi Arabia differed. The Ikhwan revolt itself appears to have little to do 
with economic conditions - both the seizure of the Grand Mosque and the Shi'a riots 
in the 
Eastern province which followed it took place against a background of rising oil prices and 
expanding public revenue outlays. 93 Although these two events were not co-ordinated and 
were conducted for different reasons, by different branches of the faith, the underlying 
causes were the same. As one commentator has noted: "[t]hese Sunni and Shiite 
insurrections reflected the ideological and social cleavages in a traditional society 
increasingly suffering from the culture shock of haphazard and rapid modernisation. 04 The 
Sunni Ikhwan acted because they believed Islam had been defiled by corruption, apostasy 
and foreign influence and that the time for an eschatological renewal had arrived. The 
Shi'a riots were largely a reaction to the low social status and social provisions accorded to 
the Shi'a minority. The Ikhwan's political programme outlined in the seven letters, of 
which the advent of the Mahdi was a feature, 95 articulated many features associated with 
preparation for messianic renewal and therefore while the timing of the Ikhwan's activities 
was political to the extent that they offered a critique and physical challenge to the Saudi 
91 For an overview of the Sudanese Mahdi see P. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A Study 
of its Origins, Development and Overthrow, 1958. 
92 G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, p. 101. 
93 M. Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, 1999, p. 26. 
94 R. H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 1995, p. 130. There is even the 
suggestion that the timing of the Sunni insurrection and the Shi'ite revolts was not a coincidence as Juhayman 
makes clear references to Shi'a grievances and activities. See J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in 
Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', The Muslim World, Vol. LXXX, # 1, 
1990, p. 5, fn. 22. 
95 R. H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 135. 
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state, it was eschatological in their expectation of a return to a pre-modern golden age 
made possible by a semi-divine figure. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The component of time for violent religious movement may be divided into two 
functions, that of perception and that of the role time plays in operational activity. All 
groups derive their perception of time from religious tradition and see the particular 
conflict that they are engaged in as part of an ongoing historical struggle. The belief in 
precisely when this contemporary struggle will be brought to a successful conclusion 
varies according to group type. Mainstream and core groups are reluctant to be precise in 
this regard because of the enormity of the opposition ranged against them and the 
incremental approach adopted (in the case of mainstream groups), or the partial nature of 
their contribution to the greater struggle (in the case of core groups). 
Messianic/apocalyptic groups are more likely to identify a precise end, usually one gleaned 
from religious tradition and interpreted in a contemporary context by the group's leader. In 
terms of the operational sense of time, the decision of when a group should act is 
determined by the organisation's belief system and the presence of both internal and 
external forces. In the case of violent religious groups, the timing of action to serve 
established political or tactical goals is similar to that employed by violent secular groups, 
as are those conducted for revenge. What is different is the symbolic resonance such 
timing has for a particular religious tradition and the possibility that new events will be 
embroidered into those traditions. The rhetoric which accompanies these actions 
establishes this link between past and present, and between the group itself and the 
community they see themselves as protecting. While the rhetoric is not always acted upon, 
it becomes an important part of a group's historical narrative. In cases where the 
motivation is to fulfil an eschatological process time is seen as finite and the need for 
action determined by the perceived correlation of degenerative events of the present and 
the eschatological prophecies of the past. The issue of time for religiously motivated 
group's is also intimately related to that of space. In much the same way as a group 
develops a timetable for action that is influenced by the past and the present, they develop 
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attitudes towards locations both as sacred spaces defined by scripture and religious 
tradition, and as pragmatic, operational spheres. 
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Chapter VI 
Location 
While the timing of an act of religiously motivated violence may be governed by 
different considerations this is equally the case for the location of these acts. Large areas 
are frequently regarded as having religious significance and while these accord with 
secular ideas of nationalist territoriality, the significance of the land in the religious 
context lies in some form of ancient religious promise - the concept of 'sacred geography' - 
combined with values identical to the secular notions of continuous habitation and 
common culture. The concept of sacred geography itself has a number of different 
components. A particular area may have been promised to a group by God or through a 
prophet. Within the context of a contemporary crisis environment this promise makes 
particular places convenient and resonant political rallying points and where they have 
been the scene of violence transforms them into 'blood icons'. On a more specific level, 
places of religious significance, especially'holy sites' have a high symbolic value for entire 
faiths, and this symbolic value is frequently a messianic one making them even more 
sensitive both for the groups themselves and the wider community from which they have 
emerged. A religiously significant location may precipitate violence, for example, where 
there is a conflict of interests where one site is regarded as an affront to a particular 
religious community, or religious locations may be targeted as a defensive response to 
other events or activities. In either event such choices invariably inspire severe reactions 
and repercussions which are out of all proportion to the actual act of violence committed 
because the symbolic value of the location acts as an amplifier. Temporal locations offer a 
far greater variety of targets which also possess enormous psychological value and 
concurrently allow a group to wage a 'legitimate' campaign of 'resistance' which avoids 
conducting a purely religious conflict against a people and its religious culture - despite the 
rhetorical messages a group may use. 
The favoured locations for mainstream groups tend to be places of temporal 
significance, reinforcing their opposition to a specific political authority or target group. 
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Religious locations are seldom targeted except as part of a demonstration aimed at 
incitement due to their inflammatory, sacred nature. For Hizballah, attacks on religious 
sites would certainly be counterproductive and in any event the struggle against Israel has 
always been characterised as one of national liberation and within Lebanon emphasis has 
latterly been placed on inter-communal harmony in the face of external hostility. 
' In the 
case of Kach and Aryan Nations, where a site of religious significance is directly attacked, 
it has been by a splinter group or a lone actor. Core groups similarly avoid the 
inflammatory results of attacking religious locations, concentrating instead on those 
temporal sites which represent the authority their revolutionary programme is aimed at 
destroying. The stunted development of Eyal meant that these locations were basically 
selected for the purposes of incitement and harassment whereas those chosen by the PIJ 
have represented a more concerted assault on the socio-political order. The absence of 
major holy sites in the American context proved not to be a determinant in activity 
(America in this context is regarded as the new holy land) and again locations were 
dictated by revolutionary activity conducted within geographical constraints. Messianic 
and apocalyptic groups have a far greater concern with the symbolic value of religious 
locations, a fact born out by the plans of the Jewish Underground and the Saudi Ikhwan, 
although not by Aum Shinrikyo who operated in an environment devoid of relevant 
symbolic religious locations. For Aum, however, the symbolism was key on a temporal 
level - the attack on the Tokyo subway system undermined the 
legitimacy of the Japanese 
government's ability to protect its citizens. 
6.1 Mainstream 
6.1.1 Kach 
The location of violent activity for Kach and most other extremist Jewish 
organisations centres around the sacredness of the land of Israel. This sacredness is defined 
in the Torah and the partial realisation of this biblical promise through the establishment 
of the Israeli state has led to calls for its absolute fulfilment. Within this larger sacred area 
1 See for example'Hizballah Commentary Urges Muslim Christian Coexistance', Voice of the Oppressed, 0550 
gmt, 12 Sept. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1485, A/12, September 14,1992. 
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exist highly symbolic holy sites such as the Temple Mount (and Jerusalem generally) and 
Hebron2 which have provided specific focuses of protest. Although it is difficult to assign 
the label 'temporal' to anything within a whole that is regarded as sacred, certain locations 
such as settlements, Arab villages, and other locales devoid of overt religious significance, 
have been the site of Kach activities that were more political in nature. Indeed, the 
selection of specific locations due to their religious sensitivity was a hall mark of Kach's 
ability to exploit tense security environments in order to garner popular support. 
While the concept of the Promised Land has been an important feature of Judaism 
for centuries, the realisation of a Jewish state has made the idea of territory the central 
element in Jewish fundamentalist ideology. The land has become the most important 
symbol of Jewish nationhood, something so essential that it is "the land of Israel, Eretz 
Israel, that assures modem Jewry of its identity and separation [as the Chosen People]. 
0 
The very state of Israel denotes enormous religious significance, as quoted by Kahane: 
"[t]he state of Israel is not 'political' creation, it is a religious creation" the purpose of 
which is to fulfil the Jewish messianic promise. 4 The land itself was promised to the 
Jewish people through the covenant made between God and Abraham "[t]o your 
descendants I have given this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river 
Euphrates... Also I give to you and your descendants after you the land in which you are a 
stranger, all the land of Canaan, as an everlasting possession. ,5 Kahane developed for the 
Palestinians the same choices that Joshua offered the Canaanites: leave the land, surrender 
and become second class citizens, or resist and face the inevitable consequences. Kahane 
developed this further claiming that Arabs would never accept inferior status and so the 
only options were expulsion or genocide. 6 He also saw the expulsion of the Arabs as 
having a messianic significance - until they left, redemption would be delayed. For Kach 
2 Hebron is sacred to both Jews and Muslims cause of its association with the prophet Abraham. Tradition has 
it that Abraham, founder of Judaism, lived in Hebron and there bought the cave of Machpelah which became 
the burial place of Abraham and his wife Sara, their son Isaac and his wife Rebecca and their son Jacob and his 
wife Leah. 
3 G. Rowley, 'The Land of Israel: A Reconstructionist Approach' in D. Newman (ed. ), The Impact of Gush 
Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank, 1985, p. 133. 
4 A. Ravitsky, Roots of Kahanism: Consciousness and Political Reality, Jerusalem Quarterly, # 39,1986, pp. 
93-94. 
S Genesis 15: 18 & 17: 8. See also Numbers 33: 53 "You shall dispossess the inhabitants of the land and dwell 
on it, for I have given you the land to possess". 
6 E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, 1991, p. 225. 
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and its various offshoots, the Land of Israel is sacred, the Palestinians are identified as the 
arch-enemy and as such their removal from the land is essential. In the words of Binyamin 
Kahane "[t]hey do not grasp that as long as Arabs live in Hebron or the Land of Israel, 
there is no chance for peace or for Jewish settlements - not in Hebron, and not in Tel 
Aviv. 0 He underpins this claim by quoting a Torah ruling "[a]nd if you do not disinherit 
the inhabitants of the land before you, then those whom you leave will be thorns in your 
eyes and thickets in your sides, and they will distress you in the land in which you dwell. "R 
Within this all encompassing Holy Land exist specific sites that are imbued with 
particular political or religious significance. Following the Camp David Accords, Kach 
became an instrumental part of protests against withdrawal from conquered territories such 
as Yamit in 1982 and at the locations of Palestinian terrorism such as Afula in 1984. The 
symbolic importance of locations such as these served to bolster Kach's primary arguments 
that the government of Israel was comprehensively 'selling out' the settler movement and 
ultimately the people of Israel, and that the very presence of the Arab population was a 
threat to the existence of the Jewish state. Even when not reacting to specific incidents, 
Kach frequently organised provocative demonstrations into Arab towns and villages, and 
Kach members would engage in clandestine raids on Arab population centres, committing 
assaults and destroying property. Similar attacks, although on a lesser scale would be made 
against Christians and Christian property, especially those engaging in missionary activity. 
The exploitation of symbolic religious locations was also a feature of Kach's 
activities. Three events in the late 1970s alone serve to illustrate this. In October 1978 
Kach activists occupied the restricted Abraham Avinu' synagogue in the centre of Hebron 
and violently resisted attempts to remove them; in January 1979 the General Secretary of 
the movement illegally entered the Cave of Machpelah9 in Hebron and harassed the 
guards; and in March 1979, Kach activists conducted a violent demonstration at the 
Temple Mount. 1° While such incidents did not result in any loss of life, their symbolic 
value was extremely potent, affirming to group members and sympathisers alike the 
7 B. Kahane, 'On Hebron', http: //kahane. org/political/32. html. s ibid. 
9 The burial place of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 
lo R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or "Shalom Jews, Shalom 
Dogs")', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. IV, # 1,1992, p. 48. 
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willingness of Kach to resist the organs of the Israeli state in expressing their beliefs. 
Although ultimately unsuccessful, Kach members have also attempted to desecrate Muslim 
holy sites. In May 1980, for example, police uncovered a plot to destroy the Dome of the 
Rock. A large quantity of explosives was found on the roof of a yeshiva in the Old City of 
Jerusalem and two Israeli soldiers were arrested who had links to Kach and Gush Emunim. 
At this time, Kahane and one of his lieutenants, Baruch Green, were also arrested for 
alleged complicity in the plot and for planning assaults on Arabs. " The full impact of a 
successful operation against an Islamic holy site is well illustrated by the 1994 attack on 
the Cave of the Patriarchs. Indeed the martyrdom of Baruch Goldstein has created another 
focus for galvanising anti-Arab sentiment. In 1995, amid widespread security fears, 
members of the settler community held a memorial service for Baruch Goldstein. Indeed, 
since his funeral Goldsteins grave has become a site of pilgrimage for members of the 
Jewish extreme right. 12 
6.1.2 Aryan Nations 
Locations for the Aryan Nations centre upon the United States, and more 
specifically the Pacific Northwest, the function of a Holy Land - or at least promised land - 
being assumed by the continental United States. This is in part due to the peculiarities of 
American Protestant millenarianism, the limited appeal of the organisation and also to the 
idealised nature of that particular region. Despite the fact that the group has not engaged in 
overt violence, its activities centre principally around its Idaho base, although other sites 
which have seen the persecution of elements within the radical religious right may be 
lauded as blood icons' and the group has developed a capacity to proselytise both 
nationally and internationally via the internet, providing scope for the creation of like- 
minded groups elsewhere imbued with the Aryan Nations ideology. 
11 I. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 1988, pp. 67-68. 
12 Voice of f Israel, 1800 gmt, 27 Feb. 94 - BBCISWB, ME/1934, MED/8, March 1,1994. Also of significance 
in this regard was the publication of Baruch Hagever [Baruch the Man] :A Memorial Volume for Dr. Baruch 
Goldstein, the Saint, May God Avenge His Blood, in March 1995. The book is a collection of commemorative 
essays and testimonies and a tribute to the survivability of Kahane supporters within Kiryat Arba. Yigal Amir 
was known as a great Goldstein admirer, and Baruch Hegevar was one of the books found in Amir's room 
after the assassination. The opulence of the grave site and its potential to incite violence has since moved the 
Israeli government to order its destruction. See Voice of Israel, 0900 gmt, 14 Nov. 99 - BBCISWB, ME/3693, 
MED/10, November 16,1999. 
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In 1980, Richard Butler first raised the Aryan Nations flag in Hays, Kansas and 
announced the foundation of a "racially clean homeland, bounded by the Rocky 
Mountains, the Mississippi river, the Northern Canada plains and the Mexican border. " 13 
By the time of the 1986 Aryan Congress, this ambitious proclamation had shrunk to 
include just the states of Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. While the precise 
boundaries vary, the Pacific Northwest is the most commonly cited location for an 'Aryan 
homeland', a reflection of practical features such as low population density, the absence of 
large non-white communities, and cheap land(at least during the seventies and eighties), 
and a reflection of the historical identification of the Northwest as an area free from the 
corrupting influences of the Easter cities. 14 For Aryan Nations, in line with most Christian 
Identity thinking, the location of the coming final struggle has been moved from Palestine 
to the United States. 15 In direct contrast to most mainstream Protestant fundamentalists 
America is Israel, the true promised land and the historical Israel is destined for 
destruction primarily because it is a Jewish state and therefore has a direct association with 
the forces of evil. The defence of racially pure areas of the American heartland lies at the 
centre of Aryan Nations eschatological view of geography, a radical departure from 
traditional Christian fundamentalist interpretations of the End which concentrate on Israel 
and afford some role in the process to the Jewish people. 16 
While Aryan Nations has never engaged in a systematically overt programme of 
violence, the location of its activities accords with the idea of the Aryan homeland. The 
group's congresses, conferences and summer youth gatherings (timed to coincide with 
Hitler's birthday) are all conducted at the Aryan Nations compound near Hayden Lake, 
Idaho. Similarly the group's proselytising activities in terms of rallies and the distribution 
of literature are confined to the Northwest and the immediate environs of Hayden Lake. 
The group thus remains isolated from mainstream society and because its activities are not 
13 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, 1990, p 58. The genesis of Identity 
thought of territorial separation is further explored in M. Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins 
of the Christian Identity Movement, 1994, pp. 233-239. 
14 M. Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement, 1994, p. 233- 
244. 
15 M. Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right, 1994, p. 109. 
16 See for example H. Lindsay, The Late Great Planet Earth, 1971, and The Final Battle, 1995. While 
Lindsay has adapted his predictions over time to account for the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism, the US retains a special place, but not at the expense of the centrality of the Holy 
Land. 
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overtly extra-legal, there is little or no interference from local or Federal authorities. Two 
examples of the group extending its reach are the conduct of a prison outreach programme 
in the form of the Aryan Brotherhood, and the group's distribution of literature, most 
notably via the internet. Although the Aryan Brotherhood is sometimes cited as a worrying 
extension of recruitment17, more balanced assessments suggest the prison outreach 
programme has met with only limited success, failing to create the hoped for cadres of 
hardened, disciplined members. 18 A different matter is the Aryan Nations internet presence 
which not only provides various tracts and polemics by the group but also an extensive list 
of publications which can be ordered, and an on-line membership form. 19 This is of 
concern not only within the US but also throughout the world where these ideas have a 
particular resonance for right-wing, Christian white supremacists. 
As with other religious groups, Aryan Nations and the extreme right generally 
possess various blood icons. While the ideological linkages vary, these icons possess 
similar themes of an over-bearing state persecuting elements of the righteous remnant. The 
locations of the Randy Weaver siege and the Branch Davidian compound are two notable 
examples. At the Mount Carmel compound site in Waco Texas a Texan militia have paid 
for a series of trees to commemorate the dead. Amongst the memorials is a plaque carrying 
the epithet "[h]ow long, 0 Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood 
on them that dwell on earth" (Revelations 6: 9,10). 20 Among those of the extreme right 
who have made the pilgrimage to the compound is Timothy McVeigh, yet another 
illustration of the diverse nature and links between the American extreme religious right. 
Before locations become blood icons they may also serve as useful political rallying 
points. During the Ruby ridge siege, for example, there was a sizeable Aryan Nations 
presence beyond the police lines (many other group were also represented) who expressed 
support for the Weaver family and condemnation of the federal government's actions. 
'7 ADL, Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far Right Fringe, 1996, p. 189. 18 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness, 1990, p. 60-61. This does not mean they are irrelevant or that they 
pose no threat. Two of the three men charged with dragging a black man to death in Jasper Texas in 1998 
claimed Aryan Brotherhood membership. See ADL, Backgrounder, 'Aryan Brotherhood and the Turner 
Diaries: Hate Crime in Japser, Texas', June 10,1998. 
19 See http: //www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic/. 20 The Economist, May 2,1998, p. 52. For another memorial and conspiratorial theories about the assault on 
the Mount Carmel site see the 'Waco Holocaust Museum', http: //www. monumental. com/Skywriter/Waco 
Museum/. 
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6.1.3 Hizballah 
While Hizballah includes locations of both religious and temporal significance in 
its rhetoric, the physical targets chosen are almost entirely temporal in nature, reflecting 
the group's broad political and social agenda, its fostering of inter-confessional dialogue 
and alliances and the gradualist nature of Hizballah's guerrilla and terrorist strategies. 
While the group has located its activities largely within the confines of the Lebanese state 
and the Israeli security zone, as befits a group born to protect the Lebanese Shi'ite minority 
and expel foreign influence in Lebanon, Hizballah has not hesitated to act abroad when 
such activity has proved to serve the group's interests. This decision has illustrated, at 
different times, both the tactical and strategic sophistication of the organisation, and also 
its useful position as an Iranian client, sometimes advancing its foreign policy agenda 
through violence. 
While locations of religious significance are largely rhetorical tools for Hizballah, 
they are important for propaganda purposes and for the organisation's underlying pan- 
Islamic premise. Central to these is Jerusalem, or AI-Quds, which has served at once to 
symbolise the struggle against the state of Israel, to function as a common theme in the 
struggles of the similarly oppressed Palestinian peoples and Lebanese Shiites (and the co- 
operation between Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic groups such as Hamas and the PIJ), 
and to reflect and bolster the importance to Iranian revolutionary doctrine of the liberation 
of Palestine . 
21 The liberation of Jerusalem as a tactical goal, however, is dependent on the 
achievement of more immediate objectives, not least of which is the establishment of an 
Islamic state in Lebanon. In terms of Hizballah's conflicts within Lebanon itself, both 
against foreigners and fellow Lebanese, religious locations such as places of worship have 
never really been a priority, reflecting the socio-political dimension of the group's struggle 
rather than the religious. Similarly the areas of operation within Lebanon, the Bekaa 
valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut and the south of the country reflect areas where there 
is a strong Shiite presence and where the social policies of the group best compliment its 
military activities. 
21 M. Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, 1997, p. 50. 
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As noted above, Hizballah has largely eschewed locations of religious significance. 
in an operational sense because far greater political leverage lies in those of a temporal 
nature. The early and spectacular operations mounted by Hizballah against foreign forces 
in Lebanon, including embassies and military centres, such as the US marine and French 
paratroop bases, are excellent examples of high value temporal locations. Control of, and 
familiarity with, certain lawless zones within Lebanon also benefited the group 
enormously in the conduct of taking Western hostages between the early 1980s and early 
1990s, and in the continuing guerrilla campaign waged by the group against the Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF) in and around the self-proclaimed Israeli security zone. The 
temporal locations chosen by Hizballah (combined with the human targets these involve) 
are indicative of the group's objective of both inflicting physical damage, and 
simultaneously (and more importantly) testing the resolve and exposing the vulnerabilities 
of their opponents. In this light, the symbolic value of embassies, military headquarters, 
Israeli settlements in the Galilee and similar 'high value' temporal locations far outweighs 
their military or political significance, thus amplifying the effects of any violent act. 
While Hizballah has operated within an almost exclusively domestic capacity there 
have been notable exceptions. Between December 1985 and December 1986, Hizballah 
conducted a terrorist campaign in France which resulted in thirteen deaths and over three 
hundred injuries. The campaign was motivated partly by the expulsion of Hizballah 
members from France, the presence of the French UNIFIL contingent in Lebanon, and 
Iran's desire to pressure France into repaying outstanding pre-revolutionary debts and to 
halt French arms transfers to Iraq. 22 In March 1992, the group was allegedly responsible 
for the bombing of Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires which caused thirty deaths and two 
hundred and fifty-two injuries. One Lebanese authority on the group when asked why Jews 
had been targeted in Argentina and not Israel replied "[t]he Jews of Israel come from 
Poland, from Russia, from Europe or from Latin America... What is the difference? It is all 
the same. , 23 The choice of Argentina did not necessarily imply an expansion of Hizballah's 
targets or general level of violence, but it certainly did demonstrate an extended 
22 M. Ranstorp, Hi: ballah in Lebanon, pp. 119-120. 
23 The Independent, 20 July 1994. 
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proficiency and reach. 24 The period following the death of Sheikh al-Musawi was also a 
period of consolidation for the group. Under the leadership of Sheikh Nasrallah, Hizballah 
pursued a strategy which involved continued, deepened participation in Lebanese politics 
and the focusing of violent actions against Israel exclusively in line with changes in Iranian 
foreign policy. 25 In this particular context then, a move overseas does not imply an 
expansion of violent activity or target groups, rather it reflects a change in overall strategy 
in which the geographical base of Lebanon and also Lebanon as a 'homeland' (as opposed 
to battlefield) have gained a greater significance. 
6.1.4 Hamas 
While Harnas is similar to Hizballah in that the group is involved in a liberation 
struggle and aims to achieve an Islamic state as a result of that struggle, ideological 
differences over geography remain. Despite co-operation between the two groups, 
however, Hamas's pan-Islamic premise results from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
and not from the revolutionary Iranian Shi'ite model. The result is a solely inward looking 
'resistance' movement albeit with extensive leadership and support contacts around the 
world. Hamas has avoided obvious religious locations regarding them as reckless and 
unnecessary when more immediate and softer targets such as exposed public places are 
available in abundance and offer a commensurate psychological reaction. 
Hamas subscribes to a pan-Islamic ideology, although the most important task is 
the liberation of Palestine which in itself is seen as sacred. As article eleven of the Hamas 
charter states "[t]he land of Palestine is an Islamic Wagf (holy possession) consecrated for 
future Muslim generations until Judgement Day. No one can renounce it or any part, or 
abandon it or any part", not least because "the first Quibla and the third holiest site are 
located [there]. i26 The idea of the land of Palestine itself is inherited from early Palestinian 
nationalist thinking which looked to the territorial boundaries demarcated by the British 
Mandate from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean (hence the slogan 'from the river to 
24 It should also be noted that Hizballah maintains representatives in many countries both in the Middle East 
and Western Europe, and has been accused of conducting training operations in the US See C. Harmon, 
Terrorism Today, 2000, p. 147, fn. 33. 
25M. Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, p. 107. Iran was heavily implicated in both the Buenos Aries attacks. 26 Article 14. 
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the sea'). The pan-Islamic vision, however, from which the organisation arose was the 
pacifist one, espoused by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood who advocated the 'internal 
jihad' within the Muslim community over'external jihad' against Israel and the West. 27 The 
advent of Hamas shifted this approach to one of political activism and violence against 
Israel in the pursuit of a nationalist goal. 28 While Hamas is aware of the sensitivity of 
Islamic holy places in Israel and the occupied territories, these are exploited as rhetorical 
devices and are the locations for demonstrations rather than constant confrontation. Again 
the primary value of religious locations such as mosques is as a vehicle for mass 
mobilisation and entrenchment of support . 
29 Despite the anger and revulsion caused by the 
1994 Hebron massacre, Hamas have not felt compelled to attack Jewish holy sites, 
probably reasoning that this would incur too severe and unpredictable a backlash, and 
because attacks on public places offer a less reckless and more effective alternative. 
The land of Palestine itself is not only discussed in sacred and religious terms but 
also in nationalist ones, as one Hamas leader has said: 
"[t]he destruction of Israel is not an issue... We know that the land that is now 
occupied by Israel and on which they are building their state is our land. They took it 
by force, and they forced us to leave. No one amongst the Palestinians.. . 
doubts that 
this land belongs to us. "30 
The land is thus also a temporal, nationalist object, making real the divine struggle. On the 
minutiae of temporal locations, Hamas shows a heavy preference for softer cultural 
centres. The apparently indiscriminate nature of attacks at such places is justified either by 
identifying Jews as the scriptural 'other', which must be eliminated, or more subtly by 
rationalisations such as the culpability of all Israelis as 'soldiers' and legitimate military 
targets, especially as all Israelis serve in the IDF at some stage in their lives. 
27 Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, 1994, pp. 10-22. 28 S. Mishal & A. Sela, Hamas a Behavioural Profile, 1997, p. 2. 29 It should be noted however that secular Palestinian factions have desecrated mosques when conflict has 
arisen between them and Hamas. See S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and 
Coexistence, 2000, p. 95. 
30 R. Gaess, 'Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab', Middle East Policy, Vol. VI, # 1,1999, p. 117. 
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6.2 Core 
6.2.1 Eyal 
The locations chosen by Eyal for their actions were similar to those of Kach in that 
they were largely temporal and domestic and chosen to create maximum political impact, 
but at the same time being conducted within the larger arena of what is regarded as a 
divinely promised land which is perceived to be under imminent threat. Eyal's ideological 
lineage was linked directly to that of Kach and so the group's actions can be seen as an 
attempt to preserve the divinely promised state of Israel, and to thwart any attempt at 
territorial compromise. Once again the group's short life and other idiosyncrasies do not 
mean that the group's choices would have altered or expanded, but they did closely follow 
the patterns established by other Kahanist group's. 
Little more need be added to the description of the sacredness of the land of Israel 
given above for Kach. Eyal leaders and members were all part of the broad Kahanist 
milieu and their perceptions and understanding were the same, continually reinforced by 
the orthodox educational milieu of Bar Ilan University. The divinely promised land of 
Israel were seen to be threatened by the Israeli political left and a nascent Palestinian state, 
and Eyal's ideology demanded that both these threats be resisted, violently if necessary. 
Eyal did not deliberately attack Palestinian places of worship or Holy sites, although 
demonstrations at these were a standard part of the right-wing repertoire. These locations 
were probably eschewed because of heightened security around Muslim holy sites 
following the Hebron massacre and because places of worship were considered too risky or 
difficult for a nascent group to tackle. Jewish religious locations are not a consideration as 
there was no major animosity by the group against the Jewish religious establishment, and 
the fundamentally political nature of the implementation of the peace process which 
precluded their active involvement and therefore culpability. 
The temporal locations chosen by Eyal for acts of violence and incitement reflect 
the group's double objectives of eliminating the Palestinian population either through 
expulsion or violence, and engaging in political activism against those elements within 
Israeli society who proposed and supported the peace process. Fulfilling the former 
involved expeditions into Arab areas - not difficult for a settler community such as that 
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based at Kiryat Arba31 - causing damage and committing assaults. The significance of 
these raids was a demonstration of the ease with which the Arabs could be attacked within 
their own communities and of the ease with which right-wing groups could mount such 
attacks with seeming impunity. The locations of demonstrations against the peace process 
were obviously political in nature, such as the anti-government demonstration held in 
Jerusalem's Zion square when the Knesset was set to vote on the ratification of the Oslo II 
interim agreement, and counter demonstrations such as the one held the same month in 
Kings of Israel Square. 32 Other locations such as those of the intimidation of and assaults 
against fellow Jews were determined solely by the location of the target at the time. 
As noted above, Eyal failed to develop an operational capability to operate outside 
the sacred confined of Israel, not even in the traditional Kahanist environment of the 
United States, especially New York. Large segments of the New York orthodox Jewish 
community however represented and championed the causes and core values which lay 
behind Eyal and all other right-wing extremist groups -a fundamental opposition to the 
peace process and a vitriolic hatred of the left-wing political establishment guiding the 
process, especially Yitzhak Rabin. 33 Following the assassination there was still a small but 
noticeable group in the US who applauded Amir's action and raised money for his defence 
- the answering service for one such group included as part of their recorded message the 
line "Yigal Amir is a young religious hero who assassinated the evil Rabin. "34 It therefore 
seems likely that had the group survived it would have found an ideal location for 
expanding and supplementing its activities in the US 
6.2.2 The Order 
The location of the Order's activities fitted with the Identity vision of the US as 'a 
promised land' and even more so by the group's racially influenced patriotism and a strong 
desire for territorial separation. The group's perception of itself as a vehicle for 
31 For weeks after the Hebron massacre the 80,000 Palestinian inhabitants of Hebron were kept under twenty 
four hour military curfew for fear of violent retaliation against the cities 450 Jewish residents. 32 Avashai Raviv was at the demonstration in Kings of Israel Square when he received news of Rabin's 
assassination. 
33 See for example M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God. " The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin, 
1998, Ch. 5. 
34 US New and World Report, 20/11/95, Vol. XIX, # 20, p. 70. 
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revolutionary change determined the location of the organisation's operational targets, as 
did considerations of local knowledge and group 'reach'. While the group acknowledged 
the 'global' threat to the Aryan race, no attempt was made to establish links with groups 
outside the US and Mathew's philanthropic activities made possible by robbery proceeds 
throughout the US did not lead to the expansion of right-wing militant activism which he 
initially expected. 
As with Aryan Nations, Robert Mathews sought a refuge from what he considered 
a degenerate and decaying society, and he found this refuge near the town of Metaline 
Falls, in the far North East corner of Washington state, not far from the Canadian border. 
Mathews reasoning for moving was typical of many within the far right, motivated by a 
desire to escape the 'cesspools' of large cities and to be 'left alone'. Although Mathews 
moved to Metaline Falls in the early 1970s, it was not until 1982 that he formulated the 
idea of a'White American Bastion' - similar to Butler's idea of an'Aryan Nation- which he 
advertised in The Spotlight encouraging like minded whites to move to the Northwest 
where he hoped they would establish political and economic hegemony through weight of 
numbers. 35 As Mathews would later describe it: 
"[t]he idea is to get enough kinfolk who believe as we do to move up here and take 
over towns, then counties, and finally states.. . 
Once we have a majority here, we 
create laws banning Jews, mud people, and other minorities... Once we've secured 
Metaline Falls, we keep expanding until we are strong enough to create a white 
nation. "36 
The brochure he despatched to interested replies described an idealised, almost mythical 
community depicted by the figures of a Viking and a caped pioneer facing each other in a 
forest. 37 The response, however, was poor and this was one of a series of frustrations 
which led Mathews in the direction of violent activism. As Mathews stated in his last 
letter: 
"[w]hen I first arrived at Metaline Falls I had only $25 to my name, a desire to work 
hard and be left alone... I had hoped to start a new life in the state of Washington, but 
35 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 109-110. 
36 ibid. 
37 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 110. The brochure was printed by Richard Butler at the 
Aryan Nations Press. 
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the ruling powers had other plans for me... By the time my son had arrived I realised 
that white America.. . was 
headed for oblivion unless white men rose and turned the 
tide. "38 
The important role of establishing racially and religiously pure enclaves was an 
important theme borrowed from mainstream Identity, and also one which served to 
highlight the machinations of the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG). As David Lane 
has stated: 
"[t]he political entity known as the United States of America has attempted with near 
single-minded determination, almost from its inception, to destroy any White 
territorial imperative, of any size and on any continent where such a state could be 
found. Genocide of the White Race has been the aim and the result of the American 
political entity. 09 
While Mathews had failed in his initial plan of establishing an Aryan homeland, the 
group's operations were planned and carried out away from the base area for security rather 
than ideological reasons. All the targets were temporal in nature, reflecting the character of 
the group as a form of revolutionary vanguard and the absence of any specific traditional 
holy sites. 40 The only exception being the single bombing attack made on a synagogue in 
Boise Idaho in April 1984. The location of the Order's violent activities, however, were 
largely constrained by geography and to a certain extent the local knowledge of the group 
members. All the Order's major activities for example were carried in the Pacific 
Northwest area. 
While there are no overt proclamations by Aryan Nations that the United States is 
the new Holy Land, there is every indication that Mathews subscribed at least in part to the 
Identity notion that the US had a special role to play in religious history by virtue of it 
containing a vast swathe of the planet's Aryan elect. The sacredness of the land is made 
evident in Mathew's final letter when he states that a secret war has been developing 
"between the regime in Washington and an ever growing number of white people who are 
determined to regain what our forefathers discovered, explored, conquered, settled, built 
38 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness, 1990, pp. 246-247. 39 Cited in M. Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right, p. 111-112. 
40 The importance of such traditional sites may have been further affected by the Odinist beliefs of some 
members. 
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and died for. "" The domestic revolutionary nature of the Order is apparent here, 
identifying the persecuted and deserving white population as the unrightfully oppressed. 
The 'homeland' where the group's members had chosen to settle was the critical location, 
resembling as it did an idealised and lush world, for which the biblical geographical 
citations were irrelevant or were interpreted as allegories within the American context. 
While the Order recognised and identified with other kindred Aryan peoples around the 
world, their immediate struggle was paramount. 
6.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
Like Hamas, the PIJ operates in a small geographical context motivated by the 
same liberation ideals. Ideological similarities and operational co-operation have meant 
that the two groups remain similar in their violent activities, and the ideological and 
tactical significance of location are no exception. The PIJ shows a similar attitude towards 
external operating environments although the PIJ is inferior to Hamas in terms of funding 
and support bases. Palestine is the sacred site of the confrontation and also the physical 
basis for any future Palestinian state. The locations chosen for violent actions have been 
influenced by events but represent no deviation from an ideological programme which in 
its extreme form identifies the entire state of Israel and all Israelis as illegitimate heretics 
which deserve destruction. 
While the PIJ subscribes to a broad pan-Islamic ideology, its immediate 
geographical concern is more limited. During the formative stages of the group, Fathi 
Shiqaqi and Bashir Musa decided that the unity of the Islamic world was not essential for 
the liberation of Palestine, but conversely the liberation of Palestine was essential for the 
unification of the Islamic world, thus narrowing the pan-Islamic premise to a specific, but 
extremely important, context. The PIJ, like Hamas (and other Islamic and Jewish 
movements) regards not only Jerusalem but the entire land of Palestine as sacred. In the 
words of Sheikh Tamimi "[from the point of view of Islam, Palestine is not [just] a stretch 
of land, not [just its] trees and springs, but a country blessed because Allah blessed it in the 
Qu'ran. "a2 Palestine was not just important for nationalist and secular strategic reasons but 
41 Cited in J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness, Appendix I, p. 248. 
42 Quoted in E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', in D. 
Menashri (ed. ), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, p. 195. 
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because the land was "in the heart of the Islamic body; it is the soul of Islam. "43 One of the 
slogans of the group, "Islam, Jihad and Palestine", underscores in the popular 
consciousness the important link between religion and nationalism - "Islam as the point of 
departure, Jihad as the means, and Palestine as the object of liberation. "44 On a more 
immediate and practical level, Muslim religious establishments have been used ranging 
from personal contacts within local mosques to more extravagant attempts to 'familiarise 
the people with the idea of Jihad' by holding open air prayer meetings and "celebrating the 
Night of Destiny with festivals in the Al-Aqsa mosque's plaza. "45 On the whole, Jewish 
holy sites are not chosen locations for operational activity, reflecting the identification of 
the state of Israel as a Jewish state, thus making the need to separate the religious 
establishments from broader society an unnecessary one, and underscored by the 
realisation that such a strategy would incur an unacceptably high degree of opprobrium for 
practically no political return. 
The temporal locations chosen for violent acts are again examples of the 'softer' 
cultural centres. Hard (although potentially) higher value targets are eschewed in favour of 
public, everyday places. 46 As with Hamas, the choice of these locations was in part 
influenced by the Hebron massacre and has been easily justified by an ideology which 
follows the example of the prophet that "not even one hour should pass when a Muslim 
does not fight a heretic"47, and by the nature of the Israeli military service system whereby 
most of the Israeli population has been, is, or one day will be a member of a repressive 
occupation force. While other attacks have been governed by the location of a specific 
individual or have been opportunistic, the temporal locations chosen by the PIJ have been 
low risk and yet high value, creating the security dilemma of coping with a choice of 
location that potentially threatens the physical structure of Israeli civil society. 
In a similar way to other Islamist groups, the PIJ sees its struggle in 'global' terms, 
even though the struggle is conducted in a purely limited geographical area. The PIJ's 
43 ibid. 
44 Interview: 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process, An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah 
Shallah', Jour al of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVIII, # 4, p. 62. 
as ibid. 
46 In an unusual aside a PU suicide bomber, narrowly prevented from blowing himself up on an Israeli bus, has 
stated that his passion for football would prevent him from blowing himself up at a football stadium even if it 
were full of 'unbelievers'. Harper'sMagazine, Vol. CCXCV, Issue 1767, August 1997. 
47 Harper's Magazine, August 1997, Vol. CCXCV, Issue 1767. 
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operational activities have been confined strictly to the Occupied Territories and Israel 
proper - paradoxically an environment in which they are vulnerable due to a small 
operational membership and support base, and as a result of being the target of both Israeli 
and Palestinian Authority (PA) security crack downs. The only important exceptions are 
foreign states, especially Iran and Syria where leadership structures and representatives 
are based, and from where financial support and training are forthcoming. Although on a 
smaller scale than Hamas, the PIJ has also conducted training in Lebanon in conjunction 
with Hizballah. 48 Similarly to Hizballah Iran holds a special place in the PIJ world view. 
Iran not only represented the ideological source of the PIJ's revolutionary ideas, but was 
seen as "the only country which truly took upon itself the Palestinian cause by forming the 
Jerusalem Army, a force capable of waging a popular Islamic liberation war. "49 While such 
fervour may have been tempered by the group's recent decline, the PIJ has long received 
so support from Iran and remains politically close. 
6.3 Messianic/ Apocalyptic 
6.3.1 Jewish Underground 
In a similar fashion to Kach, and most other Jewish extremist groups, the members 
of the Jewish Underground subscribed to the idea of the sacredness of the land of Israel. 
The sacredness of the land has come to dominate the traditional triadic relationship of 
God, people and land - by contrast during the diaspora the land was eclipsed by God and 
people. 51 This emphasis is common throughout the spectrum of extremist Jewish groups 
and for the members of the Underground this idea was taken directly from their ideological 
roots in the Gush Emunim movement. The divergence lies between the Gush's mission to 
settle as much of the Land of Israel as possible and so to make the biblical Israel a reality, 
48 PIJ have also been implicated in training activities in Yemen. See US State Department, Patterns of Global 
Terrorism: 1997,1998, p. 28. 
49 E. Rekhess, 'The Terrorist Connection', Justice, Vol. V, May 1995, p. 3. 
so PU for instance over the years has expressed unqualified support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and 
followed Iran's lead in negating the Madrid conference, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Oslo agreement 
and the Declaration of Principles. 
s' L. Hanauer, 'The Path to Redemption: Fundamentalist Judaism, Territory, and Jewish Settler Violence in the 
West Bank', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. XVIII, 9 4, p. 254. 
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and the Underground's attempts to force the messianic process via the Temple on one 
hand, and to protect those gains made from settlement through vigilante terrorism on the 
other. While the Underground regarded the entire Land of Israel as holy, Etzion regarded 
the centre of this holiness to stem from the Temple Mount: 
"I have seen myself as responsible to carry out actions which I would characterise as 
the purification of the Temple Mount, the only holy place of the people of Israel, 
from the structure now located upon it, on the site of the holy of holies, the building 
known as the Dome of the Rock. "52 
The messianic objective of the planned bombing of the Dome of the Rock was to 
precipitate another Arab-Israeli war, and hopefully a superpower conflict, which would 
force the Jewish Messiah to intervene to save his chosen people. 53 Even if such an extreme 
messianic scenario did not unfold, with the demolition of the Dome of the Rock the third 
Temple could be re-constructed, and it is the reconstruction of the Third Temple which is a 
vital portent immediately preceding the arrival of the Jewish Messiah. Messianic 
expectations aside there can be little doubt that if the attack had proceeded as planned, the 
results would certainly have been catastrophic which may indeed have "put us one step 
closer to an Armageddon. , 54 The attack itself did not envisage immediate enormous 
casualties - the aim was to perpetrate a symbolic act at a place of great religious 
significance for Judaism and Islam in the belief that an apocalyptic struggle between Jews 
and Muslims and messianic redemption would result. 
The importance of the Temple Mount has long been held but it was not until the 
capture of Jerusalem during the Six Day War that its reconstruction was a realistic 
possibility. In Etzion's view there could be no possible compromise: 
"[t]he purified Mount shall be - if God wishes - the ground and anvil for progress 
toward the next stage of holiness. As long as the Muslim Waqf is not removed from 
52 Nekuda, # 88, June 24,1985, p. 24. 
53 See Bruce Hoffman's "'Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative', 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. XVIII, # 4,1995, p. 283 (fn. 21). The information that the 
underground wished to provoke a cataclysmic Muslin-Jewish war was provided to Dr. Hofuran by an 
American law enforcement officer knowledgeable of the incident. 
54 Rapoport, D. C., `Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror? ', in P. Wilkinson, A. M. & Stewart, 
(eds. ), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 1987, p. 72. 
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the Mount, it is as if the Jebusite king, Araunah, rules alongside the Kingdom of 
David, and this is an unforgivable flaw in our sovereignty. ' 
Etzion had thus made the Temple Mount the central point of the redemptive process and 
the presence on that place of Muslim holy places was preventing redemption from 
proceeding. The nationalist and religious dimensions in this case intersect, ascribing to the 
Temple Mount both political and redemptive significance. As the nationalist poet, Uri Zvi 
Greenberg wrote "[h]e who controls the Temple Mount, controls Jerusalem. And he who 
controls Jerusalem, controls the land of Israel. 06 In a similar vein religious leaders, such as 
Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have expressed the sentiment "that the supreme purpose of the in 
gathering of the exiles and the establishment of our state is the building of the Temple. "57 
While Aviner and others believed that the Temple would be rebuilt in 'mystical' fashion the 
Underground posed a peculiar threat by proposing to fulfil a redemptive process through 
violent human agency. 
When the plot to blow up the Dome of the Rock was indefinitely postponed the 
Underground turned to temporal locations of violence. As noted previously the primary 
motivation for these attacks was not redemptive but reactionary, a response to Arab 
violence against Jewish settlers. The sites chosen for these revenge attacks were regarded 
as commensurate to the act which had triggered them. Thus the partially successful attack 
on the Arab mayors was an attack on the Arab political leadership believed to have 
inspired anti-settler violence. 58 The ensuing attack on the Islamic college in Hebron and 
the abortive attempt to blow up five Arab buses in Jerusalem, were both intended to mirror 
the effect and methods of Palestinian terrorism - namely to attack vulnerable civilian 
locations which would maximise the sense of fear throughout the target community. In this 
sense, it is interesting to note that other religious locations such as mosques were not 
considered by the Underground, although this would have marked a serious diversion from 
proportional, reactive attacks with the corresponding and unwelcome potential for 
escalation. 
ss cited in J. Aviad, The Messianism of Gush Emunim', in J. Frankel (ed. ), Jews and Messianism in the 
Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning. Studies in Contemporary Jewry VoL VII, 1991, p. 212. 56 E. Ronel, 'Inside Israel: The Battle Over Temple Mount', New Outlook, Vol. XXVII, # 2, p. 12. 
57 ibid. 
55 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Jewish Underground', in 
D. C. Rapoport (ed. ), Inside Terrorist Organisations, 1988, p. 199. 
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6.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
Unlike the Jewish Underground, Aum Shinrikyo's chosen locations were entirely 
temporal in nature, reflecting both the eclectic ideological structure of the group and its 
distance - both literal and metaphorical - from the geographical centres of the major 
traditions from which it drew its inspirations. Locations of religious significance played no 
role in Aum's activities because, as a by-product of a composite ideology, it recognised 
none as being of pivotal importance for the coming end. Instead Japan became the central 
location for Aum's prediction of Armageddon, both as a state destined for destruction but 
also as the site of the regeneration of worldly civilisation through Aum. Indeed, there are 
elements of Aum's cosmology and structure which are peculiarly Japanese, further 
emphasising the centrality of Japan. Aum conducted extensive activities around the world, 
most notably in Japan, and while recruitment was certainly a feature (in line with the 
superficially global message of the group), the primary emphasis seems to have been on 
acquiring weapons technologies and expanded the group's financial base. 
Despite the extreme and eclectic ideology of Aum Shinrikyo, the location of their 
attacks (primarily but not exclusively the two major sann gas attacks) can only be 
described as of avowedly temporal significance. The location of the earlier sann attack at 
the village of Matsumoto is easily explained because it was the site of a land trial (more 
specifically the judges hearing the case) in which Aum was involved and bound to lose. 
The subway attacks were intended to cripple the central nervous system of the state by 
gassing the main underground lines which led to Kasumigaseki station - one used by 
Tokyo police, National Police and countless other bureaucrats. Interestingly when 
discussing the peril of the coming apocalypse Asahara had stated that the Japanese 
government was largely unprepared, and "[o]nly the Kasumigaseki subway station-can be 
used as a shelter. "59 The subway attacks were therefore of enormous symbolic importance 
to Aum followers when they occurred. Although they were too isolated and ultimately 
ineffective to be realistically seen as the beginning of the Endtimes by the majority of the 
59 Shoko Asahara, Disaster Approaches the Land of the Rising Sun: Shoko Asahara's Apocalyptic 
Predictions, 1995, p. 190. 
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population, to most _ Aum 
followers they were at the very least proof of the conspiracy 
being orchestrated against the group. 
The communal aspect of Aum's organisation provides another dimension to the 
concept of temporal location. In common with some other illegal or clandestine religious 
groups, Aum advocated a rejection of mainstream society and expressed this through the 
establishment of visible yet closed group facilities. While Aum maintained both lay and 
monastic memberships as time progressed and the group became more inward looking, the 
various Aum compounds became the focal points for salvation. In the early 1990s, Asahara 
wrote that "we have to secure a place where we can protect ourselves from bodily harm, 
where we can live and continue our ascetic practice no matter what kind of weapon... is 
thrown against us. "60 While this idea accorded with earlier Aum teaching which advocated 
the establishment of 'lotus villages' to preserve the faithful from disaster, the rhetoric had 
moved away from the possibility of a peaceful avoidance of disaster to an acceptance that 
it was inevitable, a withdrawal made more necessary by the increasingly illegal activities 
which the group became involved in such as the development of chemical and biological 
agents and the abuse and murder of dissenting sect members. Indeed, the two processes fed 
on each other, a withdrawal from society enhanced conflict with society, necessitating the 
development of weapons for the impending confrontation which entailed greater secrecy 
and further withdrawal. 
Despite drawing on Hindu Buddhist and Christian Endtime traditions, Aum's 
predictions for Armageddon centred on Japan. Early in 1995 Aum published a series of 
conversations between Asahara and his 'leading disciples' entitled A Doom is Nearing the 
Land of the Rising Sun. In the book Asahara frequently discusses the possibility of the end 
of the world and settles on the last years of the 1990s. One of his visions includes Tokyo 
sinking into the sea, and another where Japan turns into "burned earth" following a nuclear 
attack by the US and the U. N. "between 1996 and 1998. r61 These great disasters were to be 
preceded by other, lesser ones which Asahara had been predicting since 1987, such as a 
decline in Japanese living conditions caused by trade friction with the US, leading to the 
institution of a police state. Beyond Japan, Russia, China, Europe and the US would 
60 Cited in D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, 1996, p. 84. 
61 Shoko Asahara, Disaster Approaches, p. 71. 
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collapse and in the year 2003 (according to one of Asahara's predictions) nuclear war 
would lay waste to all civilisation. 62 From the remnants of this apocalyptic struggle would 
rise Aum Shinrikyo which had escaped death through a combination of spiritual and 
physical preparedness, and this 'righteous remnant' would be ruled by Asahara and his 
government in waiting. The absence of specific, traditional locations such as those in Israel 
associated with the Christian apocalyptic did not pose major challenges to Aum's ideology. 
The composite nature of the group's beliefs, the deification of Asahara, and the origins of 
the group ascribed a new and central role to Japan at the end of time, a role which 
appealed to susceptible segments of Japanese society and became an important vehicle for 
recruitment. 63 
As well as activities in Japan, Aum had numerous interests abroad - largely made 
possible by the group's extensive financial resources - making the group virtually global in 
nature. Aum operated in six countries outside Japan, pursuing a variety of different 
activities ranging from recruitment and training to establishing purchasing companies and 
weapons procurement. The country where Aum was most actively involved was Russia 
where membership peaked at about 35,000 with up to 55,000 people visiting Aum 
seminars on a casual basis. 64 The group maintained seven facilities inside Moscow, a 
further eleven around the country and broadcast daily programmes from the state run 
Mayak Radio and occasionally Aum programmes were televised on Russia's '2X2' 
television station. 65 There is evidence that Aum attempted to recruit nuclear experts and 
explored the possibility of buying either a nuclear weapon or a chemical or biological one, 
and there is also evidence that Aum members received military training in Russia and 
procured various equipment from there including a Mil helicopter. 66 Aum's activities in the 
US by contrast were centred more around acquisition attempts of high technology 
equipment, many of which had dual use capabilities such as an inferometer (which can be 
used to measure plutonium), air filtration media, molecular modelling software and an 
62 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World., The Incredible Story ofAum, 1996, pp. 16-17. 63 ibid., pp. 21-31. 
64 By contrast the Japanese figures were 18,000 and 35,000 respectively. It is interesting to note that attempt 
to establish an Aum presence in two other CIS states, Ukraine and Belarus, were rebuffed by local authorities. 
65 US Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, October 31,1995, p. 19. The radio 
broadcasts were also relayed via an Aum radio tower in Vladivostok to Japan every evening. 
66 ibid. 
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industrial laser. 67 Aum also engaged in unsuccessful recruitment in Germany, maintained 
extensive financial interests in Taiwan, and operated a tea plantation in Sri Lanka. 68 The 
group also purchased a five thousand acre sheep station in a remote part of Western 
Australia. The area of the sheep station is known to contain uranium deposits and the 
group prospected for the mineral and consulted an Australian geologist about mining and 
transporting uranium by ship to Japan. Most worrying of all, there is conclusive evidence 
that the group developed and tested sann on the station using sheep as the test subjects. 69 
On a more bizarre level there is some evidence that the group attempted to cultivate the 
Ebola virus following a 'humanitarian' trip to the Congo, and visited Belgrade to explore 
the work of Nikola Tesla who examined the possibility of generating wave amplifications 
that could cause seismological disturbances. 70 
6.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan 
The activities of the Saudi Ikhwan centre around a single religious location, the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca. The group had participated in no attacks on temporal locations, 
or any other religious sites for that matter, and was denied the opportunity for further 
action when it was crushed at Mecca. The importance of the Grand Mosque meant that the 
Ikhwan had produced widespread disquiet in the Muslim umma and created a crisis of 
legitimacy for the Saudi regime. While the location was of enormous Islamic significance, 
the message of the Ikhwan was too radical (many would say even heretical) to garner any 
semblance of widespread support. 
The Grand Mosque of Mecca, is of course of profound religious significance. At 
the centre of the Grand Mosque lies the Kaabah, the holiest shrine in Islam, which contains 
the sacred Black Stone and reputedly the graves of Ismail and his mother Hagar .71 
The 
messianic dimension to the occupation of the Grand Mosque was emphasised by Qahtani 
who claimed that "[t]he Mahdi and his men will seek shelter and protection in the Holy 
Mosque because they are persecuted everywhere until they have no recourse but the Holy 
67 US Senate, Global Proliferation, p. 26. 
68 ibid., p. 29. 
69 D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror, pp. 92-93. 
70 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 96-97 & 224-225. 71 Embedded in the Eastern corner of the Kaaba is the Black Stone and as the Ka'aba is the focus of Muslim 
devotions so the Stone is the holiest object. 
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Mosque. 02 The location was not merely of traditional religious significance but also 
(according to some passages in Muslim scripture) was meant to play a role in the final 
battle. The choice of the Grand Mosque as a target may be considered a key cause of the 
Ikhwan's failure. The Saudi regime had little trouble portraying the seizure as an act of 
sacrilege and in receiving support for a military solution from the ulama. The revolt itself 
received little sympathy either within the kingdom or throughout the Muslim world. 73 Even 
contemporary Saudi Islamists such as Sa'd al-Faqih, director of the Movement for Islamic 
Reform (MIRA), condemned the take-over of the Grand Mosque as stupid as well as 
religiously wrong. Al-Faqih argues however that if Juhayman had chosen a different target 
(by which he presumably means a significant secular one) he could have been more 
successful. 74 
At the time, the sacredness of the Grand Mosque had several implications both for 
Utaybi's rebels and for the Saudi authorities. Tactically the Ikhwan had the advantage, 
occupying the various buildings of the complex and still in the company of innocent 
pilgrims who were effectively hostages, and the Saudi government initially proved to be 
psychologically and operationally ill-prepared for this sort of insurrection. 75 The Saudi 
authorities also exercised (at least in the early stages) a great deal of restraint because of 
the Grand Mosque's religious importance and also because the state the mosque was left in 
would reflect heavily upon the Saudi regime's role as 'protector of the mosques'. 76 The 
religious importance of the mosque has meant that Iran has frequently used it as a vehicle 
for criticising the Saudi regime, and in the years following the attack Iran has been directly 
implicated in orchestrating further attacks and disturbances in Mecca during the Haj. 
During the late 1980s, at low points in Iranian-Saudi relations, Ayatollah Khomeini made 
pronouncements such as "by liberating the Kaaba from the claws of the infidels we will 
72 J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan, 1979', in D. Holden & R. Johns (eds. ), The House of Saud, 1981, p. 
512. 
73 In Iran the Ayatollah Khomeini went so far as to blame the entire incident on the US and 'its corrupt colony 
Israel'. His accusations did not go unheeded and there were a series of anti-American protests across much of 
the Muslim world. See D. Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, 1996, pp. 14 & 181. 
74 M. Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, 1999, p. 154. 
's J. Paul, 'Insurrection at Mecca', MERIP Reports, # 91,1980, pp. 3-4. 
76 In October 1986 King Fahd changed his title from'Your Majesty to'Custodian of the Two Holy Places', a 
change meant to give the king greater standing amongst Muslims. See The Economist, November 8,1986. 
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enter the Holy Mosque"", and threats had also been made by a group identified as the 
Saudi Hizballah to 'liberate the Holy Ka'aba in Mecca from the Saudis'78. 
Iran's willingness to use the Grand Mosque to de-legitimise the Saudi regime was 
shown in July 1989 during the Haj when two bombs exploded just outside the Holy 
Mosque. One pilgrim was killed and about sixteen injured. A group of Shi'a Kuwaiti 
nationals who claimed to have been assisted by Iran were found responsible. 7' Twenty 
were arrested and in September four were imprisoned for varying terms, and sixteen were 
executed. At their trial, it was stated that the leader, Mansur al-Mihaymid, had informed 
his cohorts that the objectives of the attack were to: 
"instigate fear, confusion and terror amongst the pilgrims, hamper the pilgrimage 
rites, prove the weakness of the Kingdom's security apparatus and that the Kingdom 
is not capable of protecting the holy places, and that this action was to be in the 
interests of Iran. i8° 
These charges, especially those related to the inability of the Saudi regime to protect the 
holy places, were similar to those levelled at the Saudi monarchy by Iran during the Grand 
Mosque attack. While the basic purpose of this operation was in a sense religious, it was 
carried out by a religious, Shi'a state (using proxies which sympathised with that state's 
ideology) to destabilise a neighbouring state (also a religious state, merely of a different 
sort) for ideological and geo-political reasons. 81 
The symbolism of the location was also of profound political importance for the 
Saudi regime, and on a broader scale the entire Muslim world. Even though the attack was 
unsuccessful it did cast doubt over the legitimacy of the Saudi regime's custodianship of 
the Ka'aba, and as one scholar noted at the time "[i]f the Saudi government could be 
accused of a lack of religious fervour.. . then other 
Muslim states might well be liable to 
even more severe challenges. , 82 The very location of a small scale and, in so many ways, 
77 CIA, October 19,1988, p. 4. 
78 ibid. 
79 The then speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Akhbar Rafsanjani suggested that the Saudis themselves 
were responsible. See D. Pipes, The Hidden Hand, p. 272. 
130 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Tl , 1855 gmt, 21 Sept. 89 - SWB, ME/0569, A/7,23 September, 1989. s Iranian instigated religio-political violence in Mecca has been a feature during the Haj since 1979. In 1986 
for example a group of Iranians was arrested in Saudi Arabia in possession of explosives, and in a July 1987 
riot 402 persons died when Saudi police confronted an Iranian demonstration. See M. Kramer, 'Tragedy in 
Mecca', Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XJOII, # 2,1988, pp. 231 & 239. 
82 W. Ochsenswald, 'Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival', IJMES, Vol. 13, p. 271. 
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quite obviously doomed rebellion (and on a far lesser scale its messianic message) was 
enough to cause a ripple of concern far beyond the borders of the Saudi state, within a 
world rife with political tensions where activist religion was becoming a political, and 
frequently militant, force. The 1979 attack, unlike previous operations by Islamic 
militants, raised the issues of religious revival and religious destiny in the symbolic 
birthplace of Islam. 
6.4 Conclusion 
All violent religious groups possess a understanding of what might be called sacred 
geography, the perception of physical geography as it is related to their ideology. Within 
this sacred space, groups must identify specific locations for acts of violence. While the 
locations chosen for acts of religiously motivated violence are sometimes 'holy sites' or 
places of religious significance, they are more frequently temporal in nature, functional 
manifestations of the perceived foe's society. In those cases where holy sites are 
deliberately chosen, by an individual or an organisation, the backlash (or potential 
backlash) from a target society has a major impact out of proportion to the material 
damage caused. The scale of outrage caused by attacks on Holy sites is commensurate with 
their religious significance and attacks on 'lesser' religious locations, such as ordinary 
places of worship, while emotive ones do not have the same psychological resonance. Sites 
of extreme religious importance tend to be the chosen locations for groups of a messianic 
or apocalyptic orientation for whom such an action at a particular place is an important 
step in the fulfilment of an eschatological process. Mainstream and core groups, however, 
eschew these targets almost entirely because of their lack of long term tactical value. 
Mainstream and core groups do use their own religious sites but merely as focal points for 
popular demonstrations. In the case of North American Christian groups, where such 
traditional, scriptural targets are unimportant (indeed, in terms of scriptural geography, 
they are absent -a qualification which applies equally to Aum Shinrikyo), the locations 
chosen reflect those of any revolutionary organisation, merely with a certain bias 
determined by the racist dimension of their ideology. It is temporal locations which form 
the basis for mainstream and core group's tactical programmes, for it is with these, the 
cultural centres of a society, that the greatest political impact is made. Within the wider 
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perception of sacred geography the two target locations areas of holy sites and temporal 
ones share a common feature. Both represent the physical embodiment of the Manicheaen 
enemy which both threatens a religious culture and prevents the fulfilment of its divinely 
promised destiny. It is the identification of these human enemies as target groups that 
directs religious violence towards the specific act of causing casualties. 
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Chapter VII 
Targets 
While the location of violent acts encompasses both the concept of sacred 
geography, sacred space and the physical infrastructure of religious communities, the 
category of targets refers to the members of religious communities who have been defined 
by an ideological belief system as being legitimate enemies and worthy of death. At the 
ideological and rhetorical levels, target groups may represent entire 'other' religious 
communities or those apostate elements within a community which are regarded as having 
abandoned the faith, and it is these broad categories which give rise to the often cited 
claim that violent religious groups identify a 'virtually open ended category of targets'. ' 
The targets chosen by violent religious extremist groups reflect both the nature of the 
group's struggle and its Manichaean world view, but, at the same time it is crucial to 
recognise that the choices are tempered simultaneously by opportunity, environmental 
constraints and group capability. Opportunity and constraints also lead to a marked 
disparity between a totalistic rhetoric espoused and projected by a group, and the targets 
actually chosen as the focus of violence. This chapter seeks to explore this relationship 
between rhetoric and action in target selection seeking to establish a link between 
ideological statements and beliefs, and the actual pursuit of strategic objectives. 
For groups in the mainstream category, the gap between rhetoric and reality is a 
large one governed by the need for these groups to survive in open society and, in some 
cases, within the political system itself The environment certainly has an influence on the 
size of this gap as Hizballah, for example, was able to maintain its vitriolic anti-Israeli 
stance with a correspondingly effective military campaign against Israel while 
participating in the Lebanese parliamentary elections and social fabric. Hamas has 
certainly matched operational activity to target group rhetoric but issues of group survival 
dictate that the Jewish targets be attacked in a proportional fashion, especially when faced 
1 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 1998, p. 95. 
239 
with pressure from both Israel and the PA, and that many apostates within the Palestinian 
Authority not be physically targeted at all. By contrast, Kach maintained an extreme level 
of rhetoric against target groups but did not act in a concerted, centralised fashion for fear 
of jeopardising its participation in Israeli politics, a programme similar to that of Aryan 
Nations except that the latter has abstained from political participation altogether. For core 
groups, the gap between rhetoric and reality is narrower, but there are still considerable 
constraints imposed by opportunity and capability - Eyal, the Order and the PIJ have all 
experienced these practical constraints despite the clear identification of both target types 
and the absence of considerations of political system and constituency. While the 
rhetorical definition of target types by messianic and apocalyptic organisations may be the 
most totalistic, this creates a corresponding need for acts of particular severity. This 
expectation is mitigated somewhat by the expected participation of divine forces as in the 
case of the Jewish Underground, an expectation that is further intensified when the 
leadership of a group considers itself to be divine as the case of Aum Shinrikyo and the 
Saudi Ikhwan. 
7.1 Mainstream 
7.1.1 Kach 
Although conducted at different levels of intensity, Kach has targeted political 
groups, other religions and co-religionists. The choice of targets have been heavily 
influenced by environmental political context and (before his assassination) by Kahane's 
own shrewd perception of popular sympathy with his ideas. Thus, for example, while the 
basic rhetorical ideas of the group remained unchanged from JDL operations in the US to 
the formation of Kach in Israel, the targets actually selected varied enormously. All, 
however, fell under the category of 'gentiles' and to this broad spectrum of non-Jewish 
enemies, there is an equally despised group of Jews who are deemed to be in league with 
the gentiles, propagating their beliefs and betraying the true destiny of Judaism. These are 
the so called'Hellenisers', most immediately associated with the Israeli political left. While 
the group's rhetoric was not matched by activity for reasons of political survival, the targets 
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identified by Kach became powerful tools for incitement and violence perpetrated by 
splinter groups and individuals. 
The various targets from other religions that Kach selected originated from the 
ideological premise of revenge. Although the establishment of a Jewish state and the 
gathering in of the exiles was an important step towards Jewish redemption (both temporal 
and spiritual) for Kach, it only really solved the problem of exile. Kahane reasoned that the 
only way for the Jewish people to redress the damage caused by two millennia of 
persecution and humiliation was "a concrete revenge, a physical humiliation of the 
Gentiles. "2 In fact, this was the basis of Kahane's often repeated 'fist in the face of the 
gentile'. While the gentile identified has not always been the same - at various times 
encompassing the Romans, the Catholic Church, the Russians, the Nazis, blacks and the 
Arabs - this character has been a historical constant for the Jewish people. Following the 
establishment of the Jewish state and the perceived connivance of some Jews with their 
gentile oppressors, the concept of revenge, backed by Halakhic rulings, has been extended 
to Jews who impede Jewish redemption. 
The context in which targets are chosen is extremely important for Kach. When the 
JDL was operating in the US it concentrated its activities against those groups that were 
seen to pose a threat against the Jewish community such as black militants. 3 Later, the 
Soviet Union became a prime target because of official Soviet policies towards its Jewish 
population. From the late 1960s, the Soviet Union's persecution of Jews and refusal to let 
Jews emigrate (especially to Israel) became the primary motivations for JDL action. ' 
Legal demonstrations and protests soon gave way in the early 1970s to assaults and 
bombings of Soviet diplomats and diplomatic missions, Soviet cultural offices and official 
agencies, American firms conducting business with the Soviet Union and institutions 
involved in US-Soviet cultural exchanges. 5 When Kahane emigrated to Israel, his ideology 
quickly adjusted to deal with the new environment. He moved away from the idea which 
2 E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The Ideologization of 
Mimetic Desire', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed. ), Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1991, p. 51. 3 R. Friedman, The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane - From FBI Informant to Knesset Member, 1990, pp. 
83-92. These confrontations were encouraged by the FBI, ibid., pp. 93-98. 
4 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the 
Rabin Assassination, 1999, pp. 187-188. 
5 R. Friedman, The False Prophet, pp. 114-115. 
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he had developed in the US that Jews could be saved simply by moving to the Jewish state. 
Rather he simply transposed his Jewish and Gentile enemies from the American context 
onto the Israeli one. His continued calls for vigilante justice were the same, they were - 
after a period of acclimatisation - primarily directed towards the Arabs and liberal Israelis. 
6 
When Kahane emigrated to Israel, demonstrations were still organised against the 
Soviet Union, and towards this cause his initially small band of American followers found 
a willing support base amongst Soviet emigres. The Holy Land itself, however, provided 
him with an entirely new array of potential targets. The first of these were in many respects 
peripheral, such as Christian missionaries and the small and obscure sect of American 
blacks in the southern town of Dimona. 7 While Israelis generally disapproved of Christian 
missionary activity, there was seldom trouble over their presence and activities. 8 Similarly 
the small sect in Dimona, which claimed to be Jewish (but was not), was at best of 
marginal interest to the majority of Israelis, if indeed they were aware of the sect at all. 9 
Kahane, however, chose to apply literal Halakic interpretations to both groups, conducted 
demonstrations and succeeded in elevating both issues in the public consciousness as well 
as raising his own public persona. The choice of these targets is interesting. Both were 
fairly obscure and unlikely to arouse any degree of sympathy within Israeli society (the 
same could be said of the Soviet Union) and Kahane, as a new immigrant with a narrow 
support base, may have reasoned that a direct confrontation with either the Arab 
community or the Israeli state would at this early stage be unwise. 
Despite his 'outsider' status, Kahane began less than a year after his arrival to focus 
on the Arab community as the prime obstacle to the survival of the state of Israel and 
eventual Jewish redemption. 10 To Kahane, the Arab states, the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories, the Palestinian diaspora and those Arabs who remained in Israel proper as 
6 It should be noted that JDL and JDL splinter groups continued their parallel activities in the US after 
Kahane's emigration, and he was certainly involved with his followers there despite officially resigning as head 
of the JDL on April 17 1974. 
7 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, pp. 189-190. 
8A marginal exception is Yad LeAchim ('a hand for our brethren'), established in the 1970s to combat 'alien' 
roselytization. 
The Black Jews' emerged from Harlem, New York city after the First World War. One of the first leaders, 
Prophet F. S. Cherry claimed that his followers were the true Israelites of the Bible and that Jesus was black. 
There are a number of different sects that all claim to be descendants of Ethiopian Hebrews. 
'o Sprinzak rightly points to the facts that Kahane had never served in the IDF nor fought in Israel's wars as 
potentially undermining Kahane's popularity. 
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Israeli citizens were one and the same. Kahane stated of the Arabs who lived within the 
pre-Six Day War boundaries of the Jewish state, that: 
"[he] feels no loyalty to his government... He is hostile and is full of hate for the 
Jewish majority, for in his heart he is a Palestinian' and an Arab Nationalist... But 
since he suffers from a guilt feeling, for his Israeli citizenship, he is a much more 
dangerous enemy. "' 1 
Palestinians were dehumanised in Kach rhetoric, referred to as 'dogs' who, when they paid 
lip service to making peace with Israel, were merely showing their capacity for 
deviousness. Indeed, it is the untrustworthiness of the gentiles generally and the Arabs in 
particular that precludes any form of agreement between them and the Jews and defines 
Kach's Manicheaen attitude towards them. As Kahane wrote in 1983, "[t]he enemies of 
Israel will never make peace; they will never seek less than the total elimination of the 
Jewish State; they do not want compromise because they look upon us as robbers and 
bandits. " 12 
By identifying liberal Western secularism as a root cause of the plight of the Jewish 
people, Kach automatically set itself in opposition to certain segments of Israeli society. 
Kach members targeted anti-war demonstrators, attacked homosexuals and Jewish women 
suspected of relations with Arab men, and threatened various members of the 'liberal left' 
including journalists, artists, intellectuals and politicians. In the words of Kahane: 
"[i]t takes great strength to love Jews so much that one fights for them. It takes, 
perhaps, even more strength to love Jews so much that one fights Jews who would 
destroy them. The pity is that most Jews are so weak and apathetic that they neither 
love nor hate enough. if 13 
The term Hellenist' examined in Chapter Three is a particularly damning label to apply to 
these apostates. In a 1987 paper, entitled Jews and Jews, Kahane stated that: 
" M. Kahane, The Challenge: The Chosen Land, p. 39-47, cited in E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 
199. 
'2 M. Kahane, Listen World, Listen Jew, 1983, p. 139. 
13 R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', New York Review of Books, 1986, p. 19. 
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"[t]he Jews against the Hellenists, far more than the Jews against the Arabs, is the 
real struggle. And the Hellenists, with their destructive anarchy of worthless values, 
have already created a spiritual holocaust within the Holy Land. "'4 
Hellenists are thus seen as a worse enemy than the Arabs because they form an enemy 
from within, eroding Jewish culture, and the term defines them in such a way that they 
become not truly Jewish but agents of Judaism's destruction. 
Although the rhetorical definition of Kach's targets is extreme and all embracing in 
nature, the reality is somewhat different. Obviously for a mainstream group, which has 
actively sought involvement in the political process, extensive violent activity would not 
be rewarded with success. While Kach has engaged in low level violence against its 
declared targets, these activities have been of a sufficient magnitude to ensure no massive 
response by the state. Where the totalist attitude towards target groups has been pursued 
literally, it has been primarily by splinter groups associated with Kach, such as TNT, or by 
individuals, such as Baruch Goldstein. In this last instance, the role of target rhetoric as a 
vehicle for incitement actually resulted in the repression and legal prohibition which the 
organisation had so long sought to avoid. 
7.1.2 Aryan Nations 
When discussing the targets of Aryan Nations, it is important to note that they exist 
almost exclusively as rhetorical targets and not physical ones. This is primarily for reasons 
of group survival. In the instances where targets identified in the group's rhetoric have been 
physically attacked, these attacks have been conducted by members acting individually or 
by splinter groups imbued with the group's ideology such as the Order. The targets 
identified by Aryan Nations loosely follow the dichotomy of other religions and apostates, 
although the distinction is complicated by the issues of race and scriptural deviation, and 
by the dominant and pervasive role of the Jewish people who are identified as the literal 
offspring of Satan who are believed to orchestrate a plot to enslave and destroy the Aryan 
people. An integral part of this plot is the federal government which is seen as being 
directed by Jewish interests. Non-Aryans, such as blacks and other 'mud peoples', despite 
their religious orientation, are comprehensively demonised as are those who deviate from 
14 M. Kahane, Jews and Jews, http: //www. geocities. com/Athens/1651/writingsrewjew. htm. 
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scriptural rulings, such as homosexuals. Aryans, who are accused of 'race mixing', 
collaboration or sympathy with or membership of the aforementioned 'out groups', form 
the largest and most amorphous target group. 
In fact, the primary object of Aryan Nations ire is the Jewish people. For Aryan 
Nations, as distinct from some other Identity adherents, this is the racial Jew descended 
from Satan through Cain, an identification which serves to bolster the religious racist 
dimension of the group's belief system. 15 The demonic dimension of the Jewish people not 
only arouses communal enmity but also positions them as the "natural enemy of our Aryan 
(White) Race. " 16 Aryan Nations literature offers a large quantity of pseudo-historical and 
scriptural proofs that the Jews are some form of cosmic foe, and this is related in turn to 
the presence of people of Jewish descent within American society. " The cosmic nature of 
the Jewish enemy is further amplified through the perception of a global Jewish plot to 
prevent the realisation of the Aryan peoples destiny, a plot manifested through financial 
institutions, the media and ultimately ZOG. 
It is this last manifestation of Jewish control, through the US federal government, 
which provides Aryan Nations with an all pervasive temporal enemy and a powerful 
disincentive for participating in mainstream society. This rejection of government in turn 
poses a threat to the group: "Christian Aryan Nations has separated itself from this evil and 
corrupt tyranny and therefore must be destroyed. ""' This acute sense of threat, in turn, 
makes the government a more urgent target, either in a defensive or offensive capacity. 
The urgency of the threat posed by the government is exemplified by events such as Ruby 
Ridge and Waco which imply at the very least the need for accelerated defensive 
preparations to prevent their reoccurrence. This defensive stance, however, is frequently 
reversed with suggestions that the only real solution is a 'race war' similar in course and 
format to the one described in The Turner Diaries, a powerful rhetorical device which 
accords with the messianic precepts of a final battle. The interesting dimension of ZOG as 
a target group is that it represents a broad array of confessional components and racial 
is J Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, 1990, p. 93. 
16 Aryan Nations Website. 
17 See for instance 'Where to look in the Bible for Jews', 
http: //www. nidlink. com/%7wheretolookforniggers. html., and 'Why Jews are Persecuted for Their Religion', 
http: /www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic, rjewper. html. 
1s See Aryan Nations Website, http: //www. nidlink. com--aryanvic/anthrax. html. 
245 
groups but its overriding significance is its function as a tool of the primary, other religious 
target group, the Jews. 
Beyond the scope of other religions or apostates as target groups, there exists the 
racist dimension of Aryan Nations ideology. The identification of these targets is derived 
from selective readings of scripture, but the most blatant and simplistic identifications 
come in the form of Aryan Nations pamphlets and propaganda. 19 Some examples include 
the "Official Runnin' [sic] Nigger Target"20, the "Aryan Nation District of Idaho Nigger 
Hunting Licence ,21, and the flyer for the 1981 convocation at Hayden Lake entitled 
"Summer Conference and Nigger Shoot. "22 The latter contains the line: "[c]ivil Right 
comes out of the barrel of a gun and we mean to give the Niggers and Jews all the Civil 
Rights they can handle i23, linking the areas of race and liberal activism. By extension, this 
target category includes Aryans who have relations with other races. One such publication 
covers the issue of 'race traitors', claiming that "[m]iscegenation is race treason; Race 
treason is a capital offense [sic]; It will be punished by death, automatic, by Public 
Hanging. Negroes involved in miscegenation will be shot as they are apprehended. 1'24 
A related target group which partly transcends the religious dimension but largely 
falls under the category of apostate is that of 'liberals'. As with other extremist religious 
groups, Aryan Nations identifies liberalism with the moral decay of contemporary society 
and its irreligious nature. Liberal toleration of all things which Aryan Nations is opposed 
to, such as race mixing, abortion, homosexualityz', immigration of non-whites and the 
successors to the civil right movement, is a reflection of the group's inherent 
fundamentalism. Liberals are seen as a dominating force within ZOG, encouraging and 
institutionalising those practices which the groups finds abhorrent through programmes 
exemplified by affirmative action and legislation such as the seventeenth amendment and 
19 For some scriptural proofs see 'Beast-Chaya-Negro', 
http: //www. nidlink. com/%7Earyanvic/wheretolookforniggers. html. 
20 Aryan Nations pamphlet A, n. d. 
21 Aryan Nations pamphlet B, n. d. 
22 Aryan Nations, 'Subject Residents of the Aryan Empire: Summer Conference and Nigger Shoot', 1981. 
23 ibid. 
24 Aryan Nations pamphlet C, n. d. 25 "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an abomination. " Leviticus 18: 22. For an Identity 
treatise on homosexuality see P. Peters, Intolerance of, Discrimination Against and the Death Penalty for 
Homosexuals is Prescribed in the Bible, 1992. 
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anti-discrimination laws. Thus all target groups - the Jews, government, non-whites, 
liberals and homosexuals - are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. 
Although there is a pronounced gap between the rhetoric and activity of Aryan 
Nations, instances where individuals or splinters have turned to violence are illustrative of 
the target types selected. Where individuals have acted, their chosen targets have tended to 
be Jews, blacks or homosexuals. When a law enforcement official has been targeted, this 
has been usually in reaction to an impending arrest or similar threat. As will be noted 
below, the activities of the Order followed a similar pattern. The failure to pursue 'high 
value' members of these target groups such as prominent members of a community, public 
persons or high ranking personnel is basically a function of capabilities. From a strictly 
group perspective, however, rhetoric has not been matched by activity primarily because of 
fears for group survival in a largely law abiding society with an effective law enforcement 
apparatus. 
7.1.3 Hizballah 
The targets identified by Hizballah are familiar to those of most Islamic extremist 
organisations although, as with all others, they are profoundly influenced by the 
environmental context. Thus, over time, Hizballah has found itself at various instances 
targeting foreign intervention forces - primarily the Israelis, rival Islamic organisations and 
Israel's proxies. The selections of these target groups have been designed for maximum 
political gain and effect whilst they have reflected both the group's growing sophistication 
and at times the immediate political imperatives of their chief sponsor Iran. The 
environmental context within which the group has operated, fundamentally one of a 
'lawless zone' during 1982-1990, enabled Hizballah to narrow the gap between rhetoric and 
activity. 
The primary target group for Hizballah has naturally been Israel. In fact Israel is 
identified not only as an unacceptable foreign influence within Lebanon but also as an 
illegitimate state entity and therefore an enemy of Islam. The primary objection Fadlallah 
levels at the 'beast' of Zionism is its claim to Israel: 
"[i]t is uncivilised for a people that [once] lived in a certain country to return after 
thousands of years, demand that country and deport its inhabitants, in order to revive 
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its [ancient] identity. Additionally, the Israeli claim that Palestine was Jewish is 
historically inaccurate... Isaac, for example, did not start as a Jew but as prophet and 
it is not true that everybody is from the seed of Isaac.. . 
Their racism, reflected in the 
phrase 'the chosen people', is a starting point that is condescending and hostile to the 
world. 26" 
The struggle is defined by emphasising the spiritual superiority and moral righteousness of 
Hizballah over the Israelis. As Sheikh Nasrallah has described the nature of the conflict: 
"[t]wo parties are fighting in Southern Lebanon, the highest hope of a soldier or an 
officer in one of the parties [the 1DF] is to return to his family and home, while the 
highest hope of an individual of the other party [Hizballah] is to achieve martyrdom. 
We have a great[er] spiritual superiority. , 27 
In the original Hizballah programme, Israel is identified as the greatest enemy: 
"[o]ur primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is 
aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the 
expense of the rights of Muslim peoples. Therefore our struggle will only end when 
this entity is obliterated. "28 
Despite this rhetorical militancy, Hizballah changed progressively in emphasis from a 
resistance organisation to a stable and unifying political force. Moreover, the Israeli 
withdrawal from Southern Lebanon has resulted in a cessation (or at least tactical 
suspension) of anti-Israeli activity rather than the pursuit of Israel's elimination, further 
reflecting the temporal political pragmatism of the group. 
Although Israel has represented the primary target of physical violence, it is the 
Western world and the US in particular which are blamed for many of the problems in the 
Middle East. The Hizballah manifesto outlines that: 
"[w]e shall proceed to fight the vice at its very roots.. . the 
first roots of such vice 
being the United States. .. 
Imam Khomeini emphasised on many occasions that 
America is the cause of all our calamities and that she is the mother of all malice. "29 
26MEMRI, Special Dispatch # 35, June 17,1999. 
27 / J? J Special Dispatch # 36, June 23,1999. 
28 An open letter "To all the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World", Feb. 26th, 1985. The programme was 
originally read by Hizballah's then spokesman, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, at the al-Ouzai mosque in West 
Beirut. 
29 Cited in H. Jaber, Hizballah: Born With a Vengeance, 1997, p. 57. 
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The basis of this hatred is the group's perception that the US supported Israel's 1982 
invasion and continued to support the 'alien' Israeli presence in the region and operations in 
Lebanon since then. The United States and other Western powers have only been physical 
targets for Hizballah when they have been directly involved in Lebanon as with the French 
and American contingents of the MNF in 1983, and Western nationals during Hizballah's 
hostage taking campaign during the 1980s. Following the withdrawal of these contingents 
and the effective end of the hostage campaign, the West has reverted to being a collective 
rhetorical target, albeit an extremely potent one, defined primarily by the close association 
of the US with Israel and, on occasion, by popular perceptions in the West. Statements by 
Western leaders in the early 1990s, for example, that Islamic fundamentalism posed the 
next major security threat for the West had the corresponding effect of hardening anti- 
Western perceptions, especially amongst organisations such as Hizballah. In early 1995, 
Sheikh Fadlallah reacted to such statements by accusing the US of declaring 'World War' 
against Islam and that "[t]hey consider that Islam... is a danger to US interests... and the US 
is mobilising the world, including NATO, against Islam. 00 Fadlallah's assessment of 
Christianity in the modern Western world is that it has failed as a moral force in terms of 
historical perspective and theological basis, highlighting Hizballah's moral and spiritual 
superiority. Fadlallah believes that most Westerners: 
"have no bias toward religion anymore. There is a reasonable chance that 
Christianity would penetrate the consciousness of the westerner using his historical 
baggage and the state of spiritual vacuum in which he finds himself... the West 
however, is still secular and thus separates religion from the state. .. the 
Westerner is 
not Christian in the profound sense of the word. 01 
While the West, as a target group, has rarely been presented as 'Christian', the 
sectarian dimension of the Lebanese civil wars provided a more tangible basis for targeting 
other religious groups. The conflict between Hizballah and the Christian militias during 
the civil war was partly the result of centuries of second class citizenship of the Shi'ite 
community in Lebanon, institutionalised through the 1943 National Pact, and partly the 
result of the close relationship between the Christian community and Israel. Following the 
30 FBIS-NES-95-034,21 February, 1995, p. 70. 
31 MEMRI, Special Dispatch # 35, June 17,1999. 
249 
Israeli withdrawal to the southern security zone in 1985, and the eventual prospect of 
involvement in mainstream politics in 1992 major attempts were made to bridge gaps 
between the two communities by identifying a common enemy: "Muslims are not your 
enemies in this country and you are not ours. We both have a common enemy: Israel. "'` At 
a previous ceremony, commemorating a suicide bomber and a martyr, the Deputy- 
Secretary-General Sheikh Qasim stated: 
"[w]e believe in Christ and Christianity, which is part of Islam and interacts with 
it... But for some people to hide behind a cross, make themselves enemies of the 
people, and bring Israel once again into our territories, such a comparison is of no 
use... We are against both the Zionised Maronite and the Zionised Shi'ite. i33 
Allegiance to Israel is thus the primary cause of condemnation and hostility. 
By the same token, conflict between Hizballah and apostates within Lebanon is 
also seen in more nationalist terms. During the period of confrontation between Hizballah 
and Amal in 1988, which was effectively an internecine power struggle for control of 
Southern Lebanon and southern Beirut, Hizballah adopted a tone of regret. As Sheikh 
Fadlallah stated, "we consider any internecine fighting in the arena that is sincerely 
confronting Israel a loss to all sides. 04 Again, a different tone is taken regarding those 
collaborating with Israel, in this case the South Lebanon Army (SLA) many of whose rank 
and file are Shi'ites. Hizballah identifies members of the SLA as traitors who "should be 
tried and punished according to the law", an attitude supported by the Lebanese 
government. In 1996, the government charged more than ninety SLA officers with 
collaborating with Israel and sentenced them to life imprisonment in absentia. The last 
leader of the SLA, Antoine Lahad, was sentenced to death in absentia in December 1996. 
Despite this condemnation, Hizballah had repeatedly called for militia members to defect 
and over the years a number did indeed desert . 
35 Despite these threats of action to be taken 
against SLA members Hizballah acted with remarkable restraint following Israel's 
withdrawal in May 2000 as it refrained from punishing SLA members. 
32 Voice of the Oppressed, 0550 gmt, 12 Sep. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1485, A/12-13, September 14,1992. 33 Radio Lebanon, 1530 gmt, 29 Aug. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1473, A/13-14, August 31,1992. 34 Radio Monte Carlo, 1750 gmt, 13 May 88 - BBC/SWB, ME/0152, A/6, May 16,1988. 35 H. Jaber, Hizballah, 1997, p. 206-207. 
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The target groups selected by Hizballah reflect the nature of the group's struggle as 
a nationalist religious conflict inspired largely by the primarily Islamic Iranian revolution. 
Hizballah, in common with most Islamic groups, perceives its struggle as a defensive one 
against the encroachments of the 'illegitimate' Zionist state and those elements of the 
secular West (primarily the US) which support it. 36 Thus the targets chosen have reflected 
the group's desire to defend the Shi'ite community and the state of Lebanon from external 
assault and external sponsorship of domestic elements. Despite the activism of Hizballah, a 
gap remains between the rhetoric concerning Israel (and to a lesser extent the United 
States) and military activity against Israel. While the totalist version calls for the 
elimination of the Israeli state, practical considerations militate against pursuing such a 
course in the immediate future, although the broad time frame within which Hizballah sees 
itself as operating allows the group a certain degree of flexibility in the pursuit of its long 
term objectives. 
7.1.4 Hamas 
Similarly to Hizballah, Hamas sees itself as engaged in a struggle for national 
liberation and so the targets selected by the group reflect the fundamentally internal nature 
of the struggle to create a Palestinian state. The primary other religious target group are the 
Israelis and there is also a rhetorical targeting of those Western states, primarily the US, 
which supports and arms the state of Israel. The category of apostates is filled by those 
who have collaborated with the Israelis and, on a more rhetorical level, the PA for 
attempting to achieve a negotiated peace with the 'Zionist enemy'. The circumstances 
within which Hamas exists, however, ensure that target selection is justified well beyond 
mere demonisation and that most apostate targets within the PA are not acted against 
because not only would this limit the group's appeal to the Palestinian people but divisions 
within the Palestinian community are blamed on the schemes by Israel undermining 
Palestinian unity. Therefore, Hamas emphasises its restraint in turning Palestinian brother 
against brother, deflecting away from the true mission of liberating Palestine from Israeli 
control. 
36 See for example statements such as made by the pro-Hizballah radio station Voice of the Oppressed, 0530 
gnt, 1 Jun. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1397, A/9, June 3,1992. 
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In common with all extremist groups, Hamas has frequently used the rhetorical 
instrument of dehumanising their enemies, primarily the Israelis. One of the more extreme 
examples refers to the Jews as "brothers of the apes, assassins of the prophets, 
bloodsuckers, warmongers... Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream. 07 
Such comments, however, must be seen in the light of the group's image of itself as 
engaged in a defensive struggle. The Hamas charter, for example, states that the movement 
is a'humane' one which "cares for human rights and is committed to the tolerance inherent 
in Islam as regards attitudes towards other religions. It is only hostile to those who are 
hostile towards it, or stand in its way in order to disturb its moves or frustrate its efforts. 08 
With the escalation in the scale of Hamas attacks during the 1990s, the group began to 
discuss the selection of Israeli targets in reactive and proportional terms. In response to 
questions about whether killing civilians is justified, one Hamas leader responded: 
"[t]hat is the basis but the Israelis never respected that principle and civilian 
members of our people are killed ... 
Hamas has been and still is anxious not to harm 
children, woman or elderly people.. . 
but mistakes occur sometimes and some 
members of these groups fall victim, but unintentionally. 09 
Nonetheless, the continuing justice of the struggle and the legitimacy of attacking Israeli 
civilians have remained constant themes. In a fatwa issued by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, 
the legitimacy of targeting Israelis - both military and civilian is clearly outlined: 
"[t]he Israeli usurped Palestine, killed its people, and displaced those who 
stayed... therefore fighting them is a must to protect land and honour... [furthermore] 
all the Israeli society is a military society because both men and women are soldiers 
in the [IDF] who are summoned when they are needed. Therefore they are not 
civilians and killing them is permitted by Islamic law. "4° 
While the label of apostate may be attached to Hamas's perceived Islamic foes, this 
may encompass 'collaborators' who have co-operated with the Israelis, and also the secular 
PA which has deviated from resistance as a strategy and engaged in negotiated settlement 
37 January 1988, cited in Cited in S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and 
Coexistence, 2000, p. 52. 
38 Article 31 of the Harnas Charter. 
39 A1-Hayat, London, 11 Mar. 96 - BBCISWB, ME/2559, MED/7, March 13,1996. 40 AI-Sabil, March 19-25,1996. 
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which will mean territorial compromise with Israel. Targeting collaborators serves the dual 
purpose of punishing those in league with the enemy and also reduces the effectiveness of 
Israeli intelligence gathering. With the establishment of the Palestinian autonomous areas, 
however, this target group has declined considerably. The attitude towards those 
Palestinians engaged in the peace process is clear. One Hamas leaflet outlines that "[l]et 
any hand be cut off that signs [away] a grain of sand in Palestine in favour of the enemies 
of God... who have seized... the blessed land. "41 Despite disputes with the PA, as well as PA 
repression of Hamas, the group has never risked an open declaration that the Authority 
itself is an enemy and conducted operations against it. Such a course would invite further 
repression which would threaten the very existence of the group, further alienate the 
majority of Palestinians who support the peace process, and also ignore the fact that 
despite their differences Hamas and the PA have frequently found much common 
ground . 
42 A good example of this was the muted response to the March 1998 killing of 
Muhiya al-Din al-Sharif, a senior Izz al-Din al-Qassam leader. While Hamas openly 
accused the PA of complicity in his death, the group was careful not to let this lead to full- 
scale protest which would have incurred severe reprisals. 43 
The identification of target groups by Hamas reflects the group's orientation as both 
a resistor of occupation and the true successor to the leadership of the Palestinian people in 
a complete Palestinian state. The rhetoric used to identify targets and legitimise violence 
against them, however, is severely moderated by pragmatic considerations. Even though 
the Israeli people are the primary target, much of the organisation's Manicheaen rhetoric is 
tempered by claims that Hamas is waging a defensive struggle and that this struggle is 
primarily proportional in nature. Those countries which have aided Israel are also vilified, 
but, because they lie beyond Hamas's operational environment, they remain rhetorical 
targets which help place the Palestinian struggle in a wider, global context. Palestinians, 
who have collaborated with the Israelis, have formed an obvious target category and yet 
the Palestinian Authority which dares to compromise with Israel and has at times actively 
al March 13,1988. Cited in S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Harnas, p. 51. 
42 Hamas has encouraged its members not to antagonise members of the Palestinian police, and even to 
cultivate them as possible resources in the struggle against Israel. ibid., p. 140. 
43 S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 110. 
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suppressed Hamas, is not targeted in an active fashion because the onus of blame for a 
divided Palestinian community is placed with Israel. 
7.2 Core 
7.2.1 Eyal 
Like Kach (the parent movement which inspired it), Eyal targeted both Palestinian 
Arabs and liberal Jews, especially those who actively supported the peace process. Due to 
the small size of the group and the unusual circumstances behind its formation, there was a 
large gap between the rhetoric directed at these groups and the action taken against them. 
The much publicised vow taken by Eyal activists involved a commitment to do injury to 
Arabs and to oppose with violence any withdrawal from the territories is illustrative of 
this. It is important to note that had the group been better organised and not so thoroughly 
penetrated by the GSS, this gap could have been narrowed considerably. 
Most of the actions taken against both Arabs and Jews were of a relatively low 
order, expressing the group's militant orientation without attracting unwanted attention 
from the Israeli security services. When Raviv moved to Kiryat Arba in 1994, he 
frequently organised attacks on Arabs and Arab property in the alleyways of Hebron in 
which he frequently participated. 44 The objective was not so much to kill Arabs but to 
inflict a degree of physical and psychological harm in a reasonably permissive 
environment, an approach which reflected the tactics of Kach. While conducted on a lesser 
scale, left-wing and liberal Jews were also targeted by Eyal, most commonly through 
abuse, threats and assaults. In this light, it is not surprising that some of Avashai Raviv's 
early activities included beating up activists of the left-wing group Yesha Gvul ('There's a 
Limit') who advocated the refusal of military service in Lebanon or the occupied 
territories. The only crime for which Raviv served any time (nine months) was the assault 
on Tamar Gozansky, a Knesset member for the leftist Democratic Front for Peace45. 
Despite the low level of these actions, the rhetoric and ideology of the group certainly 
44 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God. The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin, 1998, pp. 218-219. 
45 ibid., pp. 215 & 218-219. 
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allowed for an expansion of these activities. An Israel television Channel One interview, 
with an unidentified Eyal activist, is instructive in this regard: 
Interviewer: "Who [would you kill]? " 
Activist: "Whoever I am told" 
Interviewer: "Arabs? " 
Activist: "Whether it is a terrorist or just an Arab, everybody" 
Interviewer: "If you were told to kill Jews? " 
Activist: "There are Jews who are not Jews, in my view" 
Interviewer: "If you were told to kill Jews, will you kill them too? " 
Activist: "If it is a Jew who is not a Jew, and people can understand to whom I am 
referring, then yes. "46 
It was the latter category of Jewish targets which brought Eyal to international 
infamy when the group was associated with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The 
targeting of Jews with the intent to kill is a disturbing feature of Jewish extremism in the 
1990s and is directly linked to the peace process. Tension between the Israeli left and right 
had existed for some time, sometimes in the form of violent demonstrations and 
provocative counter-demonstrations. In 1983, Emil Greentzweig, a peace now 
demonstrator, became the first fatality of this societal conflict when a grenade was thrown 
into a Peace Now rally. 47 The difference, after the signing of the Oslo accords in 
September 1993, was the perception that a leftist, liberal government had betrayed the 
redemptive vision of a greater Israel and the concurrent revival by orthodox rabbis of the 
obsolete Halakhic concepts of din rodef (the duty to kill a Jew who endangers another 
Jew's life or property) and din moser (the duty to kill a Jew who intends to turn another 
Jew over to gentile authorities)48. 
While there were many individuals responsible for the creation and progress of the 
peace process, and an even greater number which supported it, the ire of Eyal and other 
extremist Jewish groups was generally directed primarily at Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon 
46 FBIS-TOT-96-0 I -L, Profile of Extreme Jewish Right-Wing Movements', November 9,1995. 47 The perpetrator, Yonah Abrushmi, while inspired by right wing rhetoric appears to have no identifiable 
group affiliation and was motivated by personal reasons. 
48 I. Shahak & N. Mezvinsky, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, 1999, pp. 137-149. 
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Peres. The two were seen as almost equally culpable. As one Eyal member, Dror Adani, 
stated: 
"Let us say that both should be defined as murderers who should be sentenced to 
death; however we did not decide who was to go first. It is possible that seeing Rabin 
was easy to get, we might have gone after Peres as Well. r49 
Indeed, on the night of the assassination, Yigal Amir saw Shimon Peres first and he was 
guarded even more loosely than Rabin, but Amir waited for the target he regarded as 
primarily culpable for the 'murder' of Jews. 50 In the sense that the assassination of Rabin 
alone was regarded as sufficient to alter the Israeli political status quo, a millenarian 
comparison can be made with the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 when the act was 
less part of a concerted strategy and more an attempt to restore the political process to the 
path of divine fulfilment through a single, symbolic acts' 
The gap between rhetoric and action in Eyal's case was a function of the group's 
small size, its short life span and its penetration by the GSS. In light of this gap, it is, 
however, important to note that it was the rhetoric of the group (and those themes 
espoused by the group which were reflected throughout the Israeli extreme right) which 
inspired the assassination of Rabin. In terms of its world outlook, Eyal represented a 
militant development of Kahanist ideology in light of the advancing Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process and as such traditional target priorities had altered. Targeting the Palestinian 
community remained a constant, but the danger posed by the apostate elements within 
Israeli society and Israeli politics was perceived to have grown to such an extent that more 
extreme action than any considered in the past was required. 
7.2.2 The Order 
The rhetorical targets of the Order were very similar in content to those of most 
other extreme right-wing groups. The major difference being that the Order decided to act 
and once this decision had been made, target selection became driven by circumstance and 
expedience. Practical constraints, such as the size and capabilities of the group, overall 
strategy and the security environment within which they operated, meant that the targets 
49 FBIS-NES-95-226, 'Suspect Names Rabbi Consulted on Assassination Plan', November 23,1995. 
so M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 176-177. 
51 M. Taylor & E. Quayle, Terrorist Lives, 1994, p. 216. 
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selected differed appreciably from the rhetorical ones. There were, for example, no 
attempts to kill blacks and other'mud peoples', nor was any concerted effort made to attack 
the federal government and its agents: despite the fact that America was (and still is by 
unrepentant members) seen as "the murderer of the White Race. "'` 
Considering the racial and anti-government beliefs and rhetoric of the group it is 
perhaps surprising that the first death the group was responsible for was a member of 
Aryan Nations, Walter West. West was a member of Aryan Nations and soon after the 
Order began committing armed robberies, it was reported to Mathews that West had been 
getting drunk in bars around Hayden Lake and talking loudly about a group of 'religiously 
motivated men' robbing banks. In May 1984, West was lured to the Kaniksu national forest 
and murdered. 53 West no doubt falls under the category of a 'traitor' for the extreme right, 
but he might be more accurately described as a security risk - the label of 'apostate' seems 
wholly inappropriate. 54 The killing was not surprising because of the group's obsessive 
need for secrecy in its embryonic stage, and the example of eliminating untrustworthy 
fellow Aryans offered by the Turner Diaries. 
When Mathews began to think of specific targets for assassination, the actual list 
reflected both the group's ideology and his own preferences. At the top was Morris Dees, 
head of the Southern Poverty Law Centre and the Klanwatch project. 55 Next was the 
television producer Norman Lear, who was held responsible for debasing popular culture, 
and third was the controversial Jewish talk radio host Alan Berg. There was a so-called 
'doomsday assassination plan' which was to be enacted if the group was discovered, and 
this included Henry Kissinger, and the Rothschild and Rockefeller families, members of 
Congress and various other public figures. 56 In the end, the only assassination the group 
carried out was that of Alan Berg, mainly because the circumstances were fortuitous. The 
fact that Berg was actually Jewish, however, was not the primary consideration (merely an 
added bonus). Berg - like all the others the group considered as targets - was symbolic of 
52 D. Lane, Tri-Coloured Treason, n. p., n. d. 
53 See K. Flynn & G. Gehardt, The Silent Brotherhood, 1990, pp. 203-208. 
54 Claims that West beat his wife, drank heavily and was generally not a true, wholesome Aryan possibly made 
the decision to end his life easier. 
55 According to Dees Mathews intended to kidnap him, torture him to extract as much information as possible 
and then kill him. See M. Dees & J. Corcoran, Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat, 1996, p. 144. 
56 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 233-235. 
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the 'great sickness' which the Order felt had fallen across America, a sickness involving 
many but orchestrated by the Jews: "[i]t is self evident to all those who have eyes to see 
that an evil shadow has fallen across our once fair land" stated Mathews in his declaration 
of war against ZOG: 
"evidence abounds that a certain alien people have taken control of our people.. . 
Our 
cities swarm with dusky hordes... [and] the capitalists and communists pick gleefully 
at our bones while the vile hook-nosed masters of usury orchestrate our 
destruction. "57 
The targets chosen to be killed were intended both to disconcert their broad array of 
enemies and to show Americans that the extreme right was not toothless. 
It is indicative of the short life span of the group that no concerted efforts were 
made to attack individuals associated with the federal government. The only examples 
where individuals in the employ of the federal government were targeted were purely 
defensive. Mathews shot at federal agents when they attempted to arrest him in Portland, 
Oregon, and again when he was besieged in the house on Whidbey Island. Another 
member, David Tate, killed one Missouri state trooper and wounded another when they 
tried to arrest him in April 1985.58 All these examples, however, represent self-defence and 
not intentional targeting. This does not mean that the group was not prepared for a 
confrontation with the state. When the FBI and local law enforcement raided Gary 
Yarborough's house in October 1983, apart from an assortment of weapons and explosives, 
they found a list of local law enforcement officers which included names, addresses, 
photographs and licence plate numbers. 59 
The rhetorical target groups reflected the origins of the Order as a militant splinter 
of the racist extreme right but those that were actually attacked, or that the group planned 
to attack, reflected the self-styled nature of the group as a revolutionary vanguard. This 
explains why there were practically no random or indiscriminate attacks on the group's 
racial enemies or on the federal government. Such attacks would certainly have come later 
had the Order had a chance to mature and the group expected wide spread attacks of this 
sort to result from the revolution they had begun. 
57 Cited in M. Dees and J. Corcoran, Gathering Storm, pp. 141-142. ss ibid., p. 24. 
59 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 374. 
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7.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
At the most obvious level the primary rhetorical and physical targets of the PIJ are 
Jews and the 'Zionist entity'. The PIJ identifies itself, like Hamas, as waging a war to 
liberate the Palestinian lands annexed by Israel in the immediate context and also as part 
of a broader struggle to liberate the entire Muslim community from Western cultural 
dominance. The two struggles are ideologically twinned, the West being identified as pro- 
Israeli and anti-Muslim and therefore anti-Palestinian. As far as apostates are concerned, 
the PIJ has physically attacked collaborators although its opposition to the PA remains 
largely rhetorical. The gap between the rhetoric directed at all target groups and the action 
taken against them is indicative of the group's small size and limited resources, and the 
group's awareness both of these short comings and the need to clearly define itself as an 
Islamic revolutionary organisation. 
Within Israel, the targets selected once again reflect the capabilities of the group 
and the security environment within which it operates. Stabbings and shootings of 
individual Israeli citizens attack the primary target group in a cost effective and 
operationally basic way. By contrast, the PIJ bombings have been directed at larger scale 
civilian targets such as buses and market places, and in the rare instances where they have 
been directed at military targets these have been of the 'soft' variety such as military check 
points or small concentrations of soldiers outside military installations and at low state of 
readiness targets such as bus stops. All such attacks were tempered by the operational 
resources at the group's disposal, while the rhetoric is essential to reaffirm the groups 
beliefs and objectives. For example, following the assassination of the PIJ's leader Fathi 
Shiqaqi in October 1995 the group vowed revenge: "[w]e will take revenge wherever it is 
in the world. We assure the Zionists and their leader Rabin that this repugnant crime has 
turned every Zionist wherever he is on earth into a target for our fighters and our suicide 
bombers. "60 In this case the threat was basically a rhetorical one due to the limited 
capabilities of the group. 
The PIJ also targets on the rhetorical level those states and interests which are 
sympathetic to Israel according to the group's perception of the regional political context 
60 AFP, 29 October, 1995. 
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and dynamics. The primary target is the United States because of its long term support for 
Israel and its role in brokering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The scope of this 
rhetoric, however, can be expanded to encompass any state which supports the 'American- 
Zionist' cause. During the second Gulf War, for example, the PIJ leaders in Amman 
declared a jihad against the interests of all the twenty-nine countries making up the 
coalition and Israel. One of the organisation's leaders, Sheikh Asad Tamini, told the press 
that he had issued a religious edict permitting strikes saying "[w]e have issued instructions 
about suicide attacks against these interests. '61 No attacks, however, ensued and it is 
unlikely that the group would have been able of make any outside Israel proper because of 
the concentration of the group's limited resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such 
rhetorical identification of enemies merely serves the purpose of situating the group within 
the broader regional political context and appealing to a sympathetic constituency. 
Like Hamas the PIJ has had difficult relations with secular Palestinian groups, 
although before the establishment of the PA these relations were better than that of Hamas 
because the PIJ was not providing a political and social alternative to the PLO in the 
occupied territories. 62 By the same token, the major criticism the PIJ made against Fatah 
was their abandonment of Islamic values, and although calls were made to reject 
secularism and return to Islam these were not threatening in nature. 63 Since the 
establishment of the PA, however, this situation has changed. There have been occasions 
nevertheless when PA activities, especially security clamp downs on the PIJ and Hamas, 
have led to an intensification of hostile rhetoric against the PA and in some cases sporadic 
violence. In the wake of the 1994 killing of Hani Abed, angry mourners blamed Yasser 
Arafat (despite agreement that the Israelis were responsible), and Ramadan Abdullah 
Shallah warned that in future "the guns of Jihad will not be able to distinguish between an 
Israeli soldier and the Palestinian police. 1164 The PIJ, however, has always found itself in 
such an inferior position - even more so than Hamas - that openly declaring hostilities and 
acting upon such a declaration would pose a major threat to group survival. 
61 INA, 2017 gmt, 21 Jan. 91 - BBC/SWB, ME/0977, A/8,23 January, 1991. This statement was made on 21 
January, a day after a speech by Sadaam Hussein calling for all Muslims to declare jihad. 
62 Z. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 114. 
63 ibid., p. 111-114. 
64 Time, November 21,1994. 
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The target groups selected by the PU are very similar to Hamas, being Israeli 
(Jewish) citizens with constant rhetorical attacks made on Israel's supporters and on the 
PA. The rhetoric against all types is essential for defining the group's cause and objectives 
especially in religious opposition to the Israeli state. This rhetoric is frequently not 
translated into action. The PIJ is a much smaller group than Hamas, without a considerable 
popular support base and so fear of repression is correspondingly higher. Being relatively 
smaller the PIJ is also more prone to the constraints posed by lack of resources and trained 
personnel, further limiting the degree to which operations can be matched to group 
pronouncements. 
7.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic 
7.3.1 Jewish Underground 
The Jewish Underground showed its concentration on targets to be a mixture of 
other religions in the form of Palestinian Muslims and a symbolic place in the form of the 
Dome of the Rock. The two major attacks conducted against Palestinians and two other 
planned attacks reflected a desire for revenge -a defensive reaction to Palestinian 
violence. The proposed attack on the Dome of the Rock, not only represented a symbolic 
attack on Muslims generally, but was also meant as a practical step towards achieving 
Jewish messianic redemption. It is significant that the group did not engage in significant 
acts of violence against other Jews, a function of priority, the group's relatively short life 
span, its nationalist origins and the absence of direct political dialogue between the Israeli 
government and the PLO, or serious public consideration of allowing the establishment of 
a Palestinian state. 
Although the Jewish Underground began as a messianic organisation concerned not 
so much with targeting specific groups but with fulfilling religious destiny, the only 
operations the group was able to carry out involved the targeting of the Palestinian 
population. This temporal side-track was motivated by a desire for revenge in the wake of 
Palestinian attacks on the Jewish population in Hebron. The targets selected in the first two 
cases were proportional and symbolic - Arab mayors were targeted in response to the 
murder of six Yeshiva students and the Islamic college was attacked in response to the 
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murder of another Yeshiva student. The plan to blow up five Palestinian buses marked a 
departure from proportional reactive acts of violence to indiscriminate ones. 65 Palestinians 
in this case were identified as an unacceptable 'other' against whom extra-legal activities 
could be directed. During the Jewish Underground trial the accused remained unrepentant 
and Yehuda Etzion told the court that he was 'privileged' to have participated in the attack 
on the Arab mayors which he referred to as "the action of cutting off the legs of some of 
the murderers" while emphatically denying that these attacks could be presented as 
criminal acts. 
While the significance of the Dome of the Rock as a physical target has been 
examined in Chapter Six, the proposed attack was indicative of the group's attitude to the 
broader potential target group of gentiles generally of which the Palestinians were merely 
the most obvious and immediate threat. The destruction of the Dome of the Rock was 
supposed to trigger a transformation of the state of Israel to the kingdom of Israel, "a 
kingdom of priests capable of actualising the laws of destiny and changing the nature of 
the world. , 66 This transformation relied on the religious precept that the Jewish people 
lead a life of destiny while the gentiles merely lead a life of existence. 67 Once this destiny 
began to be realised all gentiles, not just those Arabs within the territorial confines of the 
state of Israel, would be subject to the Torah law of 'stranger aliens' where non-Jews must 
recognise Jewish hegemony and a failure to do so would lead to subjugation. While this 
was certainly true of the biblical land of Israel68, the messianic message (implicit to all the 
revealed religions) is that Judaism will triumph over the other faiths and dominate the 
temporal and spiritual realms by whatever means. 
Given the Jewish Underground's rejection of mainstream Gush Emunim ideology 
of subservience to the temporal government of Israel it is perhaps surprising that the group 
did not target elements within the government or other 'apostate Jews' whose activities 
threatened the Jewish messianic process. 69 The formation of the group itself was a reaction 
65 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Jewish Underground', in 
D. C. Rapoport (ed. ), Inside Terrorist Organisations, 1988, p. 210. 
66 E. Sprinzak, `From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 207. 
67 ibid. 
68 Etzion's biblical Israel would have included the Sinai, Jordan, Syria and parts of Lebanon and Iraq. 
69 It has been suggested however that the timing of the plot to blow up Arab buses (which before the Intifada 
Jews used), after the Jewish Sabbath had begun would by definition kill only non-religious Jews and that this 
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to the 1978 Camp David Accords, an event which was identified as reversing the 
messianic process that had received a spectacular impetus with the gains of the Six Day 
War. Although Menachim Begin's actions were regarded in some circles as treacherous 
and Etzion himself did not see the secular leaders as legitimate, he did not place the blame 
with them as would later manifestations of the Jewish extreme right. 70 The primary reason 
for this was Etzion's essentially otherworldly interpretation of historical events. Camp 
David was seen as merely a set-back (albeit a major one) and not a disaster. The secular 
government of Israel had not betrayed the Jewish people it had simply not come to the 
same conclusions about messianic destiny at the same time as the settler movement. Blame 
therefore lay elsewhere, beyond the Jewish community - both secular and religious. 
The secretive nature of the Jewish Underground means that it is difficult to say that 
there was a gap between the rhetoric of the group and its actions. Even in the case of the 
proposed bombing of the Dome of the Rock, the reason for postponing the operation 
indefinitely was the failure to obtain clerical sanction. The clearest features of the 
Underground's targets were the group's identification of traditional target groups centred 
around ancient scriptural guarantees concerning the possession of land and the importance 
of this possession for the fulfilment of a messianic promise, and the placement of blame - 
and therefore the selection of targets - clearly outside the Jewish community. 
7.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
As an avowedly apocalyptic group, Aum was by definition opposed to all other 
religious groups, although special note was made of other Japanese new age religious 
movements and Judaism. All those outside the immediate Aum belief system could 
therefore be called other religious. As a composite religion, the group possessed no firmly 
entrenched inherited animosities as the revealed religions (and others) do, although hatred 
of the Jews was adopted from the inherited Christian tradition. The number of victims of 
Aum's acts, arranged in decreasing order, were members of the group itself, innocent 
bystanders, lawyers and other individuals such as relatives of members who opposed the 
group. This first category could be described as apostates being largely composed of 
was approved by the rabbis who sanctioned the operation. See I. Shahak & N. Mezvinsky, Jewish 
Fundamentalism in Israel, pp. 138-139. 
ME. Sprinzak, `From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 205. 
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members who wanted to leave the organisation. With the exception of the innocent 
bystanders who are the inevitable outcome of indiscriminate acts of terrorism, all the other 
individuals represented a clear and immediate threat to the organisation (real or imagined) 
and were dealt with accordingly. Aum's apocalyptic belief system and rejection of 
mainstream society ensured that the scope of potential targets was almost boundless 
although attacking these targets was dictated by capability and circumstance. 
The religious organisations which Aum vilified the most were the Moonies 
Unification Church and the Japanese sect Soka Gakkai. The interesting point here is that 
all three organisations resembled each other in terms of being (to one degree or another) 
aggressive proselytisers, possessing extensive financial interests and holding unorthodox 
ideologies centred around an eschatological promise. Asahara himself had been a member 
of another new religious movement, Agonshu, in the early 1980s from where he drew 
many of his later religious principles. " Aum employed both groups as scapegoats on a 
frequent basis. During the uproar following the Sakamoto killings Asahara suggested that 
Soka Gakkai were responsible, and the group's leader, Daisaku Ikeda, appeared on Aum's 
1995 list of "black-hearted aristocrats who have sold their souls to the devil. "72 Ikeda was 
also the target of Aum's first attempt to use sann in 1994. These groups were targeted 
mainly because they were perceived as competitors in the crowded market place of 
Japanese new religious movements. 
Aum also adopted the Jews as a rhetorical target group, a decision influenced by 
the large literature on Jewish conspiracy theories. 73 In 1995, the sect embraced anti- 
Semitism by officially declaring war on the Jewish people and acknowledging ideas of a 
world Jewish conspiracy bent on engineering a series of massacres which would severely 
reduce the earth's population. 74 In a special edition of Vajrayana Sacca, entitled'Manual of 
Fear', an article claimed that: 
71 R. J. Lifton, Destroying the World to Save it: Arim Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global 
Terrorism, 1999, p. 18-19. 
72 D. Brackett, Holy War: Armageddon in Tokyo, 1996, pp. 25 & 106. " Together with the Jews and sometimes used interchangeably were the ubiquitous freemasons. Asahara 
believed the Freemasons were plotting Armageddon because "they believe the reign of Christ will not come 
unless the final war is fought", A Doom is Approaching the Land of the Rising Sun. 
74 ibid., p. 107-108. 
264 
J. 
"[o]n behalf of the world's 5.5 billion people, Vajrayana Sacca hereby formally 
declares war on the 'world shadow government' that murders untold numbers of 
people and, while hiding behind sonorous phrases and high-sounding principles, 
plans to brainwash and control the rest. Japanese awake! The hidden enemy's plot 
has long since torn our lives to shreds. 05 
The term 'Jewish' was also extended to encompass groups like the Moonies and Soka 
Gakkai, not as a form of religious identification but as part of the process of creating a 
monolithic, conspiratorial other. 76 Interestingly enough, despite this rhetoric Jewish 
interests or Jews themselves were never actually targeted. 
The primary rhetorical target identified by Aum was the US but again this group 
was never specifically attacked. 77 The United States featured consistently as a major 
participant in Aum's apocalyptic scenarios of a cataclysmic world war and was frequently 
blamed for trying to poison Aum compounds by spraying them with chemical and 
biological agents from the air. In early 1995, Aum called a press conference to announce 
that they had been attacked by American or Japanese aircraft, referring specifically to the 
use of sann against Aum. 78 Aum perceived the links between the US and Japan as 
sufficiently close to regard the two entities as synonymous, or Japan as subservient to US 
interests. As a consequence members of the Japanese royal family, government, police and 
intelligence services were frequently referred to as the 'lackeys' of the US and in many 
cases featured on an Aum 'hit list'. 79 
The largest target category in terms of fatalities were apostates - members and 
former members of Aum itself. In 1989, Aum reached a crisis point regarding violence. 80 
A young follower Shuji Taguchi had witnessed the death of another Aum member 
75 Cited in D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror, pp. 107-108. The Aum Shinrikyo website contains a copy of the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion as'proof (http: //Aum-shinrikyo. com/english/masons/masons. htm). 
76 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cull at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum, 1996, p. 220. 
7' D. W. Brackett has suggested that the group planned to assassinate President Clinton when he attended the 
November 1995 APEC conference in Osaka and to mail sann packages to the US in the hope of employing the 
agent there. See Holy Terror, pp. 105-107. The group also allegedly released botulinus toxin near American 
naval installations at Yokahama and Yokosuka without any effect, see R. J. Lifton, Destroying the World to 
Save it, p. 187. 
78 R. J. Lifson, Destroying the World to Save it, p. 42-43. 
79 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 218-219. 
80 It is worth noting that Aum Shintikyo was applied for official religious status under Japan's Religious 
Corporation Law in spring of 1989 and it was granted in August that year. The primary purpose was to avoid 
taxes. 
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receiving 'treatment"' Taguchi sought to leave and when his intentions were discovered he 
received various 'treatments' and was then murdered. Both the deaths were kept secret and 
the bodies cremated at the Aiim Mount Fuji compound. It is estimated that up to fifty-six 
ordained members of the group were murdered or considered 'missing'. It is also reported 
that there were twenty-one deaths in the Aum Shinrikyo hospital which catered both for 
group members and their families. 82 Many of the former group of victims were killed 
because they wished to leave the cult and might expose its activities to the outside world, 
and the remainder were 'accidental' deaths caused by experimentation with various 
'treatments' or 'training sessions'. 83 In some cases members or members relatives were 
subjected to harmful treatments or disposed of for financial gain. 84 
The next major target category was composed of those that posed a direct threat to 
the operations or survival of the group. In November 1989, a further escalation of violence 
was taken when a human rights lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto, his wife and child were 
murdered and their bodies disposed of. Sakamoto had formed an organisation called the 
Society of Aum Supreme Truth Victims which was composed primarily of parents anxious 
for the cult to return their children. Sakamoto had decided to sue Aum for fraud and false 
advertising in connection with activities such as the 'initiation of blood', an action which 
would have seriously damaged the reputation of the group and discredited the guru 
himself. 85 Further attacks were conducted against members of the Victims Association and 
journalists such as Shoko Egawa who were investigating the group. 86 In 1994, the group 
launched its first sarin attack in the town of Matsumoto. The target was a group of three 
judges who were due to hand down a ruling in a land dispute involving Aum. Asahara 
decided to kill the judges in order to delay the judgement and to preserve the group's 
Matsumoto branch. The judges survived but seven people died and 144 were 
S1 The man had wanted to leave the cult and the'treatment' of repeated dunking in ice cold water was meant to 
cure what the guru diagnosed as'mental instability'. See D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of The 
World, p. 35. 
82M. Watanabe, Religion and Violence in Japan Today', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. X, # 4,1998, 
p. 89. 
S3 Treatments and training sessions for Aum members included the extensive use of hallucinogenic drugs, 
immersion in extremely hot and cold water and confinement in small dark spaces for several days. 
" R. J. Lifton, Destroying the World to Save it, p. 140. 
85 The cult claimed that the gurus blood contained magical powers and if consumed would grant 'supernatural' 
powers. Sakamotos action was inspired by a disappointed former member who had been left untransformed by 
the'initiation'. See D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 33 & 38. 
86 R. J. Lifton, Destroying the World to Save it, p. 40. 
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hospitalised. 87 After the subway'attacks there were two more significant events perpetrated 
by Aum. The first was the near fatal shooting of the head of the National Police Agency on 
March 30, and the second was the explosion of a letter bomb intended for the newly 
elected mayor of Tokyo on May 16.88 
Beyond specific target groups, both rhetorical and actual, Aum's perception of 
potential targets were theoretically extended to all non-group members. Yoshihiro Inoue, 
the group's 'Intelligence Minister', stated at Asahara's trial that "[w]e regarded the world 
outside as evil, and destroying evil was salvation. i89 The group's historical expectation was 
that some form of apocalypse was imminent, and all those that did not subscribe 
wholeheartedly to Aum's belief system were destined to perish. This attitude is reflected in 
the indiscriminate nerve gas attacks the group conducted. While these and other attacks 
were tactical in nature, designed to preserve the group's security, the expectation and 
preparations for an inevitable 'final battle' were very real, as was the expectation that Aum 
as a movement or most of it would prevail and reign supreme in a post-apocalyptic order. 
The targets selected by Aum Shinrikyo represented both the group's world view and 
were in turn influenced by the many sources from which the group derived its ideological 
framework. The targets identified may be divided into rhetorical ones such as the US or 
the Jews which were not actually attacked but helped define the magnitude of the 
opposition the group faced, other new religious movements which posed a threat to Aum 
as competitors and who were occasionally attacked, and those who openly opposed the 
group either from within or without. While the group expected an apocalyptic war in the 
near future and considered all outside the group as damned, indiscriminate violence on a 
massive scale according to the group itself would not begin until the apocalypse. In this 
respect then the groups targeting (and many of its activities), at least until the end, more 
closely represent those of an introverted and paranoid criminal organisation. 
7.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan 
The primary target group of the Ikhwan throughout its short existence was the 
Saudi regime. The rhetoric of the Ikhwan condemned the government and the clerical 
97 M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 91. 
88 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 261 & 282. 
89 The Times, March 29,1997. 
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establishment as illegitimate and for deviating from the 'true path' of Islam. The Ikhwan 
also denounced the West for supporting the Saudi regime, for exploiting the region 
generally and for debasing Islam by introducing secular ideologies and practices. While 
these themes identified apostate enemies in the form of the regime, its supporters and 
agents, and other religions (the West was invariably referred to as 'Christian') the group by 
virtue of its messianic beliefs was also universalistic in its outlook. The definition of 
corrupt rulers was extended to all regimes and the presence and machinations of the West 
in the Middle East were a threat to Islam itself, not merely the Saudi kingdom. The attack 
on the Grand Mosque thus represented an attempt to destabilise the Saudi regime but was 
also intended as a major step towards renewing Islam and continuing the jihad against 
Islam's enemies. 
The primary target of the Ikhwan was the Al-Saud family and the religious 
authorities which supported them. In a series of letters published in 1978 and 1979, 
Juhayman Utaybi blamed Saudi Arabia's economic, social, religious and political problems 
and fractures on the adoption of Western, modern ideas and methods, and on the 1744 
religio-political alliance between the Muhammad al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud. 90 
The Saudi regime was viewed as illegitimate, subservient to Western interests and guilty of 
apostasy. 91 Utaybi said of the regime "[o]ur belief is that the continued rule [of these 
leaders] is a destruction of God's religion even if they pretend to uphold Islam. We ask God 
to relieve us of them all. 02 Apart from the Royal family, the Ikhwan also heavily criticised 
the Saudi religious establishment which was regarded as legitimising a corrupt 
government. Most significant of those theologians specifically named was Sheikh Abdul 
Aziz ibn Baz, Chairman of the Supreme Religious Council. Utaybi claimed that Ibn Baz 
was "in the pay of the al-Sauds, little better than a tool for the family's manipulation of the 
people ... [he] may know his Sunna well enough, but he uses it to bolster corrupt rulers. , 
93 
90 J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi 
People', The Muslim World, Vol. LXXX, # 1,1990, p. 2 
91 It is interesting to note that both the Ikhwan and the Egyptian Takfir wal Hijra were labelled by the 
authorities as khawarU, a derogatory term drawn from the Kharajites, early schismatics in the Muslim 
community. 
92 Cited in J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 13. 
93 Cited in J. Kechichian, 'The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia', 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. XVIII, p. 59. 
268 
The secondary rhetorical target was the West, primarily the United States. This 
target group was held responsible for corrupting Saudi society in alliance with the Saudi 
regime, exploiting Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Persian Gulf and for rejecting the 
true faith. During the Ikhwan's occupation of the mosque the core of the group's political 
message was delivered over the public loudspeaker system. The five main points called for 
a cessation of diplomatic relations with 'exploitative' Western states, the end of petroleum 
exports to the United States because of its hostility to Islam and the expulsion of all 
military and civilian experts from the Arabian Peninsula. 94 This hostility was held to be a 
constant since the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 when King Abdul 
Aziz "allied himself with the Christians [the British and Americans] and stopped the Jihad 
outside the Peninsula. "9' 
While most of the pronouncements made by the Ikhwan were directed at the Saudi 
regime and Western influence within Saudi Arabia there was also a universalist dimension 
addressed to the entire Islamic community. In his first letter Utaybi stated that "[a]ll 
Muslims are living under imposed rulers who do not uphold the religion. We owe 
obedience only to those who lead by God's book. Those who lead the Muslims with 
differing laws and systems-their mandate to rule is nil. 06 The Ikhwan also looked to the 
broader threats to Islam such as the Christian West and in this light the group saw itself as 
continuing the original Ikhwan's jihad in an attempt to bring about a promised messianic 
order. 97 While the actual targets of the Ikhwan when they defended the Grand Mosque 
were members of the Saudi armed forces, it remains unclear to what extent members of the 
group saw their enemies in a messianic light as servants of the forces of darkness. It is, 
however, reported that as the surviving members of the Ikhwan were led away into 
captivity, one of their number asked a National Guardsman "[w]hat of the army of the 
North? " in reference to the prophecy described by Ibn Khaldun, implying that the expected 
messianic foe had failed to materialise. 9R 
94 J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 12. 
95 Utaybi cited in Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 13. 
96 Cited in Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism, pp. 12-13. 
97 M. Faksh, The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt. Algeria and Saudi Arabia, 
1997, pp. 91-93. 
98 J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', in D. Holden &R. Johns (eds. ), The House of Saud, , 1981, p. 526. It is interesting to note that the concept of an 'army from the north' is adopted by Hal Lindsay in his Late 
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The primary target group of the Saudi Ikhwan was the Saudi regime whose 
decadence, corruption and alliances with the West had led to abandoning Islam. Thus the 
group represented a classic fundamentalist critique of an Arab government, couched within 
a belief in the imminent fulfilment of the Islamic messianic promise. The Saudi regime, 
however, denied that the group had any political demands and placed great emphasis on 
the (illegitimate) messianic expectations. In the words of (then) Crown Prince Fahd, "the 
insurgents had no demands or objectives other than [those o fl the proclaimed Mahdi, and 
the whole matter does not exceed an empty dream and empty words. "99 The target groups, 
however, were seen as immediate impediments to the expected messianic era and in the 
event that the insurrection had succeeded, the messianic era would have been expressed in 
a caliphate type rulership. 
7.4 Conclusion 
The selection of targets by a group depends upon the ideology of a particular 
organisation which in turn is influenced by the history and conditions of the environment 
within which the group exists. Due to various constraining factors, however, there will 
always exist a gap between the rhetoric directed at a target group and actual violent acts 
perpetrated against such a group. All groups face constraints imposed by capabilities and 
opportunity as must be the case in an uneven struggle against an overwhelmingly stronger 
enemy. In the case of mainstream organisations these constraints are bolstered by the need 
to avoid actions which will endanger their political and social activities, and in many cases 
the rhetoric itself must remain flexible to enable political opportunities to be exploited. For 
core organisations the gap between rhetoric and activity is potentially larger because these 
groups tend to be smaller and yet more violent due to their rejection of mainstream 
activities. Even in cases where a group's ideology does sanction an almost limitless array 
of targets - that is anyone outside the group itself - as is the case with some messianic and 
apocalyptic groups, there are always constraints imposed by capabilities and opportunities. 
In many cases, the gap between rhetoric and reality is often a function of psychological 
Great Planet Earth (1970, Ch. 5), as the opposing force in the Christian Apocalyptic (in his case identified as 
Russia not Syria) which will invade Israel for the final battle. The reference is derived from Ezekiel 38: 15-16. 
99 A. Al-Yasini, Religion and the State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1983, p. 127. One of the official 
theses offered likened Utaybi's Ikhwan to the Jim Jones cult which committed mass suicide in Guyana in 1978. 
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warfare, inducing and inspiring fear in the enemy target. Indeed, for the messianic groups 
examined here - particularly groups from orthodox traditions - the sanctioning of limitless 
target groups does not necessarily mean they will actually be attacked because the group 
considers or conducts a spectacular and symbolic act intended to trigger the final stages of 
a messianic process, a process which will culminate in the destruction of these groups 
through agents other than the group itself, both temporal and spiritual. 
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Chapter VIII 
Tactics 
The tactics employed by violent religious groups are superficially similar to those 
used by extremist secular organisations. The primary differences lie in the scale and scope 
with which these tactics are employed, and - according to some scholars - due to the 
totalist and dualistic nature of extreme religious ideology, the possibility of such groups 
employing some form of unconventional weapon. The tactical programme pursued by a 
group depends of course on the type of the organisation and the environment in which they 
operate. Most scholars ignore the fact that most groups operate within so-called 'red lines', 
conditioned by environment and the internal dynamics within groups, that often serve to 
actually constrain the conduct of violence. Mainstream groups will primarily engage in 
political (and also perhaps social) activity, and - depending on the context within which 
they operate - some form of violent activity. By contrast both core and 
messianic/apocalyptic groups will pursue almost exclusively violent tactical programmes, 
the minutiae of which are determined by the extent to which the group sees itself as 
fulfilling the role of a revolutionary vanguard or playing an immediate role in messianic 
redemption. Most tactical approaches are tempered by issues of politics, justification, 
proportionality and group survival. Conversely, this is less of a concern for 
messianic/apocalyptic groups and does not apply to radical splinters or individuals imbued 
with a particular group ideology who may decide to act independently of the main 
organisation. This chapter seeks to explore the dimensions of what means are employed by 
groups to achieve their objectives, what governs and constrains the use of such means and 
how tactical programmes can be adapted and augmented to cope with alterations within a 
group's operational environment. 
Variations in operating environments and group evolution mean that there can be a 
great deal of scope for flexibility in a group's tactical programme, even within the same 
category. Until Kach was outlawed, the movement exhibited a willingness to be involved 
with mainstream Israeli politics and distanced itself from extreme, large scale acts of 
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violence. Those acts which were perpetrated were done so by individuals imbued with the 
group's ideology or splinters disappointed with the gap between rhetoric and action. Aryan 
Nations has followed a similar pattern with regards to violent activity, although it has 
never seriously engaged in mainstream politics. Operating in a different environment, 
Hizballah has been able to conduct centrally-controlled military, social and political 
activities with the emphasis on each dependant on changes within both internal and 
external environments. While Hamas has also pursued social, military and political means, 
the group's leadership and ideology and the tight security environment in which the group 
operates have constrained the group's tactical programme. While core groups tend to see 
themselves as revolutionary vanguards, this stance frequently leads them into a 
confrontation with the state that in turn threatens their existence. This was certainly the 
case with Eyal and the Order, although the PIJ has thus far avoided extermination 
primarily through a comparatively higher degree of sophistication, and a more pragmatic 
tactical programme. The tactical programmes of messianic and apocalyptic groups while 
oriented around precipitating an expected Endtime may not immediately pursue such an 
aim. The Saudi Ikhwan did take this approach with swift and disastrous consequences for 
the group. The Jewish Underground, however, engaged in activities very similar to a core 
group when the group's messianic plan was suspended, while Aum Shinrikyo engaged in a 
wide variety of activities, some related to the expected end, many were basically criminal 
activities aimed at protecting and strengthening the group. 
8.1 Mainstream 
8.1.1 Kach 
The tactics employed by Kach ranged from direct participation in the Israeli 
political process to an assortment of illegal activities. However, due to the nature of the 
environment within which the organisation operated, a programme of systematic violence 
orchestrated and condoned by the Kach leadership was considered unrealistic, inviting as it 
would repression which would threaten the group's very existence. This justifiable fear of 
heavy reprisals by the Israeli authorities was realised after the Hebron massacre when both 
Kach and Kahane Chai were officially outlawed by the Israeli government as illegal 
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terrorist organisations. 1 It is undeniable, however, that the ideology of the group motivated 
individuals and small groups to act independently and engage in 'high level' acts of 
violence, not at the direct behest of the group although certainly with its implicit blessing. 
The gap here between the extreme rhetoric of the organisation and its activities can be 
seen to be breached by members who were not so much disaffected with the organisation 
itself but were merely frustrated by certain political events within Israel, and motivated in 
turn by the group's aggressive calls for activism. 
Electoral participation and success for Kach were directly linked to the security 
situation of the Israeli state, both internal and external. The first time Kahane and Kach 
contested seats for the Knesset in 1973 Kahane missed out narrowly'`. Conversely, during 
the next two elections of 1977 and 1981 he lost by wide margins'. In 1984, however, Kach 
gained a sufficient number of votes and Kahane became an official member of the 
Knesset`'. The peaks in Kach voting patterns are easily identified as 1973 and 1984 and are 
intimately related to the wars fought in these years5. The more difficult the security 
situation and the more disillusioned Israeli voters were with the political establishment - 
especially over security issues, both internal and external - the greater the support for the 
movement. For example in mid-1985, after a series of brutal murders of Israeli civilians by 
Palestinians, support for Kahane and his movement soared. One poll in August 1985 
showed that support for Kach had risen to nine per cent, from just over one per cent at the 
' The Israeli cabinet outlawed both groups on March 13 1994. The decree also applied to "any group of 
people acting to attain the same goals... with the [same] means... even if they are called by other names" and "to 
splinter groups or combinations of the aforementioned organisations", Voice of Israel, 1] 20 gmt, 13 Mar. 94 - 
BBCISWB, ME/1945, MED/1, March 14,1994. 
2 To be elected it was necessary to gain one percent of the electorate. Kahane received 12,811 votes or 0.81% 
of the votes. Cited in R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or 
"Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs")', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. IV, # 1,1992, p. 47. 
3 In 1977 Kahane received 4,396 votes or 0.25% of those cast, and in 1981 he received 5,128 or 0.26%. ibid., 
pp. 47 & 51. The first Likud electoral victory after thirty years of labour rule was in large part due to the 
political mobilisation of the growing Sephardic Jewish population and their perception of neglect in an 
Ashkenazi dominated society. 
4 Kach captured 25,907 votes which represented 1.2% of votes cast. Kach and a party from the opposite end 
of the political spectrum, the Progressive list for Peace, were banned by the Central Elections Committee 
before the election for their 'extremist views', but this decision was overruled by the High Court. It is 
noteworthy that the Progressive List advocated equal rights for Jews and Palestinians and the establishment of 
a Palestinian state. They won two seats. R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism', p. 52. 
s There is a discernible socio-economic dimension as well as a security one. See A. Pedahzur, 'The Extreme 
Right in Israel Approaching a Time of Peace - Features and Prospects', Unpublished paper, 1999, pp. 18-19. 
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time of the 1984 election6. It is interesting to note that electoral failure did not result in the 
group turning inwards (as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo) and abstaining from mainstream 
politics. On the contrary, Kahane realised that his ideas were well received by (an albeit 
small) section of Israeli society and that as circumstances became less stable the popularity 
of the movement would increase. In his own words "[t]he worse it gets for Israel, the better 
it is for me! "7 
After Kahane's death, the issue of parliamentary participation was the nominal 
cause of the split between Kach and Kahane Chai, led by Kahane's own son Benjamin. The 
splinter group's leader felt that the movement would betray the ideals of its founder if it 
altered its programme of uncompromising resistance to territorial compromise with the 
Palestinians or the presence of Arabs within the borders of Israel. The split, however, was 
seemingly more about personalities than ideology, which was made clear when Kach 
failed to qualify for participation in the 1992 elections because its platform remained little 
altered. 8 Following the ban placed on Kach and its various offshoots in 1994, actual 
electoral participation became a moot point. Prior to this, however, the Knesset passed a 
resolution authorising the police to prevent Kahane's demonstrations in Arab villages, a 
tactic the movement regarded as one of their most effective. 9 Equally in August 1985, a 
Knesset law prohibited parties from incitement of racism and endangering security and 
democracy which effectively ended Kach's political future. 
From the very origins of the Jewish Defence League (JDL) in America, Kahane had 
emphasised the importance of using physical force. 10 Kahane's idea of 'Jewish Iron' was 
directly borrowed from Jabotinsky's Bar el Yisrael (Iron Israel), an idea which called upon 
Jews to resist their oppressors by physical force if necessary. " Acting out such a 
programme, however, within a relatively stable democratic society, such as the United 
6 The Guardian, August 3,1985. The poll, published in Ha'aretz also showed a rise in support for the right 
wing Tehiya party. The figures show that this degree of support would have given a Kach-Tehiya coalition 
nineteen seats making them the third largest political grouping in the Knesset. 
7 R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', The New York Review of Books, February 13,1986, p. 20. 8 Voice of Israel, 1400 gmt, 24 Mar. 91 - BBC/SWB, ME/1030, A/10, March 26,1991. On the decision to 
ban the groups itself see R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical 
Appraisal', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. IX, # 4,1997, pp. 82-105. 
9 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the 
Rabin Assassination, p. 215. 
10 By the mid 1970s the JDL was labelled a terrorist organisation by the FBI. 11 E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The Ideologization of 
Mimetic Desire', in M. Juergensmeyer, Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, 1992, p. 55. 
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States or Israel, was bound to invite repression and the broader movement was always 
careful not to directly invite it. 
The violent means employed by Kach can be divided into two, albeit overlapping, 
categories. The first concerned that committed by identifiable members of the organisation 
and usually at a relatively low level, including general harassment, beatings, attacks on 
property and arson. The second category is that committed by members who are acting on 
their own, as in the case of Baruch Goldstein, or small splinter groups such as TNT, and 
represent a much higher propensity for unconstrained violence. This second category 
should be regarded as nominally and operationally - but certainly not ideologically - 
independent from Kach proper. Their motivations and ideology, however, are identical and 
in some cases there is evidence of the complicity of the Kach leadership. In November 
1974, for example, Kahane himself was convicted of arms smuggling after an abortive 
attempt to establish an anti-Arab counter-terror group in Europe. ''` Similarly in December 
1993, Rabbi Abraham Toledano, then leader of Kach, was jailed for attempting to smuggle 
military equipment and money into Israel from the U. S. 13 In October 1982, an American 
born Kach leader was sentenced to two and a half years prison for conspiring to plant a 
bomb in the Al Aqsa mosque, a crime Kahane was accused of complicity in but was 
subsequently acquitted of. '4 This division is an important one from the point of group 
survival. Although the group was eventually banned in 1994 and various members, 
including much of the leadership, had been imprisoned for a variety of offences, it pursued 
a quasi-political approach within the prescribed legal norms of mainstream society. 
The tactics employed by Kach were different to other groups on the extreme right 
wing of Israeli politics. Whereas Gush Emunim, when it acted, did so primarily in response 
to some form of Arab violence, Kach was more proactive. From the very origins of the 
organisation, provocative demonstrations and harassment of the Arab population (both 
within the Green line and without) were standard behaviour. The primary purpose of these 
activities was to scare Arabs and to cultivate within them a feeling that they were not safe 
12 Washington Post, December 19,1974. 
" ADL, Extremism in the Name of Religion: The Violent Record of the Kahane Movement and its Offshoots, 
1995, p. 40. Toledano's suitcase contained telescopic sights, silencers, reloading equipment and instruction 
manuals for bomb making. 14 Daily News, October 29,1982. 
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in Israel. " While Gush Emunim were prepared to accept a Palestinian presence in Eretz 
Israel, albeit in a completely subservient form, Kach from the outset vocally proclaimed 
the need to expel the entire Arab population, by force if necessary. 
16 The greatest 
constraint to a large scale and organised violent campaign was fear of the Israeli security 
forces. Yet due to the position of Palestinians within Israeli society (especially in the 
occupied territories) certain levels of violent activity were almost tolerable. For example in 
1986, an offshoot of Kach, the Committee for Road Safety, was established as a defensive 
measure against increased levels of Palestinian violence. During the Intifada, the group 
became increasingly aggressive and its leader Shmuel Ben Yishai claimed that he would 
'shoot to kill without warning' any Palestinian interfering with Jewish traffic. '? Other 
actions carried out by Kach members, such as armed forays into Arab villages, the 
shooting by Kach members of Palestinians during riots in Hebron in December 1993 and 
the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein, were all made possible by the 
prominent place firearms hold in Israeli settler society and the high proportion of people 
trained in their use and who carry them at all times. 18 
In terms of the permissiveness of environment - that is the degree to which 
unlawful activity was made possible or even tolerated - it is interesting to note that Kahane 
Chai in the U. S., during the early 1990s, conducted training camps where instruction was 
given in weapons training, guerrilla tactics and unarmed combat'9. Benjamin Kahane 
claimed at the time that officers of the IDF reserve and U. S. Army were conducting much 
of the training. 20 Kahane further added: 
"[i]f we in Kahana Hay [sic. ] feel that the [Israeli] government or the authorities are 
preventing us from operating.. . we will 
have to do something we very much wish to 
15R. Megui & P. Simonnot, Israel's Ayatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in Israel, 1987, p. 50. 
16The attitude of the Gush is continued today by the Yesha Council: "[w]e as Jews and Muslims share many 
things but don't cut me out. The only time there is peaceful sharing [and history shows this] is when the 
Israelis are in charge. The only way to get mutual respect and to teach understanding - Christians, Muslims & 
Jews are only free to visit holy sites because Israel is in charge". Interview with Judith Tayar, Director of 
Public Relations, Yesha Council Foreign Desk, March 23,1999. 
17 E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 212. 
18 For example, the commission of enquiry established after the Hebron massacre excluded the issue of settlers 
carrying arms, and did little to change existing regulations governing opening fire. See'Commission of Enquiry 
into the Massacre at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Report, Jerusalem, 26 June 1994 (Excerpts)', 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIV, # 1,1994, p. 144. 
19 ADL, Extremism in the Name of Religion, p. 37. 
20 IDF Radio, 1400 gmt, 6 Jun. 93 - BBCISWB, ME/ 1709, A/5, June 8,1993. 
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avoid. We will have to bring these guys over and begin operating in a different 
manner. v21 
The tactical vision here is of the creation of trained cadre outside the constrained security 
environment of Israel to be re-inserted into the country as operational needs required them. 
8.1.2 Aryan Nations 
Similar to the Kach movement, Aryan Nations is an 'above ground' organisation 
which cannot risk large scale involvement in organised violence, although there are acts of 
violence perpetrated by individual members who have acted on their own accord or who 
have formed separate organisations such as the Order. What differentiates Aryan Nations 
from Kach is the absence of a serious and well supported plan to participate in mainstream 
politics even at the local level. However, it should be noted that Identity adherents and 
other members of the extreme right have attempted electoral participation. 22 The rhetoric 
and avowed objectives of Aryan Nations are simply too extreme and divorced from reality 
for most Americans, and the group itself is fundamentally opposed to the American 
government and both the structure and form of the American political system. The primary 
tactics that can be ascribed to Aryan Nations are those of mobilisation and incitement, 
while violent acts are the province of splinter groups and lone actors conducted by 
members imbued with the group's ideology. 
The very name of the group itself refers to Butler's objective of creating a white 
Christian enclave, the so-called 'Aryan Nations'. The Pacific Northwest was seen by many 
members of the Christian Right as a symbolic Aryan homeland, replete with Nordic 
scenery and isolated from the perceived degenerate nature of urban society. Butler 
envisaged a large Aryan community centred on Hayden Lake Idaho. The number of people 
he suggested was the 144,000 of the book of revelations, the righteous remnant from the 
book of Revelations which would defeat the forces of darkness. 23 Such large numbers in a 
21 ibid. 
22 Most prominent of these was former Klansman David Duke who competed in the 1988 and 1992 
presidential primaries and at various times since in senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Other include Tom 
Metzger and Ralph P. Forbes. Despite their disquieting appearance on the American political scene none has 
met with real success. See ADL, Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far Right 
Fringe, pp. 36-40,46-49 & 77-81. 
23 Revelations 14: 1. 
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low population area it was initially hoped would also help gain political control of the 
region. By 1986, Butler's plan envisaged an Aryan homeland which would encompass the 
states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming, the so called "10 percent 
solution" -a sober modification of his stance in 1980 which foresaw an area bounded by 
the Rocky Mountains, the Mississippi River, the Northern Canadian plains and the 
Mexican border. 24 The idea of withdrawal from society is common throughout the 
American extreme right, motivated alternatively by fears of an impending nuclear 
holocaust and an apocalyptic race war. Butler's original idea was inspired by Donald 
Clerkin, head of the Euro-American Alliance who suggested the creation of a 'Europolis', 
an armed reservation to preserve the Aryan people. 25 
The primary tactic employed by Butler when he founded Aryan Nations was 
fundamentally one designed to mobilise the disparate elements of the extreme right in the 
United States and for the group to become a kind of umbrella organisation. Butler himself 
describes his efforts as an attempt to build "an interrelationship of people with the same 
ideas and beliefs. , 26 Butler planned to sponsor an annual international Aryan Congress or 
'Aryan World Congress' which would feature well-known speakers, weapons and survival 
training, religious ceremonies and cross burnings. Although Butler nor any of the group's 
members were prosecuted as a result a federal indictment relating to the 1983 congress 
claimed that attendees planned to "carry out assassinations of federal officials, politicians 
and Jews, as well as bombings and polluting of municipal water supplies". 27 Propagation 
of the group's message to other like minded organisations was considered important as was 
exposure to the mainstream media. James Aho estimates, for instance, that a quarter of 
Congress attendees in 1986 were "representatives of the media. "28 Butler also spoke at 
other, similar gatherings organised by the CSAL. Perhaps the most important group 
24 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, 1990, p. 58 & K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, 
The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 82-83. 
25 ADL, Extremism on the Right: A Handbook, 1983, p. 9. Butler went some was to according his ideas 
quasi-legal status in 1982 when he filed the 'Nehemiah Township Charter' with the Kootenai County Clark's 
office. This document decreed the area surrounding Hayden Lake to be a'Christian Aryan Township'. Idaho, 
County of Kootenai, Nehemiah Township Charter and Common Law Contract, July 12,1982, Book 120, p. 
387. 
26 Quoted in ADL, Extremist Groups In the United States: A Record of Bigotry and Violence, 1982, p. 57. 
27 Cited in B. Hoffman, "'Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by e Religious Imperative', 
RAND P-7834,1993, p. 8. 
28 J_ Aho, The politics of Righteousness, p. 59. 
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connections generated by these annual convocations were those with overseas right wing 
groups, especially in Canada and Germany29, and with the Alabama based Knights of the 
Klu Klux Klan. 30 Support for the group was also sought amongst the wider right wing 
milieu of survivalists, tax resistors, gun enthusiasts and Christian home educators through 
publications such as The Spotlight and Justice Times. 31 Since 1979, the group has also 
conducted a prison outreach programme which has led to the creation of an affiliated 
organisation within the prison system, the Aryan Brotherhood. 
Although the Aryan Nations annual congresses and others which Butler addressed 
helped cement his position and that of the group as the 'leaders' of the racist right in the 
1980s, this situation did not last. Throughout the second half of the 1980s disaffection 
grew with the absence of action from the group -a situation typified by the earlier 
defection of Robert Mathews and the formation of the Order. In July 1992, the turnout at 
the Aryan Nations World Congress was estimated at around one hundred people, and in 
July 1995 about one hundred and twenty five. 32 Butler attempted to draw attention to the 
group during the August 1992 siege of Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge and while the 
coverage was good, the turn out was small. 33 The 1995 congress was also marred by 
scuffles arising from allegations of embezzlement by the wife of the group's staff leader 
Tom Bishop. Like other elements of the Aryan Nations leadership structure noted above in 
Chapter Four, Bishop left soon afterwards. The mobilisation drive was further affected 
later in this year by Butler's declining health and the death of his wife. By contrast, the 
ideology of Aryan Nations has been successfully disseminated throughout the U. S. extreme 
right by individuals associated with the group and by the group itself. In 1994, a Klanwatch 
report on militia movements noted that "[m]ilitia strategists John Trochmann, Tom 
29 For an analysis of the Canadian right wing including links to the American right see S. R. Barrett, Is GodA 
Racist?, 1987. For an analysis of the European right wing including American association see B. Hoffman, 
Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe Since 1980,1984. See also T. Bjorgo, 'Terror From the Extreme Right', 
TPV Special Edition, Vol. VII, # 1,1995 & L. Weinberg, 'The American Radical Right in Comparative 
Perspective' in P. Merkt & L. Weinberg (eds. ), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, 1997. 
30 In 1981 the Alabama Knight of the Klu Klux Klan (KKKK) leader Don Black was arrested for participation 
in an attempt to overthrow the government of the Caribbean island of Dominica. During his incarceration the 
KKKK split in to factions, one led by Stanley McCollum of Alabama, and the other by the Arkansas based 
Thom Robb. 
31 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness, p. 59. 32 ibid., p. 20. 
33 Weaver had reportedly visited the Aryan Nations compound in the past and he quickly became a symbol 
(and his wife and son martyrs) for the extreme right. 
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Stetson, Pete Peters, Jim Wickstrom and Louis Beam are Identity adherents who have long 
standing ties to the Aryan Nations and its leader, Richard Butler. "34 The report further 
notes that "[t]hese and other racist extremists, are actively involved or associated with 
militia organisations in at least nine states. 05 
While Aryan Nations and similar organisations have not embarked on an open, 
declared violent programme as did the Order, violence is still pursued by individuals and 
splinters imbued with the group's ideology. In August 1983, Frank Spisak was sentenced to 
death by electrocution after murdering two Blacks and a Caucasian he mistook for a Jew in 
1982. Spisak was defiantly unrepentant. When he was sentenced he stated "[e]ven though 
this court may pronounce me guilty a thousand times, the higher court of our great Aryan 
warrior god pronounces me innocent.. .1 
do hereby set the example of our loyal Aryan 
Nation. Many more will come after me... Heil Hitler. 06 In 1985, a Missouri state trooper 
was shot and killed by a member of Aryan Nations. This incident led to a multi-agency 
raid on a CSAL training compound on the Missouri-Arkansas border. 37 In 1987, another 
Missouri state trooper was shot and while the assailant had no direct affiliation with any 
particular extremist group, he was an adherent of white supremacist beliefs and collected 
Aryan Nations literature and paraphernalia. 38 More recently Richard Guthrie, a self- 
proclaimed member of the Aryan Republican Army, convicted for a series of diversionary 
bombings and robberies in the early nineties, had made several trips to the Aryan Nations 
compound in the late 1980s39, and in mid-1999 Buford Furrow Jr. was convicted of a 
shooting attack on a Jewish day care centre in Los Angeles. He had been a one time 
resident of, and security guard at, the Hayden Lake compound and at his trial stated that 
"[i]t's time for America to wake up and kill the Jews. "4° In July 1998, two guards at the 
Aryan Nations compound pursued, shot at and then harassed the occupants of a car whom 
34 Klanwatch, Intelligence Report, Racist Extremists Exploit Nation-wide Militia Movement', # 76, December 
1994. 
3s ibid. 
36 People, 29 August 1983. Spisak was a Lieutenant in an Aryan Nations splinter known as the Socialist 
Nationalist People's Party, founded by Keith Gilbert in 1979. 
37 Fred M. Mills, Superintendent, Missouri State Highway Patrol. From the hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United 
States, The Militia Movement in the United States, June 15,1995. 
3" ibid. 
39 Chicago Tribune, April 22,1996. 
40 FBI and U. S. Dept. of Justice, Project Megiddo, http: /www. fbi. gov/library/megiddo/publicmegiddo. pdf. 
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they mistakenly thought had fired upon the compound. While not a significant act of 
violence the incident was pursued by the Southern Poverty Law Centre and in September 
2000 a court awarded $6.3m punitive damages against the group, effectively bankrupting 
the organisation and raising questions about its ability to continue functioning. 
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the American extreme right, including 
members of Aryan Nations is their alleged propensity to consider the employment of 
poisons and biological agents. In 1998 the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non- 
proliferation Project (CBWNP) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies compiled 
a list of fifty two terrorist incidents in the U. S41 involving chemical, biological or 
radiological materials from 1960 to the (then) present. 42 Twenty seven of these were 
classified as "unconfirmed, hoax or 'intended' use", twelve as "possession/acquisition of 
material", and thirteen as "actual use of material". 43 The second and third categories 
accounted for seven hundred and seventy seven injuries and one fatality. 44 Where the 
group is known in the second and third categories the largest identifiable bloc has some 
form of religious motivation. Two particular incidents involving biological agents have 
been ascribed to one Larry Wayne Harris, an Identity adherent with links to Aryan 
Nations. 45 Similarly in 1985, when the compound of the CSAL was raided by federal 
authorities, a large quantity of sodium cyanide was found which was allegedly to be used 
to poison the water supply of Washington D. C. 46 
41 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, A publication of the chemical and biological 
weapons non-proliferation project of the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute 
of International Studies, October 1998. 
42 The fifty two cases were drawn from a database of nearly 350 incidents kept by the CBWNP. 
43 While the FBI has measured a steady increase in WMD criminal cases (from 37 in 1996 to 181 in 1998), the 
vast proportion were hoaxes. As Deputy Assistant Dale Watson put it "yesterday's bomb threat has been 
replaced with a more exotic biological or chemical threat". Testimony before the Commission to Assess the 
Organisation of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, April 
29,1999. 
44 In order to put these figures in perspective it should be mentioned that seven hundred and fifty one of the 
injuries were accounted for by the 1984 Salmonella poisoning conducted by the followers of Baghwan Shree 
Rajneesh in order to influence a local election, and the fatality occurred in 1973 when a Symbionese Liberation 
Army member shot a school superintendent with cyanide tipped bullets from a . 
38 calibre hand gun. 
as For a refutation offered by the group of the whole anthrax procurement case see Gov. Media Conspiracy/ 
Aryan Nations, http: //www. nidlink. com/-aryanvic/anthrax. htn-d. 
46 B. Hoffman, "'Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative', RAND 
Paper P-7834,1993, p. 8. 
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8.1.3 Hizballah 
What distinguishes Hizballah from the previous two examples is its existence 
within a relatively lawless environment and its sponsorship by, and operational links with, 
Iran. 47 The group has employed a variety of tactics including suicide bombings, bombings 
generally, hostage taking, an on-going guerrilla insurgency in Southern Lebanon, 
establishing social infrastructure and more recently participation in mainstream Lebanese 
politics. In 1995, Eyal Zisser argued that Hizballah was a 'pragmatic' organisation more 
interested in survival than in attaining its pan-Islamic goals and the organisation's tactical 
programme reflects this clearly. As shown in the preceding sections on location, timing 
and targets, each tactic employed can be seen to serve either the objectives of attaining the 
organisation's pan-Islamic goals (at least rhetorically) or group survival, and collectively 
they should be seen as an array of modes employed in a co-ordinated fashion, influenced 
and directed by Syria and Iran. 
Hizballah rose to international prominence when it conducted a series of large 
scale suicide bombing attacks against Israel and elements of the Multi National Force 
(MNF) in 1983. In April, a suicide bomb was used against the U. S. embassy in Beirut 
killing 49 and wounding 120. In October, twin suicide bombs were employed 
simultaneously against the French paratroop HQ and American Marine barracks in Beirut, 
killing 56 French and 241 Americans. In November 1985, a suicide bomber attacked the 
Israeli Defence Force (IDF) HQ in Tyre, South Lebanon killing 59. While this section is 
not meant as a catalogue of Hizballah operations, these early attacks reflect the strategic 
objectives of removing foreign influence from Lebanon, and to raising the group's prestige 
within the Lebanese Shi'ite community. 48 The tactic of suicide bombing has been used 
consistently throughout the group's life span in both domestic and international arenas, and 
can be seen to serve two important functions for Hizballah (and other groups which 
employ this tactic). Firstly, it is a way of ensuring delivery of a device in a spectacular 
47 The apparent contradiction of a Lebanese party with such close ties to a foreign power has been rationalised 
by the group's Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah who claims such ties are no different to those of "every 
party operating in Lebanon ... yet no-one casts 
doubt on their Lebanese identity", Al-Ahd (Beirut), August 26, 
1996. 
48 For an overview of the competition between Hizballah and its main rival Amal for support within the Shi'ite 
community see M. Kramer, 'Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shi'ite Lebanon', Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Vol. 3, # 3,1991, pp. 23-46. 
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fashion to a precise location, at times coinciding with a specific political event, that pre- 
empts any security precautions taken by the target. Secondly, it provides martyrs for the 
cause which in turn fuels an organisation's mythology. They also display to the 'other' the 
group's degree of dedication by members accepting martyrdom, an act which has profound 
resonance in Shi'ite religious lore, most notably during the Ashura festival. 49 Suicide 
bombing is a powerful psychological weapon which Hizballah exploits very effectively. In 
April 1996, the group released a film clip entitled "Ali Baba and the Seventy Suicide 
Bombers" which purported to show a team of suicide bombers organised like a military 
unit. What was actually shown was a Hizballah commando unit - the organisation does not 
possess a dedicated suicide unit, instead individual candidates are identified within the 
Shi'ite community, indoctrinated, trained and then employed. 50 
The tactic of hostage taking by Hizballah during the 1980s and early 1990s should 
not be seen as monolithic or mono-causal, and unlike suicide bombing was conducted over 
a relatively brief period of time until its political utility waned. Magnus Ranstorp has 
identified nine distinct phases of Hizballah hostage taking each with slightly different 
motivations and objectives - often in alignment with Iranian objectives. 
51 Hostage taking 
by Hizballah was intimately related to the civil war environment in Lebanon and to Iranian 
influence over the group. Changes within the Iranian clerical hierarchy following the death 
of Ruhollah Khomeini produced intense clerical factionalism, reverberating within the 
Hizballah, and the Ta'if accord, disarming all Lebanese militias, produced a 1991 
agreement over Hizballah's future status as a resistance organisation. This led to the 
realisation by Hizballah, Iran and Syria that the retention of Western hostages was less of a 
necessity. Hizballah was quick to point out, however, that the release of the last hostages 
did not signify an end to its resistance campaign: "[t]he release of one or all of the hostages 
should not be seen as an end of extremism and fundamentalism. The confrontation is 
continuing. X52 
49 See M. Ranstorp, Hizballah's Political and Military Strategy in the 1990s: From Revolutionary Dogma to 
"Lebanonization"', paper presented at the British Middle East Studies Association Conference, Oxford, July 6- 
9,1997. 
50 Yediot Ahronot, April 19,1996. 
51 M. Ranstorp, HL-ballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, 1997, pp. 86-108. 52 Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt, 25 Apr. 90 - BBCISWB, ME/0749, A/1, April 27,1990. 
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It should also be noted that tactical linkage is another feature of Hizballah 
operations. For example the kidnappings of French citizens in Lebanon was complemented 
by bombing campaigns in Paris in December 1985 and September 1986, and attacks on the 
French UNIFIL contingent in Southern Lebanon. Such links magnify the effects of 
apparently disparate and separate actions, providing the group with maximum leverage. 
The tactical shift by Hizballah toward participation in Lebanese politics was 
inspired by three primary factors. The first of these was the October 1989 Ta'if accords 
which effectively ended the civil war, and under Syrian patronage based the new Lebanese 
polity on a Maronite/Sunni order. The second was progress in the Middle East Peace 
process which threatened to erode the corner stone of the group's ideology, its struggle 
against Israel. Thirdly was the declining influence of Iran brought about by Iranian 
political and economic difficulties which manifested themselves at the conclusion of the 
Gulf War. Participation in the 1992 elections resulted in the organisation winning eight 
seats in the Parliament and gaining the support of another four candidates. These 
parliamentary candidates, operating under the auspices of Hizballah's 'Loyalty to the 
Resistance Bloc' (Kutlat al Wafa lil-Muqawama) have been involved in setting or 
criticising national policy on social, economic and political affairs. 53 Participation can thus 
be seen as an attempt by Hizballah to gradually undermine the new government without 
having to physically resist it, a possible course reflected by Sheikh Fadlallah who has 
commented that he does not regard Lebanon as a state but as a "banana republic"54 , and 
certainly by Sheikh Nasrallah who has stated that participation in the political process was 
"trying to topple the government through peaceful means. "" However, as one 
commentator observes "by acting within the agreement's framework Hizballah actually 
strengthens and legitimises the new arrangement... [and] The long-run effect of Hizballah's 
participation in Lebanese politics may co-opt it more than the group's leaders expect. "56 
In line with this political participation has been an intensification of Hizballah's 
social welfare activities in the form of schools, mosques, clinics and in. some cases shops 
53 W. Harris, 'Lebanon' in A. Ayalon (ed. ), Middle East Contemporary Survey 16, (1992), 1994, pp. 598-608. 
54 Al Ahd, April 8,1994. 
55 AFP, February 24,1994. 
56 E. Zisser, 'Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Cross-roads', MERIA Journal, 9 3, September, 1997, p. 3. 
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in urban areas. 57 Since its inception Hizballah has been concerned with the plight of the 
Lebanese Shi'ite community, a concern motivated in part by philanthropy and also by the 
knowledge that such activity would help to secure the allegiance of the Shi'ite community. 
In 1984 the Jihad al-Binaa (JAB), construction Jihad, was opened as was the Islamic health 
committee. Three years later the Iranian Relief Committee of Imam Khomeini (RCIK) 
opened a branch in Beirut and has grown steadily since its services competing today with 
the efforts of the Lebanese government to aid the Shi'ite community. 58 These organisations 
and others, financed by Iran and also by Hizballah's own financial activities, have 
penetrated every facet of life within the Shi'ite community, addressing the needs of the 
most destitute and strengthening the organisation's claim as 'defender of the oppressed'. 
While the Lebanese political establishment may conspire to limit Hizballah's power and 
the possibility of establishing an Islamic Republic, Hizballah has effectively spread its 
religious message at the grass roots level through its schools and most importantly through 
the mosques. It was through the mosques that the organisation became known and they 
still perform a vital function for recruitment and dissemination of group ideology. 59 The 
provision of all levels of social welfare services in effect amounts to a social infrastructure 
which parallels that of the Lebanese government - and in many cases over a period of 
decades has surpassed it - ensuring widespread popular support for Hizballah. 
The guerrilla campaign against Israel has long been regarded as central to the 
group's activities, reflecting one of its limited objectives of removing foreign influence 
from Lebanon, and the effectiveness of Hizballah's guerrilla activities was the primary 
reason it remained the only militia not disarmed after the Ta'if accords. As Martin Kramer 
has noted Hizballah owes its high profile both within Israel and without to violence, and 
this profile has been constantly reinforced by the group's ongoing campaign. 60 Hizballah 
has effectively fought (and won) a successful and highly skilled guerrilla war against one 
of the most experienced, well equipped and highly motivated militaries anywhere in the 
57 A1-Hayat, February 23,1994. See also Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1,1630 gmt, 28 Sept. 
93 - BBC/SWB ME/1808, MED/12, October 1,1993. 58 H. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance, 1997, pp. 147-148. 
59 Although Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq have historically been the centres for Shiite theological studies, 
Hiizballah has constructed seyeral theological schools in Lebanon. H. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a 
Vengeance, 1997, p. 166. 
60 M. Kramer, 'The Calculus of Jihad', in M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (eds. ), Fundamentalisms and the State: 
Remaking Polities, Economics and Militance, 1993, p. 547. 
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world, and it is this achievement which has given the organisation such high standing in 
Lebanon. The bilateral approach of continuing struggle against Israel and participation in 
Lebanese politics will depend on further developments in the Peace Process - specifically 
if the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon is seen as sufficient to warrant a long 
term suspension of operations against Israel - and the degree to which the organisation can 
rationalise the suspension of its long term objectives. History would seem to suggest that 
large hierarchical organisations that have been engaged in violence for a long period that 
do not achieve all their goals produce splinters which are determined to continue the 
struggle, and so loyalty to the central leadership will be increasingly important in the 
future. 
8.1.4 Hamas 
In contrast to Hizballah, the tactics employed by Hamas are constrained by an 
extremely tight security environment. Not only do Israel and the occupied territories 
comprise a small and fragmented geographical area, but since 1993 the organisation has 
had to face the dual threat of both Israeli security activity and that of the Palestinian 
Authority and its myriad security services. Countering such problems has certainly led to 
an increase in tactical sophistication over time, an essential development for ensuring 
group survival and operational viability. Indeed this growth in tactical sophistication has 
been in part inspired by Hizballah, either through example or through direct contact, 
especially following the Israeli expulsion of 415 Hamas and PIJ activists to Southern 
Lebanon in 1992. Hamas's tactical programme exhibits traits consistent with a mainstream 
extreme Islamic organisation, both violent and non-violent. 
As with almost all other groups, both religious and secular, Hamas regards itself as 
conducting a war of resistance and ultimately liberation. The tactics employed are thus 
commensurate with the security situation and yet flexible enough to cope with alterations 
in the political context. As one senior Hamas figure has noted: 
"[i]n war time it is permissible to use all means... remember that Hamas has its own 
clear visions of its goals, brothers in the military wing have their own clear timetable 
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in facing the occupation according to the environment and the conditions that 
surround them. , 61 
Hamas's attitude towards violence is entirely a pragmatic one. As Mahmud al-Zahar has 
stated: 
"[w]e must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can 
fulfil our goals without violence, we will do so. Violence is a means not a goal. 
Hamas's decision to adopt self-restraint does not contradict our aims including the 
establishment of an Islamic state instead of Israel. "62 
The early activities of Hamas were random and limited in nature, reflecting the 
group's vulnerability in its nascent form. The first significant wave of these, conducted in 
the first year of the Intifada, consisted of shooting attacks on Israeli patrols and civilian 
vehicles in the Gaza strip, and the use of roadside anti-vehicle devices against Israeli 
traffic. In April 1989, the group kidnapped and murdered two Israeli soldiers, an action 
notable for the absence of demands or bargaining typical of such an operation. 63 The 
organisation came to widespread public notice, however, during the so called 'war of the 
knives' against Israeli settlers and soldiers following the Al-Aqsa mosque massacre of 
October 1990.64 It is interesting to note that many of these attacks were not directed by 
Hamas, although the group presented them as examples of Palestinians performing their 
Islamic duty in line with the pronouncements and'action calls' of Hamas. 65 
The direction and conduct of violent tactics was altered after the Israeli 
crackdowns of late 1990 and early 1991. The response was the establishment of an official 
military structure, the'battalions of Izz al-Din al-Qassam'. The al-Qassam squads began by 
assassinating Palestinians within the Gaza Strip who were suspected of collaborating with 
the Israeli security services - severely disrupting Israeli intelligence gathering - and then 
attacked more Israeli civilians, a course of action which again spawned emulation within 
the Palestinian community unconnected to Hamas. The general escalation in violence by 
61 Interview with senior Hamas leader in Hebron conducted by Dr. M. Ranstorp, May, 1999. 
62 Al-Duds Al -Arabi, October 12,1995. 63 Kidnapping is a tactic unique to Hamas within the Palestinian context. According to the group itself Sheikh 
Yassin ordered the first kidnapping which was meant as "a challenge to Rabin (then defence minister and 
responsible for the so-called 'fist of iron' policy towards the uprising). 
64 Hamas also engaged in the burning of forests as a disruptive and economic tactic. 
65 S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence, 2000, pp. 57-58. In the 
five months following the Temple Mount massacre thirteen Israelis were killed in stabbing attacks. 
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Hamas, driven in large part by progress in talks between the PLO and Israel led in 
December 1992 to the group's first concerted campaign when, in three separate attacks in 
the space of a week, five Israeli soldiers were killed. The Israeli response, to expel 415 
Islamists into southern Lebanon was a major boost for Hamas and a public relations 
disaster for the Israelis. 66 Moreover the expulsion was an important turning point in the 
employment of car bombs by the group, with many being employed in response to the 
expulsions, and those that had been expelled found themselves in close contact with 
members of Hizballah from whom they learned a great deal about the employment of 
suicide bombs and the construction of vehicle bombs. 67 
Throughout its existence Hamas has shown a high degree of tactical adaptability, 
revising tried methods in reaction to security threats. This capacity to refine existing means 
is perhaps best shown by developments in the tactic of suicide bombing. In the July and 
September 1997 bombings, the group made a number of innovations, firstly by employing 
multiple suicide bombers to attack the same targets (two at the July 30 Mahane Yehuda 
bombing in Jerusalem and three in Rehov Ben-Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem), the 
bombers detonating themselves near simultaneously at different point to maximise 
casualties. These bombings were more developed in other respects. The bombers did not 
leave behind the usual farewell videos, clothing labels were removed and the explosives 
placed near the heads of the bombers in a concerted effort to disguise their identities. 
There are numerous other examples of more refined tactics and operational sophistication. 
In July 1997, for instance, Palestinian security services raided a Hamas bomb factory near 
Bethlehem. As well as explosives other items included IDF uniforms, skull caps and 
Jewish prayer shawls suggesting the use of disguises to more effectively place bombs or 
suicide bombers. 68 
Another crucial feature of Hamas's tactics which at once put it into competition 
with the PA and contrast it from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the development of a 
social infrastructure and a social welfare system. Indeed some commentators have been 
moved to observe that despite its violent activities Hamas is "essentially a social 
66 Not only did the expulsion outrage the Palestinian population but their was no appreciable effect on Hamas 
activities. The International pressure forced the Israelis to return the exiles in December 1993. 
67 S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 66. 
68 Voice of Israel, 0400 gmt, 21 Jul. 97 - BBC/SWB, ME/2977, MED/6, July 22,1997. 
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movement. , 69 Since its inception Hamas has maintained a broad range of social activities 
and institutions, initially in competition with those provided by Israel and later with those 
established by the PA. Hamas runs educational institutions at all levels, maintains libraries, 
recreational clubs, and like Hizballah and other Muslim Brotherhood organisations the 
group runs hospitals and provides assistance to the needy. When resistance activities 
began, these welfare activities encompassed those injured in the fighting or the relatives of 
those that lost their lives. Hamas also maintains a significant presence from the mosques in 
the occupied territories which are at once places for dissemination the group's message, 
recruitment and logistical nodes for violent operations. While these overt activities remain 
vulnerable to disruption, this pervasive social presence has done much for the group's 
popularity and has ensured support across Palestinian social strata. 
A different form of social tool employed since the organisation's beginnings has 
been the encouragement of civil disobedience, calls for strikes, boycotts of Israeli products 
where local alternatives were available and discouraging Palestinians from working for 
Israelis. Open calls for such activities, however, declined or were tempered when it was 
realised that such tactics merely created hardships for the general Palestinian population 
and a corresponding decline in support for Hamas. 70 A similarly negative popular reaction 
can be seen in the wake of Hamas bombings in Israel proper where the security response 
has been a closure of the occupied territories, severely impairing the movement of 
Palestinian goods and labour. 
Hamas' attitude to participation in mainstream politics is defined by the fact that 
Palestine is occupied, there can therefore be no comparison between Palestinian politics 
and the example proffered by Islamist parties in Algeria, Egypt and Jordan. In the words of 
Sheikh Yassin "[llamas] sees holy war as a means to liberate Palestine - all of Palestine. 
Muslims may not cease from holy war so long as the land of Muslims remains occupied. i71 
Resistance, however, exists on all levels, both violent and non-violent. As a senior 
spokesman for Hamas has noted, in the past the group has identified three different types 
of election. The first are 'non-political, popular' elections such as those for municipalities, 
trade unions, professional associations, university bodies and so on. Hamas has always 
69 S. Mishal & A. Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. vii. 70 ibid., pp. 63-63. 
71 FBIS-NES-95-039,28 February, 1995, p. 10. 
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participated in this kind of elections from where it derives a great deal of its popular 
support. The second are elections for the Palestinian National Council which the group 
regards as important and should be extended to Palestinians in the occupied territories and 
those in exile. The third are elections which relate to autonomy; legislative, executive and 
administrative. Hamas has categorically rejected participation in these because they are a 
function of 'autonomy status'. As a Hamas spokesman has stated, autonomy is rejected 
"Because if we won the majority of seats, we would be forced to respect the autonomy 
policy.. . even 
if we were a minority our presence in the chamber would only legitimise the 
autonomy. 02 Despite previous disagreements between the internal and external leadership 
regarding participation in this third category, the movement's stance remains one of 
fundamental rejection, although participation has been a serious consideration periodically 
since 1992. For example, shortly after his release from prison in September 1997, Sheikh 
Yassin outlined the conditions for a cease-fire agreement with the Israelis. These included 
the withdrawal of all Israeli troops to within the pre-1967 borders, the dismantling of all 
Jewish settlements built on 'Palestinian soil' since 1967, the release of all Palestinian 
prisoners held in detention centres The cease-fire would be for a given period of time 
during which Hamas would agree to halt all military operations and would not entail 
recognition of the state of Israel. 73 
8.2 Core 
8.2.1 Eyal 
Due to the embryonic nature of Eyal and the fact that its leader, Avishai Raviv was 
a Shin Bet informant, the tactics employed by the group were of a lower violent order, or 
of a purely symbolic nature. Despite Raviv's status, he was, as noted earlier, far from a 
totally compliant tool of the GSS. As Karpin and Friedman note "[t]here is substantial 
evidence to suggest he had his own agenda, unrelated to the needs of the Shabak [GSS]. "''' 
The most obvious example of this agenda is of course his decision to establish Eyal in the 
72 H, Hijazi, 'Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct. An Interview With Mahmud Zahhar', 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIV, # 3,1995, p. 82. 73 Article by Dr. Azzam Tamimi, Palestine Times, October, 1998. 
74 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin, 1998, p. 221. 
291 
first place. The primary problem of establishing what means Eyal employed stems not so 
much from the issue of Raviv but more from which acts exactly were perpetrated by 
members of the group, and which ones were perpetrated by individuals associated with 
Raviv in fact, or associated with him or Eyal by conjecture, following the Rabin 
assassination in order to establish a neat, group oriented explanation. 
Without a doubt the most obvious tactic that can be ascribed to Eyal with any 
certainty is that of incitement. To this end Raviv was adept at using the media. The 
swearing in ceremonies conducted over the grave of Abraham Stern are a good example. 
75 
At one of these in September 1995, a television crew from Israel's Channel One was 
present and recorded the proceedings. The Shamgar commission concluded, however, that 
far from this functioning as an integral part of Eyal's indoctrination process, Raviv had 
staged this particular ceremony for the benefit of group publicity. 76 The report noted that 
"[the clip] was a performance, for anybody who was present at the site must have been 
aware that it was a fake. 07 In a similar fashion the photomontage of Yitzhak Rabin in the 
uniform of an SS officer, which was circulated at the right wing demonstration in 
Jerusalem's Zion square on October 5 1995, while not the creation of Raviv as has been 
claimed, was certainly deliberately brought to the attention of a television correspondent 
by Raviv. 78 Courting the media to publicise his group also had the potential to backfire 
quite seriously as it did when Raviv claimed responsibility for the murder of a Palestinian 
in Halhul. The ensuing police investigation found that the man had been killed by fellow 
Palestinians during a robbery, a fact which further discredited Raviv in the eyes of the 
extreme right, some members of which had harboured suspicions that he was an informer 
since February that year. 79 
Allied to this range of incitement, Eyal also engaged in various violent activities 
against Arabs. The Shamgar Commission report stated that amongst other things Raviv had 
75 One commentator has claimed (erroneously) that Eyal members swore allegiance over Baruch Goldstein's 
grave. See L. Joffe, Keesings Guide to the Middle East Peace Process, 1996, p. 153. 
76 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 221. 
77 Jerusalem Post, December 16,1998. Channel I was also involved in a previous'staged' performance by 
Kach in summer 1994 where youths were shown training, being indoctrinated and then conducting an 
aggressive and violent raid on a Palestinian village. See R. Cohen-Alamagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political 
Extremism', p. 92. 
79 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 224. 
79 ibid. p. 222-223. 
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"organised 'night patrols' on the Jerusalem-Hebron road, during which he and his friends 
masqueraded as policemen, struck Arab residents... [he also] initiated acts of violence in 
Hebron, published fliers - including one which called for refusing to serve in the IDF, 
intimidated the Kiryat Arbor head and his sons who appeared too moderate. "80 Raviv had 
personally noted that he had "badly beaten up many Arabs"". Such activities are strikingly 
similar to those employed by members of Kach, adopting a programme of physical 
harassment which did not necessarily result in fatalities, thus being seen to be 'doing 
something while avoiding the risks of suppression which would have followed in the wake 
of a campaign of bombings or shootings. Although there is evidence that the group was 
considering moving rapidly to higher order acts such as serious bombing82, as is usually the 
case with such a rapid transition (and in this case proved by Amir's assassination of Rabin) 
the group risks raising its profile without a corresponding development of structural depth 
and thus invites destruction. 83 Eyal certainly had access to an array of weaponry and the 
decision not to employ it in a more systematic and lethal capacity appears to have been 
motivated by the knowledge that a security crack-down would be inevitable, combined 
with Raviv's knowledge that not only would such a crack-down be total and inclusive, but 
that it would spell the end of his lifestyle and freedom of action as he had known it since 
the late 1980s. 
Undoubtedly the most serious act perpetrated by an individual associated with 
Eyal, and the one which brought the group to prominence, was the assassination of Yitzhak 
Rabin by Yigal Amir. 84 Although some reports blandly state that Amir was a member of 
the group85, it would be more accurate to claim he was associated with it through his close 
friendship with Avashai Raviv. 86 The Shamgar Commission report claims that: 
"Avishai Raviv was closer to him than any other person regarding everything related 
to organising student demonstrations in Judea, Sumaria and Gaza ... [he] made strong 
80 Jenusalem Post, November 14,1997. 
ibid. 
82 US. News and World Reporl , 
11/20195, Vol. XIX, # 20, p. 70. 
83 Size is not necessarily an impediment to success, for example the secular Greek November 17 organisation. 
84 For a breathtaking conspiratorial version of the assassination see B. Chanvsh, Who Murdered Yitzhak 
Rabin?, 1998. Chamish has also offered a conspiratorial version of the 1994 Hebron massacre, see his 
'Was Baruch Goldstein Completely Innocent? ', http: //members. tripod. com/-VaArn/Aug2198. html. 
85 See for example: U. S. News and World Report, November 11,1995, Vol. CXIX, # 20, p. 70, & L. Joffe, 
Keesing's Guide to the Middle East Peace Process, p. 95. 
86 M. Karpin & I. Friedman, Murder in the Name of God, p. 224-225. 
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statements against the prime minister and claimed that he was subject to 'din rodef 
and that it was permissible to harm him... It is therefore astonishing that in his reports 
on Amir he did not mention or even hint at Amir's known statements on his 
intentions to harm the prime minister, which Amir made more than once to members 
of his close circle of friends. i87 
The assassination of the Prime Minister, shocking as it has been, has in large part been a 
tactic inspired by the peace process and has been interpreted by elements within the 
extreme right as being the most dramatic and direct way of forestalling that process. It is 
significant that with the election of Ehud Barak and the continuation of negotiations with 
the PA, Israeli security forces are warning of plots by disaffected young right wing 
gs extremists to assassinate the Prime minister citing the Halakhic ruling of din rodef 
8.2.2 The Order 
While the Order shared isolationist visions of a pure community like most of the 
American extreme right, the activist programme of the group was revolutionary in nature. 
The Seattle trial of the group which concluded nearly a year after Robert Mathew's death 
investigated sixty-seven separate crimes which included robberies, arson, bombings, 
counterfeiting schemes and murders across the United States. The driving force behind this 
revolutionary strategy was impatience and frustration with the gap between the rhetoric 
and activities of organisations such as Aryan Nations (of which Robert Mathews and Bruce 
Pierce amongst others had been members). The tactical programme which the group 
developed was designed to lay the foundations for a more widespread revolution, isolating 
the group from mainstream society, securing resources for future actions and striking at the 
group's perceived enemies. 
Similarly to Aryan Nations, Mathews envisaged a community of believers living in 
the same area which could be motivated as a political or revolutionary force. In 1982, 
Mathews created the idea of the 'White American Bastion', whereby whites would move to 
the Northwest, form a majority and gradually exert increasing social, political and 
87 Jenisalem Post, November 14,1997. 
88 Israel TV, Channel 2,1930 gmt, 8 Nov. 99 - BBC/SWB, ME/3689, MED/4, November 11,1999. 
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economic influence. 89 He placed an advertisement in the right wing paper The Spotlight 
encouraging like minded people to move to the Pacific Northwest. The response to his 
advertisement was good, although very few people actually took the drastic step of leaving 
their old lives and moving into the bastion'. 
90 In Mathew's words: 
"once we have a majority here, we create laws banning Jews, mud people and other 
minorities from living here.. . 
Once we've secured Metaline Falls, we keep expanding 
until we are strong enough to create a white nation, separate from the Jew-nited 
States. "91 
The poor response to such appeals, however, further convinced Mathews that militance 
was the only route to success. 
Mathews believed that the Order would function as a symbolic revolutionary 
vanguard which would probably not survive confrontation with the overwhelming forces of 
evil, but would show the way to fellow 'kinsmen'. Despite the optimistic claims by Pierce's 
periodical National Vanguard that the Order "set its sights on a full scale armed 
revolution, ending with the purification of the U. S. population and the institution of a race 
based authoritarian government"92, the group did not overestimate their chances or expect 
to survive to be part of a racially purified state. Mathews is reputed to have said: 
"[t]he chances of any of us coming out of this alive or free from prison for the rest of 
our lives are pretty slim. But somebody has to start it. Once others see us, more 
kinsmen will be inspired to follow... Cattle die, kinsmen die, and I too shall die. The 
only thing I know that doesn't die is the fame of dead men's deeds. "93 
This is an extreme example of a phenomenon James Aho calls 'Christian Heroism', where 
individuals identify themselves as essential components of a struggle against an opposition 
force. 94 In the ultimate expression of this heroism, martyrdom is actively sought in the face 
s`' Although whites already formed an overwhelming majority in the area, they were not a 'racially aware' 
population. 
90 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 109-112. People who responded to the advertisement 
were sent a brochure printed at the Aryan Nations compound the cover of which alluded to the Viking and 
American pioneering ethoses. 
91 ibid., p. 225. Mathews was further incensed by the fact that the local mayor was Chinese. 
92 Cited in ADL Research Report, William Pierce: Novelist of Hate, 1995, p. 5. 
93 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 225. These remarks were allegedly made to Richard 
Scutari, a martial arts expert who became the Order's chief of security. 
94 J. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness, p. 79. 
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of acknowledged and overwhelming odds, identifying with Christ who also foresaw his 
own death and embraced it willingly. 95 
The overall strategy Mathews articulated at the group's first initiation ceremony 
consisted of six steps. The first was to form the group itself, the second to set goals, the 
third was to procure funds, and the fourth recruitment. 96 Although legal methods were 
considered for step three (primarily through the logging of forest concessions) it was 
quickly discovered that these would not furnish sufficiently large quantities of money 
quickly enough. The two illegal modes settled on were a counterfeiting operation and the 
more immediate option of armed robbery. Although counterfeiting did not make the Order 
nearly as much money as armed robberies and also helped give the FBI some of its more 
valuable leads when investigating the group, this method warrants some mention. The 
rationale for counterfeiting was obviously to provide funds, but there was the added 
attraction perceived by the group that it would help de-value the currency of 'ZOG', and 
cause wider economic disruption. The first operation was carried out at the Aryan Nations 
compound, apparently without the knowledge of Richard Butler. When Butler discovered 
what was going on he had the two individuals responsible suspended - further evidence to 
the Order of how far Aryan Nations was from acting upon its rhetoric. 97 All following 
operations were conducted elsewhere and must ultimately be seen as a liability - it is 
through counterfeiting that the FBI acquired their first informant. Initially at least the 
Order decided to target a narrow section of their ideological enemies for funds - drug 
dealers and pornographers. Indeed, the first robbery perpetrated by the group was of an 
adult video store in Spokane (the only one in the town). The robbery itself was a success, 
marking a major tuning point for most members of the group, but the results were 
disappointing. As a result, the group decided to consider more lucrative targets such as 
banks and armoured cars which would net substantially more money, and also disrupt the 
economy of the ZOG. In December 1983, Mathews robbed a bank alone in the Puget 
Sound area of $25,000, but this was a rare instance and the bulk of the funds obtained by 
95 A similar willingness to accept martyrdom was expressed by Gordon Kahl. ibid., 'Appendix 1. Documents', 
pp. 242-246. 
96 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 124. 97 ibid., p. 161. Butler is reported to have asked one of the counterfeiters, Bruce Pierce, Why are you doing 
this? ', to which Pierce replied 'We're all building the same house. It's just that you have one function and we have another. 
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the Order were from organised attacks on armoured cars. The first such robbery in March 
1984 netted the group almost $50,000, and a robbery in the April almost $250,000. The 
largest haul, however, was made in July 1984 when twelve Order members ambushed an 
armoured car near Ukiah California, escaping with $3.8 million. Robberies such as those 
in March 16 and April 23 1984 were accompanied by bombings or bomb threats designed 
to distract local law enforcement. These bombings also had an ideological undercurrent, as 
in the case of the April 1984 when the target was a pornographic theatre. 
Assassination was step five in the Order's revolutionary programme. Mathews 
talked frequently about a hit list of prominent 'racial enemies' which were to be 
assassinated. Mathews, however, added a new twist to the idea of assassinations with a so- 
called 'doomsday plan'. If the group was detected and persecuted by the authorities then 
each member who remained at liberty was to track and kill his assigned target. 
98 This 
desperate last possibility is similar to the idea of 'Leaderless Resistance' propagated by 
Louis Beam, whereby highly motivated individuals with no group affiliation act on their 
own (or in small groups), thus minimising the chances of discovery or penetration by the 
state. 99 It is widely believed that Timothy McVeigh was following such a programme when 
he conducted the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. 1°° 
Ironically the first person assassinated by the group was Walter West, an Aryan 
Nations member who was talking freely in bars around the Hayden Lake area about the 
activities of the Order. West was executed in May 1984. The first 'ideological' target was a 
Jewish Denver talk show host, Alan Berg who was gunned down outside his home a month 
after West. Berg was targeted because he had a history of goading (and frequently 
humiliating) right wing figures on his show. Berg was actually the third name on a list 
drawn up by Mathews. The first two were Morris Dees, head of the Southern Poverty Law 
Centre and the Klanwatch project in Montgomery Alabama, an obvious enemy of the 
98 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 126. 
99 L. Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', The Seditionist, # 12, February 1992. The original essay was published in 
1983. Barkun argues that such 'uncoordinated violence' within the U. S. has become the norm, replacing 
revolutionary models based on military hierarchy and the leftist cellular model (with the exception of PIRA). 
See his 'Leaderless Resistance and Phineas Priests: Strategies of Uncoordinated Violence on the Far Right', 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Diego, California, 1997. 
100 For an examination of the history of leaderless resistance and the motivations of McVeigh see J. Kaplan, 
'Leaderless Resistance', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. IX, # 3,1997, pp. 80-95. David Lane, an 
Order member, has offered his own Odinist interpretation of leaderless resistance in 'Wotan is Coming', WAR, 
April, 1993. 
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extreme right, and Norman Lear, a television producer who Mathews felt was responsible 
for changing television programmes into "race mixing free-sex garbage. "101 Another target 
of opportunity considered for assassination was Baron Rothschild who visited Seattle in 
1983 but the plot was shelved due to a lack of explosives and Mathew's conviction that it 
was too early to consider planning assassinations. 102 
Step six was to be the formation of a guerrilla army which would conduct 
03 
operations in urban areas' It was for this purpose that Mathews property contained a 
barracks and training areas. One member of the group, Randall Rader, was in charge of the 
guerrilla training. Rader had previously been 'minister of defence' at the CSA compound 
and was in charge of survivalist training there. Step six was, however, cut short as federal 
authorities came closer to making arrests. Although it has been noted the Order's robberies 
were executed in a sophisticated 'paramilitary style', it was the group's lack of 
professionalism which provided the authorities with their most valuable intelligence - 
during the Ukiah robbery Mathews left a handgun at the scene which was traced back to 
another member of the group, and soon after a member was arrested in Philadelphia for 
passing counterfeit money and quickly agreed to become a government informant. 
After the first armoured car robbery Mathews began to send out group members to 
see which organisations within the extreme right warranted a 'donation'. This was another 
important part of Mathews strategy. The Order would function merely as a vanguard 
which would breathe new, militant life into Christian extremists throughout the country. 
Robberies were meant not only to fund the activities of the Order but also those of other 
organisations -a form of revolutionary philanthropy. The major recipients were: Glen 
Miller, a North Carolina Klan leader ($300,000); Thomas Metzger, leader of the White 
Aryan Resistance104 ($250,000); William Pierce's National Alliance ($50,000); and Butler's 
Aryan Nations ($40,000). When the 'war chest' was established, each member of the 
organisation was paid a wage of $400 a week and those that had participated in the $3.8 
million Brinks heist were paid $20,000 each. 105 
101 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 234. Another contender for assassination was a 
federal judge in Texas who had ordered the eviction of elderly whites to make room for poor blacks. 
102 The New York Times, September 14,1985. 
103 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 126. 
104 Formerly the White Aryan Political Association. 
105 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, p. 296. 
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The tactic of engaging in robberies to fund revolutionary activity (sometimes in 
conjunction with diversionary bombings) was copied from earlier leftist organisations, and 
by extreme right groups which followed the Order. In 1968, Robert De Pugh, a man 
Mathews greatly admired, was indicted along with other Minutemen, for blowing up a 
Washington police station and attempting to rob a number of banks. Diversions for bank 
robberies which would fund an insurrection were also employed by the Minutemen. 106 In 
October 1981, a group of individuals affiliated with the May 19th Communist organisation 
and the Weather Underground robbed a Brink's armoured car, taking $1.6m. 1°7 In 
September 1983, Los Machateros, a pro-Puerto Rican independence group, robbed the 
Wells Fargo depot in Hartford Connecticut netting $7.2m. '°8 The perpetrators of the 1981 
robbery saw themselves as revolutionaries in a battle to establish a separate black nation in 
the Southern United States and regarded the Brink's heist as ajustified expropriation'. 109 
These tactics did not go unnoticed by the religious right. It has been suggested that the 
Order were inspired to target armoured cars at a July 1983 convention at Hayden Lake. At 
one of the assemblies held there Reverend Robert Miles, an Identity preacher, is reputed to 
have said "[i]f we were half the men the leftists were, we'd be hitting armoured cars 
too. "" O There are many examples since the Order. An unrelated group calling itself the 
'Bruders Schweigen Strike Force II' emerged in September 1986. The members also had 
Aryan Nations ties and engaged in counterfeiting and bombings which were meant as 
diversions for planned bank robberies. The group also planned to kill judges, prosecutors 
and federal agents. ' 11 Similarly an FBI raid in December 1986 on an Arizona Patriots camp 
revealed evidence of planned armoured car robberies which would help finance a right 
wing revolution. The investigation also revealed plans to bomb the Phoenix ADL regional 
office, a Phoenix synagogue and the Simon Weisenthal centre in Los Angeles. Perhaps 
most seriously the group was in possession of blueprints for three major dams on the 
106 See H. Jones, The Minutemen, 1968. 
107 E. Nicklaus et al., International Terrorism in the 1980s, p. 212-215. 
1°8 J. Builta, Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organisations, Violent Political 
Groups and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements, 1996, p. 916. 
109 AP, October 6,1983. The defendants boycotted most of the trial on the grounds that the state had no right 
to try them, and one of the defendants told AP that his sentence didn't matter because he did not recognise the 
U. S. judicial system. 
10 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 90-91. 
111 AP, October 9,1986. 
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Colorado and Missouri rivers. ' 12 In April 1997, three members of the True Knights of the 
Klu Klux Klan were arrested and found guilty of planning to blow up a natural gas storage 
area as a diversionary tactic before robbing an armoured car. At about the same time four 
individuals associated by the 'Phineas Priesthood' were convicted of, amongst other things, 
at least two bombing/bank robbery incidents. "3 
While the Order applied only conventional methods, the sudden influx of funds and 
growing confidence within the group led to unconventional ideas being mooted. This is 
symbolic both of the group's inexperience in the conduct of political violence and their at 
times tenuous relationship to political reality. Perhaps the strangest was that suggested to 
Mathews by Daniel Bauer in September 1984. Bauer claimed to know two right wing 
scientists engaged in research on laser beam and microwave weapons and he proposed to 
put them on a grant from the group. The contacts were false but this incident does give a 
glimpse of the potential for groups to drift from reality when immediate successes cannot 
be easily digested. ' 4 Such a course of action is reminiscent of some of Aum Shinrikyo's 
more unusual weapons programmes. Days before Mathew's death and the effective end of 
the Order Bruce Pierce was elaborating plans for fomenting social unrest to Mathews. 
Pierce proposed disrupting power and phone lines in Los Angeles, and even to poison an 
aqueduct with cyanide. It was expected that the cyanide would be detected at the filtration 
plant, but the disruption and fear caused would be immense, hopefully resulting in urban 
rioting like that which erupted during the 1960s. 115 
Robert Mathews was the first to practically apply the idea that in order to succeed 
the White Patriot movement must engage in militant activism. Unrepentant members of 
the Order still espouse such a belief, embellished by their own experiences and the lack of 
co-ordinated militant activity since Mathews' death. As Gary Yarborough has noted: 
"[c]onventional tactics such as: recruiting members and associates from the 
populace, mass gatherings and meetings, rallies, protests etc. are no longer 
112 ADL, Danger: Extremism, p. 184. 
113, Prepared Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence: 
'Threats to National Security', U. S. Federal News Service, January 28,1998. 
114 K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood, pp. 353-354. 115 ibid., pp. 420-421. It should also be noted that the diversionary bombing of a natural gas refinery 
mentioned above would have resulted in the release of a cloud of poisonous Hydrogen Sulphide. See Federal 
News Service, Prepared Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, Before the Senate Committee on 
Intelligence: Threats to National Security', January 28,1998. 
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profitable, viable, or judicious to employ... The only way to triumph and triumph over 
such an eminent adversary is via covert, clandestine, irregular and guerrilla 
tactics. "' 16 
8.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
While the PIJ operates within the same geographical area as Hamas, the issue of 
balancing tactics and operations with the issue of self preservation is even more pressing 
because the PIJ is smaller and eschews mainstream political and social activities. The 
comparatively smaller size of the group and its lower degree of social penetration are 
further factors influencing the balance between militant action and organisational survival. 
These issues aside, the tactical programme employed by the PIJ has been markedly similar 
to that of Hamas - albeit on a lesser scale - not surprising given the similar tactical origins 
and influences of the groups and the instances of operational co-operation. 
The strategy of the PIJ is revolutionary in nature. As one commentator has put it 
the liberation of Palestine: 
"is to be accomplished by guerrilla groups, led by a revolutionary vanguard, which 
carry out terrorist attacks aimed at weakening Israel. Its militants see themselves as 
those who lay the groundwork for the day when the great Islamic Arabic army will 
be able to destroy Israel in a military confrontation. ""7 
The group focuses solely on armed struggle and has no social welfare programme as does 
Hamas. In the words of one of the group's leadership, the overall strategy is to "Kill so 
many Jews that they will eventually abandon Palestine. " 8 At a Gaza rally in July 1998 
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shami elaborated this theme by stating: 
"the goal of the 'Jihad' movement is to sow belief and revolution, to launch from the 
heart of defeat and to carry renewed blessings for the nation through knife-stabbings, 
bombs and car bombs in order to turn the region into a flaming torch ... 
in the face of 
the occupier. " 119 
1 16 G. Yarborough, Alert Update and Advisory, n. p., 1993. '" ICT, Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, http: //www. ict. org. il. t"' Ibrahim Sarbal, head of the Al-Aqsa brigades in Palestine, Jerusalem Post, December 19,1990. 
119 Quoted in MEMRI, Leaders of Islamic Jihad and Hamas Call for Renewed Bombings, Special dispatch # 
2, July 20,1998. 
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The gap between this totalist rhetoric and actual activity, however, is shown by the 
(comparatively) small number of the PIJ's operations amidst the constraints posed by the 
Israeli security forced and in the wake of the Oslo agreement those of the PA as well. 
While the organisation does not oppose social welfare activities the emphasis is on 
militance. As Shallah has noted: 
"[f]or the traditional Islamist movement, charitable or associational work has been a 
priority. MIJ [PIJ] did not come about to compete with anyone in this domain. Had 
we followed this path, there would have been no need to form MIJ and there would 
have been nothing new in the Islamist movement. " 120 
While the organisation has concentrated on jihad at the expense of 'satisfying people's 
material interests and needs' Shallah does not feel that this has marginalised or isolated the 
group, but rather is "present in all corners of Palestinian society, as a political and vital part 
of the fabric of this society. "121 The fact remains though that the absence of social and 
welfare structures have effectively denied the PIJ not only the social depth that these have 
given Hamas but would represent a significant shortfall should the group ever wish to 
become involved in mainstream politics perhaps following a concerted Israeli/PA effort to 
extinguish the group. 
Over time, the PIJ's tactics have developed partly in response to security threats and 
also as a result of external influences and support. At times the PIJ's tactical programme 
has involved launching operations which complement those of Hamas or have been 
directly co-ordinated with them. The initial low level tactics employed during the Intifada 
have gradually led to more sophisticated uses, especially of explosives in the form of 
suicide bombers. Some tactics have been used because they are simple and offer a 
disproportionate psychological impact. For example, the PIJ has employed a method 
developed by Hamas in 1992 for road shootings (as does the PFLP). This involves 
travelling after an Israeli vehicle usually on a dark and deserted road, approaching or 
overtaking the car and opening fire. Afterwards the shooters drive to an Arab population 
area and burn the car. 122 Such a method is uncomplicated from an operational viewpoint, 
120 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', 
Journal of Palestine Studies, XXVIII, # 4, p. 64. 
121 ibid. 
122 Yediot Ahronot, December 12,1996. 
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inexpensive and has an enormous psychological impact on the target population. The 
viability of such operations has been lessened in the face of more stringent Israeli and 
Palestinian security. The most dramatic tactical adaptation, however, was the adoption of 
suicide bombing, a method adopted from Hizballah during the 1992 expulsion of Islamic 
activists. In a January 1995 interview Fathi Shiqaqi described the development of the PIJ's 
tactics: 
"[a] few years ago we used knives. Three months ago we used a bicycle bomb after 
Hani Abid [the Islamic Jihad journalist allegedly blown up by Israeli agents] was 
killed by Mossad. Now we have changed our style. We know the Israelis are very 
sophisticated too. It's more difficult for us to get explosives than for anyone else in 
the world, but if you want to you can do it. " 23 
The use of certain tactics such as suicide bombing by a relatively small group, 
however, can result in a counter response directed at the operational core of the 
organisation. Such attacks are carried out by 'al-Qasam' units, groups tasked solely with 
attacks similar to Hamas's Izz a-Din al-Qassam battalions. 124 These are small in number - 
in late 1994 it was estimated that there were about thirty operating in the Occupied 
Territories. 125 Initial suicide attacks were conducted against Israeli military personnel, 
however, the targeting priorities were radically altered after the 1994 Ibrahimi mosque 
attack. 126Due to their small size, such units are difficult to neutralise but when they are the 
effects can be highly disruptive. Hani Abed, for example, was alleged to have been a 
suicide bomber operator and this is what inspired the Israeli security services to kill him. It 
was noted at the time that Abed's death hurt the organisation, although not enough to 
prevent a revenge attack soon after his death and another even more destructive one two 
months later. 127 Further degradation of the group's capabilities has been reflected in 
subsequent operations. In 1998, two of the PIJ's suicide bombers were killed when their 
devices exploded prematurely. Their target was presumed to be the crowded Mahane 
123 The Independent, January 30,1995. 
124 The word 'al-Kassam' is an acronym for'forces of the Islamic Jihad' (kuwa Islamiya Mujahidah), and may 
also mean'the oath'. 
125 Yediot Ahronot, November 18,1994. 
126 For a profile of the bombers involved in these attacks see L. Adoni, 'Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide 
Bombers', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVI, # 4,1997, pp. 33-45. 127 Maariv, November 13,1994. 
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Yehuda market in Jerusalem on a busy Friday and was significant because it was the first 
major attempted bombing by the organisation since the assassination of Shaqaqi in 
October 1995. Ya'akov Perry, former head of the GSS, noted that the PIJ's activities had 
been severely curtailed by Israeli and Palestinian authority operations against leaders and 
bomb makers: "There is a weakness both in the explosives used and in the engineers - the 
experts capable of building the bombs - and there is also the problem of the quality of the 
terrorists themselves. " 128 
8.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic 
8.3.1 Jewish Underground 
Although the Jewish underground is most notable for its plot to destroy the Dome 
of the Rock, the tactical origins of the group lay in revenge attacks which took the form 
took the form of shootings and bombings (actual or proposed). Thus while the group begun 
by planning a conventional bombing which they felt would have profound consequences 
for the Jewish messianic redemptive process, it quite quickly settled on a tactical 
programme of bombings and shootings in response to Arab acts of terrorism against Jews. 
This parallel pursuit of vengeance and messianism can be seen as protecting and avenging 
the Jewish community while simultaneously pursuing a course which would lead to the 
establishment of a Jewish religious state, albeit through the medium of prophetic 
fulfilment. 
The first operation perpetrated by the Jewish Underground was aimed at the Arab 
mayors of five Palestinian towns in June 1980. The attack was intended as a response to an 
Arab shooting of six yeshiva students in Hebron the month before. The objective was not 
to kill the mayors but to permanently maim them so that they would remain "living 
symbols of the consequences of anti-Jewish terrorism. 029 Two of the mayors were 
crippled, two survived because their bombs were not wired properly, and at the home of 
the fifth, an Israeli bomb disposal officer accidentally detonated the device which left him 
severely wounded and blind. In 1982, the messianic direction of the group was further 
128 AP, Reuters, November 8,1998. 
129 E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, 1991, p. 97. 
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altered when the Temple Mount plot was indefinitely postponed. Consequently the next 
series of actions were conventional shootings and bombings. In July 1983, a shooting 
attack was launched against the Islamic College of Hebron resulting in the death of three 
students and the wounding of thirty-three. The next proposed attack was the bombing of 
the men's dormitory at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah. This plan was suspended owing to 
a government closure of the university. The plan which succeeded this one was to blow up 
five Palestinian passenger buses. This was to be done on a Friday afternoon thus limiting 
the possibility of Israeli casualties. Just before the operation was to be carried out the 
Israeli security services arrested the entire group. 130 
The apparent paradox of the Underground planning a redemptive messianic action 
and then engaging in vigilante operations can be explained in part by looking at the group's 
membership. All were settlers used to conflict with both the Israeli government and the 
Arabs. Many were serving soldiers of reserve officers and all shared a close sense of 
mission and community. The settlers as a body were also aware that reprisals by the state 
for revenge attacks conducted by settlers were mild. In 1982, for example, a committee 
headed by the deputy Attorney General of Israel, Yehudit Carp, examined seventy cases of 
violence and threat against Arabs by Jews. Over two thirds of the cases ended in no 
action. 13' Furthermore, a 1983 study of the settler community revealed that twenty-eight 
percent of males and five percent of females admitted to having participated in some form 
of vigilante activity, and only thirteen percent disapproved of vigilantism. ' 32 The study 
concluded that "[t]hough a minority of settlers actually participate in vigilante acts, they 
are not isolated deviant figures in this settlement movement. " 133 Vigilantism was thus the 
accepted order of the day, while the concept of preparing a complex. single event which 
would have redemptive consequences was not, and nor did it offer the sort of immediate 
(and proportional) gratification of a revenge attack. When the members of the Jewish 
Underground were put on trial, opinion polls at the time revealed that while a majority of 
Israelis opposed any sort of Jewish terrorist organisation almost a third thought attacks on 
130 E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim 
Underground', in D. C. Rapoport, Inside Terrorist Organisations, 1988, p. 210. 
13' E. Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, p. 169. 
132 D. Weisburd & V. Vinitzky, 'Vigilantism as Radical Social Control: The Case of Gush Emunim Settlers', in 
M. Aronoff (ed. ), Religion and Politics, Social Anthropology, Vol. 3,1993. 
133 ibid. p. 82. 
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Arabs could be 'partly or wholly justifiable'. Furthermore over a third of people polled felt 
that if the Underground members were sentenced they should receive "light to nominal 
sentences or should get of scot-free. i134 
With the arrest of the Underground members came the knowledge that the group 
had been planning to blow up the Dome of the Rock in order to pave the way for the 
construction of the Third Temple. Unlike the previous operations this was intended solely 
as an attempt to aid in the fulfilment of the Jewish messianic promise. Yehuda Etzion 
himself felt that the Jewish state carried the responsibility for removing the mosques on the 
Temple Mount: "[i]t [the Temple Mount] is the possession of David, the possession of 
David that we are commanded to take over today. And the nation's instrument for this is, of 
course, is the state of Israel. " 135 Because the state would not act and appeared disinterested 
in the fulfilment of messianic destiny Etzion decided to act himself. While there can be 
little doubt that the response to the bombing - particularly in the Islamic world - would 
have been catastrophic and the subsequent prospects for the Underground' survival would 
have been slim, these were not the immediate issues. Although some group members 
expressed apprehension concerning the possible consequences136, the rationale was not 
temporal but spiritual and therefore temporal issues such as security backlashes, group 
survival and conflict escalation were not of primarily relevance. 
While the means that were to be employed by the Jewish Underground in the Dome 
of the Rock attack were conventional, it is important to examine the way in which they 
were to be used. 137 Twenty-eight different bombs were manufactured for the attack. Three 
were to be placed at the foot of three of the four pillar supporting the Dome. The other 
smaller charges would be placed at the foot of the smaller pillar supporting the rest of the 
building. This intricate plan was designed to preserve the Rock of Foundation, believed to 
be the site of the Jewish Temple's inner sanctum. In the words of Yehuda Etzion: 
134 The Economist, June 23,1984. 
135 Cited in J. Aviad, 'The Messianism of Gush Emunim', in J. Frankel (ed. ), Jews andMessianism in the 
Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning. Studies in Contemporary Jewry Vol. VII, 1991, p. 211. 
136 E. Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, 1991, p. 96. 
137 One member of the group, Chaim Ben David claimed that the idea of bombing the mosque from the air had 
been floated at one of the group's meetings (he was unsure if this was a serious suggestion). See E. Sprinzak, 
Brother Against Brother, p. 159. 
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. L- 
"[t]he whole operation was carefully planned because we had to be careful not to 
touch the rock inside-we planned it in such a way that only three columns would be 
destroyed. This would cause the Dome itself to fall onto the rock, and protect it from 
all the other masonry. " 138 
This description highlights further the religious significance of the bombing, ensuring that 
what was sacred to Jewish traditions would be preserved while the Islamic edifice was 
removed. Had the operation proceeded as planned the group assumed that construction of 
the Third Temple, centred around the inner sanctum of the second, could proceed as soon 
as possible. 
8.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo 
The tactics employed by Aum Shinrikyo were many and varied and the emphasis 
on which were used reflected both the increasing paranoia of the group and also its 
obsession with the end-time. It is significant to note that Aum Shinrikyo did not begin as a 
militant movement and its initial activities centred around recruitment and fund raising. 
Investigations, primarily by journalists, into the legality of the groups activities - especially 
the treatment of group members - led to the first murders being perpetrated, but it was the 
complete failure of Aum's foray into mainstream politics which appear to have moved the 
group into a confrontational situation with Japanese society, intensified the messianic 
rhetoric of the group and led it to consider, and then engage in, acts of mass violence. This 
progression was made easier by the legal standing of the group within Japanese society and 
the reluctance of Japanese law enforcement to interfere with religious organisations. The 
violent tactics considered and employed by the group varied from a variety of conventional 
means to an even more bizarre variety of unconventional means, most notably the use of 
chemical agents, and many of these were made possible by the broad membership of the 
group and the substantial funds which the group managed to accumulate. 
Before examining the extra legal activities of Aum it is important to explore the 
process whereby the group was initially established as a legal and accepted part of 
Japanese society. The most important step in this direction occurred in August 1989 when 
138 Yehuda Etzion, cited in C. Coughlin, A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions: The Quest for Modern Jerusalem, 
1997, p. 234. 
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the Tokyo Metropolitan Government granted Aum official religious corporation status. 
This law provided Aum privileges such as large tax concessions and 'de facto immunity 
from official oversight and prosecution'. Under the law authorities are not permitted to 
investigate an organisation's 'religious activities and doctrines' and it appears that this was 
an important event in the development of the group's illegal activities. 139 These 
concessions and lack of oversight enabled Aum to accumulate a considerable fortune with 
which expensive projects such as weapons procurement and development could be 
financed. The second murder perpetrated by the group (of a member threatening to leave 
and reveal details of the first murder) in early 1989 can be seen as a desperate, if 
calculated, attempt to ensure that religious corporation status was granted. The murder of 
members threatening to leave the group, those conniving in their escape or the murder or 
attempted murder of outsiders investigating Aum became common place, and it is 
important to note that at this very early stage murder was considered a viable and 
justifiable manner of ensuring the group's future survival and prosperity. 
Although some of Aum's extra-legal activities predated the group's foray into 
mainstream Japanese politics, the result of this experiment was an intensification of extra- 
legal activities and an abandonment of legitimate political means. In the 1990 general 
election Asahara and twenty-four of his followers stood for seats in the Lower House of 
parliament. The effort was a serious one with millions of dollars being spent on an 
unorthodox campaign. Aum held rallies where followers wore oversized papier-mache 
masks of Shoko Asahara and sang Aum songs. Aum also intentionally broke electoral rules 
by destroying other parties posters, campaigning past accepted times and so on. 140 The 
campaign and Aum's political platform however were not to the taste of the Japanese 
public and the elections were a humiliating failure. 141 Not a single Aum candidate came 
anywhere near being elected, and the entire slate gathered only 1,783 votes. The campaign 
had caused severe financial loss to the group as well as a drop in membership and in 
response Asahara further radicalised Aum's belief system by making a doomsday 
139 U. S. Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Statement, Global 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, 1996. 
140 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum, 1996, p. 47. 
One ex-member claimed afterwards that the phone of an opponent had been tapped. 
141 Another sect, Soka Gakkai, had run in previous elections and done well, although there methods and 
ideology were more conservative. 
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prediction linked to the approach of the comet Austin142. From this point on Aum's 
apocalyptic rhetoric intensified as did the group's attempts to raise more money and 
increase its membership. '43 
Apart from Aum's attempts at entering mainstream Japanese politics the group also 
sought to participate in Japanese society through various business interests - both legal and 
illegal - the primary aim of which was to raise revenue. Aum operated various open 
business concerns ranging from noodle shops to chemical wholesalers. 144 The group also 
owned and ran computer shops and competed for tenders for installing computer systems. 
It is this last activity which provided the group with intelligence on Japanese law 
enforcement activities even after the nerve gas attacks. It has been revealed that cult 
members worked on computer systems at the ministries of education, construction and 
telecommunications, as well as at large corporations such as NTT, Kiyo Bank and East 
Japan Railway. '45 There has also been the revelation that a company affiliated with Aum 
helped the Japanese metropolitan police department set up a system to manage its patrol 
cars, some of which were likely to have been used to monitor the group. The identity of the 
software provider was discovered only a month before the system was to go on line in 
early 1998 and after the group had been paid two million yen by the police for the job. '46 
Perhaps most worrying of all Japanese police revealed in March 2000 that "software 
developers of the Aum Shinrikyo cult [had] apparently siphoned off information about 
Japan's nuclear programme... including nuclear fuel suppliers, research and transportation 
of nuclear materials. " 147 
Although they never reached fruition Aum's attitude towards, and construction of, 
conventional weaponry is important for understanding the mind-set of the group. After 
obtaining a prototype and blueprints for the Russian AK-47 assault rifle Aum set up a full 
scale, computerised machine shop for their manufacture at the 'Clear Stream Temple' a few 
142 It was predicted that following the passing of Austin there would be a catastrophe in'the near future'. The 
prophecy was made at a seminar held on the island of Ishigakijima near Okinawa. The seminar was designed 
to attract more members and to raise more funds. 
'43 D. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, 1996,82-83. 
'44 ibid. pp. 89-90. 
gas The Guardian, March 13,2000. Raids by police following these revelation discovered a database with 
information on thousands of officials working at Japanese corporations. 146 ibid. 
147 Asahi Shimbun, March 29,2000. 
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miles from the Mount Fuji compounds. '48 The plan was to arm a large number of Aum 
members for the coming confrontation with the state, although it does not appear to have 
occurred to the group to use these or other weapons the group procured before that time. In 
parallel with this some cult members were provided with training in all forms of military 
equipment at a Russian military base outside Moscow and later training camps were run in 
Japan by three men who were serving members of the JDF. '49 As well as manufacturing 
toxic chemical compounds Aum also experimented with making various forms of high 
explosive, most notably RDX and TNT. 150 Despite this investment of money and effort the 
group did not engage in shooting or bombings and apparently did not consider some 
combination of explosives and chemical or biological agents for a CB bomb'. This is 
largely due to the mind set of the group and the fascination with more destructive and 
symbolically appropriate weapons. 
The most disturbing element of Aum's tactical programme was undoubtedly the 
group's almost obsessive experiments in developing and employing unconventional 
weapons. Aum first began experimenting with biological agents in early 1990 and despite 
repeated attempts at releasing botulinus toxin and anthrax over a period of five years using 
a variety of delivery systems there were no discernible results. When considering Aum's 
experiment's with biological weapons it is well worth noting the many problems 
encountered by the group along the way despite the resources devoted to the task. Aum 
initially developed biological agents (botulinum toxin and Anthrax) and carried out a 
series of abortive attacks. Further investigation revealed however that the botulinum toxin 
was not completed to culture and therefore harmless and the anthrax developed by the 
group was from a vaccine strain which meant that however it was cultured it would always 
remain harmless. ''' No casualties resulted in any of the above examples and in most cases 
the incidents were not noticed by anyone. Despite alarming reports to the contrary there is 
148 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 88. 149 R. J. Lifton, Destroying the World to Save it: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global 
Terrorism, 1999, p. 192 
'50 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cull at the End of the World, p. 151. 151 M. Leitenberg, 'The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents', in B. 
Roberts (ed. ), Hype or Reality: The "New Terrorism " and Mass Casualty Attacks, 2000, pp. 161-164. 
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no evidence that Aum experimented with Q fever or Ebola, or engaged in genetic 
engineering of toxins or pathogens. '52 
After the disappointing results of biological weaponry Aum turned in 1993 to the 
development of chemical agents. Aum produced sann gas on three separate occasions in 
November and December 1993 at the Satyam No. 7 facility at the group's Kamikuishiki 
compound which had been specifically designed for the purpose. Further quantities were 
produced there in February 1994 and it was this batch which was used at the Matsumoto 
nerve gas attack which killed seven people. 153 The sann used in the 1995 subway attacks 
was manufactured at a smaller facility within the compound. As well as sann, Aum 
experimented with other chemical agents including soman, tabun, hydrogen cyanide, 
phosgene and VX. Hydrogen cyanide was used in two known incidents in Tokyo subway 
stations during May and July 1995, but they resulted in no casualties largely due to the 
quick thinking of railway staff. VX was employed on at least three other occasions, but as 
an assassination weapon rather for generating mass casualties. ' 4 
Apart from their chemical and biological programmes Aum also explored the 
possibility of manufacturing or acquiring a nuclear device and investigated an array of 
other more bizarre unconventional weapons. For the purpose of developing a nuclear 
capability Aum took the following steps: purchase of a property in Australia where they 
hoped to mine Uranium which they intended to enrich (and where they conducted a 
successful sann test on sheep); attempted to purchase dual use equipment for the 
manufacture of nuclear devices from the U. S.; actively recruited members of a Russian 
nuclear research facility, the I. V. Kurchatov Institute as well as physicists from Moscow 
State University155; and in 1993 sought (but were denied) a meeting with the Russian 
Energy Minister to discuss the purchase of a nuclear warhead. 156 Aum's attempts to 
construct a nuclear device however were haphazard. The actual and attempted 
procurement of various components and equipment do not suggest a coherent plan aimed 
at constructing a particular type of device and this lack of focus contributed to emphasis 
152 ibid. pp. 164-166. 
153 U. S. Senate, Global Proliferation, p. 62,68-69. 
154 ibid., p. 62,68-69. 
us ITAR-TASS, 1541 gmt, 23 May 95 - BBC/SWB, SU/2312B, May 25,1995. 156 Marshall & Kaplan, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 112,190-192,208, and D. W. Brackett, Holy 
Terror, pp. 92-93. 
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being placed on the development of chemical and biological weapons. 157 Aum's obsession 
with science fiction also led the group to experiment with laser weaponry (including the 
enrichment of Uranium with lasers), railguns and to examine the work of the Yugoslav 
scientist Nikola whose theories of resonating frequencies and seismology led Aum to 
consider the development of'earthquake weaponry'. 158 
With the decision to develop nerve gas taken and production going ahead major 
problems still remained with regard to dispersal systems. The first attempt to use the agent, 
against Daisaku Ikeda, leader of Soka Gakkai. The plan was to pump the gas into a 
building where Ikeda would be giving a talk, but the spraying mechanism failed on two 
attempts, the second incapacitating one of the Aum perpetrators. 159 A new system was 
devised for the Matsumoto attack with greater success, although the wind did interfere. 
Following the Matsumoto attack little consideration seems to have been given by the group 
to methods of dispersal and the method used during the Tokyo subway attacks, that of 
piercing bags of sann with sharpened umbrellas represented a technical regression at the 
very least. Moreover, the haste with which these final operations were organised and 
carried out is indicative of their defensive and tactical nature. The final and most appalling 
violent acts of Aum, the Tokyo subway gassings were made in response to intensified 
police operations. The decision to use sann thus appears to be much more tactical than 
redemptive. 160 Asahara also apparently sanctioned further acts of this nature before his 
arrest. Following the assassination of Hideo Murai, Aum's 'Minister of Science' Asahara is 
reputed to have order his disciples to engage "in a campaign of terror to overthrow the 
government and to thwart his arrest. i161 A document discovered by Japanese police shortly 
after Murai's murder stated that if Asahara was arrested "we will use sann to launch a 
suicide attack on police investigators. " 162 
157 G. Cameron, 'Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons From Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida', Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. XXII, # 4, p. 287. 
158 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 207-208,220-221 & 224-225. 
159ibid., p. 132-133. 
160 M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum 
Shinrikyo', TPV, Vol. X, # 4,1998, p. 92. 
161 ibid., p. 93. 
162 JPRS-TOT-95-011-L, June 26,1995. The document dated April 27 was the first documentary admission 
that the group had developed sann 
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While some of the previous cases have employed allusions to unconventional 
weapons as a rhetorical tool in the case of Aum Shoko Asahara's pronouncement's 
provided clues -sometimes quite ominous ones and nearly all of which were universally 
ignored by the Japanese authorities - as to the group's intended activities. During the court 
action over the Matsumoto land deal for instance Asahara delivered a sermon heavily 
criticising the court and invoking a prophecy of Nostradamus which claims that by the end 
of the twentieth century will be "out of control" as Asahara explained, "I mean they will 
not be able to tell right from wrong" and such judges would suffer "a chemical change 
unthinkable in normal circumstances. " 163 Other examples from Aum publications and even 
forensic evidence of sann production by Aum failed to generate a thorough and decisive 
law enforcement response, and in this regard while the activities of Aum are alarming in 
the extreme there was certainly scope for circumvention, although these drawbacks should 
be seen in the light of the haphazard and uncoordinated way that the group developed and 
used unconventional weapons. 
8.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan 
The tactical programme of the Saudi Ikhwan was straightforward in nature and 
short-lived primarily because of its messianic underpinnings. After a period of ideological 
formation and recruitment the Ikhwan did develop and disseminate a religiously based 
political agenda, but the nature of Saudi society and the extremity of the Ikhwan's views 
meant that participation in, or influence on, Saudi politics was negligible. Following this 
inevitable disappointment the group engaged in a period of more radical ideological 
development, membership consolidation and arms procurement which culminated in the 
conventional military assault on and occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The total 
commitment of the group to this operation and the overwhelming force arrayed against it 
ensured that it would be their last. 
Juhayman Utaybi's Ikhwan made no attempt at mainstream political activity. 
Although Utaybi's 'seven letters' could be considered the basis for one, their radical form 
and the absolutist, conservative nature of the Saudi regime ensured that their very 
appearance could only lead to the repression of the group. The option decided upon was a 
163 D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, The Cull at the End of the World, p. 138. 
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direct confrontation with the state. This tactic is not necessarily the only possible one as 
was demonstrated by the other significant contemporary Mahdist movement, the Egyptian 
Takfir wal-Hijra. '64 In this case the decision that not only the regime but also the society in 
which they existed were illegitimate led the group to withdraw from mainstream society 
and to postpone military action. 165 Takfir was thus not revolutionary in the immediate 
sense and a combination of the group's provocative stance towards society and its decision 
to abandon isolation and engage in violence led to the group's destruction. Similarly to the 
Ikhwan Takfir wal-Hijra saw the end of the world as imminent and considered its leader, 
Shukri Mustapha to be the Mahdi. 166 
The Ikhwan financed its activities by selling religious pamphlets and by soliciting 
donations. One member of the group, the son of a wealthy merchant, also sold a property 
in Jeddah to help cover the cost of the weapons. 167 The acquisition of arms posed no major 
difficulties for the group. As members of a tribal society that takes pride in the possession 
of arms many Saudis own them and before the insurrection there was a flourishing arms 
trade within the kingdom. Arms were also smuggled from Syria, Jordan and Iraq, and it is 
believed that shortly before the occupation of the Grand Mosque a group of Ikhwan 
members attacked a National Guard base near Jeddah and stole some light weapons. 168 
The weaponry of the Saudi Ikhwan was varied but accorded with tribal tradition as much 
as tactical practicality. In the main it consisted of automatic weapons which were 
apparently used with devastating effect during the initial phase of frontal assaults by the 
Saudi National Guard and Army. The contention that National Guard units may have 
deserted out of sympathy and or provided the group with ammunition, machine guns, gas 
169 masks, food and medical supplies seems unrealistic. While the exact number of the 
164 It has been suggested that the Egyptian members of the Ikhwan were members of Takfir wal Hijra. See W. 
Dietl, Holy War, 1983, p. 217. 
165 W. M., Abdelnassar, The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations, 1967-1981, 
1994, pp. 204-205. 
166 D. Zeidan, Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups', MERIA Journal, Vol. III, # 3,1999, p. 
6. 
167 J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan - 1979', in D. Holden & R. Johns (eds. ), The House of Saud, 1981, 
p. 521. 
168 A. AI-Yassini, Religion and the Slate in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 125 169 For allegations of National Guard complicity see S. Mackey, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom, p. 
231. See also Arabic sources cited in J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia', The 
Muslim World, Vol. LXXX, # 1,1990, p. 7. A more likely explanation for the desertions is that in the initial 
organisational chaos national guardsmen refused to take orders from non-tribal officers appointed to their 
units (indeed, by most accounts the Saudi forces were eager to do their job). This is indicative of the quality of 
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insurgents is difficult to calculate it is estimated to be around four hundred. IM This figure 
may have been even greater because a number of insurgents were arrested by Saudi 
security services en route to the Mosque. 
The occupation of the Grand Mosque appears to be a desperate militant act inspired 
more by messianic objectives than political ones. Prior to this attack the Grand Mosque's 
sanctity had been violated only twice before. The first occurred in 693 AD when Allah al- 
Zubair led a revolt against the Umayyid dynasty and sought sanctuary in the mosque with a 
group of followers. The ensuing siege lasted eight months and when they capitulated al- 
Zubair and his followers were executed. The second was in 930 AD when the Qarmatians 
(a sect which emerged from the Ismaili Seveners) occupied Mecca and allegedly carried 
off the black stone housed within the Kaaba. 17' The occupation of the Grand Mosque was 
an attempt to alter the existing political and social status quo by fulfilling messianic 
prophecy At the very outset of the take-over Muhammed al-Qahtani shouted into the 
Imam's microphone that he was the Mahdi, claiming that "The Mahdi and his men will 
seek shelter and protection in the Holy Mosque because they are persecuted everywhere 
until they have no recourse but the Holy Mosque. " 172 
Although the Saudi regime was keen to implicate hostile foreign intelligence 
services (specifically Syria or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)173, there was 
no proof. Similarly, attempts were made to find a link between the attack on the Grand 
Mosque and the Shi'a riots in the Eastern provinces at the same time. By January 1980 both 
these suspicions had been officially quashed by the Saudi interior minister, Prince Nayef 
bin Abdulaziz. '74 The first allegations were easily disproved. Weapons in Saudi Arabia 
were fairly easily procured as was training, either through traditional tribal life or through 
service in the national guard, as Prince Nayef commented "weapons were easily to be 
found amongst the Bedouin and they are good shots anyway. " 75 The Ikhwan itself was a 
the Saudi military response to the attack. See The Financial Times, 'Areas of Military Weakness Revealed', 
April 28,1980. 
170 A. Al-Yassini, Religion and the State, p. 150, fn. 41. 
171 P. Holt, A. Lambton & B. Lewis, The Cambridge History of Islam: Volume JA, The Central Islamic 
Lands From Pre-Islamic Times to the First World War, 1970, pp. 84 & 136. 
172 J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', p. 512. 13 There was also the suggestion that George Habash's PFLP was involved. The Observer, January 27,1980. 
174 The Guardian, January 14,1980. 
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Sunni sect and the Shi'a riots were mainly evidence of the wide range of opposition (and 
ways in which this opposition manifested itself) the Saudi regime faced. It has been 
suggested that the attack was also meant to involve the capture of King Khaled who it was 
thought would be attending the Mosque that day, but the overwhelming motivation appears 
to have been messianic not least because of the ultimate futility of such a tactic motivated 
by temporal considerations of group survival and political success. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The tactics employed by violent religious groups are not only defined by a group's 
ideological programme and objectives but also by a variety of environmental and practical 
constraints. Mainstream organisations engage in the broadest variety of activities including 
participation in political processes, social welfare activities and violence and it is a 
combination of these which is intended to bring about a complete alteration of a particular 
socio-political order with the select applications of violence at critical sacred or political 
moments. The environmental context in terms of potential popular support for a group's 
ideas and methods and the presence (or absence) of an effective law enforcement 
apparatus and judiciary will determine the tactical programme. Once this programme has 
been adopted it will then be subject to various practical constraints such as organisation 
and procurement. In situations where there is effective legal control as in Israel and the 
U. S., groups such as Kach and Aryan Nations must moderate the violent dimension of their 
activities, the result of which is that most violent activity is not orchestrated by the group 
but is conducted by individuals or splinter groups related to the group. In the case of Aryan 
Nations where there is limited popular support for the group's ideas, participation in 
mainstream politics is also rejected. In different environments such as Lebanon Hizballah 
has been able to formulate and conduct a far more robust programme of violence in 
combination with social and political activities. While core groups concentrate on 
violence, they too face environmental and practical constraints, and like mainstream 
organisations the environmental constraints are fully taken into account and worked 
around in the interests of group survival, while practical constraints govern the level of 
violence. Messianic and apocalyptic organisations are far less constrained than other group 
types because their desire to alter the socio-political status quo is driven by a desire to 
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fulfil an eschatological promise which will end temporal history. There is thus little point 
in engaging in political or welfare activities and the emphasis lies in both extreme and 
highly symbolic violent actions. 
p 
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion 
The preceding chapters have served to demonstrate that the conventional 
assumptions made about religiously motivated violence are not necessarily accurate when 
one correlates these within specific cases and contexts. The phenomenon of religious 
violence has been treated with assumptions about degrees of militancy and the propensity 
for violence, treating it largely in a monolithic fashion, especially in the way that these 
assumptions have linked the dialectic of militant rhetoric to seemingly unconstrained 
levels and forms of violence. Perhaps the most prominent exemplar of these assumptions 
has been Bruce Hoffman, although he is certainly not the only exponent. The main purpose 
of this thesis has been to provide a composite picture of the mechanisms and complex 
processes that define and govern religiously motivated violence. In particular the 
identification of the 'other', processes of legitimising violence and how group dynamics 
and other environmental factors serve to influence (and at times constrain) the actual and 
practical conduct of violence across faiths, group styles and contexts. 
This study has revealed many similarities in these complex processes as they apply 
to a diverse collection of case studies. The purpose was not to be conclusive but illustrative 
of the need to apply a consistent framework in order to understand this composite picture. 
While the actual contexts within which each of the groups examined exists differs greatly, 
especially how the groups interact with their environments, these similarities hold true. 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that it is possible to systematically and 
comparatively draw out the framework for a more nuanced analytical understanding of the 
mechanisms and processes governing religious violence. 
The preceding chapters have sought to address in a holistic fashion the significant 
features and processes which underlie the conduct of religiously motivated violence in the 
contemporary era. Religious violence is an extremely complex phenomenon, manifesting 
itself in a variety of different forms across many different societies and faiths. This does 
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not mean, however, that there do not exist certain constant features and attitudes which 
transcend the revealed religions, and it is through identifying these and applying them to 
specific case studies that an objective understanding of religious violence becomes 
possible. It is, after all, through a fuller understanding of a problematic phenomenon that 
more effective solutions suggest themselves. In this final chapter a number of conclusions 
will be drawn concerning the veracity of the framework of analysis as a whole, particularly 
its predictive value, and more specific observations will be made regarding the 
categorisation of group types and the six primary elements. Following this will be a 
discussion of the additions this thesis has made to the examination of religiously 
motivated violence, and the challenges it poses to some existing, widely held observations 
regarding the phenomenon. 
9.1 The Utility of Group Categorisation 
The creation of three distinct group types allows us to establish the propensity for 
groups to engage in violence and also to explore the permeable nature of the boundaries 
which lie between group types. The major differences between groups within the same 
category are basically a function of the environment within which they exist. Hizballah, for 
example, has been able to engage in large scale organised violence since its inception 
because of the fragmentary (and for the most part lawless) nature of Lebanese society. A 
similar observation can be made of Hamas whose militant activities began and flourished 
in Gaza and the West Bank - those areas beyond effective Israeli control and latterly under 
the less effective control of the PA. Such a course of action for Kach or Aryan Nations 
would have been unthinkable because of the certainty that such a course would lead to the 
group's destruction. All groups of the mainstream type possess a significant constituency. 
In the cases of Hizballah and Kach this has most clearly been shown in electoral success 
and in the case of Hamas a latent form of electoral support, unrealised because of the 
group's current unwillingness to participate in PA elections (especially as this would entail 
tacit recognition of Israel's right to exist). The extremity of Aryan Nation's ideological 
programme precludes electoral participation but the group embodies right-wing racist 
Identity beliefs and has attracted a significant number of members and sympathisers 
throughout the United States and beyond. 
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For all the group types the fundamental spur to action however is the same. It is a 
reaction to socio-political circumstances which are regarded as acutely offensive. Most of 
the groups experience a sensation of crisis akin to historical ones, linking the past and the 
present. For mainstream groups, the perceived solution to this crisis is an attempt at mass 
mobilisation involving a call to arms which, depending on the individual context, is acted 
upon to one degree or another. For core groups, the solution, or at least the beginning of 
the solution, lies with the militant actions of a revolutionary vanguard whose violent 
activities will ignite a broader struggle. For messianic and apocalyptic groups the solution 
lies with a particular act or series of acts of eschatological significance which will cause a 
divine transformation of the existing order. 
The most dangerous and devastating attacks (not least because of their 
unpredictability) are those conducted by small, radical groups, or small splinters within a 
large group. Michael Wieviorka has claimed that violence comes only when a splinter 
group alienates itself from a larger organisation and it has rejected the original ideology as 
insufficient for dealing with the perceived crisis. ' While ignoring the fact that mainstream 
religious organisations do engage in violence it should be observed that individuals or 
splinter groups such as the Order, Eyal or the Jewish Underground do not reject the 
original ideology, they wish to give it truer substance by acting according to its 
fundamental precepts. 
9.2 Establishing the Necessity for Violence 
As with violent secular groups all the case studies examined here expect to realise 
some form of articulated, idealised future or Golden Age. The expectation of this Golden 
Age is a powerful determinant in the justification of violent struggle in that, despite the 
horrors and privations of the struggle itself, society as a whole will emerge purified, just 
and pleasing in the eyes of the Almighty. While this may be seen as similar to secular 
expectations furnished by ideologies such as Marixsm-Leninism or nationalism it is more 
fundamental both in terms of its historical lineage and the signifying transcendent elements 
which make both the cause unarguable, and make it virtually impossible for the ideology 
1 M. Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism, 1993, p. 291. 
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to be tried in practice and found wanting. The Golden Age is both forward and backward 
looking. It seeks to replace the current socio-political status quo with something better, but 
a something better derived from the past, in the case of Jewish groups a society akin to that 
of the Davidic era, for Islamic groups the first Islamic communities and for Christian 
groups the loose idea of a 'Christian Republic' which has no real scriptural or historical 
precedent .2 
The religious concept of a Golden Age is, after all, an elastic one - an ideal 
community similar to those described in scriptural times may be achieved on earth, but the 
ultimate Golden Age is an eschatological one. Moreover, the almost overwhelming 
resistance that all the groups examined here have faced means that even the partial 
achievement of an earthly 'ideal community' would represent such a profound success that 
the achievement of even more remains merely a constant ideal of the distant future. What 
is important is not so much the full realisation of the Golden Age, but the fervence with 
which the justice of its ultimate realisation is believed. 
The need to achieve the Golden Age is driven by a perception that a religious 
culture is under threat both from within and without. Culture, for all the groups, rests in a 
religious tradition but is also informed and embroidered by a common language, an 
attachment to a particular geographical area, and a shared history with its emotive symbols 
and significant events. A threat to culture is thus an assault on all aspects of life and 
identity. Much of this cultural identity may be embroidered, misinterpreted or even 
manufactured over time, but to the community of believers themselves the veracity of the 
identity cannot be doubted - influenced and guided as it has been by divine forces. Indeed, 
the process of outlining which traits of a culture are under greatest threat and which are 
worthiest of emulation in a modern context, unwittingly prove to be selective in nature and 
serve to reinforce a violent group's programme of confrontation. Long established cultural 
traditions of inter-communal tolerance, dialogue and co-operation are pushed aside by 
their opposites, a process generally rationalised by the former's inappropriate nature 
(however laudable they might be) in a struggle of such magnitude. 
All groups showed the centrality of a particular religious message in the form of 
scripturalism. This scripturalism is governed by a process of selective retrieval guided by 
2 L. Zeskind, The "Christian Identity"Movement: Analyzing its Theological Rationalization for Racist an 
Anti-Semitic Violence, 1986, pp. 35-42. 
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contemporary events and augmented by historical accumulation. The most important part 
of this message is the narrative of struggle against an evil force which threatens a 
community of believers. This may be a historical narrative such as the persecution of 
Hussein or early Hebraic struggles against societies such as the Amelakites which has been 
transposed onto the present and redirected against contemporary enemies. The historical 
narrative may be an explicitly apocalyptic or messianic one which will transform human 
existence, or more commonly it may be one which has defined the religion and the 
community that subscribes to it. The historical narratives tend to be drawn from scriptural 
sources and while their interpretation may be at odds with traditional orthodoxy it 
nonetheless represents a historically constant interpretation by radical religious 
organisations in time of crisis. While motivating texts such as The Turner Diaries do not 
qualify as strictly 'scriptural' sources they perform the same role of providing a historical 
narrative and become what Michael Barkun calls "a philosophical centre of gravity" to the 
disparate and loosely linked groups which subscribe to Identity thought. 3 A similar, but 
more specific observation, may be made of cultic groups such as Aum which formulate a 
composite ideology - while the influences and sources may be many and varied -a 
discernible theme (or themes) appears in the narrative which is constructed. 
Although there is some variation in the balance between them, the process of 
ideological formation shows the importance to all groups of both internal and external 
enemies. Once again this outlook is consistent with religious, historical narratives. An 
external enemy exists which threatens the realisation of, or return to, a Golden Age and 
poses a direct threat to the culture of a religious community. By the same token, an equally 
(and occasionally even more) insidious enemy exists within the religious community itself 
that threatens the group by colluding with the external enemy or by flouting accepted 
religious laws and thus defiling the community as a whole. Both these groups, despite their 
distinctions, are melded together to form the monolithic 'other'. 
All the three revealed religions contain powerful eschatological traditions and the 
degree to which these traditions were emphasised as ideological components in some cases 
determined their group categorisation. Eschatological expectations, whether they be active 
3 M. Barkun, `Racist Apocalypse: Millenialism on the Far Right' in C. Strozier & M. Flynn (eds. ), The Year 
2000: Essays on the End, 1997, p. 200. 
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or passive, allow all revealed religious believers to place themselves on a religio-historical 
continuum which has an identifiable (because they are recorded - however vague) 
beginning and end. The precise location of the group on this continuum is in large part 
determined by the pre-eminence of eschatological traditions in their ideology, and this in 
turn influences the extent to which a group interacts with the society of which it is a part. 
Those groups which became messianic or apocalyptic did so as a response to a particular 
crisis environment, either discernible to a scholar of such groups, or largely manufactured 
as a response to disparate events of no overt scriptural significance. All shared the 
common features of having a relatively small membership, a high degree of isolation from 
mainstream society and its various discourses, and an express desire to participate in, or 
precipitate, an expected Endtime. 
9.3 Leading Religious Militance 
The analysis of the role and purpose of leadership underscored several broadly 
accepted observations regarding violent religious groups and also revealed some other, less 
well understood ones. The division of leadership types into ideologues, charismatic and 
bureaucratic effectively encompassed all the groups examined and displayed a degree of 
flexibility and interactivity which would lend the typology to any other form of violent 
religious group. For example, a charismatic leader might be the single, deified leader of a 
group, or he might co-exist alongside a bureaucratic leadership structure, he may also be 
the sole ideologue of the group or merely a contemporary mouth piece of earlier 
ideologues. Leaders of violent religious groups (like their activist members) are also 
exclusively men, a reflection of what Martin Reisbrodt has called'radical patriarchalism'. 4 
Leadership structure showed a close correlation with group types and group life 
cycle. All religious group types had some form of ideologue, either living or dead, who 
interpreted religious traditions in the light of a contemporary crisis environment and 
selectively manufactured an explanation of the crisis itself and justified the necessity of 
violent struggle for its resolution. Living ideologues, however, do not always involve 
themselves in operational planning and direction, or in operational participation. In those 
4 M. Reisbrodt, Pious Passions: The Emergence ofModern7 Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran, 
1993, p. 176. 
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cases where they do - particularly where they participate - the group is certain to be core or 
even more likely messianic. Mainstream ideologues tend to formulate a general ideology 
of militant struggle but tend not to be directly involved in its implementation in order to 
insulate themselves from the conduct of violence. 5 Charismatic leaders abound in all group 
types, although they exist in different degrees of intensity and are governed to a certain 
extent by the group structure within which they exist. At times of political and social crisis 
fundamentalist charismatics perform the critical role of mobilising previously unrealised 
networks of discontent. Mainstream charismatic leaders may achieve saintly status and in 
some cases (Meir Kahane and potentially Richard Butler) their demise may cause a major 
crisis for the group itself, but they seldom achieve divine status. A similar observation may 
be made of core groups, although in this case the demise of the charismatic leader more 
often causes the demise of the group itself, or results in a crisis marked by a decline in 
militance. The most common examples of divine charismatic leadership exist in messianic 
and apocalyptic groups where the leader assumes the role of an expected deity. This is not 
always the case, however, as the claim to divinity rests upon the acceptability of the 
individual's claim (if indeed one is made - no member of the Jewish Underground for 
example, ever made such a claim) and must be bolstered by both the individual's physical 
and psychological qualities and their ability to place themselves within understood 
messianic and apocalyptic scenarios. Bureaucratic leadership structures are a reflection of 
both group size and the range of group activities. The determinants of group size and 
operational portfolio, however, must be complemented by the consideration of whether the 
bureaucratic form is dominant, or whether it is merely a way for a charismatic leader to 
delegate an overwhelming number of activities and perhaps also to maintain tighter control 
over his immediate subordinates. When this consideration is made, genuine bureaucratic 
structures tend to be the province of mainstream and longer established core groups. 
As noted above, the elimination of a leader may seriously effect the operational 
capacity of a group - particularly core and messianic groups - but their elimination also 
makes them powerful martyr figures. All the monotheistic faiths have powerful martyr 
images at the core of their traditions, the crucifixion of Christ, the death of Hussein at 
5 While Meir Kahane was complicit in some of Kach's violent activities he was always careful to avoid direct 
and intensive involvement in organised violence and was never the centre piece of a militant bureaucratic 
leadership structure. 
324 
Karbala and so on. This applies not only to leaders but also to the foot soldiers as a 
mechanism for providing a pool of martyrs, catapulting servants into the unfolding 
catalogue of martyrology. The ideological messages of martyred leaders takes on a new, 
more symbolic meaning and their death creates a symbolically powerful reason and time 
for revenge. The elimination of a leader may also seriously effect the longevity of a group. 
This is particularly so of core and messianic groups. Longevity is also a major factor in 
shaping the leadership structures of mainstream and core groups. As time passes 
leaderships learn to become acutely aware of their vulnerabilities and shortcomings and 
adjust themselves accordingly. 
9.4 Violence and the Passage of Time 
All religious groups harbour a long view of time, seeing their activities as the 
continuation of a struggle which is as old as history itself. Their success against the 
virtually overwhelming forces of the enemy is important (but not essential) to the 
resolution of their religious struggle. If they should fail, or be overwhelmed in this current 
phase of the conflict, others will come after them just as they themselves followed their 
predecessors. The historical religious mission is thus inextricably linked to the present. In 
the case of some core groups, fulfilling the role of a revolutionary vanguard, the 
destruction of their group may be viewed as a necessary sacrifice to set an example for the 
masses and to show the way for a broad based future struggle. For messianic and 
apocalyptic groups, this perception of time holds true but they also see themselves at the 
end of the religio-historical continuum. Their acts are designed to compliment, precipitate, 
or fulfil acts foreseen in eschatological prophecy and it is hoped their actions will usher in 
the next stage of spiritual transformation. 
Action timed to coincide with anniversaries and religious festivals is significant 
because it helps to bridge the gap between past and present. Festivals recall previous 
communal struggles and recast them in a contemporary environment, while anniversaries 
elaborate the martyrology of a group and embellish existing historical traditions, 
reinforcing historical messages of the past in the present. The significance of this recasting 
process should not be underestimated and has no real equivalent in secular violence. By 
seamlessly linking events which occurred many hundreds (or even thousands) of years ago 
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not only are the beliefs and experiences of a religious community held to be constant, but 
so is the centrality of struggle to the fulfilment of that particular religious community's 
destiny. More immediate events which become anniversaries such as the martyrdom of 
leaders or followers fit this pattern and further underscore the continuity of the struggle in 
the eyes of the protagonists and their constituency. 
Alongside the highly symbolic and evocative categories of religiously significant 
dates, anniversaries and revenge, religiously motivated groups also time violence along a 
tactical plane. This is most obviously true with regards to mainstream and core groups 
where well chosen acts may have a disproportionate influence over political events. The 
employment of violence by Islamic groups, for example, as a means of influencing Israeli 
elections is obvious. A grasp of tactical timing in this sense shows a shrewd understanding 
of the group's religious struggle and how it relates to the social and political processes of 
the larger secular world in which they exist and the symbolic importance of cultural 
centres in all societies. It shows an understanding also of the relationship between the 
group and the overwhelmingly powerful enemy it faces and how the judicious timing of 
violence may amplify their (relatively) physically insignificant acts of violence. Tactical 
timing may also have a more desperate dimension whereby the group acts to forestall some 
impending disaster or fresh onslaught by their enemies. This is certainly true of 
mainstream and core groups but it may also be a feature of messianic groups. Aum 
Shinriky©s subway attacks, after all, were a means of pre-empting expected action by the 
Japanese authorities and although the Saudi Ikhwan's take over of the Grand Mosque was 
perfectly timed to coincide with a date of great messianic significance, there is evidence to 
suggest the take-over % ,. ms hastily arranged and that the group's ability to effectively survive 
beyond November 1979 was in doubt. 
Violence timed as a reaction serves many purposes for a group and has been shown 
to be a powerful motivating force. The act of revenge at once heightens the sense of threat 
to a group, shows a group's capacity to'protect' its constituency and itself, and also helps to 
reinforce significant milestones in the group's struggle. These various purposes can be 
observed in all the group categories, although the issue of constituency is less important 
for messianic and apocalyptic groups. 
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While specific eschatological times can act. as a guide for potential acts of violence, 
perceptions of time remain elastic and are heavily influenced by the crisis environment in 
which a group exists. Although the beginning of the year 2000, for example, passed 
without any major violent incidents (despite many predictions to the contrary) it is 
important to realise the fluidity of the perception of time as it relates to all the revealed 
religions. The conduct of violence may not follow specific and popular predicted dates - 
the convenience of selective dating may draw on the accepted date of 4 AD for Christ's 
date of birth for example - the perception of time, even when governed by specific dating 
traditions is elastic, dictated primarily by circumstance and the perception of crisis. This is 
especially so with a group whose ideology has moved away from strict orthodox traditions, 
making the significance of dates almost irrelevant and placing the onus of significance 
with the leader of a group and his interpretation of contemporary events. This is further 
complicated by the fact that dating in some religious traditions such as Judaism and Sunni 
Islam are determined more by signs rather than specific dates. 
9.5 Violence and Sacred Space 
The importance of location for violent religious groups has been shown on three 
different levels. Firstly, how a group perceives physical geography itself as part of their 
cultural make-up. Secondly, there is an obvious and intense devotion and loyalty to their 
own specific holy places. And thirdly, there is an awareness of those holy sites which are 
of importance to their enemies (in some cases these sites may be common) and those 
places which are generally representative of an enemy's society and cultural base. This last 
category has a different weighting for different group types. Cultural centres are important 
for mainstream and core groups because of their desire for widespread socio-political 
change, while locations of solely religious significance tend to be of paramount 
importance for messianic groups because they envisage a spiritual transformation of 
temporal society. 
As with the other key elements all the groups exhibited a wide gap between 
rhetoric and reality when expressing their attitude towards location. Although the 
geographical reach of the groups examined varied, almost all their activities were confined 
to a specific geographical area. Almost all, however, engaged in rhetoric of the kind 'we 
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will strike the enemy wherever he may be' which suggests the group's capabilities are far 
greater than they are. The reason for this is two fold. Firstly, statements such as these are 
intended for other members of a particular religious community who identify with the 
significance of locations at a religious communal level and who may be moved to express 
a reaction, whether it be open sympathy with the cause or actual activism. Secondly, such 
rhetoric elevates what might appear to be a localised struggle to one which is of global 
significance. Each of the revealed religions in their extreme forms regard themselves as the 
one true faith, the successful fulfilment of whose prophecies will ultimately decide the fate 
of mankind and the end of temporal history. The struggle is therefore total in nature and 
this totality pervades the realm of physical space. 
The extreme volatility of religious locations manages to amplify acts of violence 
far beyond the mere physical damage caused. For example, even though the quantities of 
explosives to be used and the potential casualties caused in the proposed bombing of the 
Dome of the Rock would have been far less than the corresponding quantity and number 
which resulted from the 1983 bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, the 
consequences would have far more significant. In many cases of mainstream and core 
group violence, attacks on religious sites are avoided because of their highly inflammatory 
nature and the negative side effects, in terms of popular support and repressive reaction. 
These constraints are obviously far less for messianic and apocalyptic groups whose 
catalytic and symbolic acts of violence often centre around a religious site of profound 
significance and eschatological importance. There are notable exceptions however, most 
notably displayed by the US extreme right and Aum Shinrikyo. In the first case 
geographical removal from traditional religious locations has led over time to a new 
importance being imbued in the territory of the United States as a substitute 'promised 
land' bereft of specific sites. In the second case a similar process has occurred whereby a 
composite belief system has taken specific religious locations, imbued them with a 
metaphoric value and transposed them onto the central locality where the group develops 
and operates. 
In terms of the space within which a violent religious group operates, withdrawal is 
a common feature and also one which contributes to the fomentation of violence. 
Mainstream groups are less prone to this process, requiring in most cases direct interaction 
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with a broader constituency. While Aryan Nations does not fit this pattern closely because 
the extremity of the group's views preclude realistic expectations of involvement within 
society, there is still an important extemalised dimension in the form of proselytisation. By 
the same token elements within Kach, Hizballah and Hamas have also exhibited a 
propensity for withdrawal to preserve activist cells or to establish a closer bond with their 
perceived 'sacred geography'. Core and messianic/apocalyptic groups are more prone to 
withdrawal. In the case of core groups this withdrawal is in part a rejection of society 
(including elements within their own communities) and in part a tactical procedure which 
will ensure a more effective operational basis. For messianic and apocalyptic groups 
withdrawal is a central element reflecting their rejection of society and frequently the 
expectation that they are the righteous remnant that will be saved following the Endtime. 
The existence of a 'permissive environment' is an important consideration for a 
group's tactical programme. A more permissive environment where security constraints are 
weak allows a group to engage in violence more freely and at a higher level of magnitude. 
The best example contained in this study is that of Hizballah which over the years has been 
able to develop what amounts to an effective guerrilla army employing large numbers of 
men in co-ordinated activities in the field (not merely in an urban environment) with both 
light and heavy weapons. By contrast, most groups are confined to the employment of light 
weapons only and explosive devices in brief and limited actions. Environmental 
permissiveness does not only apply to the conduct of violence. Such a situation allows a 
group greater contact with the local populous, the opportunity to spread its message and to 
provide social services (frequently of a better, cheaper kind than the regime that 
simultaneously undermines the legitimacy of the regime) and so to expand its power base. 
9.6 The Victims of Religious Violence 
The selection of targets by religious groups has been shown to have two distinct 
elements, those external to that particular group of believers and 'apostates' within their 
community. The mixture and size of these groups varies depending on the group type but 
the uniting feature is the transformation of these enemies into an evil 'other' whose 
destruction is not merely necessary, but favoured in the eyes of God. In some cases the 
targets are a group that have historically been seen as oppressors, or an enemy of the true 
329 
faith, and in others they are identified with a scriptural enemy. As in other areas, the 
disparity between a totalist outlook and the resources available mean that there is 
frequently a wide gap between target rhetoric and the reality of attacks. 
While the targets of other religions and apostates are constants, as is the process of 
the 'satanisation' of enemies, important differences in emphasis are created by group type 
and group circumstance. Mainstream groups tend to have an identifiable constituency with 
clearly defined external and internal enemies. Practical political considerations may lead 
them to co-operate with secular rivals when circumstances are propitious, as in the case of 
Hamas, or to espouse inter-faith co-operation as in the case of Hizballah. Core groups have 
less need to enter the mainstream and so their attitude towards targets is often more 
extreme. In the case of most messianic and apocalyptic groups virtually all those outside 
the group are regarded as a non-believing other. As has been shown, the process of 
identifying enemies as part of religious history is important. The enemy may be 
symbolically cast as historical foes such as the Amalekites, the Crusaders, the Hellenisers 
and so on. 
The identification of target groups is an important part of what Berger has referred 
to as the 'social construction of reality'. This construction is reinforced by the day to day 
evidence of suffering at the hands of a target group, or is reinforced by an isolation where 
there is no corresponding experience to contradict what are often outlandish beliefs about 
a target group. The extent to which an enemy is dehumanised depends upon how many 
ideological concessions a group is willing to make in order to sanction coexistence on 
whatever level. The number of internal targets is governed by the need both to maintain 
group secrecy and to punish those of a community who have 'deviated'. The number and 
diversity of external targets reflects the extent to which the group rejects society. 
9.7 The Conduct of Violence 
One of the important underlying features of the tactical programmes of violent 
religious groups is the perception that their struggle is primarily defensive in nature. They 
see themselves as defending a righteous and sanctified culture from an evil and more 
powerful enemy. The very use of extra normative violence is justified both because it is the 
weapon of the weak and because of the catalogue of evil acts perpetrated by the enemies 
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and their very existence as a demonised other. This does not, however, mean that the 
weaponry and tactics which can potentially be used are open ended in nature. There exists 
once again a gap between rhetoric and reality, created by capabilities, constraints and the 
need for group survival. In terms of capabilities, whatever a group is willing to do will 
always be constrained by the availability of the tools at hand and the number (and skill) of 
those that can use them. Other less tangible constraints will also be at work, such as the 
need to preserve the sympathy of a constituency or to obey the wishes of a state sponsor. 
Finally there is the consideration of group survival, whereby a group cannot expose itself 
by engaging in intensive, high visibility operations, or by threatening the use of 
unconventional weapons which would doubtless intensify the repressive measures taken 
against it. By the same token, groups must satisfy the expectations of their internal and 
external audiences by engaging in a rhetorical discourse that threatens massive retaliation 
for the transgressions of the enemy, speaks of endless resources, and exaggerating the 
results of its operations. 
In terms of the tactical programme of a group this gap may well engender a sense 
of frustration and dissatisfaction which leads to the emergence of splinter groups and lone 
actors. This is most apparent with groups in the mainstream category where the need to 
operate within the law much of the time means that the rhetoric cannot realistically be 
acted upon. The leadership of the mainstream group may not disapprove of the splinter or 
lone actors' activities - in many cases they applaud it - but cannot afford the potential 
backlash of having organised or directed them. In this sense both Hizballah and Hamas are 
different but their more direct relations with the organs of violence are governed by the 
permissiveness of the environment in which they operate, and in both these cases the 
spiritual and political leaderships have found tactical advantages in being a stage removed 
from the actual conduct of violence. Despite the totality of rhetoric much religious 
violence is proportional and when there is an escalation it is usually reactive, in line with 
the. perception of a defensive struggle. This concept of proportionality is sometimes 
expressed in terms of 'red lines' within which a group operates. It is therefore critical to 
understand the context rather than looking merely at violence in a vacuum. 
Participation in mainstream politics by religious groups provides the obvious 
opportunity of subverting a political system. The frailties of democracy, it may be argued 
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within societies that are insufficiently democratised, are revealed when a party such as 
Kach enters mainstream power legally, backed by a real - if somewhat limited - popular 
mandate. The reaction of a democratic system to these subversive interlopers then is a 
crucial element in the future of these groups. If new legislation is created to remove the 
interloper, then the charge that the system has altered the rules to forestall an expression of 
democratic rights sits uncomfortably with the nature of the system itself. By the same 
token, efforts to remove an extremist individual or party by outlawing them runs the risk of 
making the group even more extreme and driving them away from political participation to 
the underground and towards violence. In certain circumstances a relaxation in a crisis 
environment, as it proved for Kach, will undermine support for these groups and deny 
them popular representation. In many other cases such as Algeria or Egypt the success of 
subversive religious parties is more a comment on the broad failures of society generally 
and of the form of democracy which has developed there in particular. 
While religiously motivated violent groups have displayed a high degree of tactical 
innovation, they are largely conservative in the destructive methods they choose to employ. 
Conventional weaponry has consistently displayed its utility over time and while its 
employment is constantly governed by constraints of availability and practicality, it forms 
the backbone of violent religious tactical programmes. Alongside this inherent 
conservatism is an appreciation and exploitation of globalisation's new information 
technologies as an important tool in psychological warfare, establishing a vehicle for 
uncontested propaganda and a window to the outside world. Although beyond the scope of 
this study an examination of the use of these windows can not only enhance our 
understanding but also serve as a mechanism to exploit or even engage these groups. As 
with all tactical programmes, be they secular or religious, the co-ordination of activities 
serves to amplify the effect of the violence. In the case of religious groups co-ordination of 
tactics is largely the province of larger groups with a developed tactical programme, a well 
organised apparatus for conducting violence and a structured leadership apparatus. The 
longer a group exists the greater the scope for increased tactical sophistication and 
innovation. 
The repression of group may also have a hand in intensifying a group's tactical 
programme. In the case of a mainstream group which is not actively engaging in organised 
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violence, a judicial ban on the organisation and its activities may drive it underground and 
make it more extreme. Following the banning of Kach and Kahana Chai in Israel in 1994, 
Mike Gusovsky (then spokesman for the U. S. chapter of Kahane Chai) stated that "Yitzhaq 
[sic] Rabin and the fools in government are preventing Kahana Hay [sic] and Kakh [sic] 
from operating legally and democratically. So they should not be surprised 
afterwards... when a regime prevents its people from electing freely, and when it prevents 
the Kahana Hay [sic] and Kakh [sic] people from being elected, they should not ask 
afterwards why we act undemocratically. ,6 This rhetoric was also matched by the concerns 
of Israel's security apparatus. In 1996 the Israeli Public Security Minister Moshe Shahal 
stated that "the radical elements who brought about Rabin's assassin have not moderated 
their positions, the danger is real. It has not passed. On the contrary, it may have 
increased. "' In the Christian context, legal, juridical repression may alter the future course 
of Aryan Nations. The action brought against the group by the Southern Poverty Law 
Centre (SPLC) with the avowed purpose of putting the group in a vulnerable financial 
position. As Morris Dees stated "we intend to take every single asset from the Aryan 
Nations now and forever.. . we 
intend to even take the name Aryan Nations. "8 This is the 
financial equivalent of outlawing an organisation but brings in train similar effects - the 
group is pushed further to the fringes of society and the process intensifies its hatreds, in 
this case of the government, the judiciary, 'mud peoples' (the plaintiffs were American 
Indians) and the SPLC. 
By the same token the relatively lenient treatment of a group (where its legal 
position is slightly ambiguous) is not necessarily the right solution. When the Japanese 
government decided not to apply Japanese anti-subversive laws to Aum the group became 
active again. Aum has at least twenty offices open today and has significant earnings from 
Aum related computer stores. Although the group has changed its name, its current 
leadership is heavily associated with the original one and the philosophical programme - if 
not the coercive, fraudulent and violent practices - have been largely repackaged. As one 
61DFRadio, 100 gmt, 2 Mar. 94 - BBC/SWB/ME/1937, MED/7,4 March, 1994. 7 FBIS, FBIS-TOT-96-010-L, 'Israel: Article Views Danger of More Political Assassinations', February 16, 
1996, 
a Washington Post, September 7,2000. 
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Aum observer has noted the Japanese police "strongly suggest that there is still potential 
danger in the group ... which still 
holds anti-social doctrines. "9 
As one study has noted "terrorists with a vague, undefined constituency are among 
the most likely candidates for acquiring and using CBW agents". 10 In these cases there is 
no outside constituency that must be considered or that cannot risk being offended, a state 
of affairs commensurate with Hoffman's observations but one which is confined to the 
extreme, messianic and apocalyptic end of the religious violence spectrum. The only 
example in this study of a group developing and using unconventional weaponry is Aum 
Shinrikyo -a messianic group with something of a technology obsession. By and large 
religious groups conform to the idea of a conservative mindset in their tactical 
programmes. Even so, the sinister nature of unconventional weaponry adds an important 
psychological dimension to even the very thought of their acquisition or use. Even in the 
case of the only known example of unconventional weapon use by a religious group, that 
of Aum Shinrikyo, the social and psychological impact of the nerve gas attack was in a 
way out of proportion to the actual damage done. The earthquake which shook Japan in 
January 1995 (which Asahara claimed to have predicted) killed more than 5,000 people 
and caused enormous infrastructural damage. The earthquake however was an accepted, 
natural phenomenon (even if its meaning could be seen in the light of apocalyptic 
prophecy by groups such as Aum) while the nerve gas attack exploded certain social myths 
in Japan about public safety and religious practice. 
It is logical to suggest that purely messianic or apocalyptic terror envisages even 
greater casualties through its acts than does mainstream or core religious terror because 
secular, temporal objectives and considerations are rejected. Unconventional weapons thus 
possess a certain appeal in the absence of moral constraints against their use, however, 
there still exist considerable constraints on their development and use, some practical and 
technical and others, as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, organisational. The utility of such 
tactics for mainstream and core groups are dubious and the risks associated with them are 
severe. Thus the employment of conventional violent tactics offers a far greater degree of 
9 M. Watanabe, Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum 
Shinrikyo', TPV, Vol. X, # 4, p. 96. 
10 J. Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 2000, p. 259. 
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variety, adaptability and security for any group pursuing a programme which has 
discernible political or nationalist objectives. 
Statements such as those made by groups which are not fundamentally messianic or 
apocalyptic in orientation which suggest that they are considering unconventional weapons 
are not common, although they do bolster the official view (especially in the United States) 
that terrorist group use of unconventional weapons is not a matter of 'if but of 'when'. " 
They are also deliberately ambiguous and directed at both an internal and an external 
audience. The questions remains why have they not already done so, and why should they? 
While enormous resources have been devoted to countering this threat these questions 
remain largely unanswered. As one article on the subject has suggested "The only way to 
truly understand the thinking and intentions of terrorists concerning the weapons of mass 
destruction is to ask them". 12 It is too early to say whether or not the Aum nerve gas attack 
has eroded extremist group taboos on the use of CBW. The idea that "once political 
terrorists used mass destruction weapons the whole concept of the rules of the game would 
change" 13 does suffer from certain inconsistencies in this respect. 
9.8 Broader Conclusions 
This thesis has broken down into its constituent components the common features 
of religiously motivated violence and applied group type across the revealed faiths to 
illustrate diversity and similarity. As such it has created a composite analytical structure 
rather than presenting individual case studies side-by-side, therefore providing a more 
comprehensive framework of the mechanisms and processes governing religious violence - 
both for individual groups and relationally. It is therefore possible to examine both the 
whole and individual case studies in this study. By deconstructing the similar mechanisms 
11 For example the findings of the 1998 National Defence Panel Report. The greatest threats identified were 
those posed by'rogue' states and clandestine organisations employing weapons of mass destruction - the 
danger of so called 'superterrorism'. 
12 J. Post & E. Sprinzak, 'Why Haven't Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?, Armed Forces 
Journal International, April, 1998, p. 17. For further evidence see R. Purver's 'Understanding Past Non-Use 
of CBW' in B. Roberts (ed. ), Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and 
Responses. Purver's piece examines the academic literature but does not contain any statements by potential or 
actual CBW users. 
" B. David, 'The Capability and Motivation of Terrorist Organisations to Use Mass Destruction Weapons' in 
A. Meran (ed. ), On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism, pp. 150-151. 
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at work and gradually superimposing them through interactive analysis, the actual nodes 
where militant religion and contexts intersect have been established. 
Legitimacy is at the core of these religious 'warriors' which is simultaneously a 
strength and a weakness. Violence may be de-legitimised using mainstream clergy, 
religious scholars and inter-faith dialogues as auxiliary tools to creative political (as 
opposed to coercive) pathways out of violence while addressing the strategic, systemic 
causes of violence that extremist groups thrive upon and exploit. The coherence and 
appeal of a group's ideology is also in part determined by its proximity to accepted 
orthodoxy (hence the limited appeal of messianic groups) and this may provide a valuable 
starting point in challenging the legitimacy of religious extremists. 
To fully understand the phenomenon of religious violence one must simultaneously 
appreciate the religio-historical process, processes of legitimisation, organisational 
dynamics and the political, social and economic dynamics of specific contexts. One must 
also understand the centrality of history, rhetoric and symbolism which permeate and 
govern religious violence. All too often specialists on extremist groups focus exclusively 
on the conduct of violence rather than the processes involved and the contexts within 
which violence erupts. As ethno-religious violence continues to permeate the post Cold 
War environment, old and new violent sub-state entities will proliferate and exploit the 
sacred to their own ends, using faith to explain and challenge the shortcomings and 
cleavages within secular society. This study has provided a beginning to a fuller 
understanding of the complex mechanisms which underpin this important religious 
phenomenon. 
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